University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
Continuing Legal Education Materials

Kentucky Legal History

12-2000

Consumer Bankruptcy Update
Office of Continuing Legal Education at the University of Kentucky College of Law
Sandra D. Freeburger
Dietz and Freeburger, P.S.C.

Thomas L. Canary
Mapother & Mapother

Ann E. Samani
W. Thomas Bunch
Bunch & Brock

See next page for additional authors
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/uky_cle
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Repository Citation
Office of Continuing Legal Education at the University of Kentucky College of Law; Freeburger, Sandra D.;
Canary, Thomas L.; Samani, Ann E.; Bunch, W. Thomas; Cantor, David M.; Morris, Jan C.; Burden, Beverly
M.; Lawrence, William W.; Bryant, Lisa Koch; Langdon, Dean A.; Cooper, Joan Lloyd; Dickinson, Henry H.;
Howard, William S.; Scott, Joseph M. Jr.; Lee, Joe; Bowles, C.R. Jr.; Stout, Alan C.; Lyon, James D.;
Freeburger, Sandra D.; Parris, Geneva F.; Golden, Joseph J.; Stonitsch, John R.; Friedman, Hal D.; Schaaf,
Gregory R.; Nowka, Richard H.; Frost, Christopher W.; Bachert, Scott A.; Baker, Michael L.; and Pike, Cathy
S., "Consumer Bankruptcy Update" (2000). Continuing Legal Education Materials. 32.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/uky_cle/32

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Kentucky Legal History at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Continuing Legal Education Materials by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For
more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Authors
Office of Continuing Legal Education at the University of Kentucky College of Law, Sandra D. Freeburger,
Thomas L. Canary, Ann E. Samani, W. Thomas Bunch, David M. Cantor, Jan C. Morris, Beverly M. Burden,
William W. Lawrence, Lisa Koch Bryant, Dean A. Langdon, Joan Lloyd Cooper, Henry H. Dickinson, William
S. Howard, Joseph M. Scott Jr., Joe Lee, C.R. Bowles Jr., Alan C. Stout, James D. Lyon, Sandra D.
Freeburger, Geneva F. Parris, Joseph J. Golden, John R. Stonitsch, Hal D. Friedman, Gregory R. Schaaf,
Richard H. Nowka, Christopher W. Frost, Scott A. Bachert, Michael L. Baker, and Cathy S. Pike

This book is available at UKnowledge: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/uky_cle/32

[

r
r
'r
r

r
r
r

UK------

eLE

CONSUMER
BANKRUPTCY
UPDATE
-2000December 2000

r

r

r

r___,UK___________

.r
r

CLE

!r

r
r
r

CONSUMER
BANKRUPTCY
UPDATE

r
r

-2000,-

r
,r
:r

December 2000

Presented by the
OFFICE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY COLLEGE OF LAW

,r

r

,r
;r
j

.

:r
j

,

J

FROM THE LAW LffiRARY OF:

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

J

Written materials and oral presentations offered through the University of Kentucky College of
Law Office of Continuing Legal Education (UK/CLE) are designed to assist lawyers in maintaining their professional competence. The Office of Continuing Legal Education and its volunteer
speakers and writers are not rendering legal or other professional services by their participation in
continuing legal education activities. Attorneys and others using information obtained from UK/
CLE publications or seminars must also fully research original and current sources of authority to
properly serve their or their client's legal interests. The forms and sample documents contained in
our continuing legal education publications are intended for use only in conjunction with the
professional services and advice of licensed attorneys. All parties must cautiously consider whether
a particular form or document is suited to specific needs. The legal research presented herein is
believed to be accurate, but is not warranted to be so. These written materials and the comments
of speakers in presentation of these materials may contain expressions of opinion which do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Continuing Legal Education, the University of Kentucky, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or other governmental authorities. UK/CLE strives to
make its written materials and speaker presentations gender-neutral; however, gender-specific
references may remain where it would otherwise be awkward or unclear. It should be understood
that in such references the female includes the male, and vice-versa.
Copyright 2000 by the University of Kentucky College of Law,
Office of Continuing Legal Education.
All rights reserved.

J
J
J
,

J
oJ

J

J
.J
-'

Printed in the United States of America

4

....I

1

J
J

r

r
r
r
r
r
r

r

Ir

lr
Ijr
lr

Ir

I
IIr
I
Ir
r
r'
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CLE

The University of Kentucky College of Law, Office of Continuing Legal Education (UKlCLE) was organized in 1973
as the ftrst permanently staffed, full-time continuing legal education program in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It endures
with the threefold purpose to: 1) assist lawyers in keeping abreast of changes in the law; 2) develop and sustain practical
lawyering skills; and 3) maintain a high degree of professionalism in the practice of law. Revenues from seminar registrations
and publication sales allow the Office to operate as a separately budgeted, self-supporting program of the College. No tax
dollars, bar dues or public funds are budgeted in the Office's ftnances.

Courses
UKlCLE provides a variety of workshops, conferences, and institutes to satisfy the continuing education needs of
lawyers and other professionals. Courses range from half-day programs in selected areas to in-depth programs extending over
several days. While most courses are conducted at the College of Law in Lexington, UKlCLE has a longstanding statewide
commitment. Since its ftrst year of operation, beginning with a criminal law program in Madisonville, Kentucky, the Office has
continued to bring the highest quality continuing education to attorneys across Kentucky, the Midsouth, the Midwest, and the
nation.
Publications
Each course is accompanied by extensive speaker-prepared course materials. These bound materials are offered for
sale following courses and are consistently regarded as valuable, affordable references for lawyers. In 1987, UKlCLE began
producing a series of publications which now consist of Practice Handbooks, Monographs, and Compendiums. Each Practice
Handbook is an extensively referenced, fully indexed practice guide consisting of separately authored chapters, sequenced for
the comprehensive coverage of a distinct body of law. Their format allows for updating through supplements and cumulative
indexes. Each Monograph is a concisely written practice guide, usually prepared by a single author, designed to cover a topic of
narrower scope than Practice Handbooks. Compendiums contain both official forms and sample documents. Designed to assist
the lawyer by suggesting speciftc structures and language to consider in drafting documents, these publications are beneftcial in
the resolution of legal drafting concerns. The Compendiums are often used most effectively in conjunction with UKlCLE
Practice Handbooks and Monographs.
Professional Management
UKlCLE serves the needs of the bar from its offices on the University of Kentucky campus in Lexington. Its staff
manages course planning, publication content planning, course registrations, publications sales, course and publication marketing, publication composition and printing, as well as internal budgeting, accounting, and ftnancial reporting. As an "income
based" program, UKlCLE's course tuitions and publications sales are designed to generate sufficient revenues for self-support.
Commitment to Quality and Creativity
UKlCLE is a member of the Association for Continuing Legal Education (ACLEA). As such, UKICLE subscribes to
the Standards of Operation for Continuing Legal Education Organizations, and the Standards of Fair Conduct and Voluntary
Cooperation administered under the auspices of the American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee on Continuing Professional Education. Throughout its existence UKlCLE has been actively involved in the activities of and discourse
sponsored by ACLEA. UKlCLE's association with national and international CLE professionals has afforded it the opportunity
to continually reassess instructional methods, quality in pUblications, and effective means of delivering CLE services at consistently high levels of quality.
An Integral Part of the Legal Profession's Tradition of Service
An enormous debt is owed to the practitioners, professors, judges and other professionals who generously donate their
time and talent to continuing legal education. Their knowledge and experience provide the fundamental components of our
seminars and publications. Without their motivation and freely given assistance in dedication to the legal profession, high
quality continuing legal education would not exist. As a non-proftt organization, UKlCLE relies upon the traditional spirit of
service to the profession that attorneys have so long demonstrated. We are constantly striving to increase attorney involvement
in the continuing legal education process. If you would like to participate as a volunteer speaker or writer, please contact us and
indicate your areas of interest and experience.
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UKlCLE: A Self-SupportinG Entity
The University of Kentucky Office of Continuing Legal
Education (UK/ CLE) is an income-based office of the University of Kentucky College of Law. As such, it is separately
budgeted and financially self-supporting. UK/ CLE operations are similar to not-for-profit organizations, paying all
direct expenses, salaries and overhead solely from revenues.
No public funds or tax dollars are allocated to its budget.
Revenues are obtained from registrant enrollment fees, and
the sale of publications. Our sole function is to provide
professional development services. In the event surplus
funds become available, they are utilized to offset deficits or
retained in our budget to improve the quality and variety of
services we provide.
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EFFECflVE REPRESENTATION OF CHAPTER 7 DEBTOR
Sandra D. Freeburger
I.

INTRODUCI10N

r·

It is the goal of the following paper to assist the bankruptcy practitioner in effectively, efficiently
and ethically handling Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. Dealing with cases in this manner will bring plaudits
from one's peers, but plaudits will not pay the rent. Therefore, an emphasis will also be placed upon
obtaining, fostering and preserving the goodwill of your clients throughout the attorneyI client
relationship. After all, good recommendations from fonner clients are the best, most cost effective fonn
of advertising.

r

The paper is arranged chronologically as most cases unfold. So we begin with the initial client
telephone call.

r

U.

INITIAL CLIENT CONTACT

A.

Role Of Secretary

r
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I am uncertain whether we lawyers truly appreciate a well trained staff. Fielding the initial
telephone call from a financially distressed individual falls to one's secretary, receptionist, administrative
assistant, etc., whatever title you chose to bestow upon that person who bravely addresses the unknown
public each time the telephone rings. For the purposes of this work, I will refer to this staff member as
"secretary." The truism that first impressions are the most important was never more accurate than in
this setting.
1.

Specific Inquiries Referred to Attorney

If the caller begins the conversation with a narrative of a specific event-a car has been
repossessed, a lawsuit has been filed, a contract dispute has arisen-the secretary should go no further
with the conversation. The caller should be promptly referred to an attorney.
2.

Basic Information and Fee Schedules

However, many inquiries are received from individuals who know that their financial affairs
are desperate. As the number of consumer Chapter 7 filings continue to grow, many individuals are
facing their second or third bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. Information about
bankruptcy law is more widespread due to legal advertising, press coverage of high profile bankruptcy
cases and word of mouth. From July 1, 1997 to June 30, 1998, 1.38 million bankruptcy cases were filed.
So often your secretary will receive a call from an individual who knows very well that a bankruptcy
case will be required to deal with his or her debts.
Your secretary must impart brief, accurate information about your services and fees. Highly
visible advertising has increased the numbers of legal fee price shoppers. Unless your secretary can
impart to the caller information about your fees in consumer cases, you may find your calendar cluttered
with long office conferences with individuals who really only want to know your charges.

J
In the author's office, the secretary will advise the caller of the finn's basic fee for consumer
Chapter 7 cases but will infonn the caller that more complex cases requi~ higher fees. Care must be
taken to differentiate between the court costs and attorney fees. Further, the secretary will tell the caller
that there may be a charge for the initial consultation unless the finn is retained. This practice has
eliminated some unproductive office conferences and distilled those would-be clients with whom the
attorneys meet.

3.

Specific Inquiries and Preparation for Initial aient Interview

The caller will make inquiries of the secretary about substantive matters. It is important that
one's secretary understand that bankruptcy protection from creditors will occur immediately upon filing;
so when asked by a caller about the length of time required to stop a wage garnishment, the secretary
can answer. See, 11 U.5.C.§362(a). In many areas a secretary is more competent to answer questions
than the attorney. For example, when asked about the promptness of getting the petition filed, the
secretary is often more aware of the existing workload and time demands. In the event a petition needs
to be filed expeditiously, the secretary should know about the availability of skeleton and emergency
filings, so the caller can be assured that the office and the court system can work with sufficient speed to
meet a" critical situation.
The secretary should ascertain the identities of the caller's major creditors. If the finn represents
those creditors, then the secretary should advise the caller that a conflict of interest would prevent the
finn from representing the caller.
To allow for a productive meeting between the caller and the attorney, the secretary must instruct
the caller to prepare for the meeting by gathering financial information which lists the assets and the
debts of the caller. The potential client should be asked to value those assets and designate which assets
are encumbered by mortgages and liens. If the caller has been sued, the secretary should direct that
copies of the complaint and other relevant pleadings be brought to the meeting. Certainly any deeds,
wills, notes, and security agreements which the caller has on hand should be included in the portfolio.
Tax returns can provide important information. As such, the caller should be asked to bring his/her tax
returns for the past two (2) years to the initial meeting.

m.

INITIAL CLIENT INTERVIEW

A.

aient Relations

J
j

J

J
J
J
J

J

Many people who are forced to consider a Chapter 7 filing have never dealt with attorneys.
Filled with the images of lawyers provided them by pop culture, they will arrive in the law office for the
initial interview anxious not only about their circumstances, but about the lawyer. The attorney and
support staff must put these interviewees at ease. Offering coffee or a beverage is elementary, but also
think about dress and the conference room environment. By conductipg the meeting in your best blue
suit you may never develop a rapport with an hourly worker who has come to your office wearing
dusty work clothes. By meeting in an austere law library, you may never engage in an open dialog
which will fully apprise you of the clients' problems. These guests in your office should be impressed
not only by your credentials but also your compassion.
While the stigma of filing a bankruptcy petition may have lessened since 1978, for most people
bankruptcy is still an unthinkable act, the very consideration of which is emotionally wrenching. You
are meeting people at a low point in their lives and you can observe their depression in their demeanor
and posture. Realize that with the privileges afforded by the Bankruptcy Code, you have the power to
help them.

j

J
J
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B.

Ascertaining Conflicts Of Interest

r

As you move into the actual interview, but before any discussion of specific legal issues, ask to
review the list of creditors to whom the interviewee is indebted. Obviously, the attorney must ascertain
if she/he has a conflict of interest which would prevent the fonnation of an attorney-client relationship.
Any discussion of the client's particular circumstances which occurs prior to a review of the creditor list
can disqualify the attorney from representing either the debtor or the creditor client. SCR 3.130-1.7, 1.9.
aients will respeq an attorney who zealously seeks to avoid conflicts and appearances of impropriety.

I

C.

r

Assuming no conflict of interest, it is then logical to ask the client about the immediate problem
which has brought him or her into your office. In that way one can determine the rapidity of action
which is required. For example, a wage earner whose salary is being garnished will need to decide
whether to file and which form of bankruptcy relief to seek before his/her next paycheck is issued.
Someone who has been served with a summons will have limited time to decide whether a good defense
can be raised or whether legal fees are best spent on obtaining a discharge from the claim of the plaintiff.
A client who foresees difficult finandal times in the future may want to understand bankruptcy's
ramifications and has time for careful analysis.

,.
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r
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D.

Immediate Problems And Future Concerns

Review Of Finandal Statement

The discussion should now refocus on the financial statement. Many clients insist that they
have limited credit problems and that but for a delinquency or disagreement with one creditor no
bankruptcy relief would be required. As the discussion proceeds, it may become evident that the problems
are widespread and the resources limited. As you review the client's financial infonnation, consider the
issues discussed below.
1.

Are the Debts Jointly Owed by Husband and Wife?

r

Assume the husband has partidpated in a failed business venture, leaving unpaid suppliers
and business credit cards. The wife has liability only on bank notes which are secured by the residence
and vehicles. The couple agrees that they wish to reaffirm the bank obligations. In such drcumstances,
there may be no reason for the spouse to join in the filing. Assume the residence has value which
exceeds the claim of the mortgagee and the statutory exemptions allowed by I<RS 427.060 and KRS
427.160. Recognizing that the trustee can sell jointly owned property after obtaining a judgment in an
adversary proceeding, consider whether the trustee is less likely to sell the residence if the co-owner
spouse has filed no petition. See, 11 US.C§ 363(g), (h). The spouse will partidpate in on~half of the
sale proceeds with the debtor's portion of the proceeds being surcharged with the sales expenses and
the trustee's commission. Consequently, it is not as attractive for the trustee to sell marginally nonexempt
jointly owned assets as it would have been had the couple filed a joint petition.

r

2.

r
"r

r
r

r
r

Should the Debtors have their Assets Appraised?

If the estate's assets consist of automobiles or other kinds of property which are the subject of
independent, well publicized valuation guides, then there may be no need to incur the expense of an
appraisal. However, if the asset is out of the ordinary, sayan antique automobile or specialty equipment,
then an appraisal may be beneficial. It is the author's experience that clients who have never been
involved with the bankruptcy process habitually overestimate the worth of their property. Without an
appraisal the client may be adamant that the property is worth much more than the debt it secures; with
the appraisal the client, and the trustee, can quickly see that no equity exists.

A-3

J
Conversely, an appraisal could reveal equity which the client did not know existed. Remember
that the debtor must sign his/her schedules, under oath, valuing the assets at market value. See, FRBP
1008, 1007(b) which incorporates Official Form No.6. An appraisal performed before filing must be
considered by the debtor while affixing the value of the asset. Valuation of the asset at an amount
significantly below the appraised value could conceivably create grounds for action against the debtor.
11 U.5.C.§727(a)(4).
.
3.

What are the Tax Ramifications of Filing?

If the debtor owns property which is encumbered to secure debts far in excess of value, then in
all likelihood, this property will be abandoned hom the bankruptcy estate and liquidated by the creditor.
It is important to discuss the tax basis of such property. If the property is worth more than the taxpayer's
basis, then the taxpayer will have a taxable gain when the property is sold, even if all the proceeds go to
the creditor. See, 26 U .5.C.§ 61. The sale of depreciated equipment can lead to tremendous tax liability,
for the debtor will be taxed on all the recaptured depreciation, even though the creditor receives all the
proceeds. See, 26 U.S.C.§ 1245. These results will occur whether or not a Chapter 7 case was filed, but
the attorney has a duty to advise clients of the ramifications of their actions. If the asset has equity and
the Chapter 7 trustee decides to sell the property, then the taxpayer's basis passes to the estate and the
tax liability will rest in the bankruptcy estate. See, 26 U.S.C.§ 1398.
Occasionally a creditor will recognize that the value of the asset which secures its debt is the
most the creditor can hope to recover. In return for a quick sale, the creditor may be willing to forgive
any debt which remains after the collateral is sold thereby eliminating the necessity of a bankruptcy
filing. The attorney must advise the debtor that this proposal is fraught with peril. Recall that debt
which is discharged as a part of a bankruptcy proceeding creates no taXi but, outside a bankruptcy case,
the discharge or forgiveness of debt will likely create taxable income for the debtor. See, 26 U.S.C.§108
(a) (1). Once created, income tax debt can not be discharged for ~ (3) years. See, 11 U.S.c.§ 523
(a)(1)(A),l1 U.5.c.§ 507 (a)(8)(A)(i). It may be necessary to decline the offer of the forgiving creditor in
favor of filing a Chapter 7 case in order to escape debt forgiveness income.
In cases where significant tax liability may be created as a result of the debtor's action in
liquidating property, a tax professional knowledgeable about the tax aspects of bankruptcy law should
be involved in the prebankruptcy discussions.
4.

Does the Oient have Substantial Equity in His/Her Assets?

Chapter 7 works best for those debtors who have accumulated Significant unsecured debt and
whose assets are encumbered to the full extent of their value by mortgages which are being paid on a
current basis. Counselling the client with unexempt equity must be undertaken carefully. Obviously
the client must be told that a Chapter 7 trustee is under an obligation to liquidate assets which will
benefit the unsecured creditors. See, 11 U.5.C.§ 704(1). Occasionally a client will respond to that disclosure
by expressing a willingness to allow the trustee to sell the asset. In light of the potential tax aspects of a
sale, it may be best for the bankruptcy estate to bear the tax consequences of the sale.
Often the debtor will ask the attorney about ways to preserve the asset. For an attorney, danger
attaches to the response. Law journal articles and lectures have addressed the role of the attorney in
prebankruptcy planning. See, Safford, The Slippery Slope: The Road from Ethical Practice to Attorney
Negligence, Contempt or Fraud in Bankruptcy Cases, 2 Workshop for Bankruptcy Judges 227 (NCBJ 1996).
These scholars examine the fine line that lawyers must draw between advising the clients of the status
of the law and actively participating in defrauding creditors. If the lawyer crosses the line between
counselor and becomes an active participant in a scheme to defraud creditors, sanctions can attach. 18
U.s.C.§ 157i SCR 3.130-83(c) and KBA v. Newcomer, Ky., 977 S.W.2d 20 (1998).
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Oients are entitled to fully understand how state Jaw exemptions can be applied to their property.
If a client has significant equity in an asset, the attorney should advise that by selling the assets or
borrowing against the equity the client may invest the proceeds in a retirement account approved by
I<RS 427.150 and protect the equity (albeit in a different fonn).
If asked about giving property to the client's family, the practitioner should advise the client of
the bankruptcy and state fraudulent conveyance statutes. See, 11 US.c.§ 548, I<RS 318.010 et seq. Advise
them that such gifts made within a year of the filing of a bankruptcy case can be easily set aside by the
trustee. Oients should also be counseled that while Kentucky fraudulent conveyance law has a five (5)
year statute of limitations, its requirements are more difficult to prove than the bankruptcy cause of
action. The statement of affairs contained within the petition requires disclosure of gifts made within
one (1) year of the filing date, so the overworked trustee may never discover transfers made outside the
one (1) year time frame. See, FRBP 1007 (b)(1) incorporating Official Form No.7.
If the client does not have at least $5,000.00 ($10,000.00 if a joint petition has been filed) equity in
his/her home, the homestead exemption will not be fully utilized. See, I<RS 427.060. In advance of
filing, clients may consider liquidating an asset which has equity and investing those funds in their
home. Either real property or mobile homes qualify. Beware that the exemption statute, I<RS 427.060,
limits the availability of the exemption, for it can be claimed only against creditors with claims acquired
after the homestead was purchased. In re Bush. 196 B. R. 378 (Bkrtcy W.D. Ky.1995). The trustee can use
the powers granted under 11 US.C.§ 544 (b) to exercise the rights held by any unsecured creditor. So if
any creditor's debt was incurred before the homestead equity was created, the trustee can sell the
homestead.
When in doubt, the attorney should claim any exemption to which the client is arguably entitled
and place the burden on the trustee to object to the petitioner's entitlement. Under Thylor v. Freeland &
Kronz. 503 US. 638,112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed. 2d 280 (1992) , the trustee has only thirty (30) days to object
to the exemption.
5.

Has the Oient Made any Payments to Creditors Other than Regular Installment Payments or

Monthly living Expenses Within the Last Year?
This information may not appear on the client's financial statement, so it is important that you
probe. Often the payments which fall into this category are made to family members. It is understandable
that the debtor would want to devote his/her limited resources in repaying a relative or friend. The
debtor must know that filing a bankruptcy petition within one (1) year of the payment to an insider and
within ninety (90) days of the payment to other creditors will entitle the trustee to investigate the
preferential payment and probably recapture it for distribution to all creditors. See, 11 US.c.§ 55O(aXl).
Garnishments are considered transfers by the debtor for the benefit of creditors, even though
involuntarily done. In re Winters. 182 B. R. 26 (Bkrtcy W.O. Ky. 1995). The date of the transfer is the date
of service of the garnishment order upon the garnishee. If the date of transfer is outside the preference
period, then even payments received by the creditor within the preference period escape recovery by
the trustee or debtor. In re Edwards. 219 B. R. 970 (Bkrtcy W.O. Ky. 1998). If the garnishment order is
served within ninety days before bankruptcy and the amount of the funds paid to the creditor exceed
six hundred dollars ($600.00) but do not exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), the debtor may seek to
have the preferential conveyance set aside and recoup the garnished funds under his/her general
exemption provided by K.RS. 427.160. In re Towery. 53 BR 76 (Bkrtcy W.O. Ky.1985). Presumably, the
trustee will act on behalf of the estate if the amount of the funds exceed the general exemption. Any
garnishments which do not exceed $600.00 are not preferences under the Code. See, 11 US.c. § 547
(c){8).
Many Chapter 7 debtors have liability on which third parties have cosigned. These debtors
must realize that payments to a bank on an unsecured note that has been cosigned by their parents (or
other insiders) can entitle the trustee to recover the payments from the parents if a bankruptcy is filed
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within a year after the payments are made. See, 11 US.C.§ 547 (b)(4)(B). Those payments benefited an
insider by decreasing the liability of the insider, so the payments are preferential. Note that voluntary
payments on the same debt after. bankruptcy are not preferential.

,

j

Understanding basic preference law can lead the client to consider Chapter 13 relief and thereby
protect the preferential payment, to delay the filing of the bankruptcy to allow the payment to fall
outside the preference period, or to accelerate the filing to enable the trustee to recover a preference that
has been paid to a creditor in order to benefit other creditors, particularly tax creditors.
6.

Has the aient Granted any Mortgages or Security Interests to Secure Antecedent Debt Within
One Year?

aearly granting a creditor a mortgage to secure an otherwise unsecured debt can fall within
the purview of a preferential conveyance, for such a transfer enables that creditor to receive more in
repayment of debt than would have been the case without the transfer. In a Chapter 7 case, the recipient
of a preferential security interest or mortgage is likely to be a creditor whose good opinion the debtor
believes helshe needs to survive after bankruptcy. In such circumstances, the debtor will want to make
every effort to avoid filing a bankruptcy petition until after the preference period has passed.
E.

j

aient Desires And Goals

Afte~ a thorough analysis of the debtors' financial information, it is helpful to ask the clients
what they realistically hope to accomplish through the bankruptcy process. Often the clients will say
that they will be happy if they can save their home or their car. They may proclaim that they just want
out from under all their debt. Consider writing the clients a letter after the initial meeting and reiterating
your understanding of their purpose. It is important to have this discussion at the very beginning of the
representation. Expectations tend to soar as·the bankruptcy case progresses, for the protection of the
bankruptcy court is narcotic to some debtors, lulling them into false optimism while they are protected
from making payments. When the caSe concludes and the debtors are faced with the reality of having to
make payments on debts they have reaffinned or new debts they have undertaken since filing, one can
tactfully remind them that their initial goals have been met. They will feel more positively about their
experience and about your representation.

Commonly clients will advise their lawyer that they want to pay all their debts. Attorneys are
obligated to discuss Chapter 13 with clients and present it as a means of paying their debts, or at least a
substantial portion of them. See, FRBP 1002 incorporating therein Official Form No.1. As a part of the
initial interview the practitioner must give clients an overview of both Chapter 13 and Chapter 7
bankruptcies.
RChapter 13 Versus Chapter 7 Bankruptcies
1.

J
J

Design of Chapter 13

In general, Chapter 13 is designed to permit the payment of a significant amount to unsecured
creditors and to return to secured creditors the value of their collateral, be it through the actual surrender
of the collateral or the payment of the value of the collateral over the term of the plan with interest at the
market rate. See, 11 U.S.C.§ 1325 (a)(5) and Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman. 692 F.2d 427 (6th Or.
1982). Discrimination between creditors who are similarly situated is prohibited. See, 11 U.s.C.§ 1322
(a)(3). Chapter 13 cases tend to be more complicated from the perspective of both the debtor and debtor's
counsel; consequently legal fees are higher than fees in Chapter 7 cases, although the payment of these
fees through the trustee's office in installments may be easier on the debtor's budget than Chapter 7 fees
which are typically paid in one or two installments. At a minimum, Chapter 13 cases require a three (3)
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year commitment from the debtor, with court supervision of any additional, nonmedical debt. 11 U.S.C.§
1322 (d). However, Chapter 13 offers a means of dealing with debts which are nondischargeable in
Chapter 7 and it offers protection for the debtor's cOsigners, to the extent that the debtor proposes to
pay the debt under his/her plan. 11 U.S.c.§ 1301(a). No assets will be sold or preferences recovered by
the Chapter 13 trustee, as long as the debtor's plan proposes payment of an amount equivalent to these
potential recoveries. See, 11 US.C.§ 1325 (a)(4).
2.

Design of Chapter 7

On the other hand, Chapter 7 is designed to completely discharge unsecured debt, at the cost of
the debtor's equity. Most Chapter 7 proceedings are no asset cases, so debtors risk no equity by filing a
Chapter 7 proceeding. Congress has limited the filing of Chapter 7 cases by prohibiting a debtor from
filing more than once every six (6) years. See, 11 US.C.§ 727 (a)(8). A Chapter 7 case is concluded
quickly, requiring only one court appearance. 11 US.c.§ 341(d). The economic value of a Chapter 7
case can be tremendous. The debtor can obtain a discharge from many thousand dollars of debt, while
attorney fees rarely exceed one thousand dollars. There is no prohibition against discriminating between
creditors after the filing, so a Chapter 7 debtor can voluntarily repay one unsecured creditor, ignoring
all other unsecured claimholders. See, 11 U.S.c.§ 524(0. Some debts will not be effected by a Chapter 7
filing. See, 11 U.S.C.§§ 523 (a){l),{3),{5),{7),{8),{9),{lO),{11),{12),{l3),{l4) and (l6). Taxes, child support
obligations and student loan debts are examples. Other debts may be excepted from discharge if the
creditors assert their rights in a timely manner. These debts include debts predicated upon a false
financial statement, certain credit card debts incurred immediately before filing, debts arising out of
fraud, etc. See, 11 U.S.C.§§ 523(a)(2),(4),(6), and (l5).
Having discussed the differences between Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 in general terms, it is then
necessary to discuss these alternatives using the specific circumstances of the client. Ask the client if
any money remains from his/her salary after payment of living expenses. Most will respond negatively.
In those cases, no further exploration of Chapter 13 is required for there is no ability to fund the plan. If
the client believes that he/she could make a Chapter 13 payment and meet his/her living expenses,
then have the client complete Schedules I and J of the bankruptcy petition and delay further discussion
of Chapter 13 until you have reviewed these schedules which list living expenses and income.
G.

Discussion Of Bankruptcy Process And Procedure

1.

Generally

If your clients have not previously asked how the bankruptcy system works, they will surely do
so before the conclusion of the initial conference. Reassure them that bankruptcy relief goes into effect
as soon as the petition is filed. Most of these clients will be concerned about their jobs and will ask
questions like, "Will my employer be notified?" You can assure them that in all likelihood there will be
no need to inform the employer, but that it will be necessary for the client to take off work to attend the
creditors' meeting. Advise the client that the notice of the creditors meeting will come to him/her at the
same time as it comes to you and that the ''Notice of Commencement of Case Under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code, Order for Relief, Meeting of Creditors and Fixing of Dates" (herein referred to as
"creditors' meeting") will be received several days in advance of the meeting, so that he/ she can schedule
time off.
Explain to clients that the filing of a bankruptcy case draws a line between their prepetition
activities and·their postpetition affairs. They will be comforted to learn that earnings generated after
filing are free and clear of prebankruptcy debt and that property which they acquire after the bankruptcy
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filing can not be subjected to the payment of the prepetition debt. See, 11 U.S.c.§ 541(a). There are
exceptions to this rule. Advise your clients that any property inherited within six (6) months of the
filing of a bankruptcy petition is drawn into the bankruptcy estate and divided between creditors. See,
11 U.S.C.§ 541 (a)(5)(A). A client with an elderly or ailing parent, sibling, etc. may want to suggest to
that potential testator that his/her will be rewritten. Further any funds paid to the debtor as a beneficiary
under a life insurance policy within 180 days of the petition date may be drawn into the bankruptcy
estate for payment of creditors. See, 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(5)(C). Fmally, any property received by the
debtor in a property settlement agreement or divorce decree within 180 days of filing will become part
of the bankruptcy estate. See, 11 US.C. § 541 (a)(5)(B)."
2.

Surrender of Property

Reaffirmation, redemption and surrender of property should be discussed during the initial
client meeting. Often the client has been attempting to sell a boat or vehicle, having decided that they
are unable to make the monthly payment on the collateral. Being told that they can surrender this
property to the secured creditor-paying the creditor no additional monies-will be well received. See,
11 U.S.C.§ 506 (a). Redemption of property from the secured creditor is more difficult to explain and, in
the author'S opinion, underutilized by Chapter 7 debtors.
3.

Redemption of Property

Typically, redemption is used with creditors which hold purchase money security interests in
household goods. A revolving charge account may retain for the merchant a security interest in anything
that was ever financed on the account as long as a debt is outstanding. Appliances, furniture and stereo
equipment purchased several years ago may still be held as collateral for substantial debt, even though
the property has minimal value. A debt of several thousand dollars may be secured by property worth
only a few hundred dollars. Ask the client how much the property is worth in its current condition.
Explain to the client that by offering to pay that amount, usually in a lump sum, the creditor's interest in
the property can be purchased. See, 11 U.S.c.§ 722. Both debtors and creditors are aided by redemption.
Debtors are spared the humiliation of having their personal items repossessed, and creditors are spared
the expense of repossession and sale. You can not force the creditor to allow your client to make
installment payments on a redemption, but increasingly, creditors have allowed Chapter 7 debtors this
flexibility. Redemption must be approved by the Court and a dispute over the value of the property can
lead to a hearing. These disputes are best resolved through negotiations, for the Chapter 7 debtor can
rarely afford additional attorney fees arising out of the hearing, and the Court will not deal kindly with
lawyers who take up courtroom time to determine the value of a ten year old refrigerator.
4.

Reaffirmation of Debt

Frequently the Chapter 7 case will involve at least one reaffirmation of a secured debt. Oients
will tell you that they want to "resign" with a creditor. The attorney is advised to inform the client of the
legal consequences of such an act. Make sure they realize that by reaffirming the debt, they are
recommitting their personal liability on the debt and will be subject to suit and garnishment if they
default on the payment.
Reaffirmation is easily accomplished if the clients are current on their payments to the creditor
and if the collateral is worth approximately the same amount as the debt which is owed. Local Rule 22
of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Kentucky provides a simple
reaffirmation agreement form to be signed by the client, the creditor and the debtors' counsel. See,
Appendix A to this paper. The completed form must be filed with the court within the time period set
forth in the notice of creditors' meeting. It is unclear whether a debtor has an absolute right to reaffirm
a debt which is being paid according to contract terms.
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Reaffirmation is somewhat complicated when the client is delinquent in the payment of the
debt. Oearly, the creditor must consent to this reaffirmation, and the creditor will require some agreement
on curing the arrearage in the account. If the debtors have been habitually delinquent in their payments,
creditors may refuse to negotiate a reaffirmation of the debt and the Court will not intervene on behalf
of the debtors. It has been this author's experience that creditors will usually allow the debtors reasonable
time to cure the delinquency and will consent to the reaffirmation. Again, an agreement must be drafted
setting forth the terms of the agreement and the document must be filed with the court after it has been
signed by the debtors, debtors' counsel and the creditor.
Debtors may want to reaffinn an unsecured debt. Courts rarely approve such reaffirmations
and only then if the reaffirmation is done in settlement of a nondischargeability case. You can remind
your client that he/she may voluntarily pay any prepetition debt, without reaffinning the debt and
resubmitting his/her personal liability to the creditor.
Pursuant to 11 US.C.§ 524 (d), as a part ofthe reaffirmation procedure as debtors' counsel, you
must sign an affidavit stating:
I,
. attorney for the debtors in the above
captioned bankruptcy proceeding declare that I represented the debtors during
the negotiation of the foregoing Agreement and that said Agreement represents
a fully infonned and voluntary agreement by the debtors which does not impose
an undue hardship on the debtors or a dependent of the debtor. I have fully advised
the debtors of the legal effect and consequences of this agreement and any
default under the agreement. (Emphasis added).
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The emphasized language is of concern. Can the creditor assert a claim against debtors' counsel if there
is a subsequent default? Conceivably debtors' counsel makes an actionable misrepresentation by signing
the affidavit knOwing that the clients do not have the ability to repay the debt. There have been occasions
when I doubted the wisdom of my clients' decision to reaffinn a debt. On occasions I have refused to
sign the reaffirmation affidavit. If debtors' counsel does not sign the affidavit, then a hearing must be
held on the reaffirmation. The hearing will necessitate the client's attendance. See, 11 US.C.§ 524 (cX6).
H.

TIming Of The Bankruptcy Filing

By now, the attorney has fonned an opinion about the timing of the petition's filing. If an
exists and you practice in a division of court other than Louisville or Lexington, you may
need to ask pennission from the bankruptcy clerk to file a skeleton petition at the office of the U. S.
District Court nearest you. See, LBR 4 (W.O. Ky). You may file the petition in the division of court which
is most available to you, even though the case may actually proceed in another division. For example,
assume you practice in Henderson, Kentucky which is about 30 miles from Owensboro, the nearest seat
of the district court. Your client needs to file an emergency petition to stop a wage garnishment and that
client resides in Princeton, Kentucky. The petition can be filed in Owensboro even though the case will
. be designated a Paducah Division case. Verbal permission of the bankruptcy clerk must be obtained
before an emergency petition is filed, but pennission is readily granted. Cessation of garnishments,
avoidance of the entry of a judgment or cancellation of a judicial sale have all been deemed sufficient
grounds for the accommodation. After the bankruptcy clerk has spoken with the attorney, she/he will
call the district clerk's office in the division where you plan to file the petition. The deputy district court
clerk will be given the bankruptcy number which will be assigned to the case. The district clerk will
accept the petition and filing fee, stamp it and give it a case number. The district clerk will then mail the
petition to Louisville or Lexington and will have no other dealings with the case, unless the case results
in an appeal.
emeIg~mcy

Most emergency filings are also skeleton filings. A skeleton petition is composed of the first
page of the petition and a list of creditors' names and addresses. Obviously one can complete the
necessary paperwork to accomplish a skeleton filing in much less time than that required for the complete
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petition and schedules. Your client need only estimate his/her total debt and total asset value for the
skeleton petition; specifics about individual creditor claims are not required. Permission of court is not
required to file a skeleton petition. After the petition has been filed, you have fifteen (15) days within
which to file the statement of affairs and schedule. See, FRBP l007(c).
Whether the attorney uses the shorthand procedure of a skeleton filing or delays the filing until
the complete petition has been prepared, it is most important that one file the petition in conjunction
with the timetable agreed upon with the client. Failure to timely file petitions have led to disciplinary
sanctions. See, KBA¥ Watson, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 317 (1993); J<BA v. Goodrich, 851 S.W.2d 479 (1993); KBA
v. Reeyes, Ky., 851 S.W.2d 478 (1993).
L

Petition Infonnation And Oient Questionnaire

As the office conference concludes, give the client a questionnaire which will assist the client in
gathering the infonnation necessary to complete the bankruptcy petition. The questionnaire is invaluable
for it will allow your staff to work on the petition in the client's absence and more effident1y utilize staff .
time. Further, the questionnaire will provide protection should a question ever arise about the failure to
list an asset or creditor. A sample questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this work for your
consideration. See, Appendix B.

The Bankruptcy Court has developed two pamphlets which practitioners are asked to distribute
to Chapter 7 filers. The pamphlets reiterate many of the concepts that you will discuss with your client
during the initial conference. Supplying the pamphlets is ideal, for the clients can review the infonnation
after they have left your office and refresh their memories about some of the important subject matters
that you have covered.

J.

Before the client leaves the office, attorney fees must be discussed. It is customary to require a
retainer in Chapter 7 cases. If the retainer is eqUivalent to the total chatges for the representation, then
technically the attorney has received a fraudulent transfer because the attorney is going to be paid for
work which will not have been perfonned when the petition is filed -attendance at the creditors' meeting
and creditor negotiations, for example. Fraudulent transfers are defined for bankruptcy purposes as
transfers without equivalent value. See, 11 U.S.C.§ 548 (a)(2). However, the author is unaware of any
challenges having been made to a retainer unless the amount appears excessive. If the client is unable to
pay the entire fee before filing, an arrangement which requires the payment of one-half of the fee in
advance of filing and one-half on or before the creditors' meeting is standard. The attorney is at peril
under this arrangement, for he/she is required to attend the creditors' meeting whether or not payment
has been received. See, LBR 3(d) (W.O. Ky.).

INFORMATION GATHERING

A.

Oient Inquiries And Additional Creditors

'I

.J

j

J
J
J
j

J

Discussion Of Attorney Fees

IV.

j

As the client undertakes to complete the questionnaire, be prepared for many questions to arise.
Queries about the questionnaire can often be handled by one's secretary. Often the client needs
clarification of an issue which was discussed at the initial meeting. Many times the client will recall a
creditor which was omitted from their financial statement and want to discuss that creditor's position
after a Chapter 7 filing.

During this phase of the case, the client may tell the attorney about a creditor that they do not
wish to list on their petition - say a family friend or a credit card that they want to retain. Counsel must
remind the client that the bankruptcy petition is a document, executed under penalties of perjury, and
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that all creditors to whom they are indebted at the time of filing must be listed on the petition. See, 18
U.S.C.§§ 152 and 3571. If the client has the financial wherewithal to pay the debt before filing, then there
will be no need to list that entity on the petition.
B.

Credit Bureau Report

For a nominal sum, the client-debtor can obtain a copy of his/her local credit bureau report.
The report may assist the client in recalling all of his/her creditors and it may provide addresses of
collection agencies which hold assignments of claims against the client. Giving notice to these agencies
will hasten the notice process and eliminate future collection efforts against the client.
C.

Lien Search

Ideally, a courthouse lien search is performed during this period. It is particularly important
that counsel learn about any judgment liens which may have been filed against the clients' real property.
Furthermore, the client may believe that a creditor has a lien or mortgage; yet a review of the records
may indicate that the creditor did not properly perfect its mortgage or security interest. This knowledge
may equip the attorney to negotiate with the creditor to avoid bankruptcy. It may make the bankruptcy
more beneficial for the sale of the asset may allow the trustee to pay a priority claim such as a tax or
child support. See, 11 U.S.C.§ 507.
Conducting even a cursory lien search adds to the time expenditure on the case. Chapter 7 fees
are very competitive. As such, charging an additional fee to conduct a lien search may well cost an
attorney the representation. Whether a lien search is a necessity or a luxury is unclear. However,
creditors are using the judgment lien statute with great frequency and you may not learn about the lien
unless you search the records. It is difficult to explain to a client two years after the case is closed why
you took no action to remove a judgment lien. The client's failure to advise you about the lien's existence
will be forgotten; your failure to avoid the lien will be remembered.
D.

Inquiries From Creditors

If the client is being hard pressed by collection efforts, the client may wish to tell creditors that
he/she is filing bankruptcy is imminent. Be prepared to receive telephone calls from creditors asking
whether a filing has occurred. It is best to discuss your handling of these calls with your client. See,
HUShes v. Meade. Ky., 453 S.W.2d 538 (1970). In all likelihood, the client will most likely consent to your
telling the creditor that you have been retained to file a Chapter 7 petition. Such information will gain
the client a respite from collection calls. Make sure that the client understands that you must tell creditors
the truth. Oients have been known to teIl their creditors that they have actually filed when they have
merely made the decision to file. Counsel must not assist the client in misleading creditors.

V.

SECOND CUENT CONFERENCE

Once the actual bankruptcy petition has been completed, it will be necessary for your clients to
again visit your office in order to sign the petition. Provide them with a comfortable environment to
review the petition if they have not already been supplied a copy of the document via mail.
A.

Fee Agreement

If the clients have not already done so, they should be asked to sign a fee agreement. Ideally
this contract would have been signed prior to preparation of the petition, although clients are rarely
willing to commit to the filing of a bankruptcy petition after the initial conference. The occasion of the
petition signing provides the best opportunity to memorialize the agreement of representation.
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Attached as Appendix C to this paper isa copy of a fee agreement. Note that the contract leaves
the attorney with the option of renegotiating the representation in the event that an adversary proceeding
is filed against the client.

B.

j

Fee Disclosure Statement

The attorney is required to attach a disclosure statement to the bankruptcy petition, advising
the Court of the amount charged to represent the debtor in the proceeding. H the fee falls outside the
normal range (S500 to SI,OO()), counsel should be prepared to justify the fee. If the Court concludes that
there has been an overt:harge, the attorney can be required to tum over any excess fee to the trustee. See,
11 US.C.§329(b). A sample fee disclosure statement is set forth in the appendix as Appendix D.
C.

Post-Execution Filing Deadline

Once the petition has been signed, it must be filed with the bankruptcy clerk's office within
fourteen (14) days. H the petition is held in the attorney's office any longer than fourteen (14) days, it
becomes stale and the clerk's office will not except it. See, LBR 5(d) <W.O. Ky.). The filing fee must be
submitted to the clerk's office in the form of cash, certified check, money order or an attorney's office
check. The client's check will not be accepted.
VI.

TELEPHONE AND MAIL TRAFFIC

A.

Basic Information

j

J
J
J
J

After the petition has been filed and the notices have been sent by the bankruptcy clerk's office
to creditors, the attorney will get a flurry of telephone calls from creditors asking for very basic information
such as the date of filing, the case number, and the date and location of the first meeting of creditors.
These calls can be handled by your secretary.

J
J

B.

j

Secured Creditors And Statement Of Intent

There may be inquiries from secured creditors about your clients' intention regarding
reaffirmation of their debt. The Bankruptcy Code requires that all creditors with liens on consumer
goods receive notice of the debtors' intentions concerning their collateral within thirty (30) days following
the filing of the petition. See, 11 U.S.C.§ 521 (2)(A). Regardless of the fact that you have complied with
this requirement, expect calls from large national creditors which involve many departments involved
in the collection process. The Statement of Intentions will provide an easy reference for one's secretary
in fielding the creditors' calls.

c.

J
j

J

Reaffirmation Agreements

De:btor's counsel will receive reaffirmation agreements from creditors for the client's
consideration. The author usually holds the reaffirmation agreements until the flI'St meeting of creditors.
This procedure saves time and is not harmful to clients. Certainly you should review each reaffirmation
agreement to make certain that the amount and debt being treated by the agreement is as expected.

D.

•

Creditor Activities

Since most creditors have computerized billing systems, it is understandable that the debtor
might receive a bill post-filing. However, bills which continue to be sent to Chapter 7 debtors sixty (60)
days after the bankruptcy filing are inexcusable, assuming that the creditor's address used in the petition
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is correct. The client is going to want immediate cessation of creditor contact. Tell him/her to ignore the
first statement received after filin~ but to notify you if subsequent statements are received. Usually a
short letter from counsel will bring a halt to postpetition collection activities. If collection activities do
not cease, 11 US.C.§ 362 (h) provides for significant sanctions, including attorney fees, against creditors
who violate the automatic stay of the court.
Assume that prior to filing the bankruptcy case a motion for a default judgment against the
client had been tendered in some pending litigation. If the judgment is entered before the judge gets
notice of the bankruptcy filing, it is voidable. See, Easley v. Pettibone Michigan Corporation. 990 F2d 905
(6th Or. 1993). It is good practice to file notices in all pending litigation advising the trial court about
the bankruptcy. Attached as Appendix E is a sample of such a notice.
VII.

CREDITORS' MEETING

A.

Preparation Of aient

Counsel should arrange to meet with clients a short time before the first meeting of creditors in
order to prepare them for their session with the bankruptcy trustee. Suggest that the clients review their
bankruptcy petition before coming to court.
It is helpful to get to the creditors' meeting early so to allow your clients to sit through some of
the other debtors' meetings. Stay focused on your clients' case. This author once received a compliment
and a business referral from a creditor's attorney, simply as a result of sitting with her clients while they
waited for their case to be called and explaining proceedings rather than abandoning her clients.
The rudiments of the first meeting of creditors are set forth in 11 US.C.§§ 341 and 343. The
trustee will ask the debtors if they have listed all their property and debts in the bankruptcy petition.
Remind the clients about the discussion which you had with them during the initial meeting concerning
Chapter 13 options. The trustee may ask them if they considered filing a Chapter 13 petition and if they
are aware of the effect that Chapter 7 will have upon their credit. The trustee will want to verify that the
petition correctly sets forth the debtors' names and sodal security numbers.
The trustee will then open the meeting up to creditors. Questions about the location of collateral
and the status of insurance are common.

If the client has sold collateral without turning over the proceeds to the creditor or has committed
some other act which may constitute fraud or a criminal violation, she/he can claim the Fifth Amendment
protection against self incrimination during their testimony. If the client does not testify and the
bankruptcy court is asked to determine whether a debt should be excepted from dischatge or a dischatge
should be denied this debtor altogether, then the judge can be expected to infer culpability from the
debtor's refusal to testify. See, In re Edmond. 934 F2d 1304 (4th Cir. 1991).
B.

Trustee Report Of No Assets

As mentioned earlier, the vast majority of Chapter 7 cases are declared to be no asset cases as
soon as the trustee has conducted his/her examination of the debtors. The trustee will tell the debtors
and the assembled creditors that a no asset report will be filed. By so doing, the trustee will abandon
any interest which the bankruptcy estate had in your clients' assets. See, 11 U.S.C.§ 554(C). Counsel is
left to deal with the creditors who hold liens or security interests in the clients' property.
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j
C.

Dealing With Creditors

After the hearing, creditors may encircle one's clients, trying to get signatures upon reaffirmation
agreements. 'Iiy to meet with as many Creditors as possible, since clients are present and matters can be
resolved quickly. If you return to the office without resolving an issue with a creditor, it will take several
telephone calls and letters to get the debt reaffirmed or the property redeemed. If the client has chosen
to surrender the asset to the creditor, then counsel can use the creditors' meeting to discuss the time and
place of delivery.

The attorney must discuss each reaffirmation agreement with the clients. Remember to tell
clients that they are allowed to rescind any reaffirmation agreement if they do so in writing prior to the
last date for filing nondischargeability complaints or sixty (60) days after the agreement has been filed
with the court, whichever date is later. See, 11 US.C.§ 524 (c)(4).

vm.

FOLLOW UP

A.

Amendments To Petition

. If the client has failed to claim an exemption to which he/she is entitled or fails to list an asset,
an amendment must be prepared and served upon the trustee but no additional fee is required.

Redeeming Property

The Debtor's option to redeem property which is the subject of a secured creditor's claim was
discussed supra. A written motion seeking court approval of the redemption amount must be filed.
Having met with the creditor and client following the creditors' meeting, the attorney will be able to
complete the motion to redeem property. A copy of the Western District of Kentucky form, provided in
Local Rule 23, is attached as Appendix G. The Eastern District of Kentucky has also adopted a form for
use in redeeming property and it can be found in the local rules of that court.

C.

,

.J

J
J
j

In the event a client has omitted a creditor from his/her petition, it will be necessary to file an
amendment. Again, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District has provided a straight-forward
form for such an amendment. See, Appendix F. It will be necessary to serve a copy of the amendment
upon the trustee, and it will be necessary to certify to the Court that you have mailed a copy of the notice
of creditor's meeting to the added creditor. Each time you file an amendment which adds a creditor, an
additional filing fee of $20.00 is required. Whether the amendment adds just one creditor or whether it
adds 100, the cost is still $20.00.

B.

J
J

Uen Avoidance

If any asset in which a client has claimed an exemption is subject to a judicial lien, counsel must
consider filing a motion to avoid that lien under 11 U.S.C.§ 522(f). Let us consider an example.

Assume that your client's residence was worth $12,000.00 and assume further
that a debt of $3,800 was owed to a creditor which was properly secured by a
real estate mortgage. A general creditor had obtained a judgment of $8,317
and had recorded a judgment lien. Your client has a homestead exemption of
$5,000, pursuant to KRS 427.060. You file your motion to avoid the lien of the
general creditor because it impairs the exemption of your client. Without the
judgment lien, the homestead is worth a sufficient amount, if sold, to pay the
first mortgageholder and your client's $5,000 entitlement. Your motion will be
granted, in part. The Court will conclude that the amount of the first
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mortgageholder's debt and the exemption is $8,800 so the remaining value of
the residence, $3,200, will be subjected to the judgment lien. If the sum of the
valid mortgage and the exemption exceeded the value of the property, then the
judgment lien would be avoided altogether. See, In re Powell, 173 B. R. 338
(Bkrtcy. E. D. Ky. 1994).

r
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r
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Lien avoidance has generated litigation in recent years. The Sixth Orcuit ruled that Ohio law
prevented the use of lien avoidance unless a foreclosure proceeding had been commenced before the
bankruptcy case was filed. In re Moreland, 21 F. 3d 102 (6th Or. 1990); In re Dixon, 885 F. 2d 327 (1989).
Because of similarities in Ohio and Kentucky statutes, Kentucky practitioners generally regarded these
cases were dispositive of the issue. In 1994, Judge William Howard was called upon to squarely address
lien avoidance, comparing our Kentucky statutes with those of Ohio. He concluded that lien avoidance
in the Commonwealth was appropriate even if the creditor had not sued for foreclosure. In re Powell,
supra. The Western District of Kentucky followed the Powell decision, but imposed a sixty day time .
limit, following the first meeting of creditors, within which to file the motion. In re Hunter.164 B. R. 738
(Bkrtcy W.O. Ky. 1994).
With lien avoidance firmly in Kentucky case law, more recent opinions have focussed on the
effect of judgment liens prospectively, after bankruptcy. A judgment lien creditor was forced to release
its lien after it had received the value of its judgment liens from estate property, thereby allowing the
debtor to acquire additional property post petition without the specter of the lien. In re Stidham, 1995
WL876391 (Bkrtcy E. D. Ky.). In another case, the debtor owned no real property; nevertheless a judgment
lien had been filed to encumber any property which might someday be acquired. Cautioning that he
would not make a practice ofissuing such orders, the bankruptcy judge required the creditor to release
the judgment lien to facilitate the debtor's future real property acquiSition. In re Norvell. 198 B. R. 697
(BkrtcyW.D. Ky. 1996).
Bankruptcy Courts for both the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky have adopted Official
Forms for use in filing motion to avoid liens. Attached hereto as Appendix H is the Western District
form. Also refer to Form Number 5(b) for the Eastern District of Kentucky in the Local Rules.

IX.

r
r

CONCLUSION

1iiallawyers labor for years and risk thousands of dollars in costs to develop a case which may
have an economic effect on their clients' lives as great as the relief which a properly handled Chapter 7
bankruptcy case will bring. Through your efforts, clients can be discharged of thousands of dollars of
debt which they otherwise would have struggled for years to satisfy. Within sixty (60) days, an attorney
can actually see the fruits of his or her labors. Few other legal specialities provide such positive
reinforcement.
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x.

Appendix

A.

Reaffinnation Agreement

UNITED STATES BANKRUPl'CY COURI'
FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICI' OF KENTUCKY

r
r

r
r
r
r
r
r

r
,

r
r

)
)
)
)
)
)

INRE:

Debtors

CASE NO. _ _ _ _ _ _ __

)

REAFFIRMATION AGREEMENT
The debtors reaffirmation agreement is as follows:

1.
REAFFIRMATION - The debtors reaffirm to pay
, in accordance with the loan
documents, <copies are attached), the sum of $
, the principal balance due, plus interest at the rate set forth
in the instruments from
, at the rate of $
per month until fully paid, beginning
on _ _ _ _ _.
2.

This agreement does/does not change the terms of the original contract.
Payment is secured by the following property with the value to the secured creditor as indicated:

3.
PAST DUE PAYMENTS - In addition to the monthly payments provided in paragraph one (1) above,
the debtors agree to make up payments as follows: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(if applicable)
4.
RESCISSION PERIOD - THE DEBTOR(S) MAY RESCIND TIllS AGREEMENT BY GIVING
NOTICE TO THE CREDITOR AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO THE LAST DATE FOR FILING DISCHARGEABILITY
COMPLAINTS OR SIXTY (60) DAYS AFl'ER TIllS AGREEMENT HAS BEEN FILED WITH THE COURT,
WHICHEVER DATE IS LATE~ BY GIVING NOTICE OF RESCISSION TO THE HOLDER OF THE CLAIM.
Executed this the _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _-', 19_ _•

Debtor

Debtor
ACCEPl'ED AND AGREED TO:

I

~r

lr
1

B~~------------------

ntle

Creditor
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AfFIDAVIT OFATIORNEXFOR DEBTQR(S)
I,
• attorney for the debtors in the above captioned bankruptcy
proceeding declare that I represented the debtors during the negotiation of the foregoing Agreement and that said
Agreement represents a fully informed and voluntary agreement by the debtors which does not impose an undue
hardship on the debtors or a dependent of the debtor. I have fully advised the debtors of the legal effect and
consequences of this agreement and any default under the agreement.

Date

Attorney for Debtor(s)

J
J

J
J
J
J

J
J
J

J
j

J
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B.

Bankruptcy Questionaire

CLIENT QUESTIONS-Individual or Joint
Name and Other Information
You:
__________________ ______________________________________
1. a.
(1)
MaiUng _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
a) Addreu: _____________________________________________
Name:~

~

(3)
(4)

r

(5)

(6)
(7)

r

r

(8)

r
r

T~~hoM:(~--~),-----~-----------

Cou~---------------------------------------------------Have you moved within the last two years?
___No ___Yes
(a)
If Yes, enter addresses, occupancy dates, and names used:

Are mailing address and residence the same?
__No __Yes
If No, enter the residence below:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)

r
r

(13)

Social security number: _ _-_ _-_ _
Tax identification number:__________
Gender: __Male _Female
Marital status:
__Never Married
__Divorced __Widowed
__Married and living together
__Married and living apart
Other names used in last six years:

Spouse:

b.

__
---------------~-------------~------------------Name:
(1)
Mailing
_______________________________________________
Address: _________________________________________________

a)

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

r
r
r
1

(8)

Tel~hone:

(
)
County: _________-:--_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___
Have you moved within the last two years?
__No __Yes
(a)
If Yes, enter addresses, occupancy dates, and names used:

Are mailing address and residence the same?
__No __Yes
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If No, enter the residence below:

~)'---------------------------------------
~)-~---------------------------------
~)'----------------------------------------------------(9)
(10)
(11)

2. a.

(d)_ _ _ _~--------------------

Social security number: _ _-___-___
Tax identification number:
Other names used in last six years:

Are you currently employed? _Yes _No
If Yes, provide the following information about employment:
0)
_____________________________________________
(2)
Employer's address:____________________________________________
Emp~yer~n~,

(3)

(4)
(5)
(6)

Telephone: C
)_ _ _ '_ _ ___
Occupation and natureofbusiness:,______________________

(7)

Dates employed:~----:---::__':"'""":'------------------------------Relationship to business described above:
_Employee ___ Owner
If more than one emp~yer, provide the information requested
above about other employer(s):

(8)

b.

No
Is your spouse currently employed? __Yes
If Yes, provide the following information about employment:
(1)
Employer's name: ______________________________
Q)
Emp~yer's address: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Telephone: C'-_--J_-:--_ _ _ __
Occupation and nature ofbusiness:,________________________

(7)
(8)

Dates employed: ___-:-~::--:--:-------------------------Relationship to business descn"bed above:
_Employee _Owner
If more than one employer, provide the information requested above about other
employer(s):

3. Please provide the ~ income received from your prindpal place of employment (If unemployed, write
~ at Source(s):
You
This year: 19___
(a)
(i)
SOurce: __________________________
(ii)
Amount: $,_ _ __
Last year: 19___
~)
(i)
Source: ___________________________
(ii)
Amount: $,______
Previous year: 19___
(e)
(i)
SOurce: __________________________
(ii)

Amount: $,_ _ __

J
J
J

J

J
J
J
J
J
J
J

J
J
J
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•

•
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Spouse
(a)

r

~

___________________________________

Amount: $,_ _ _ __
Last year: 19_ _
G)
_______________________________________
(Ii)
Amount: $,_____
Previousyear:19_ _
(I)
Source:--:-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(Ii)
Amount: $,_ _ _ __
Sou~:~

(c)

b.

Have you received any other income, other than income received from your principal employment?
__No __Yes
If Yes, provide the following information
You
(a)
This year: 19_ _
(i)
Source(s): ______________________________________
(ii)
Amount: $,_ _ _ __
(b)
Last year: 19_ _
(i)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(Ii)
Amount: $,_ _ _ __
(c)
Previous year: 19_ _
(i)
____________________________________
(ii)
Amount: $'---_ ___
Spouse:
(a) This year: 19_ _
Source(s): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(ii)
Amount: $~_ ___
(b)
Last year: 19_ _
(i)
Source(s): ______________________________
(ii)
Amount: $'---_ ___
(c)
Previous year: 19_ _
______________________________
(ii)
Amount: $~_ ___
Have you made any PAYMENTS to anybody, within the past year of more than $600 other than
__Yes
normal scheduled payments? __No
If Yes, provide for each creditor:
Name & Address_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___
SO~(s):

Sou~(s):

ro

ro

4. a.

r
r
.r
r
r
r

ro

(Ii)

(b)

r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r

This year: 19_ _'_

SOu~(s):

Amount and Date,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Relationship, if any, to you,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
b.

Has any creditor ATIACHED/CARNISHED/SEIZED property within last year? _No _Yes
If Yes, provide for each garnishment or attachment:
Name & Address_______________________________________

Date of garnishment or attachment,_______________________________________
Property garnished or attached,_________________________________________

___________________________________________________________

V~ue,

c.

Has any creditor REPOSSESSED/FORECLOSED/RETURNED property within last year?
___No ___Yes
If Yes, provide for each repossession/foreclosure or return:
Name&Address,_____________________~----------------------------

r

r
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Date of repossession, foreclosure or retum,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Property repossessed, foreclosed upon or returned_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
________________________________________________________

V~ue.

d.

Have you given any creditor a mortgage or lien against any property within the last year?
___No _Yes
If Yes, provide for each lien:
Name&Address,______________~----------------------------Date of lien.____________________________________________
Propertymort~~----------------------------V~ue;
__~---~----------------------Relationship
to you, if any____________________________________________

e.

Has any creditor taken a SETOFF within last 90 days?
___No ___Yes
If
Yes, provide
for___________________________________________
each setoff:
& Address
_
Name
Dateofsetoff________________________________________________
Amountsetoff_____________________________________________________

5. Are you named in any LAWSUITS within last year? ___No ___Yes
If Yes, provide for each lawsuit:
TItle of lawsuit.__________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Type of suit___________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
Court name and location.____________________________________________
Num~

Starus~

TItle oflawsuit.___________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
Typeofsuit._________________________________________________________
Status,________________________________________________________________
Court name and location_________________________________________________
Numb~

6. Has any of your property been placed into a Court appointed RECEIVERSHIP within last year?
_No ___Yes
If Yes, provide the name and address of custodian; court name and location; title, num~, and date of the
ord~; and property description and value:
______________________________________________

J
J
J
,
I

J

J
J

J

J
J
J
J
J
J
j

Name&Addressofcustod~n

____________________________________________________
DateofCOurt~~___________________________________~---------------Property placed into receivership_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.:...-_ _
__________________________________________________________

Courtna~eandlocation

J

Value~

7. Have you made any GIFr or CONTRIBurION within the past year oth~ than the normal gifts to family
mem~ or charitable organizations?
__No __Yes
If Yes, provide for each gift or contribution:
Name & Address._____________________________________________________

•
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___________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________

RemtioMhlpmyou~

Da~of~ft~

~~~wm,

__

V~ue,

~

8. Any LOSSES from fire, theft, etc. withln mst year? ___No __Yes
If Yes, provide
of each loss:
_________________________________________________________
_
~~w~,

_____________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
Name and address of insurance company_____________________________________
_______________________________________________________

V~ue,

n.~ofloss~~~

CUamuumcesofw"~

COYeredbyiMunm~?

Smtusofc~

9. Have you coMulted and paid any other attorneys Cor DEBT COUNSELING? ___No ___Yes
If Yes, provide for each attorney:
_________________________________________________
Name&Address~

Da~

of payments and amounts __________________________________________

10. Have you made any TRANSFERS or CONVEYANCES of your property, within the past year?
_No __Yes
If Yes, provide for each traMfer:
Name & Address,____________________________________________

RemtioMhip, if any, m you__________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
Da~oftraMfer

~------

~pertytrans~

V~ue~cived,

11. Have you closed any bank ACCOUNTS within mst year? ___No ___Yes
If Yes, provide for each account:
Name & Address ofbank_________________________________________________
Typeandnumberofaccourn,________________________________________________
Final
__________________________________
of closin,l!jg___________________________________
bala~,

Da~

12. Have you maintained any SAFE DEPOSIT BOXES withln last year? ___No ___Yes
If Yes, provide for each box:
Name & Address ofbank._____________________________________________________

Name Address of person(s) with access m box______________------------------------Description of con~nts and values
n.~ surrendered (if applicable)
13. Are you currently in possession of any property belonging to another i.e. household goods, cars, etc.?
___No _Yes
If Yes, provide for each property:
Name&Addressofowner____________________________________________________
Descriptionofproperty_____________________________________________________
Locationofproperty_______________________________________________________
Valueofproperty__________________________________________________________
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14. Are you currently a party to any contracts that have not been completed, unexpired lease Ilgreements, or
timeshare agreements? __No __Yes
If Yes, provide the following information for each contract/lease:
Name & Addns:.______________________________________

Description of property involved:._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Terms of the contract _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Name & Addns: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Description of property involved: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Terms of the contract _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Have you ever filed bankruptcy before? _ _no

~es

If Yes, provide the following information about petition:
(1)
Nameoffiler: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(2)
Location (district) filed:._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(3)
Casenumber:._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(4)
(5)
(6)

Date filed: - - ' _ / _

Judge:-=---:':"---:=-_--:-~----------------Status (Pending, Dismissed, Judgment):

Has a business partner or your spouse ever filed bankruptcy? __No _Yes
If Yes, provide the following information about case:
(1)
Name of filer: _________________________________
(2)
Relationship:._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(3)
Location (district) filed: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(4)
Case number: _________________________________________

(5)
(6)

Date filed: _1_1_
Judge and status:

J
J
J
J
J

J

J
J
J
J
J
j

CUENT QUESTIONf-INDIVIDUALS IN BUSINESS
15. Have you been a partner, etc., or five percent owner of any other businesses within the last two years?
___No ___Yes
If Yes, provide:
Name&AddressofEnti~-------------________________________
Nature ofbusiness___________________
Dates ofoperation.___________________________
17. Has someone other than yourself kept your books of account within last six years?
__No __Yes
If
Yes, provide:
Name
& Address _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Period of time books were kept _________________________
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18. Has any person AUDITED your books of account during last six years? _No _Yes
If Yes, provide:
_______________________________________________________
Name&Add~:

Period of time books audited:,________________________
19. Is any person, other than yourself, CURRENTLY IN POSSESSION of books of account?
__ No_Yes
If Yes, provide: _______________________________________________________
Name&Add~

r
r

r
r
r
r
r
r
r

Are aU your books currently available?
_No_ _ Yes
_______________________________________________________
IfYes,~plam

20. Have you issued any FINANCIAL S1'ATEMENTS in last two years to creditors or others? __No __Yes
If Yes, provide the name and address of person(s) receiving statement(s), and date(s) issued:
____________________________________
Name&Add~:

Dateissued:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
21. Have you preformed any inventories within the last two years? __No __Yes
If Yes, provide the following information:
a. Last inventory:
(1) Date: _1_1_
(2) Name and address of person with records:

(3) Inventory dollar amount (cost, market, other):

b.

Previous inventory (if no previous inventory, write None in date space):
(1) Date: _ 1 - - ' _
(2) Name and address of person with records:

(3) Inventory dollar amount (cost, market, other):

r

,r

r
'<

r
r

1

TAX CREDITORS:

Do you owe any taxing authorities: ---Ye5 __no
If yes, please answer the following questions (use a separate sheet for additional tax creditors, if necessary):
a.

Name&Address,___________________________________
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_ __

~m~x.
__~~--------------~~---------------------------------Person incurred
debt --you __spouse ---Pint
Is anyone else responsible for debt --Ye5 __no
If yes, please provide
Name&Address,___ ___________________________________________________
~

Relationship to you.______________________________________________________
____________________________________
Amountdue._________________________________________________________
__________________________________________
Does the creditor owe you money? __no --Ye5
Ifyes,~~n~-----------------------------------------------------Duedebt~smcurred

Doyouagme~ththisamount~

Has creditor brought a lawsuit against you for this debt?
------Yell ___no
If yes, include on question 5 on client questions
b.

Name & Address._______________________________________________________

~oftax.--~~--------------~~--------------------------------Person incurred debt --you ___spouse ---pmt
Is anyone else responsible for debt --yes _ _no
If yes, provide:
Name & Address._________________________________________________________
RelatioMhlpto you.________________________________________________________
Date debt was incurred_______________________________________________________
Amountdue.____________________________________________________________
Doyoua~~ththisamount.--~---------------------------------------------Does the creditor owe you money? ___no --yes

Ifyes,~l~n~--------------------------------------------------

Has creditor brought a lawsuit against you for this debt?
__no
If yes, include on question 5 on client questions

~

SECURED CREDITORS:
Please provide the following information about all creditors that have a lien on any of your property. Use a
separate sheet of paper for additional secured creditors, if necessaty.
a)

Name & Address of secured creditor_______________________________________________

Aanuntnumber~~--~~-----------------------------------------------Are you related to this creditor many way__--:--:--___________________________________
Person incurred debt --you ___spouse ---'pint
Is anyone else respoMible for debt --Ye5 ___no
If yes, provide:
Name & Address__________________________________________________________

J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J

J
j

J
J
J

J
J
J

I

..J
Relationship to you

Does the debt involve=-a=-=n=-u:-:-:n=-ex=p';"ired-:-;--co-n-:-tr-a-ct=-o-r"";lea--se-------------------------------------

Date debt ~s incurred.___________________________
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___________________________________
Do you agree with this amount?_____________
Does the aeditor owe you money? __no ---Ye5
If~,~lmn,-----------------------------~ountdue,

r
r
r
r
r
r
r

Has aeditor turned this account over to an attorney or collection agenCY?---Jyes __no
If~,
Name&Address~

Has aeditor brought a lawsuit against you for this debt?

__no
If yes, include on question 5 on client questions
Description of the collateral,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___
~

~r~v~ueofrollat~._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Do you wish to keep this property_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

b)

Relationship to you.__________________________________________________________
Does the debt involve an unexpired contract or lease:....-___________________________________
Daredebtwasincurred_________________________________________________________
Amountdue'---~~------~----------------------Do you agree with this amount?~--------------------Does the creditor owe you money? __no ---yes
If yes, ~lain,--------------------------------

Has aeditor turned this account over to an attorney or collection agency?~ __no
If yes,
Name & Address_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

r

lr

Has aeditor brought a lawsuit against you for this debt?

-Y8S __no

If yes, include on question 5 on client questions
______________________________________________________
~riptionof~ecollateral

lr

1

'r
l

!r

Ir
I

Name & Address of secured creditor___________________________

Accountnumber~~--~~~--------------------
Are you related to this aeditor in any way__--:-~--------
Person incurred debt --you __spouse ----Pint
Is anyone else responsible for debt ---yes _ _no
If~, provide:
Name & Address,____________________________________________________________

r
r

Ir

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

~~v~ueofrollat~l,

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

Doyouwishtokeepthispro~rty--------------------________

c)

Name & Address of secured aeditor_____________________________________________

Acrountnumber_______-------------------------Are you related to this aeditor in any way__--:-___________
Person incurred debt --you __spouse ----Pint
Is anyone else responSible for debt ---yes _ _no
If yes, provide:
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__________________________________________________________

Name&Add~s,

Relationship to you._______________________________________......,_ _ __
Does the debt involve an unexpired contract or lease,_________________________
Date debt was inc:urred_________________________
Amountdue._~~-----~------------------

Do you agree with this amount?~----------------Does the creditor owe you money? ___no --yes

If~,~~~-------------------------------------------------Has creditor turned this account over to an attorney or collection agency?--Y'S __no
If~,
Name&Add~~

____________________________________________________

Has creditor brought a lawsuit against you for this debt?
----Ye5 __no
If yes, include on question 5 on client questions
Description ofthecollateral,_________________________________

Marl<etvalue of collateral.________________
Do you wish to keep this property_______________

j

UNSECURED CREDrrORS:
Please provide the following information about all unsecured creditors. This will include all credit cards,
doctors bUls, personal notes, etc. Use a separate sheet of paper for additional unsecured creditors, if necessary.
a)

J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J

Name & Add~s of unsecured creditor____________________________
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Accountnum~

Are you related to this creditor in any way_ _ _ _ __
Person incurred debt -you ___spouse -Pint
Is anyone else ~ponsible for debt --Ye5 ___no
If~, provide:
___________________________________
Name&Add~s,

j

J

J

J

Relationship to you_____________________________________________________
Does the debt involve an unexpired contract or lease'--_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Datedebtwasincurred_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

j

Amountdue,_ _ _ _ _ _~-----------Do you agree with this amount?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___
Does the creditor owe you money? __no --Ye5
If~,~~n,------------------------------------------

J
J

__________

Has creditor turned this account over to an attorney or collection agency?----Ye5 __no

If yes,
Name & Address_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Has creditor brought a lawsuit against you for this debt?
----Ye5 __no
If yes, include on question 5 on client questions

•
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b) Name &r: Address of unsecured creditor _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Accountnwnber_____________________________________________
Are you related to this creditor in any way_____________________________
Person incurred debt --you __spouse ---pint
Is anyone else responsible for debt --yes _ _no
If yes, provide:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Name&r:Address~

Relationship to you_____--:--:--:_.........._--:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Does the debt involve an unexpired contract or lease,_ _ _ __
Date debt was incurred_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
__________________________________
Do you agree with this amount?_____________________
Does the creditor owe you money? __no -.--.:yes
______________________________________
Amountdue~

,.

Ifyes,ppl~n~

fill

..
.
..
.
..
..

Has creditor turned this account over to an attorney or collection agency?---Ye5 __no
If~
,
Name&r:Address,_____________________________________________________________

Has creditor brought a lawsuit against you for this debt?
---Ye5 __no
If yes, include on question 5 on client questions
c) Name &r: Address of unsecured creditor ____________________________________________
Accountnumber________________________________________________
Are you related to this creditor in any way_______________________________
Person incurred debt --you __spouse ---Pint
Is anyone else responSible for debt --yes _ _no
If yes, provide:
Name&r:Address.____________________________________________

Relationship to you,_______________________________________________________
Does the debt involve an unexpired contract or lease'--'_ _ __
Datedebtwasincurred___________________________
Amountdue.________~----------------

Do you agree with this amount?________________
Does the creditor
owe you money? __no --yes
______________________________________________________________

Ifyes,expl~n

PI

Has creditor turned this account over to an attorney or collection agency?---Ye5 __no
If
yes,
Name&r:Address,
___________________________________________

..
.
..

Has creditor brought a lawsuit against you for this debt?

-------Ye5 ___no
If yes, include on question 5 on client questions
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d) Name & Address of unsecured creditor_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Accountnurnber______________________________________________________________
Are you related to this creditor in any way__~--------------------------------
Person incurred debt ---you __spouse -pint
Is anyone else responsible for debt ---yes _ _no
If yes, provide:
_________________________________________
N~e&Address.

Relationship toyou__________________________________
Does the debt involve an unexpired contract or lease._______
Date debt was incurred.__________________
Amountdue.____________________________________
Do you agree with this amount?____________________
Does the creditor owe you money? ___no ---yes
Ifyes,explain.___________________________________________
Has creditor turned this account over to an attorney or collection agency?------yes __no
If yes,
Name&Address___________________________________

Has creditor brought a lawsuit against you for this d~bt?
------yes __no
If yes, include on question 5 on client questions
e) Name & Address of unsecured creditor______________________________________________
Accountnurnber________________________________________
Are you related to this creditor in any way__________________________
Person incurred debt ---you __spouse --pint
Is anyone else responsible for debt --yes _ _no
If yes, provide:
Name &Address_________________________________________________
Rruationshiptoyou___________________________________
Does the debt involve an unexpired contract or lease_______
Date debt was incurred._________________
Amountdue______________________________
Do you agree with this amount?____________________
Does the creditor owe you money? __no --yes
Ifyes,explain,_______________________________________
Has creditor turned this account over to an attorney or collection agency?-----Jfes __no
If yes,
Name &Address__________________________________________________

Has creditor brought a lawsuit against you for this debt?
------yes __no
If yes, include on question 5 on client questions
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PROPERlY QUESI'IONS
Please answer the following questions about your property. If you do not own any property of the type
requested, simply write "NONEH •
What real estate do you own an interest in. Please provide the address of the property, and the market value.

How much cash do youhave?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Please list all checking and savings accounts.
Bankname&address ________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
____________________________________________

TYPeofa~ount

Balance~

On a separate sheet of paper, list all of your household goods with the market value of each item.
What is the value of your wearing apparel,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
What is the value of your jewelry_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Do you own any firearms? If yes, please list with values._ _-.,.._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Does your life insurance have a cash surrender value? If yes, how much and what insurance company_ _ __
Value ofanyannuities._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Value and location of any interests in IRA, ERISA, Keogh or other pension pIans.____________

Valueofanystocks~

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Value of any interests in partnerships._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Value of any bonds._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Does anyone owe you money? If yes~ who and how much ________________________
Are you owed a tax refund._________________________________
Please list all automobiles, trucks and trailers and their values_______________________
Value of any boats_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

List and value of office equipment _____________________________________
Attach list and values of equipment used in business, if any.
Valueofinventory _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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_________

List and value of any crops, stored or growingo-______________________

Attach list and value of any farm equipment'--_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
List and value any livestock_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

List and value any other property not listed above._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

..
.
.
..

.
..

.

..
..

.

..
.
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c.

Fee Agreement

BANI<RUPI'CY FEE AGREEMENr
The undersigned, whether one or more persons, hereby retain the law firm of
, for
representation in a bankruptcy proceeding in the bankruptcy division of the U. S. District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky. The undersigned agree to pay~law firm the sum of
DOLLARS AND no/lOO
($~ as a retainer in this proceeding. The undersigned' also agree to pay the filing fee and all other costs of this
action. The undersigned further understand that a record of the attorneys' time spent in worlcing on this bankruptcy
is being kept and that said attorneys will bill for the same at the rate of
DOLLARS ($.-J per hour. In the
event said attorneys' time, at such hourly rates, exceed the retainelj the undersigned further agree to pay and be
responsible for that additional time. The retainer does not apply to any adversary proceedings which may be
brought as a result of this bankruptcy. Nor does it apply to negotiations with creditors (other than meetings with
creditors which occur at the first meeting of creditors). Additional retainers may be required from the debtors in
the event of an adversary proceeding or extensive aeditor negotiations. Unless attorney fees are paid promptly
, reserves the right to withdraw from this proceeding with court approval at any time.
The undersigned further authorize and direct that any telephone expense may be charged to
the number of _ _•
This the _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _-I, 19_.

Debtor

Debtor

STATE OF KENTUCKY
COUNTY OF

••.scr.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by_--" on this the _ _ day of _ _ _ _.-I
19_.
My commission expires:
Notary Public
(Notarial Seal)

r

r
r

r
r

r
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D.

Phone:
Attorney for the Petitioners

r

r
r
r

r

r
r

UNITED SfATES BANKRUPfCY COURI' FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRlcr OF KEN11JCKY
_ _ _ DMSION
Inre

Case No.:

Debtor
Social Security No.: _~~_ __
and Debtor's Employer's Tax
Identification No.:,_ _ _ _ _ __

Rule 2016(b) - Statement of
Attomey Compensation
Chapter _ _ _ _ _ __

Debtor
Social Security No.:,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

DISCLOSURE OF COMPENSATION OF ATTORNEY FOR DEBTOR

1.

r
r
r
r

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. sec. 329(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 2016(b), I certify that I am the attorney for the
above-named debtor(s) and that compensation paid to me within one year before the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy, or agreed to be paid to me, for services rendered or to be rendered on behalf of
the debtor(s) in contemplation or in connection with the bankruptcy case is as follows:
For legal services in connection with this case I have agreed to
accept................................................................................................................ $

or
See Below

r

r
r
r

Disclosure of Compensation of Attomeyfor Debtor

Prior to the filing of this statement, I have
received ....•..........•.•.•.............•..........................•............•.•......•••••••.........••..•...•. $,_ _ _ __
Balance Due..........................................•••.................•.....•........•........•.•............ See below
(This is only used if there are special arrangements made for payment other than payment in full at
flling)
The debtor agrees to pay the firm of
$
at Elling and an additional
$_ _ at the
(first meeting of creditors or other designation) plus any amounts
over and above the retainer at their normal hourly rate.
2.

The source of the compensation paid to me was:

I I Debtor I I Other (specify)

3.

The source of compensation to be paid to me is:

I I Debtor I I Other (speciCy)
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4.

I I I have not agreed to share the above-disclosed compensation with any other person unless they are
members and associates of my law firm.
I I I have agreed to share the above-disclosed compensation with a person or persons who are not
members or assodates of my law firm. A copy of the agreement, together with a list of the names
of the people sharing in the compensation, is attached.

5.

In return for the above-disclosed fee, I have agreed to render legal services including:
a. Preparation and filing of any petition, schedules, statement of affairs and plan which may be
required;
b. Representation of the debtor at the initial meeting of aeditors;
c. Other provisions:
The debtor agrees to pay the firm of _ _ _ _ at their normal hourly rate, any amounts over
and above the retainer.

6.

By agreement with the debtor(s), the above-disclosed fee does not include the following services:
The standard fee agreement is for the basic bankruptcy proceedings listed above and does not
include representation in advenaty proceeding or tax counseling. If any other services are required
the fee will be discussed at that time.

In re _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Case No. (if known)
Debtors

j

J
CERI1FICATION

I certify that the foregoing is a complete statement of any agreement or arrangement for payment to me
for representation of the debtor(s) in this bankruptcy proceeding.

Date

J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J

Signature of Attorney

Name of law firm

j

J
J
J
J
J
•
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E.

Notice of Stay

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
CIRCUIT/DISTRICf COURI'

r
r

CASE NO. _ _ _ _ __

PLAINTIFF
YS.

DEFENDANTS

r
r

r
r

r
r
r

r
r

r
r
r
r
r

NOIlCEOF STAY

All interested persons will please take notice that _ _ _ _-'. have/has filed, on _ _ _..I
199-, in the United States Banlcruptcy Court for the Western District of Kentucky, a petition under the provisions of
Chapter _

of the United States Bankruptcy Code where said action is pending as Case No. _ _ _ _ _'
You will further take notice that 11 U.S.C. §362(a)(1) provides for an automatic stay of all

proceedings of this action.
_ _ _ _ _ _--', are/is represented in the above-mentioned Chapter _ _ _ _ by the
undersigned counsel.
Respectively submitted,

DEITZ &t FREEBURGER, P.S.C.
536 Chestnut Street
P. O. Box 21
Henderson, KY 42420
(502) 830-0830

By:
Attorney for Debtor

CERIlFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Stay was mailed,
day of
, 199_.
postage prepaid, to
; this the _
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F.

Amendment to Schedules

UNITED STATES BANKRUPfCY COURl'
FOR THE WESTERN DlSTRIcr OF KENTUCKY
)
)
)
)
)
)

INRE:

DEBTOR(S)

AMENDMENTlP SCHEDULES
Comes the debtor(s) and states that through error and Inadvertence, _ _ _ failed to list in schedule the
following:
INSTRUcrIONS FOR COMPLETING AMENDMENTS
oN~E~DEOF~SFORM

If amendment lists you as a Creditor, you have 90 days from the date of certification of mailing of
amendment within which to file a proof of claim. (ONLY IF CASE IS A CHAPl'ER 13 OR ASScr
CHAPTER 7).
The undersigned certifies under penalties of perjury, that I have read the foregoing amendment, and certify that
the statements therein contained are true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
Executed on: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

r
r
r

CASE NO.,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--', Debtor

Executed on: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--', Debtor
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPI'CY COURr
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICf OF KENTUCKY
)
)
)
)

INRE:

DEBTOR(S)

CASENQ,_________________

)
)

CERTlBCATE OF SERVICE AND
NanCE OF AMENDMENT TO SCHEDULES

I hereby certify that a copy of the attached Amendment to Schedules was this the ____ day of
_ _ _ _ _- - J '

199_forwarded to:

(List any creditor who has not been previously listed
and the trustee. Provide complete addresses.)
____________ ,TNstee

along with a copy of the Order for Meetins of Creditors by depositing a copy of same in the United States man,
properly addressed and postage prepaid.

Attorney for Debtor(s)

J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J

J
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G.

Motion and Order to Redeem Property

UNITED S1'ATES BANKRUPfCY COURI'

FOR THE
WESTERN Dl5l'Rlcr OF KENTUCKY
INRE:

CASE NUMBER

)
)
)
)
)

____~~~~~n~sL)_________________ )

MOTION TO REDEEM PROPERlY
Debtor(s) hereby move(s) the Court pursuant to Section 722 of litle 11, United States Code, for an Order
permitting the Debtor(s) to redeem an item of tangible personal property from a lien securing a dischargeable
consumer debt.
1)
The item of personal property involved is _ _ _ _--', which is intended primarily for personal, family
or household use.

2)

The debtor originally purchased the property on _____ and the original purchase price was $~_ _,

3)
The debtor has/has not obtained an appraisal and believes the fair market value of the property to be
$~----,
4)
The debtor represents that the debtor will have cash available to redeem the property within ten (10) days
of the entry of the requested Order.

The security interest of
in said property, except to the extent of the amount of the allowed
secured claim of said creditor, is a dischargeable consumer debt.

S)

The amount of the allowed secured claim of said creditor has been or should be fixed by Court as the sum
ofS,_ _ _ _ _,

6)

WHEREFORE, the Debtor moves the Court for an Order permitting the Debtor to redeem said property by paying
said creditor the aforesaid sum, and finding that the remainder of the claim of said creditor is a dischargeable
consumer debt.

Attorney for Debtor(s)

CERI1FICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing motion to redeem was served by regular mail upon ______-'
this the _ _ day of
,199_.

Attorney for Debtor(s)

r

r
(

r
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UNITEO STATES BANKRUPI'CY COURI'
FOR THE
WESTERN DlSTRIcr OF KENTUCKY
INRE:

CASENUMBBR

)
)
)
)
)

j
j

J

_ _-"oe~b~towrC~s)r.-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ )
ORDER TO REDEEM PROPERTY
No objections having been filed,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to redeem the _ _....be SUSTAINED.
IT IS FURl'HER ORDERED that the debtor shall tender to _ _ the sum of$._ _ _ which is
the amount of the allowed secured claim fixed by this Court within ten (10) days of the entry of this Order.

ENTERED BY ORDER OFCOURr

Date:._ _ _ __
United States Bankruptcy Judge
Prepared by:

Phone: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

j

J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J

I
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H.

Motion to Avoid Lien with Order

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
WESTERN DISTRICf OF KENTUCKY

DEBTOR(S)

MOUONTO AVOID LIEN

Debtor, by counsel, hereby moves the Court pursuant to Section 522(0 of the Bankruptcy Code to avoid
the lien on the following described property:
In support of said Motion, Debtor states:

1.

The amount of the claim which the lien secures is $:...-____--'

3.

The above mentioned lien is a ________ lien.

4.

Debtor submits the following information on the value of the property:
A).

Fair Market Value: $,_ _ _ _ _,

B).

Value listed in Schedules: $'--_ _ ___

o.

Value according to records of County Property Valuation Administration:

$~-----------

1

Jr
~

I

I

a creditor, filed a lien in the Office of the Clerk of _____ and a copy of the

2.

,r

Ir

_ _ _ _ _ _ _- - I ,

lien is attached.

r
r
r
r

Ir

CASE NO.,_ _ _ __

---------------------------)

r

lr

)
)
)
)
)

INRE:

D).

Purchase Price: $,________-'

E).

Date of Purchase: _______'

Fl.

Appraised Value (if recently appraised): $.______...

5.

The trustee haslhas not abandoned the property.

6.

The debtor does/does not claim an exemption of $~______ in said property.

7.

The lien held by the creditor impairs the exemption of the debtor in the property described in the

motion.
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WHEREFORE, the debtor moves the Court to order the lien void and for such other relief as may be
entitled. Any objection to this Motion must be filed within lS days of the certificate of service date below. If no
objections are received, an order approving this motion to avoid lien may be entered.

CERTIBCATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of this motion was served by first class mail upon, ________: this the_day
of _ _ _..... l99_.
Respectfully submitted,
By:
Attorney for Debtor

J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
j

J
J
J
J

J
•
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
. WESTERN DISTRICI' OF KENTUCKY
INRE:

DEBTOR(S)

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.,______

------------------------)
ORDER

No objections having been filed,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Avoid Lien of _ _ _ _ in the following property be, and
is, SUSTAINED.

Property Description:

A copy of this Order shaD be mailed to the attorney for debtor(s), trustee, and the above-named creditor.

Louisville, Kentucky
Dated: _ _ _ __

~=~~=~~==~==-..J.JUDGE

r
r

UNITED STATES BANKRUPfCY eOURI'
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HANDLING CASES WITH THE OFFICE
OF THE U.S. TRUSTEE

r

r
r
r

r

Joseph J. Golden
Office of the U.S. Trustee
Louisville, Kentucky

and
John R. Stonitsch
Office of the U.S. Trustee
Lexington, Kentucky

r

r
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r
r
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r
r

Copyright 2000, Joseph 1. Golden, John R. Stonitsch
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HANDLING CASES WITH THE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE

I.

INTRODUCTION

r

The "Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Act of 1986" enacted
on October 27, 1986, paved the way for the creation of United States Trustee's office which began
operating in Kentucky on September 7, 1988. While two states-North Carolina and Alabama-are
currently not a part of the United States Trustee system, all other states are. The offices are grouped
according to geographical considerations into regions which total twenty-one. Kentucky and
Tennessee make up Region 8. The headquarters for Region 8 is located in Memphis, Tennessee, the
largest city in the region.

r

The United States Trustee supervises and maintains chapter 11, 12, and 13 trustees, and a
panel of chapter 7 trustees. This section will focus only on the chapter 7 aspects of the United States
Trustee's duties as they relate to consumer bankruptcy matters.
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Statutory Authority

Those laws involving the establishment of the United States Trustee program are not to be
found in Title 11, The Bankruptcy Code, but are located in Title 28, Part II, Department of Justice.
The duties of the United States Trustee are set forth at 28 U.S.C. §586. The duties of the United
States Trustee most salient to chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy cases are set forth below:
1.

The duty to establish, maintain, and supervise a panel of private
trustees that are eligible and available to serve as trustees in cases
under chapter 7 of Title 11 (28 U.S.C. §586(a)(I));

2.

The duty to supervise the administration of cases and trustees in
cases under Title 11, whenever the United States Trustee deems it
appropriate by:
a.

Reviewing applications filed for compensation and
reimbursement under section 330 of Title 11 and filing
comments or objections (28 U.S.C. §586(a)(3)(A)(i));

b.

Taking such action to ensure that all reports, schedules,
and fees are properly and timely filed (28 U.S.C.
§586(a)(3)(D));

c.

Notifying the United States Attorney of matters that may
constitute crimes under the laws of the United States and
assisting the United States Attorney in carrying out
prosecutions based on such actions (28 U.S.C.
§586(a)(3)(F));

d.

Monitoring the progress of cases and taking such actions
as are deemed to be appropriate to prevent undue delay in
such progress (28 U.S.C. §586(a)(3)(G));

e.

Monitoring employment applications filed under section
327 of Title 11 (28 U.S.C. §586(a)(3)(H); and
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f.

Performing the duties prescribed for the United States
Trustee under Title 11 and such duties consistent with
Title 11.

The last of these duties (found at 28 U.S.C. §586(a)(5)) incorporates the many duties found
in Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) which the United States Trustee may be either required to perform
or may be required to see that other parties perform. The United States Trustee is not a judicial
officer, but is an officer under the Executive Branch of government. However, many of the duties
now required of the United States Trustee were previously performed by the. Judicial Branch of
government. For example, appointments of trustees were previously made by judges.
Some major rights and responsibilities of the United States Trustee as they relate to
consumer bankruptcy cases that are mentioned in Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) follow:
1.

Pointing out abuses to the court with respect to bankruptcy petition
preparers (11 U.S.C. s§ 11 O(h)(3);

2.

Raising and being heard on any issue in any case or proceeding
under Title 11 (11 U.S.C. §307);

3.

Serving as the chapter 7 trustee in a case when necessary (11
U.S.C. §321);

4.

Determining the amount of a trustee's bond and the sufficiency of
the trustee's surety (11 U.S.C. §322);

5.

Convening the creditors' meetings and presiding over such
meetings (11 U.S.C. §341);

6.

Questioning the debtor and administering the oath (11 U.S.C.
§343);

7.

Appointing an interim trustee to serve in the case who becomes the
trustee ifno election is held (11 U.S.C. §701);

8.

Examiningthereportsandaccountsoftrustees(11 U.S.C. §704(8),
(9));

9.

Seeking the dismissal of cases by reason of debtors' substantial
abuse (11 U.S.C. §707(b)); and

10.

Objecting to or seeking the revocation of debtors' discharges (11
U.S.C. §727).

As can be seen, Congress intended the United States Trustee to be an important party in the
consumer bankruptcy process.
B.

Mission Statement
The United States Trustee's Mission Statement is set forth below:
"The United States Trustee Program acts in the public interest to promote
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the efficiency and to protect and preserve the integrity of the bankruptcy
system. It works to secure the just, speedy, and economical resolution of
bankruptcy cases; monitors the conduct of parties and takes action to
ensure compliance with applicable laws and procedures; identifies and
investigates bankruptcy fraud and abuse; and oversees administrative
functions in bankruptcy cases."
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The Mission Statement incorporates the concept set forth in Rule 100 1 of the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure as promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States, which states:
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"These rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every case and proceeding."
Many of the day-to-day goals of the United States Trustee are aimed at speedy and fair case
treatment, reasonable fees for those professionals involved in cases, and increased distribution of
dividends to creditors.

n.

CASE ADMINISTRATION

The United States Trustee has the responsibility for monitoring the progress of cases in
bankruptcy and taking appropriate actions to prevent undue delay. Accompanying the duty to
prevent undue delay is the United States Trustee's duty to know (or be in a position to learn) about
each case.
A.

Review Of Schedules

The 12 month period ending March 2000, 908,802 Chapter 7 cases were filed in the U.S.
It is estimated that as many as eighteen thousand Chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy cases will be filed
in Kentucky in the year 2000. In an ideal environment, the United States Trustee would make a
cursory examination of each case and review the schedules, statements and lists of each debtor.
Currently, spot checks are randomly conducted. If a case requires special attention, a file is
assembled and a monitoring process begins.
One area of United States Trustee concern is the amount of attorney fees charged consumer
debtors. Since most consumer cases involve credit card debt and medical expense debt and involve
virtually no unencumbered or non exemptible assets, the skill level of the debtors' attorneys are not
particularly taxed. In this regard, when the United States Trustee identifies cases in which fees
appear excessive, the normal course is to call or write the debtors' attorney and request an
explanation. Recourse to the court is permitted by 11 U.S.C. §329. This section governs the
debtor's transactions with the debtor's attorney and permits an exploration of the fee issue. Section
329 also codifies the court's authority to govern the reasonableness ofthe fees charged by attorneys
for debtors, and if fees are found excessive, the court has the power to cancel the fee agreement or
make other determinations.
Another area of concern in dealing with the debtors' schedules, is whether or not the
schedules provide creditors with a sufficiently clear picture of the debtors' financial condition in
order to explain the debtors' inability to satisfy debts or determine the cause of bankruptcy. On
occasion, when debtors' schedules are unclear, the United States Trustee has moved the court to
require amendments. Therefore, a reading of the schedules by the United States Trustee staff is an
important function of the office.
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As part of monitoring the schedules and statement of affairs, the United States Trustee
routinely checks for multiple filers: Multiple filings are one indication of bad faith. The United
States Trustee also monitors whether the debtor(s) has filed a Chapter 7 within the full 6 year period.
If the debtor(s) have received a discharge within 6 years, the office will file a motion to dismiss
under 707(a). This is usually done if the attorney for the debtor does not voluntarily do so after
contact with this office.
The Office of the United States Trustee may use llUSC 707(a) in a motion to dismiss the
petition in Bankruptcy for "cause". 707(a) states:

t
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(a) The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and a hearing and only
for cause, including(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(2) nonpayment of any fees or charges required under chapter 123 of title 28; and
(3) failure ofthe debtor in a voluntary case to file, within fifteen days or such additional time
as the court may allow after the filing of the petition commencing such case, the information
required by paragraph (1) of section 521, but only on a motion by the United States Trustee.

In In Re Zick, 931 F.2d 1124, (6 Circuit 1991), that court determined that bad faith can be
determined to be "cause" for the court to dismiss the case. Specifically "fact driven", egregious
actions by the debtor(s), such as spending a state court settlement within 30 days of filing, along
with other factors, could warrant the United States Trustee to file an action to dismiss.

J
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Occasionally, signatures on petitions are checked to verify authenticity. There have been
occasions where one debtor has signed the name of the other to the petition.

B.

Substantial Abuse

.J

"Substantial abuse" is a concept intended by Congress to deny a debtor the use of the
bankruptcy system in order to discharge debts and achieve a "fresh start". Section 707(b) is set forth
as follows:
"(b) After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by the United
States Trustee, but not at the request or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed
by an individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that
the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions ofthis chapter. There shall be
a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor."
11 U.S.C. §707(b).
In essence and stripped to the barest essentials, if a debtor records sufficient disposable
income, as reflected in debtors' Schedules I and J, to make a meaningful payback to creditors over
a period of time, the United States Trustee is placed in the posture of considering moving for
dismissal of a case. Numerous factors play into the scenario. It may be that the debtor has lost a
goodjob, been involved in a divorce proceeding, suffered serious illness, and the income stream will
be interrupted with a corresponding increase in expenses. Efforts are made to communicate with
debtors prior to making a motion to dismiss.
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This statute is geared strictly to consumer debts. In interpreting the statute, the Sixth Circuit
in In Re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123 (1989), ruled that the honest debtor and/or the needy debtor could
make use ofthe bankruptcy system, but denied the "fresh start" to those debtors who weren't needy
or who weren't honest.
The United States Trustee examines each situation in light of the facts of the case in
determining whether to move forward or not. It is suggested that debtors' counsel carefully pre:pare
Schedule I and point out anticipated changes in income of more than ten percent (10%) on the face
of the schedule.
C.

Criminal Referrals

Section 586(a)(3)(F) of Title 28 requires the United States Trustee to notify the United
States Attorney of the occurrence of any action which may constitute a crime under the laws ofthe
United States. This corresponds to the duties ofother parties in the bankruptcy process-judges and
trustees-to report potential criminal matters to the United States Attorney as is required by Title 18
Section 3057, which states:
"§ 3057. Bankruptcy investigations
(a)

Any judge, receiver, or trustee having reasonable grounds for
believing that any violation under chapter 9 of this title or other
laws of the United States relating to insolvent debtors,
receiverships or reorganization plans has been committed, or that
an investigation should be had in connection therewith, shall report
to the appropriate United States attorney all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the names of the witnesses and the
offense or offenses believed to have been committed. Where one
of such officers has made such report, the others need not do so.

(b)

The United States attorney thereupon shall inquire into the facts
and report thereon to the judge, and if it appears probable that any
such offense has been committed, shall without delay, present the
matter to the grand jury, unless upon inquiry and examination he
decides that the ends of public justice do no require investigation
or prosecution, in which case he shall report the facts to the
Attorney General for his direction."

The United States Trustee has taken a very aggressive role in seeking to uncover situations
involving fraudulent schemes, concealed assets, perjury, false proofs of claims, and such other
activities which destroy the integrity of the bankruptcy system. United States Trustee personnel
have conducted extensive investigations and reconstructions of records, appeared as both fact and
expert witnesses in federal trials, lectured other governmental agencies, including the Federal
Bureau oflnvestigation-all with the purpose ofadvancing integrity within the Bankruptcy system.
Consumer bankruptcy cases normally do not generate the sophisticated schemes seen in
business bankruptcies. However, there is no statistical information on the amount of fraud tb.at
occurs in consumer bankruptcy cases. Information about consumer bankruptcy fraud matters is most
frequently generated in the form of tips from ex-spouses, relatives, and friends who are either
co-makers or guarantors of debts.
The policy of the United States Trustee, prior to making a criminal referral, is to request a
written statement from the person with information about the debtors' alleged fraud. Personnel from
the United States Trustee's office will conduct an investigation, and if satisfied, will then make the
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referral. Referrals are made without publicity and United States Trustee personnel will rarely
discuss referrals with anyone other than federal law enforcement officials. The lack of public
knowledge on this subject belies the weight and emphasis the United States Trustee places on this
function.

D.

Employment Of Professionals

Consumer debtors choose their own counsel. Counsel is required to set forth in a Rule
2016(b) statement the terms of counsel's employment. This disclosure is attached to the petition,
filed with the Court, and also transmitted to the United States Trustee. Usually, this is the last and
only matter in which consumer debtors are involved with respect to professionals.
However, about three per cent (3%) ofthe anticipated eighteen thousand chapter 7 consumer
cases for 2000-or perhaps five to six hundred cases-will be denominated as asset cases. Asset
cases involve considerably more work than the no-asset cases. Assets for distribution to unsecured
creditors need to be collected, liquidated, and disposed of. The panel trustee may hire auctioneers,
attorneys, accountants, appraisers, and other types of professionals in order to assist in the handling
of the case.
Section 327 of the Code and Rule 2014 govern the procedures involved in the hiring of
professionals. The United States Trustee plays a major role in pointing out conflicts to the court
with respect to the employment of professionals.
The "disinterestedness" of the professional in the case (defined at section 101) is a
determining factor in whether or not a professional may be permitted by the court to be involved in
the bankruptcy process. This process places high regard on fiduciary concepts and fiduciary
relationships.
E.

Petition Prepares

The United States Trustee has been instrumental in the enforcement of 11USC 11 0 and the
unauthorized practice of law. 11USC 11 0 deals with penalties for persons who negligently or
fraudulently prepare Bankruptcy petitions. In addition to section 110, United States Trustee have
grounded their complaints on state law prosecuting the unauthorized practice oflaw, section 105 and
329, and contempt power set forth in Rule 9020. The courts have generally proscribed all activity
except the mere typing of a Bankruptcy petition and schedules from the unauthorized practice of
law, although some courts have concluded that prosecution ofthe unauthorized practice oflaw rests
with the states. United States Trustees have also referred a number ofcases for criminal prosecution
under 18USC § 156. Injunctive relief is routinely obtained. There have been instances where an
attorney is involved with a petition preparer or non lawyer. Also a petition preparer may be engaged
under the umbrella of an attorney or an attorney over charging for services if all the work is done
by a paralegal. There are other ethical considerations such as fee splitting, trust fund or escrow
account violations. The United States Trustee office has used 11 USC329 motions, injunctions, show
cause motions, Bar referrals, and referrals to court disciplinary panels.
F.

Complaints

There are instance where a debtor has become dissatisfied with the services oftheir attorney.
The United States Trustee is sometimes contacted by the debtor who has formal complaints about
their attorney. The United States Trustee in most instances, directs the debtor to the local Bar
Association and recommends that a formal complaint be filed with that entity. There are times
though that the United States Trustee becomes actively involved with the local Bar association
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directly. This can occur if an attorney has repeated complaints logged against himlher and the
United States Trustee becomes aware ofthese complaints. Also, there are times when a panel trus'tee
files a complaint with our office concerning conduct by a debtors attorney in filling out lhe
schedules and statement ofaffairs. Depending on the nature and number ofoccurrences, the United
States Trustee may take some action, from calling the attorney to filing a formal complaint.

III.

PANEL TRUSTEE

Panel trustees are the backbone ofthe consumer chapter 7 process. The consumer debtors'
contact with a bankruptcy system "authority figure" is almost exclusively only the panel trustee, not
United States Trustee personnel, the bankruptcy court clerk personnel, or judicial officers. It is the
panel trustee who is responsible to the creditor body for making sure their positions are protected
when necessary and for determining whether or not the case should be denominated as an "asset"
case or a "no asset" case. Since about ninety-seven percent (97%) of the cases will be declared "no
asset" cases in 2000, the panel trustee is the consumer debtors' only brush with the bankruptcy
system.
A.

Appointment To The Case

Section 701 requires the United States Trustee to promptly, after a case filing, appoint one
of the panel trustees to serve as interim trustee until the first meeting of creditors about thirty (30)
days later. If no trustee is elected, then the interim trustee becomes the permanent trustee. Secti on
702(d). Rarely, ifever, is there an election for a trustee in a consumer bankruptcy case. Therefore,
as a practical matter, once the United States Trustee appoints an interim trustee, that trustee knows
he or she will serve continuously in the case.
The panel trustee qualifies by filing a bond in favor of the United States in an amount
determined by the United States Trustee and conditioned upon the faithful performance of the
trustee's official duties. The United States Trustee also determines the sufficiency ofthe surety on
such a bond. The trustee's bond is a broad instrument and not one that merely guarantees paymt~nt
if the trustee should abscond with money. The acceptance ofthe appointment by the panel trustee
is an assumption of a number of fiduciary duties owed by the trustee to the estate. A determination
by a bankruptcy court that the trustee has breached a duty owed to the estate calls into question l:he
trustee's lack of faithful performance and liability under the surety bond.
In accepting the appointment, the trustee must carefully determine whether or not conflicts
are evident from the schedules as between the trustee and the consumer debtor. Likewise, the trustee
should decline accepting a case in which one of the trustee's clients has a claim against the debtor.
If a trustee declines or rejects a case at or near the time of appointment, the United States
Trustee must appoint another interim trustee.
B.

Meeting Of Creditors

The meeting of creditors calls for the debtor to be placed under oath and examined by the
United States Trustee and other interested parties. §§341,343. By statute, the United States Trustee
presides over this meeting. The Court may neither preside over the meeting nor attend. The United
States Trustee has delegated the authority to preside over meetings ofcreditors to the panel trustee.
At the meeting, the debtor is examined by the panel trustee and other interested parties. The
proceedings are tape recorded and the tapes are turned over to the United States Trustee which
maintains custody ofthem for two (2) years. Anyone can obtain a copy by writing the United States
Trustee and providing the United States Trustee with blank tapes.
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Meeting places in the Eastern District of Kentucky are held in Lexington, Covington,
Ashland, Pikeville, Corbin and Frankfort. In the Western District they are held in Louisville,
Bowling Green, Paducah and Owensboro. Louisville and Lexington meeting places are located in
spaces provided by the United States Trustee. All other places in Kentucky make use of facilities
where bankruptcy courts are located.
The meeting of creditors not only provides for debtors' examinations, but also operates as
a clearinghouse for debtors and creditors to work out reaffirmation agreements, arrange to surrender
property, as well as working out other matters. In almost every case the meeting venue provides the
only face-to-face contact among the parties to the process-debtors, creditors, their representatives,
and panel trustees.
Congress has stepped up its desire to make consumer debtors aware ofalternatives to fIling
a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. For example, Section 342 requires the clerk to notify the debtors of
the availability ofother chapters. As seen on the face ofthe petition, debtors must acknowledge that
they are aware of the availability of other chapters. In addition, attorneys for debtors must declare
that they have informed debtors of the availability of other chapters.

Recently, Congress enacted 11 U.S.C. section 341(d) requiring the trustee to ensure the
Chapter 7 debtor is aware of the availability of relief under other chapters as well as the effects of
discharge and reaffirmation. This new law requires the panel trustee to question the debtor about
the debtors' knowledge ofthe impact of bankruptcy and its effects on future actions of the debtors.
C.

Trustee Oversight

By statute (28 U.S.C. §586), the United States Trustee is required to establish, maintain, and
supervise the panel ofprivate trustees. Private trustees are regarded as independent contractors, not
employees. "Establishment of the panel" requires the United States Trustee to be involved in
recruitment, background investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, hiring practic,es,
including equal opportunity and diversity issues. "Maintaining the panel" requires the United States
Trustee to engage in periodic training, one-on-one training, review of reports, review of bank
deposits, other reviews, and to provide trustees with a handbook on policy and procedure.
"Supervision" requires the United States Trustee to discuss issues in cases, visit the trustees
regularly, and sample the trustee's legal and accounting practices to ensure that these practices
comport with sound fiscal and fiduciary practices. The United States Trustee makes policy, and also
litigates with and against panel trustees, creditors, and debtors. Because ofthese numerous contacts
and relationships, the United States Trustee attempts to be forthright in the positions taken, both in
policy-making and litigation, and attempts to deal with panel trustees in an even-handed fashion with
respect to the United States Trustee's oversight powers.
D.

Duties Of Trustee

In the consumer bankruptcy setting the primary function ofthe United States Trustee is to
see that the panel trustee presides at the meeting of creditors, tapes the proceedings, fIles a
memorandum of the proceedings, and submits a final report, referred to as an "NDR" (No
Distribution Report) as required by Rule 5009. This permits the case closing process to begin.
Additionally, the panel trustee must ensure that the debtor performs those intentions as
specified in section 521(2)(B). For example, surrendering assets to creditors who hold security
interests.
The trustee must investigate the financial affairs ofthe debtor. As a practical matter, panel
B-8

trustees satisfy this from an examination of the schedules, statements, and lists as well as :the
interrogation of the debtor at the meeting of creditors.
E.

Asset Collection And Liquidation

In the event the case is an asset case, the panel trustee must collect and reduce to money
property of the estate. Section 704(1). One of the primary goals of the United States Trustee is: to
check the conduct of the panel trustee to ensure that all assets have been identified, that they are
physically collected or taken into custody, and timely liquidated.
The practice in Kentucky, as is the case in other jurisdictions, has been for debtors to
maintain control of estate assets until the panel trustee requests them. A reading of section 521 (4)
is clearly contrary to the practice. However, in today' s setting, with consumer bankruptcies at a nl~ar
all-time high, practicalities seem to take precedence.
The United States Trustee gauges the panel trustee's efforts at taking possession of estate
assets and encourages trustees to quickly liquidate assets. Statistical information is collected from
cases in order to determine how much of the assets' values go toward fees and expenses and how
much is distributed to creditors. Since panel trustees represent the interests of unsecured creditors
primarily, the United States Trustee encourages diligence and aggressiveness from the panel trustees
in order to maximize dividends to creditors.
F.

Investment Of Funds

The result ofasset liquidation is cash proceeds. The United States Trustee requires the panel
trustee to carefully safeguard funds by placing funds in a federally insured depository as set forth
in 11 U .S.C. §345. The money is kept in accounts clearly identified as trust accounts. Panel trustl;!es
are required to invest funds in interest-bearing accounts when doing so 'Would promote meaningful
distributions to creditors.

Since the limit of a federally insured depository is $100,000, the United States Trustee has
agreements with authorized banks and the appropriate Federal Reserve branches, that when funds
on hand exceed $100,000 the depository bank will pledge its own assets as collateral to guarantee
the funds of creditors in the event of a bank failure.
Various documents relative to this collateralization are maintained by the United States
Trustee for each panel trustee and each case.
G.

Submission Of Reports

Trustees as fiduciaries are required to make periodic reports to the United States Trustee.
The United States Trustee examines these reports and makes use of them as a management tool.
A key report is the 180 Day Report. In this report, which the panel trustee is required to
submit to the United States Trustee each six (6) months, the trustee records the number of cases to
which he or she was appointed during that time period. Also, the trustee reports the num ber ofcases
closed. Total funds on hand and total funds for each case are reported. This assists the United States
Trustee in determining changes in the trustee's bond amounts. It also provides a mechanism for the
panel trustee to control his or her inventory ofcases because the United States Trustee maintains its
own data base and can also request the court clerk to provide a listing of cases. All these lists are
used by the United States Trustee to ensure cases do not "fall through the cracks" but move along
steadily.
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For each case the panel trustee must submit a report listing each asset whether the debtor
listed it or not.
A form that reflects a checkbook entry process must be filed with the United States Trustee
in each case in which the trustee holds cash funds. This permits cross-checking between other
reports such as auctioneer reports or bank reports, in order to determine the movement of assds
through the liquidation process.
H.

Case Closings

The United States Trustee must examine the case closing documents prepared by the panel
trustee prior to their submission to court for approval in cases where assets are to be distributed to
creditors. These documents include a request by the trustee for his statutory compensation as well
as his out-of-pocket expenses incurred during the administration ofthe estate. Before an asset case
can be closed, all professional fee applications must be submitted to the Court for approval and all
creditors' proofs of claim examined for objections by the panel trustee.
While asset collection and distribution occur in only a small percentage ofbankruptcy cases,
debtors are anxious to see if priority creditors will be satisfied. Generally, priority creditors ~Lre
federal, state, and sometimes local taxing agencies whose debts are not normally extinguished by
bankruptcy. Since these debts will survive bankruptcy, the more the trustee is able to pay to satisfy
them, the less the debtor will have to pay post petition. Unsecured creditors take the balance of
funds held by the trustee. In some unusual situations there will be sufficient funds to pay all
administrative, priority and unsecured creditors in full with interest. On occasion, the debtors will
receive a refund of sums left remaining after all claims have been satisfied in full.
The distribution scheme in bankruptcy is complex. Trustees are required to strictly follow
that scheme in making lawful distributions of dividends to creditors. The United States Trustee's
function is to double-check the trustee's distribution proposals and assist the trustee in ensuring that
the statutory scheme of payments to creditors is carried out.
The panel trustee disburses estate funds in accordance with the court approved order of
distribution. As soon as all checks have cleared the account, the trustee submits a final account
along with all canceled checks and bank statements to the United States Trustee for review. If the
United States Trustee determines that the funds have been properly disbursed by the panel trustl~e,
the final account is sent to the court for approval and the case is administratively closed.
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Having successfully litigated or sought recovery on a claim against a debtor the word
"bankruptcy" (in particular Chapter 7, commonly referred to as a "straight" or "liquidation"
bankruptcy) can strike fear in the hearts of creditors. "What happens to my claim now?", "Will I get
paid?", and for the secured creditors, "What happens to my collateral?" are all common and
legitimate questions and concerns raised by creditors when a bankruptcy ensues. The ability of a
creditor to obtain recovery in a bankruptcy is directly related to the creditor's knowledge of the
proceeding, and its experience (and that of its counsel) in dealing with bankruptcy issues. This
outline is designed to provide a general overview of the most important Chapter 7 bankruptcy
concepts.
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1. THE AUTOMATIC STAY ANn ITS IMPORTANCE.
In the typical Chapter 7 case, a consumer debtor is seeking relief from creditor attempts to obtain
recovery on an outstanding debt, either through non-litigation methods such as collection letters and
telephone calls, or through legal process, a judgment, garnishment, execution and similar collection
measures. It is critical for the creditor and practitioner to remember that the filing of a bankruptcy
petition (under any chapter, including 7) creates an automatic stay, stopping virtually all attempts
by the creditor to enforce a pre-petition obligation of the debtor.
The automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. §362 is one of the most fundamental protections
afforded the consumer debtor by the Bankruptcy Code. The stay arises immediately and becomes
effective automatically without court order upon the filing of the bankruptcy case. No stay arises,
however, until the petition is in-fact filed with the clerk.
The stay stops all collection efforts against a debtor. All collection proceedings (both pre and
post jUdgment) are stayed, including actions against the debtor or any property comprising the
debtor's estate.
In the typical consumer Chapter 7 case, the stay only prevents action by creditors against the
debtor and the debtor's property which is part of the bankruptcy estate. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v.
New Jersey Dept. ofEnvtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 106 S.Ct. 755, 88 L.Ed.2d 859 (1986). This
is different from the protection afforded under Chapter 13, where the stay is made applicable to
both the debtor and to "co-debtors" in Chapter 13 by virtue of 11 U.S.C. §1301. Thus, in a
consumer bankruptcy filed under Chapter 13, a creditor may not act to collect any part of a consumer
debt owed by a debtor in bankruptcy from any individual that is also liable for the debt in
conjunction with the debtor (typically friends or relatives that may have co-signed an obligation for
the debtor). 11 U.S.C. §1301. In Chapter 7, the co-debtor stay is not applicable and co-debtors and
their property are "fair game" through normal state law remedies.

1.1 Scope of the Automatic Stay.
The stay provided by §362 is extremely broad in its scope, and with certain limited
exceptions enumerated by statute or carved out by judicial decisions applies to almost any action a
creditor might take against the debtor or property of the debtor's estate. Although there are
exceptions, these are narrowly construed and a creditor contemplating action against a debtor or the
debtor's property post-filing should consult an attorney to discuss the effect of the stay on the
proposed course of conduct. In determining what constitutes "property of the estate" subject to
protection from the stay, the practitioner is advised to refer to 11 U.S.C. 541, which provides a
comprehensive list of the types of property and property interests that make up the estate, as well as
those interests not included as property of the estate. As a rule of thumb, a creditor should consider
any action it is contemplating against the debtor or their property post-bankruptcy "off-limits'" unless
a well recognized exception is granted by the bankruptcy court or agreed to by the debtor.
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§362 lists those actions which are stayed upon the commencement of a bankruptcy as
follows:

(a) Litigation. §362(a)(1) provides for a broad stay of litigation against the debtor and
prohibits the commencement or continuation ofany judicial, administrative or similar ''proceedings''
against the debtor based upon any claim which arose prior to the filing of the debtor's petition.
(b) EnforcementofJudgments. §362(a)(2) stays enforcement of any judgment obtained
pre-petition against the debtor or against property ofthe estate. For example, the stay would prohibit
actions to commence or continue with wage or non-wage garnishment or attachment, post-judgment
replevin of property, pursuing execution against a debtor's real or personal property, and all similar
attempts of a creditor to recover on a judgment obtained prior to commencement of the case.
(c) Acts to Obtain Possession ofProperty ofthe Estate. §302(a)(3) prohibits a creditor
from taking any action to obtain possession of, or to exercise control over, property of the debtor's
estate. For example, a creditor's post-petition use of self-help repossession remedies authorized
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, Sec. 9-503 is prohibited by the stay, absent an
order annulling, modifying or terminating the stay (discussed below).
(d) Acts to Create, Perfect or Enforce any Lien Against Property of the Debtor or the
Estate of the Debtor. §362(a)(4) and (a)(5) prevent a creditor from, for example, filing a notice of
judgment lien against real property, which would otherwise be authorized under KRS 426.720, filing
or recording a mortgage lien or perfecting a lien on a motor vehicle owned by the debtor under
Kentucky's title lien statutes.
(e) Acts to Collect, Assess or Recover Claims Againstt/,e Debtor. §362(a)(6), although
similar to paragraph (a)( 1), prohibits any "act" (as opposed to a "proceeding") by a creditor to collect
a pre-petition debt. Under this provision, informal "acts" (such as demand or acceleration of a
promissory note) are stayed, in the same manner as formal litigation is prohibited. The practitioner
should further refer to the broad definition of the term "claim" set forth at 11 U.S.C. §101.
(f) Setoff. §362(a)(7) prohibits a creditor's "setoff of any debt owing to a debtor that
arose before commencement of the [bankruptcy case] against any claim against the debtor.""This
section clearly prohibits actions such as the "pure" setoff of a debtor's bank account to payor satisfy
a concurrent obligation of the debtor to the bank. See,~, In re Nelson, 6 B.R. 248 (Bankr. D. An.
1980).

Prior to 1995, it had also been held by several courts that the placing of an administrative
"freeze" or hold on a debtor's bank or similar account by a creditor was also a violation of this
section. See, ~, In re Patterson, 967 F.2d 505 (11 th Cir. 1992). However, in Citizens Bank of
Maryland v. Strumpf, 116 S.Ct. 286, 116 S.Ct. 286, 133 L.ED.2d 258 (1995) the Supreme Court
settled this debate by unanimously ruling that the so called "freeze" or administrative hold was not
a setoff in violation of the Bankruptcy Code, because the bank's refusal to pay was not permanent
and absolute, and was merely a temporary measure to preserve the status quo while it sought relief
from the sty in the bankruptcy court to pursue its common law right to setoff against the account.
According to the Court in Strumpf, setoff in violation of the automatic stay does not occur until (i)
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a decision to effectuate it has been made; (ii) some action accomplishing it has been taken; and (iii)
a recording of it has been entered. An important caveat to note here, however, is that the creditor
which has placed an administrative hold on an account should be careful to promptly bring the matter
to the bankruptcy court's attention through a form motion for relief from or modification of the stay
to all the setoff under 11 U.S.C. §506 and 553. The language of the Strumpf opinion sanctions only
a "temporary", not indefinite, hold on the debtor's funds to allow the creditor to determine how to
proceed.
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1.2 Violation oft/Ie Stay; Penalties.
A majority of Circuits have held that actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void
ab initio and without effect, regardless of whether the creditor has notice of the stay. See Raymark
Industries. Inc. v. Lai, 973 F.2d 1125, 1132 (3n! Cir. 1992); In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569,574 (9th
Cir. 1992); In re Calder, 907 F.2d 953,956 (lOth Cir. 1990); Mathews v. Rosene, 739 F.2d 249,251
(7th Cir. 1984); Borg Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Hall, 685 F.2d 1306 (lIth Cir. 1982). It has been
held that a creditor which initiates collection activity post-petition, even without knowledge of the
bankruptcy, has an affirmative duty to restore the status quo without the debtor having to seek relief
from the bankruptcy court. In re Dungey, 99 B.R. 814, 816 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989). Failure ofa
creditor to restore the debtor to the status quo voluntarily could lead to a finding that the Creditor
has acted in willful violation of the stay. In re Dungey, 99 B.R. at 816.
In 1993, the Sixth Circuit reversed its earlier position and concluded that actions in violation
of the stay are merely voidable, rather than void. Easley v. Pettibone Michigan Corp., 990 F.2d 905
(6th Cir. 1993). Thus, under some limited circumstances, such as where a debtor unreasonably
withholds notice of the stay and the creditor would be prejudiced as a result, or where the debtor is
attempting to use the stay unfairly as a shield to avoid an unfavorable result, the protection afforded
by §362 may be unavailable to the debtor. Easley, Id.at 911.
The distinction between whether actions in violation of the stay are void or voidable can be
important in a practical sense for the creditor. For example, suppose in a Chapter 7 case a creditor
acts in good faith post-petition to repossess a vehicle in which it holds a security interest, without
notice that the bankruptcy has been filed or that the stay is in effect. Such an action would clearly
constitute a technical violation of the stay. However, because the action may now be considered
voidable, rather than void, the creditor may be able to request that the court authorize this conduct
post-petition, where the debtor has not been harmed or prejudiced in order to expedite disposition
of the collateral where voluntary reaffirmation will not occur.

1.3 Penalties and Damages.
Section 362 provides forrecovery ofactual damages (including out of pocket losses, damages
for embarrassment and humiliation), costs and attorneys fees incurred by an individual injured by
a willful violation of the stay. 11 U.S.C. 362(h). In certain cases, punitive damages may also be
awarded against a creditor. Of course, where the violation of the stay is inadvertent or unintended,
a creditor should not be held in contempt. However, it is important for the creditor to remember that
a violation of the stay is considered "willful" where the action violating the stay is undertaken with
knowledge that the stay is in effect; willfulness in this context does not require a showing of malice
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or specific intent to violate the stay. In re Garofalo's Finer Foods. Inc., 164 B.R. 955 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1994).

1.4 Grounds for Relief From The Automatic Stay.
Relief from the automatic stay is controlled by §362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code and
Bankruptcy Rule 4001. After notice and a hearing, stay relief, modification or annulment may be
granted by the Court to a "party in interest" upon request for the following reasons:
(a) cause, which includes but is not limited to a showing of lack of adequate protection
of an interest in property of such party in interest (typically collateral held by a secured creditor), 11
U.S.C. §362(d)(1); or,
(b) where the party in interest (usually the creditor) can demonstrate that (i) the debtor
has no equity in the property in which it has an interest and which it seeks to recover; and (ii) that
said property is not necessary for the debtor's "effective reorganization." 11 U.S.C. §362(d)(2). The
party seeking stay relief need not establish both. In re London Tiles. Inc., 35 B.R. 681 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1983); In re Cabe. Inc., 41 B.R. 222 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984).

In the vast majority of consumer bankruptcy cases, the "effective reorganization" prong of
the test outlined in §362(d)(2) would be an applicable consideration only in Chapter 13. In Chapter
7, the debtor is not seeking to reorganize and establish a payment plan to creditors. Rather, the
debtor's non-exempt assets, if any, will be liquidated and a discharge of the debtor's obligations
entered in court.

r

Note that the pendency of the state court litigation related to the claim may also be grounds
to modify or obtain relief from stay. See,~, In re Marvin Johnson's Auto Service. Inc., 192 B.R.
1008 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ala. 1996); In re Revco D.S .. Inc., 99 B.R. 768 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (relief from
stay would be granted to allow state court litigation to proceed, in order to liquidate the claim of the
creditor, where the creditor's claims and the debtor's counterclaims had been previously filed in state
court, discovery was in progress and all issues were based entirely on state law).

r

Technically, it is not proper for a creditor to request the bankruptcy court to authorize a ·'lift"
of the automatic stay. Many practitioners improperly use this term when seeking relief from stay.
However, the terms is not found in the Code, and is not generally accepted as an appropriate request
by the Bankruptcy Courts in Kentucky.

r
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The bankruptcy court is a court of equity, and will consider the balance of hurt in fashioning
relief. In re Phelia Associates. Inc., 26 B.R. 235 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982). Ultimately, therefore,the
grant or denial of stay relief by the bankruptcy court will be based on an evaluation and weighing
of various factors, depending upon the relative position of the parties. The following cases are
illustrative.
The automatic stay would be terminated to permit a creditor to exercise rights in the
debtor's automobile following the debtor's default, where the debtor continued to use the
automobile without adequately protecting the .creditor and while failing to execute a

r
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reaffirmation agreement on the vehicle. In re Smith, 167 B.R. 850 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1994).
A debtor is not entitled to a continuance of the automatic stay to prevent a creditor from
enforcing its security interest or mortgage where no equity exists in the property and no
offer of adequate protection was forthcoming at the hearing. In re Tinsley & Groom, 38
B.R. 457 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984).
A Chapter 7 debtor's auto payment, made seven days late, is not cause for stay relief in
order to repossess, In re Nikokyrakis, 109 B.R. 260 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio. 1989).
The most common example of "cause" for stay relief under §362, set out by the statute itself,
is a lack of "adequate protection" for the creditor in its secured collateral. The concept of adequate
protection is discussed in more detail below. It has been repeatedly held that whether cause exists
for stay relief must be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, there are other examples of
cause which might justify relief from stay.
For example, bad faith on the part of the debtor, as found by examining the totality of the
circumstances, may be cause for stay relief. In re Grand Traverse Development Co. Ltd.
Partnership, 151 B.R. 792 (W.D. Mich 1993). The requirement that the Debtor come into court with
"clean hands" and in "good faith" has been established in Chapter 7 cases On re Khan. 35 B.R. 718
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984), remanded, 751 F.2d. 162 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Zick, 931 F.2d 1124 (6th
Cir. 1991)), as well as in Chapter 13 (In re Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427
(6th Cir. 1982)). Although Khan, Zick, and Whitman dealt with the concept of the debtor's bad faith
in the context of the creditors' request for dismissal of the bankruptcy case, the elements of bad faith
constituting the necessary prerequisite for "cause" justifying dismissal would likewise appear
applicable in the context of a request for stay relief.

1.5 Adequate Protection Defined.
Adequate protection is an important but illusive concept in the retail consumer bankruptcy
context. The term is not defined anywhere in the Bankruptcy Code, and yet the "lack" of adequate
protection is generally considered to be the foremost reason for the grant of stay relief whete the
debtor has equity in a creditor's collateral and asserts a need for the collateral in order to accomplish
a reorganization plan.
Adequate protection has been defmed judicially as: (1) the debtor having equity in the
property, or (2) the property is necessary to the debtor's performance under the plan and the creditor's
security interest will not be impaired by the stay. In re Milo Ridge Resort & Executive Conference
Center, 26 B.R. 277 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982).
Because exactly what constitutes adequate protection cannot be defined with exactitude, the
following case examples are provided to assist the practitioner in determining the existence of
adequate protection, or the corresponding lack thereof:
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(a) Where the value of the collateral is equal to or greater than the debt owed by the
creditor, the creditor is adequately protected. In re W.L. Mead .. Inc., 42 B.R. 57 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1984).
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(b) An equity cushion in and of itself suffices as adequate protection from the stay. In
re Epstein, 26 B.R. 354 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982);
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(c) Regular payments to a creditor may serve as adequate protection, where the debtor's
equity cushion is inconsequential. In re Shriver, 33 B.R. 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983);
(d) A debtor is not required to provide adequate protection to an under-secured creditor
seeking relief from the stay where the value of the creditor's interest in the property has increased.
In re Cablehouse. Ltd., 68 B.R. 309 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986); and,

(e) An under-secured creditor is not entitled to compensation in the form of adequate
protection payments for money that it could earn by foreclosing upon its interest and having
investing the proceeds. In re Pullins, 65 B.R. 560 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986).
Note that although the courts have generally held that the existence of equity in a creditor's
collateral constitutes adequate protection, there may be instances where adequate protection is
lacking, even where there is an equity cushion. For example, the failure of a debtor to maintain
insurance covering property damage to the collateral might be inadequate protection,justifying relief
from the stay.

1.6 Obtaining Stay Relief: Distinctions Between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13.
In the retail or consumer Chapter 7 case, the secured creditor is generally faced with the
dilemma either of obtaining a reaffirmation agreement from the debtor to avoid discharge of the
debtor's obligation to the creditor, or surrender of its collateral from the debtor to allow the creditor
to liquidate the collateral and minimize its loss. In Chapter 13, on the other hand, the debtor is
interested in retaining the majority of its property, rather than surrendering it to creditors. Therefore,
in Chapter 13 the creditor must ensure adequate protection of its claim and the collateral securing
its claim during the pendency of the debtor's reorganization plan, while it obtains payment from the
debtor in the plan.
It becomes readily apparent that the grounds asserted by a creditor for stay relief in the retail
bankruptcy case will vary considerably depending upon the type of bankruptcy commenced by the
debtor. For example as discussed above, in a Chapter 7 proceeding, §362(d)(2) is not applicable to
the inquiry, because the debtor does not seek "reorganization", but rather liquidation of assets and
discharge of all indebtedness in a Chapter 7. Because reaffirmation is a wholly voluntary process,
and the creditor is not obligated to allow reaffirmation, the debtor has little practical choice but to
surrender its property secured by a creditor's lien to the creditor when reaffirmation is not agreeable
to both parties. A motion or relief indicating that the creditor will not allow reaffirmation, and that
there is no equity in the property for the benefit of unsecured creditors, should result in stay relief
as a matter of course, as a debtor has few, if any, objections available.
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It should be much easier, therefore, for a creditor to obtain quick relief from the stay in a
Chapter 7 proceeding, as opposed to Chapter 13 where the debtor has proposed a repayment plan and
has the intention of retaining the majority of its property. For example, a motion for relief from stay
in Chapter 7 is granted automatically within 15 days following the filing of the motion, unless an
objection is filed by the debtor establishing "good cause" for a hearing on the motion. This is why
under the Local Rules of both the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky, a party seeking relief
from stay has the burden of proof on the issue of the debtor's equity in the property and the party
opposing relief has the burden on all other issues. §362(g); See also In re Williams A. Smith Const.
Co. Inc., 86 B.R. 115 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). A debtor must prove that the creditor's interests are
adequately protected. In re Milo Ridge Resort & Executive Conference Center, 26 B.R. 277 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1982). A creditor bears the burden of proving the validity and perfection of its security
interest. In re Vanyas, 50 B.R. 988 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985).

1.7 Procedure for Stay Relief
The procedure for obtaining relief from the automatic stay is governed by Bankruptcy Rule
4001, and the rules applicable in the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky. Under Rule 4001
a request for relief from the automatic stay is brought by written motion, which must state with
particularity the grounds for the motion and the relief sought. In a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 case, the
motion should be served by regular mail service and must be served upon the case trustee and on the
debtor. See Bankruptcy Rules 9013, 9014 and 7004.
A Motion for relief from stay may be made ex parte, but only where it is shown by sworn
testimony that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the movant before the
adverse party or the attorney for the adverse party can be heard in opposition. The movant's attorney
must further certify to the court in writing hislher efforts to give notice and the reasons why notice
should not be required. Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(2).
In both the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky, a motion for stay relief may not be
filed without an accompanying proof of claim with supporting documents establishing the security
interest of the movant in the property of the estate that is subject to the motion. See LBR 401.
Eastern District of Kentucky; LBR 10, Western District of Kentucky . Notice to all parties in interest
is required in both Districts. Note that in the Western District of Kentucky, a request for relieffrom
stay shall not be combined in the same pleading with any other request for relief, and all motions
filed must include a proposed order. LBR 10, Western District of Kentucky.
In the Eastern District of Kentucky, all parties to a motion for relief from stay must be given
at least ten (10) days notice of the hearing on the motion. LBR 401, Eastern District of Kentucky.
In the Western District in a Chapter 7 case, a hearing on a motion for relief from stay will only be
set if the party in opposition to the motion so objects within 15 days from the date of service of the
motion; otherwise, if no objection is filed, stay relief will be granted within 15 days following the
date of service of the motion, without hearing. LBR 10, Western District of Kentucky.
In the Western District of Kentucky, LBR 15 serves as a useful tool for the creditor in a
consumer Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 case. The Rule also serves to free up the court's crowded docket
from routine stay relief motions involving disputes over claims secured by motor vehicles. Under
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the rule, whenever a debtor elects to retain possession of a "motor vehicle" which secures an
outstanding obligation, either by paying for the vehicle through a Chapter 13 plan, or through
reaffirmation or otherwise, the debtor is required to maintain proof of insurance against physical
damage on the creditor's collateral. If the debtor fails to furnish proof of insurance on the vehicle at
the Section 341 meeting, the stay shall be deemed terminated. Further, if during the pendency of a
case, either before or after the 341 meeting, insurance lapses on any motor vehicle subject to the
provisions of the rule, (1) the creditor may notify the debtor and hislher counsel in writing (with a
copy to the court) regarding the lapse of insurance; (2) the debtor shall be enjoined from using the
motor vehicle for so long as it remains uninsured; and, (3) if the debtor fails to provide proof of
re-insurance for a minimum of 90 days to the creditor within five business days following the
mailing of the notice, the stay shall be deemed terminated. LBR (WD)15.
Although not required by the rule, it is recommended that a creditor that has complied with
Rule IS's requirements, but has not received proof of insurance within the time specified, notify the
Court of the debtor's failure to comply with the Rule to insure that the procedure has been carried
out properly. This is ususally done by local practice or custom through a document filed of record
which certifies non-compliance with the Rule.
This rule is currently the subject of focus by the Joint Local Bankruptcy Rules Committee
for the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky. It is possible that a joint rule for both districts
related to insurance on collateral may soon be in place.

2. GENERAL BANKRUPTCY TERMINOLOGY AND OVERVIEW.

2.1 ReliefAvailable. The United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §1011 et seq., sets out
the basic avenues of relief available to debtors, these include:

(a) C/,apter 7. The purpose is to achieve a fair distribution to creditors of the nonexempt, non-mortgaged property of the debtor and to give the debtor a fresh start through a discharge
in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. §§701-766.
(b) Chapter 13. A rehabilitation program for an "individual with regular income" where
the debts do not exceed a specified amount and the debtor's future earnings are used to pay creditors
in full or in part. The fresh start comes from the discharge granted at the end of the case. 11 U.S.c.
§§1301-1330.
(c) Non-Consumer Related Bankruptcies: C/,apters 11 and otllers. A reorganization
proceeding for use by any debtor generally engaged in business, with the goal of rehabilitating tile
debtor as a going concern rather than liquidating it. 11 U.S.C. §1101-1174.

2.2 The Parties.
(a) Debtor. The person, corporation, partnership, or legal entity which is the "principal"
of the bankruptcy proceeding. 11 U.S.C. §101(13).
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(b) Creditor. An individual, corporation, partnership or other legal entity that has a
claim against the debtor which arose at the time of or before the beginning ofthe bankruptcy process.
11 U.S.C. §10I(lO).
(c) Trustee. The "person" who is charged with the responsibility of supervising the
bankruptcy case and estate property. All Bankruptcy Courts now have a United States Trustee. The
U. S. Trustee is independent of the Court system and is appointed by the Justice Department. The
function of the U. S. Trustee varies by type of case. In a Chapter 7, the U. S. Trustee appoints a case
Trustee whose primary function is to take possession of the debtor's property which is neither
exempt nor subject to a valid security interest, tum these items into money, and fairly distribute it
among the creditors.
2.3 The Debtor's Property - TIle Estate.

(a) Property ofthe Estate. Tthe debtor's assets which are to be administered during the
proceedings. 11 U.S.C. §541(a).

(b) Property Subject to a Security Interest. The debtor's property on which he or she
has granted a consensual lien or security interest prior to the bankruptcy proceedings.
(c) Exempt Property. Under 11 U.S.C. §541, upon the commencement of a bankruptcy
proceeding, all property of the debtor becomes "property of the estate". In order to provide the
debtor with a "fresh start", debtors are allowed to claim enumerated exemptions to prevent certain
property from being liquidated by the trustee, and to protect it from claims of creditors whose claims
arose before the commencement of the case. See 11 U.S.C. §522; KRS 427.
The date for determining exemptions is the date the order for relief is entered. In the
event of a conversion from one chapter to another, the date for determining exemptions in the
converted case is the date of conversion. In re Butcher, 75 B.R. 441 (E.D. Tenn. 1987), affd. without
opinion in 848 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1988); In re Dyess, 65 B.R. 143, 14 BCD l379 (Bankr. W.O. La.
1986).

(1) Basic Categories of Exemptions. 11 U.S.C. Section 522(d) lists the federal
exemptions to which each debtor is entitled, and also provides that an individual debtor may
elect to use either federal or state exemptions, unless the state of which it is a resident has "opted
out" of the federal exemption scheme. 11 U.S.C. Section 522[b]. Kentucky has "opted out" of
the federal exemptions (KRS 427.170). Thus, Kentucky law provides that the following property
of an individual debtor resident in this state is exempt:
(A) All household furnishings, jewelry, personal clothing and ornaments not to
exceed $3,000 in value; The terms "household furnishings, jewelry, personal clothing, and
ornaments" mean clothing, furniture, appliances, linens, china, crockery, kitchenware, and
personal effects ofan individual and the individual's dependents, but do not include:
(i) Works of art;
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(ii) Electronic entertainment equipment (except to the extent of one television

and one radio;
(iii) Antiques; and

r

(iv) Jewelry other than wedding rings.

r

(B) Tools, equipment and livestock, including poultry, of a person engaged in
farming, not exceeding $3,000 in value;

r

(C) One motor vehicle and its necessary accessories, including one spare tire, not
exceeding in the aggregate $2,500 in value;

r

debtor;

r

(E) Tools, not exceeding $300 in value, of any individual debtor necessary in its
trade, and one motor vehicle not exceeding $2,500 in value and its necessary accessories,
including one spare tire, of a mechanic or other skilled artisan primarily engaged in the
replacement, repair, or emergency servicing of essential, mechanical, electrical or other
equipment in general use;

r
r
r

r
r

(D) Professionally-prescribed health aids for the debtor, or a dependent of the

(F) The professional library, office equipment, instruments and furnishings of
a minister, attorney, physician, surgeon, chiropractor, veterinarian, or dentist, necessary in the
practice of such profession, and not exceeding $1,000 in value, and one motor vehicle not
exceeding $2,500 in value with necessary accessories, including one spare tire;
(G) An individual debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $5,000 in value, in
real or personal property that such debtor or a dependent of such debtor uses as a permanent
residence in this state, or in a burial plot for such debtor or a dependent of such debtor.
However, this exemption does not apply if the debt or liability existed prior to the purchase of
the property or the erection of the improvements thereon; see,~, In re Connors, 1999 W.L.
1090829, 1999 Bankr. Lexis 1472 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999) (federal tax lien paid before
homestead);

r
r

(H) Any money or other benefit to be paid or rendered by any assessment or
cooperative life or casualty insurance company, and any money or other benefit to be paid or
rendered by any fraternal benefit society;

r

(J) To the extent reasonably necessary for the support of an individual and his
dependents, in addition to the foregoing property which is totally exempt, money or property
received and rights to receive money or property for alimony, support or separate maintenance;

r
r

(/) An award under a crime victim's reparation law;
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(K) A payment on account of the wrongful death of an individual of whom the
debtor was a dependent, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any
dependent of the debtor;
(L) A payment, not to exceed $7,500, on account of personal bodily injury, not
including pain and suffering or compensation for actual pecuniary loss, of the debtor or an
individual of whom the debtor is a dependent;

(M) A payment in compensation of loss of future earnings of the debtor or an
individual of whom the debtor is or was a dependent, to the extent reasonably necessary for the
support of the debtor or any dependent of the debtor; and
(N) Assets held, payments made and amounts payable under pensions exempt
pursuant to KRS 61.690, 161.700,427.120 and 427.125, or the right or interest ofaperson in
an individual retirement account or annuity, deferred compensation account, tax sheltered
annuity, simplified employee pension, pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or other retirement
plan described in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, which qualifies for deferral
of income tax until the date benefits are distributed. However, this exemption does NOT apply
to any amounts contributed to an individual retirement account or annuity, deferred
compensation account, a pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or other qualified retirement plan
or annuity if the contribution occurs within 120 days before the debtor files for bankruptcy.

In addition to the foregoing, every debtor shall have a general exemption not to
exceed $1,000 in value to be applied toward any property, real or personal, tangible or intangible,
in its estate on the filing date.

(2) Claiming Exemptions. The debtor is required to list the property claimed as
exempt on the schedules which are required to be filed either with the petition or within fifteen
(15) days thereafter. In light ofthe fact that exemptions are claimed in the bankruptcy schedules,
the rule for amendment of exemptions is identical to the rule for amendment of the schedules,
which is that amendments may be filed any time before the case is closed. Bankruptcy Rules
4003(a), 1007 and 1009.
In the event the debtor fails to claim exemptions to which he is entitled, for example
when the debtor has died or is incapacitated, a dependent of the debtor may file the list within
thirty (30) days after the schedules are filed. In the event the debtor fails to file its schedules, the
deadline begins to run on the date when the schedules were due to be filed. Bankruptcy Rule
4003(a).
The exemptions are listed in Schedule C of Official Form 6 of the debtor's petition.
Schedule C requires that the debtor estimate the value of the items claimed as exempt, and
indicate the statute under which the exemption is claimed. Typically, a debtor lists the maximum
statutory amount allowed for exemption of each category of property, regardless of the amount
of equity which the debtor has in the property. The exempted property must be listed with
sufficient specificity so as to enable the trustee and creditors to determine its nature and value.
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(3) Trustee's and Creditors' Rig/,t to Object to Exemptions. The trustee or any
creditor may file objections to the list of property claimed as exempt. Bankruptcy Rule 4003 (b).
Some of the more common grounds for objections to exemptions include:
(A) Sloppiness in claiming exemptions;

(B) Lack of statutory basis;
(C) Exemption of several items of property whose aggregate value exceeds the
statutory exemption;
(D) Conversion of non-exempt assets into exempt assets, which conversion
appears to be fraudulent, Abbott Bank-Hemingford v. Armstrong, 931 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.
1991); see also Inre Simms, 243 B.R. 156,2000 Bankr. Lexis 7 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.) (trustee failed
to prove conversion was done with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors); and
(E) Assets which are concealed and later discovered cannot be exempted.
In the event that no objections are timely filed to claimed exemptions, ''the
property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt". 11 U.S.C. §522(l). See In re Rosenzweig,
245 B.R. 836,2000 Bankr. Lexis 185 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.) (a tax refund scheduled as exempt, but
not listed as asset was allowed because of trustee's failure to timely object).

(4) Burden ofProof and Objection Time Lines. Either the trustee or creditors can
file objections to exemptions. In any hearing on objections to exemptions, the objecting party
has the burden of proving that the exemptions are not properly claimed. Thereafter, the burden
shifts to the debtor to show that the claim to exemption has been properly claimed. In re Catli,
999 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Lester, 141 B.R. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
After hearing on notice, the court will determine the issues presented by the
Objection. Bankruptcy Rule 4003(c).
All objections to exemptions must be in writing and must be served on the trustee,
the person filing the list of exemptions claimed, and the attorney for such person. Bankruptcy
Rule 4003 (b). Because an objection to exemptions is a contested matter, no answer to the
objection must be filed, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Bankruptcy Rule 9014.
The deadline for filing objections to exemptions is normally thirty days after the
date on which the first meeting of creditors is actually concluded. In the event an amendment
to exemptions is filed after the conclusion of the first meeting of creditors, the deadline for
objecting to exemptions claimed by the amendment is extended for an additional thirty days.
The time period for objecting to exemptions may be extended by the court only ifthe extension
is granted within the original time period. Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b). Ifthe time period for filing
objections to exemptions expires, due to excusable neglect, it may not be later extended by the
court. Bankruptcy Rule 9006{b){3).
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In the event no objections to exemptions are timely filed, the exemption claimed
by the debtor is finalized, and the valuation of the debtor's interest in the property is approved.
The importance oftimely objecting to exemptions was emphasized by the United States Supreme
Court in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280, (1992),
wherein the Court held that there is no "bad faith" exception to the deadline for timely filing
objections to exemptions, even where there is no colorable statutory basis for the exemptions
claimed. Therefore, although it was apparent that the debtor's claimed exemption was not
permitted under the exemption statute, the failure of any party to timely file an objection waived
the trustee's right to later challenge the exemption. However, the Court observed that the
Bankruptcy Code contains sufficient safeguards against debtors filing groundless claims, such
as the denial of a discharge under 11 U.S.C. Section 727(a), or civil or criminal sanctions under
Bankruptcy Rule 9011 or 18 U.S.C. §152, to prevent meritless exemption claims from being
routinely filed.

(d) Trustee's Avoidance Powers. The right of the debtor or a Trustee to avoid or
"nullify"certain liens on property which would otherwise have been exempt, except for the debtor's
own actions or actions of the debtor's creditors prior to the bankruptcy proceedings. Harvey v.
Fellner, 245 B.R. 834,2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21454 (W.D. Ky. 1999) (reopening case to avoid
unknown judicial lien discretionary, not per se disallowed); see also In re Pressley, 242 B.R. 193,
1999 Bankr. Lexis 1556 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.) (same).

(e) Abandonment. Action taken, primarily by the Trustee to surrender or give up any
right which the debtor may have in specific property of the estate.
(f) Preferential Transfers. A transfer of the debtor's property usually on the "eve of
bankruptcy" which the Court can set aside to restore the parties to their original status. Discussed in
detail.
(g) Claims Against tile Estate.

(1) Claim. Generally, a right which a creditor has against the debtor or against his
property. This right may be unliquidated or liquidated, and may be established by contract
(prejudgment) or by order or judgment of a court (post-judgment).

(2) Secured Claim. The claim of a creditor which is secured by some right in the
debtor's property usually created by an act ofthe debtor prior to the bankruptcy proceedings, such
as signing a mortgage or security agreement. A claim is generally secured only to the extent of
the value of the collateral. The pre-eminent case on valuation is the United State Supreme
Court's recent ruling in Associates Commercial Com. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953,117 S.Ct 1879, 138
L.Ed.2d 148 (1997). In Rash, which dealt with a filing under Chapter 13, the Supreme court held
that the value of a creditor's collateral (and thus, the amount of its secured claim), is the
"replacement value" ofthe collateral, i.e., the price a willing buyer in the debtor's trade, business
or situation would pay to obtain like property from a willing seller. While the case dealt only
with valuation in a Chapter 13, valuation for purposes of a creditor's secured claim in Chapter
7, or for redemption purposes, should follow the same standard.
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(A) Unsecured Claim. A claim of a creditor which is not secured, i.e., is backed
only by the debtor's promise to pay and the creditor's previous reliance on the debtor's general
assets.

(3) Terminating tlte Bankruptcy Case.
(A) Disc/large. A formal act of the court and entry of a final order which in
effect relieves the debtor from any responsibility for payment of his debts.

(B) Dismissal. An involuntary dismissal ofthe case (Debtor has failed to comply
with rules of court, or for other cause), see Dionne v. Simmons, 200 F.3d 738, 2000 U.S. App.
Lexis 294 (11 th Cir;) (court improperly dismissed case because cause was not shown by moving
party; the moving party was the debtor; In re Tumen, 244 B.R. 431, 2000 Bankr.' Lexis 96
(B.A.P. 8th Cir.) (debtor's solvency did not justify dismissal).

(C) Closure oftlte Case. Typically, a case is administratively closed by the
Court upon discharge or dismissal.

3. BASIC CONCEPTS IN CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY.

3.1 Notices in Cltapter 7. Notice of Debtor's Bankruptcy filing is sent to all creditors listed
on the petition schedules. The notice includes the following useful information:

(a) Name of the debtor and any alias' used in the last six (6) years;
(b) Name and address of the debtor's attorney; and
(c) The time frame in which certain actions may be taken:

(1) Date Petition Filed. Automatic stay goes into effect.
(2) Meeting of Creditors. The date first set for an examination of the debtor by
his/her creditors, required by the Code.

(3) Last date to file objection to discharge or complaint of nondischargeability.

r
r
r

r
r
J

.

(4) Date ofDischarge. Generally the last date to file reaffirmation and stay lifted.
3.2 Tlte Automatic Stay. Arises automatically upon the filing of the petition. Discussed in
detail above.

3.3 Proofs of Claim (filing procedure).
(a) Generally. Unsecured creditors are informed by the Court's notice not to file a proof
of claim unless they are notified that is is likely assets will be realized for their benefit. The vast
majority of consumer Chapter 7 cases are no-asset cases, with no distribution to be made to the
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unsecured claimants, and a proofof claim should generally not be filed in a Chapter 7, no-asset case
unless the creditor is advised by the Court or the Trustee to file.

(b) Notice to File. Should notice be provided that a proof of claim should be filed, it
should contain the following information:
(1) Unsecured Proof of Claim. Statement by the creditor of the balance owed by
the debtor. Some evidence showing how the balance was derived should be attached to the proof
of claim along with a copy of the original obligation.

(2) Secured Proof of Claim. Statement by the creditor of the balance owed by the
debtor and evidence that the creditor has a valid and perfected security interest in specified
propertY of the estate.
All proofs of claim should be filed using the official bankruptcy form and all
information requested should be included. Note: Do not include any "pre-computed" interest
charges in your claim balance.

3.4 Role of the Trustee. The Trustee represents the interests of the unsecured creditors. His
or her job is to collect assets and to distribute them to the unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis. The
Trustee conducts the meeting of creditors. The Trustee will review the petition and proofs of claim
filed and question the debtor at the meeting of creditors to determine if there are any assets for the
benefit of the unsecured creditors. To the extent that the Trustee is a "friend" to the unsecured
creditors, he is the "enemy" of the secured creditors. The Trustee possesses certain powers which
may be used to adversely affect the secured creditor's position. He or she can set aside unperfected
security interests, fraudulent transfers, some statutory liens, and preferences.
3.5 Preferences in Chapter 7.
(a) Elements of a Preference. The power to avoid a preference allows the Trustee to
set aside any transaction between a creditor and the debtor which improves the position of that
creditor to the detriment of the other creditors. The burden is on the Trustee to prove all of the five
(5) elements of a preference action:
(1) Transfer must be to or for the benefit of a creditor;

(2) Transfer must be for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor
before the transfer was made;

(3) Transfer must have been made when the debtor was insolvent (the Code provides
the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding
the filing of the bankruptcy petition).
(4) Transfer must have been made during the 90 days before the date of the filing of
the petition or between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition if the
creditor was an insider at the time of the transfer; and
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(5) Transfer enables the creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive
if the case were a case under Chapter 7 and the transfers had not been made. 11 U.S.C. §547.

(b) Exceptions to Preferellces. The Code sets out specific exceptions. These include,
as a general rule, a creditor's ability to retain up to $599.99 on consumer debt received within 90
days from the filing of the petition (note that transfers less than $600.00 within the 90 day period
may be aggregated, resulting in a preference); 11 U.S.C. §547(c)(8) when the transfer in question
was a contemporaneous one for new value; 11 U.S.C. §547(c) (1); where the payment of a debt was
within the ordinary course of business by the debtor; 11 U.S.C. §547(c)(2) and when the creditor
gave new value after the transfer in question. 11 U.S.C. §547(c)(4)
(c) Preferences Ullder State Law. Under Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee
may also seek to assert a preference claim under state law. In Kentucky, the applicable preference
period is extended from 90 days under federal law, to 6 months from the date of transfer by virtue
ofKRS 378.060. However, unlike under the federal statute, in order to succeed on a preference
claim under state law a trustee must prove that the debtor intended to prefer the creditor which
received the transfer. In the typical case of a garnishment or other involuntary payment by a debtor
to a creditor, this will be a difficult burden. See In re Rexplore Drilling, 971 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir.
1992); Omniflight Helicopters. Inc. v. Kennedy, 567 S. W.2d 123 (Ky. App. 1978). Practitioners are
also directed to In re Battery One-Stop Ltd., 36 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 1994), which holds that a
garnishing creditor rises to the level of a lien creditor on the date of the service of the garnishment
order upon the garnishee. Thus, where a creditor obtains a lien prior to the beginning of the
preference period, no preferential transfer can occur with respect to payments received subsequent
to the date of the creation of the lien via service of the garnishment order. See also In re Edwards,
219 B.R. 970 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1998).
3.6 Fraudulent Conveyance. In Kentucky, the trustee has two bodies oflaw at his disposal
in pursuing fraudulent conveyances-state law (11 U.S. C Section 544, incorporating KRS 378.010
et seq) and federal bankruptcy law (11 U.S.C. Section 548). Some common examples of fraudulent
conveyances are the transfer of property or the grant of a security interest for less than fair
consideration and the sale of property by the debtor for less than fair consideration. In such event,
the lien may be avoided under either 11 U.S.C. §548 orKRS 378.010 etseq, discussed infra, and any
equity which is otherwise exemptible by the debtor may be claimed as exempt, free and clear of the
creditor's claim, provided the debtor has not concealed such property. or voluntarily transferred it.
In re Gaines, 106 B.R. 1008 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989); In re Roberts, 81 B.R. 354 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1987).
3.7 Lien Defects. Under 11 U.S.C. Section 544, the trustee has the power to avoid any
transfer of property of the debtor, including defective liens, that would be voidable by ajudiciallien
creditor or a bona fide purchaser of real property from the debtor. 11 U.S.C. Section 544. This
power permits the trustee to strike down invalid or "secret" liens (liens which have not been
recorded, as required by KRS 382.010):
No deed or deed of trust or mortgage conveying a legal or equitable title to
real property shall be valid against a purchaser for valuable consideration,
without notice thereof, or against creditors, until such deed or mortgage is
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acknowledged or proved according to law and lodged for record. As used in
this section, "creditors" includes all creditors irrespective of whether or not
they have acquired a lien by legal or equitable proceedings or by voluntary
conveyance. KRS 382.270.
Kentucky law also specifies the place of recordation of mortgages, by requiring that:
All deeds, mortgages and other instruments required by law to be recorded
to be effectual against purchasers without notice, or creditors, shall be
recorded in the county clerk's office of the county in which the property was
conveyed or the greater part thereofis located. KRS 382.110.
In addition, Kentucky law (KRS 355.9-302) requires that certain liens on personal property must
be recorded to be effectual.
In the event that a mortgage or lien on real or certain personal property is unrecorded or
improperly filed, it may be avoided by the trustee. Any equity which exists after avoidance of such
liens and/or mortgages may be claimed exempt by the debtor, to the extent such exemption is
allowed by Kentucky statutes.
Lien avoidance on certain exempt property under Section 522(f) is done by motion of the debtor,
and is a contested matter under Bankruptcy Rule 9014. Bankruptcy Rule 4003(d). The prerequisites
for lien avoidance are:
(a) Existence of property in which the debtor has a valid exemption;
(b) Existence of a lien on such property;
(c) The lien is either a judicial lien or a nonpossessory, non-purchase money security
interest in household furnishings or goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops,
musical instruments or jewelry, which are held primarily for personal, family or household use of
the debtor or his dependents; implements, professional books or tools of the trade of the debtor or
his dependents, or professionally-prescribed health aids; and
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(d) The lien impairs the debtor's exemption interest.

No deadline for seeking lien avoidance is imposed by either the Bankruptcy Code or the
Bankruptcy Rules. Notice ofthe motion seeking lien avoidance must be given to the creditor whose
lien is sought to be avoided. A minimum of five (5) days' notice must be given of any hearing on
the motion for lien avoidance, which time may be reduced by the court. Bankruptcy Rule 9006.
The debtor bears the initial burden or proof, and the creditor has the burden of rebuttal. In re
Streeper, 158 B.R. 783 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1993); In re Maylin, 155 B.R. 605 (D. Me. 1993); In re
Mohring, 142 B.R. 389 (E.D. Ca. 1992).
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The standard of proof in a lien avoidance action is presumably a preponderance of the evidence.
4. TREATMENT OF THE SECURED CREDITOR - THE THREE "R's" OF CHAPTER 7
BANKRUPTCY. There are three possible ways to resolve a secured claim in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy:
reaffirmation, redemption or recovery.

4.1 Reaffirmation.
(a) Generally. Reaffirmation of a debt by the debtor is a method for insuring that the
creditor will be paid post-bankruptcy, despite the discharge entered in the case. The basic question
is, does the creditor want to allow the debtor to reaffirm the debt (or does the creditor wish to realize
on its collateral), and if so, on what terms. Remember that reaffirmation is a voluntary agreement
between the debtor and the creditor, and may not be required unilaterally by either party.

(b) Terms All Reaffirmations Must Include:
(1) Name of parties.

(2) Balance as of a certain date, including interest rate, the installment payment, and
date of the next payment due;
(3) Identify the security in the reaffIrmation and attach a copy of the original
obligation and security agreement;
(4) "Subject to the original terms of the contract";
(5) Require proof of insurance;
(6) Provide for fair rental value: this protects the creditor if the debtor later rescinds
the reaffirmation;
(7) The debtor's attorney's declaration;
(8) Conspicuous statement that the reaffIrmation agreement may be rescinded and
that the agreement is not required by the b~ptcy code or other non-bankruptcy law; and,
(9) Signature of both the debtor and the debtor's attorney.

Under the Code, the agreement must be made before the granting of the debtor's
discharge. See Chase Automotive Finance. Inc. v. Kinion, 204 F.3d 751,2000 U.S. App. Lexis 5025
(5 th Cir.); In re Collins, 243 B.R. 217, 2000 Bankr. Lexis 98 (Bankr. D. Conn.). The debtor also
must not have rescinded the agreement at any time prior to the discharge or within sixty (60) days
after the agreement was fIled with the Court, whichever occurred later, by giving written notice of
the rescission to the creditor. Generally, Bankruptcy Courts will set a fIling deadline for reaffIrmation
agreements to be fIled with the court. That date is usually the same date as the date for discharge of
the debtor. The Code requires simply that the agreement must be "made" prior to discharge, and fIled
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with the Court. Failure to file your agreement with the Court could result in the agreement
being invalidated and could subject the creditor to penalties from the Court.

(c) Debtor's Right to Rescind. Anytime prior to discharge or within sixty (60) days after
such agreement is filed with the Court, whichever occurs later, the debtor may rescind by giving
notice to the creditor. The notice to the debtor that he may rescind the agreement must be set out in
the agreement conspicuously. This means that the required language must be underlined, or placed
in capital letters so as to be conspicuous within the body of the reaffmnation agreement.
(d) The Effect of the Reaffirmation. If the rescission period is past, the debt is not
discharged and the debtor remains liable on the indebtedness as if the bankruptcy was never filed.
4.2 Redemption. A debtor may redeem property by paying the lienholder the amount of its
allowed secured claim, as either agreed to by the debtor and creditor, or as established by a valuation
hearing. 11 U.S.C. §§722 and 506(a). If the creditor is over secured, the allowed secured claim
is equal to the outstanding balance owing at the time of the bankruptcy filing. Ifthe creditor is under
secured, the allowed secured claim is the value of the collateral. In re Breckinridge, 140 B.R. 642
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1992); In re Polk, 76 B.R. 148 (9th Cir. 1987). Such payment must be made as
a one-time lump-sum payment, unless the creditor consents to an installment payment schedule. In
re Bell, 700 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1983). Redemption is initiated by the debtor filing a motion to
redeem, and is a contested matter. Bankruptcy Rule 6008.
Redemption is a very limited right, and only applies where the creditor's security is:
(a) Tangible personal property;
(b) Intended primarily for personal, family, or household use;
(c) Is a dischargeable consumer debt; and

(d) Is exempted or has been abandoned.
All of the above conditions must exist or there is no right to redeem.
The Code provides that the debtor may redeem qualified property by paying the secured creditor
the amount of the allowed secured claim. However, in cases where the lien exceeds the value of the
property, the creditor would only be entitled to the fair market value of the collateral at the time the
bankruptcy petition was filed. Note that if all of the conditions for redemption are met, the debtor
has an unqualified right to redeem and the creditor cannot keep a debtor from redeeming merely
because it would prefer reaffirmation (of course, the creditor always has the right to contest valuation
of the collaternl for redemption).

4.3 Recovery. If the debtor and creditor have been unable to agree on terms of reaffirmation
or the creditor does not choose to allow the debtor to reaffirm, and no motion to redeem has been
made by the debtor, then the creditor must begin to think in terms of recovering its security. This
a two-fold process. First, the creditor must position itselfto take possession by "freeing" its property
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from the restrictions imposed by the bankruptcy. Second, the creditor must obtain actual physical
possession of the security.

(a) Positioning to Take Possession. There are three (3) interested parties: the debtor
who owns the property, the Trustee who is entitled to any equity over and above the properly
perfected liens and allowed exemptions, and the secured creditor.
In order to take the property free and clear of claims by the other two (2) interested
parties, the secured creditor must obtain stay relief (see above), removing bankruptcy protection
provided to the debtor, and obtain the Trustee's abandonment of the property (extinguishing the
unsecured creditor's interest). In the best of worlds, the creditor can get the debtor and his counsel,
as well as the Trustee, to sign an Agreed Order Terminating Stay and Abandoning the Property.
If one or both will not cooperate for one reason or another, then the creditor will have to file motions
to have the stay lifted and to have the Trustee abandon the property.

(1) Notification. Motion to Terminate, Annul or Modify the Stay (see above).
(2) Abandonment. Even though the Stay has been terminated and creditor is
permitted to obtain possession of its collateral, the creditor must still obtain an abandonment
from the Trustee in order to dispose of the collateral free of the Trustee's lien. One of the most
common methods of abandonment is obtaining an abandonment from the Trustee at the meeting
of creditors, by way of an agreed order. Both abandonment and lifting of the Stay can be
achieved by no action on the part of the creditor. In all cases, once discharge has been entered
the Stay is lifted as a matter of law. Note that termination of the stay does not equal
abandonment, and separate tests are required to be met by the Court for each.

(3) Obtaining Possession ofSecurity. Even though the creditor is free from the
bankruptcy proceedings, he still must act in accordance with state law and take peaceable
possession of the property, and otherwise comply with Article 9 of the UCC.

4.4 Lien Avoidance.
(a) Introduction. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 522(f), a debtor may avoid the fixing
of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such nonconsensuallien impairs
an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled, if such lien is a:
(1) judicial lien, other than a judicial lien that secures a debt to a spouse, former
spouse or child ofthe debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child,
in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record; and
to the extent that such debt is not assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law or
otherwise; and includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such
liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support; or

(2) nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any household
furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, musical
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instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for the personal, family or household use of the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor; implements, professional books, or tools of the trade of the
debtor or the trade of a dependent of a debtor; or professionally-prescribed health aids for the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
Only a nonconsensuallien can be avoided. In re Fagan, 26 B.R. 212 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1982); InreDriver, 133 B.R. 476 (Bankr. S.D. In. 1991). 11 U.S.C. §101(36) defines a "judicial
lien" as a lien "obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or
proceeding." 11 U .S.C. §522(f) permits a debtor to avoid certain liens, to the extent that such liens
impair an exemption to which the debtor would otherwise be entitled. For purposes of 11 U.S.C.
§522(f), a lien is considered to impair an exemption to the extent the sum of (i) the lien, (ii) all other
liens on the property and (iii) the amount of the exemption that the debtor could claim if there were
no liens on the property exceeds the value that the debtor's interest in the property would have in the
absence of any liens. See In re Lehman, 205 F.3d 1255,2000 U.S. App. Lexis 3418 (11th Cir.)
(calculate lien avoidance using entire value of property, ignoring non-debtor spouse's interest); In
re Cannon, 243 B.R. 153,2000 Bankr. Lexis 6 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.) (lien upon dissolution of marriage
split between prope~ settlement - avoidable - and support obligation).
For example, if a debtor has household goods worth $3,000 and claims the household
goods exemption provided by statute, and a creditor has a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money
security interest in the household goods, the creditor's lien may be avoided. The result of such a lien
avoidance would convert the creditor's claim from a secured claim to a general unsecured claim.
Prior to the adoption of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, the rule adopted by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Dixon, 885 F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1989) was that a homestead
exemption applied only in execution sale situations. Thus, the Court ruled that the debtor's
exemption was never impaired in a bankruptcy situation, and consequently a debtor could never
avoid liens. As a result of this ruling, Sixth Circuit debtors were confronted with the problem of
selling their home after bankruptcy, and being required to pay the lienholder out of the equity which
should have been protected as exempt property to provide for their "fresh start".
However, Kentucky courts found that the holdings ofln re Dixon and In re Moreland,
21 F.3d 102 (6th Cir. 1994), a case which reaffirmed Dixon, did not apply in Kentucky due to
differences in Kentucky and Ohio law. In re Lynch, 187 B.R. 536 (Bkrtcy E.D. Ky. 1995); In re
Powell, 173 B.R. 338 (Bkrtcy E.D. Ky. 1994). These decisions, which have been adopted in the
Western District ofKentucky, hold that Dixon was based on an interpretation of Ohio law which was
contrary to Kentucky case law.
In re Dixon, supra, was probably overruled by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
which provides that a debtor may avoid a judicial lien, even when the debtor has no equity in the
property over and above a lien which is superior to the junior lien which the debtor is seeking to
avoid. Thus, a debtor's residual interests in property, such as a possessory interest, are protected
from ajudiciallien. Section-by-Section Description ofH.R. 5116, 140 Congo Rec. HI0, 764 [daily
ed. October 4, 1994]; H.R. Rep. No. 835, 103d Congo 2d Sess. 35-37 [1994].
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However, Bankruptcy Courts in Kentucky have held that judgement liens are void
and need not be released by the Bankruptcy Court.
For example, in Stidham v. Ford Motor Credit, Case No. 91-50019, Adversary
Proceeding No. 94-5091 (January 11, 1995), the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky was presented with a fact situation wherein Ford Motor Credit held a judgement lien
encumbering all real estate ofthe debtors, including the two pieces ofreal property which the debtors
owned at the time they filed bankruptcy. One piece of property was sold by the Chapter 7
bankruptcy trustee and Ford Motor Credit's lien attached to the sales proceeds. A second tract of
property was abandoned by the trustee and later sold at a state court foreclosure sale. After they filed
bankruptcy but before receiving their discharge, the debtors purchased real estate (the "new
property") in the same county where the judgement lien was filed. When the debtors later attempted
to refinance the new property, they discovered that Ford Motor Credit's judgment lien was still of
record. Ford Motor Credit refused to release its judgment lien, and the debtors sought an order of
the Bankruptcy Court removing such lien. The Hon. Joe Lee first determined that the discharge of
indebtedness was retroactive to the date of the bankruptcy filing, and that the underlying judgment
lien was discharged prior to the debtor's purchase ofthe new property. The Court then addressed the
status of the judgment lien and determined that it was extinguished by the sale of the two pieces of
real property. Thus, because there was no longer any indebtedness owed by the debtors secured by
the judgment lien, the underlying judgment is void and did not survive bankruptcy.
Similarly, in In re William Norvell. III, Case No. 95-34212(1)7 (July 31, 1996), the
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Kentucky agreed with Judge Lee's analy~is and held
that because the underlying obligation was discharged and no property to which the lien could attach
was owned by the debtor at the time of the bankruptcy filing, the judgment lien itself was also void.
Consequently, the Court determined that a KRS 426.720 judgment lien will survive bankruptcy
ONLY as an in rem claim against real estate which the debtor owned at the time the bankruptcy case
was filed, and will not attach to any real estate acquired by the debtor after the bankruptcy filing.
It is clear that 11 U.S.C. Section 522(t) applies even in a jurisdiction that has opted
out of the federal exemption scheme. Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 111 S.Ct. 1833, 114 L.Ed.2d,
350 (1991).

5.

EXCEPTIONS To DISCHARGE IN CHAPTER 7.

5.1 Generally. When the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code were developing the "fresh start"
approach to bankruptcy, they recognized that there should be certain instances where the debtor was
not entitled to the benefits of the discharge provisions of the Code. As a result, the Bankruptcy Code
allows creditors and other interested parties the right to object to allowing the debtor the benefit of
a discharge of all ofhislher debts, or having a specific debt(s) held to be non-dischargeable in the
bankruptcy action. This outline provides a general overview of Section 523 claims (exceptions to
discharge) and provides a detailed discussion regarding the most common forms of these claims,
which are designed to except from discharge isolated debts incurred by fraud, false pretenses, false
representations or for willful and malicious injury to property under Sections 523(a)(2)(A), (B), (C)
and Section 523(a)(6).
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Claims for exception to discharge are filed within the bankruptcy proceeding, and are referred
to as "Adversary Proceedings".
Practice Note: What is an "Adversary Proceeding" and how do you file one? Generally, these
cases are brought ''within'' the main bankruptcy case and are styled in accord with the sample
Complaint form to these materials. With the complaint, the Plaintiff must complete and file
an Adversary Proceeding Cover Sheet (which can be obtained form the Court clerk), along
with the filing fee, which is currently $150.00.

5.2 Exceptions To Discharge Generally-ll U.S.C.§523. The Code provides for exceptions
to the discharge of certain debts. These "non-dischargeable" debts or "exceptions to discharge"
relate only to the specific debt involved. This section of the Bankruptcy Code will not operate to
deny the debtor a discharge ofhislher other debts.
Practice Note: You should be careful to distinguish complaints under Section 523
from those under Section 727 and Motions to Dismiss under Section 701. Complaints
under Section 523 relate to individual, isolated debts. Complaints under Section 727
are an attempt to prohibit a debtor's discharge entirely, and different factors are
considered by the Court in such a proceeding. Both are brought by adversary
proceeding, however. To the contrary, actions under Section 701 of the Code are an
attempt by a creditor or other party with standing to dismiss a Chapter 7 case, thus
denying the debtor a discharge, for reasons related to the debtor's bad faith in filing
the proceeding in the first place. See. ~, In re Spangolia, 199 B.R. 362 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1995). Unlike Adversary proceedings, Section 701 actions are brought by
motion filed in the main bankruptcy case.
The types of debts which are generally non-dischargeable in a Chapter 7 petition under
Section 523 are as follows:

(a) Taxes. Many taxes are non-dischargeable. See, Meyersv. IRS, 196F.3d622, 1999
U.S. App. Lexis 29962 (6th Cir.) (tax obligation not discharged per 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(I)(c) because
of wilful failure to file returns and abuse of exemptions); Ward v. Board of Egualization, 204 F.3d
888, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis §2597 (9th Cir.) (post-petition interest non-dischargeable if tax nondischargeable).
(b) Fraud. Debts incurred by fraud or under false pretenses or representations, including
through false statements made in a written financial statement or other writing submitted to a creditor
for the purpose of obtaining credit. See, In re Wiggins, 245 B.R. 726, 2000 Bankr. Lexis 183
(Bankr. M.D. Ga.). The code protects creditors who extend credit based on fraudulent information
communicated by a dishonest debtor (see detailed discussion below). But see, In re Bryant, 241 B.R.
756, 1999 Bankr. Lexis 1497 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.) (creditor failed to prove justifiable reliance).
(c) Unscheduled Debts. A debtor has a duty to file a list of creditors and ifhe fails to list
a creditor, that creditor will not receive notice of the bankruptcy and will be deprived of the right to
participate in the case. Thus, the Code provides that unlisted debts are excepted from discharge. But
see In re Madaj, 149 F.3d 467 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that "the bankruptcy code does not except an
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unscheduled debt from discharge if the creditor had notice or actual notice of the bankruptcy case
in time for timely filing of a proof of claim"). The Madaj court also held that the unscheduled debt
was discharged even though the creditor did not learn ofthe case until after the discharge order was
entered, in light of the fact that the court could find no prejudice to the creditor that could have been
avoided if the creditor had received timely information.
(d) Theft. Debts which result from embezzlement, larceny and fiduciary fraud. See,~,
In re Jacks, 243 B.R. 385, 1999 Bankr. Lexis 1729 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.) (fiduciary duty had to exist
before misconduct).

(e) Alimony, Maintenance and Support. This section is self-explanatory, but it should
be mentioned that if the right to receive the alimony, maintenance or support is assigned to a third
party, the debt will lose its nondischargeable status. Details will be discussed by other presenters at
this CLE. See, In re Ackerman, 247 B.R. 336, 2000 Bankr. Lexis 384 (Bankr. M.D. Fla) (spouse's
professional fees are nondischargeable support obligations).
(f) Willful and Malicious Injury. When a person or entity is injured or property is
damaged as a result of the "willful or malicious" conduct of the debtor, the debtor's liability arising
therefrom may not be dischargeable. This might include the deliberate sale of collateral and
conversion of the proceeds by a debtor without payment to the secured creditor. Generally, however,
under recent case law, the injury must be intentional and the damage caused by the injury must have
been intended. See, infra; see also, In re Baldwin, 245 B.R. 131,2000 Bankr. Lexis 138 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir.) (state battery conviction proved intent to injure); In re Sarff, 242 B.R. 620, 2000 Bankr. Lexis,
(B.A.P. 6th Cir.) (breach of duty of loyalty was based on willful breach of service contract, so
nondischargeable).

(g) Fines and Penalties. Fines, penalties or forfeitures owed to a governmental unit,
including traffic fines, are generally not dischargeable.

(II) Student Loans. The Bankruptcy Code provides that some types of student loans may
not be discharged. Recent amendments have changed the rules related to student loans. Soverign
immunity will limit a debtor's ability to sue state educational institutions. See, University of
Virginia v. Robertson, 243 B.R. 657,2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis k766 (W.D. Va. 2000).
(i) Intoxication. Judgments and consent decrees resulting from driving while
intoxicated. See, In re Longhevv, 246 B.R. 234, 2000 Bankr. Lexis 178 (Bankr. D. Md.) (loss of
consortium award nondischargeable).

0) Prior Denials. Debts from a previous bankruptcy in which discharge was denied.
5.3 Elements ofa §523(a) Claim. As listed above, there are several different types of Section
523 claims. The most common claims brought by creditors are found at Section 523 (a)(2) and (a)(6).
Subsections (a)(2)(A) and (B) deal with debts incurred for money, property or services to the extent
they are obtained by false pretenses, false representation, fraud, or the use of a fraudulent statement
concerning the debtor's financial condition. Subsection (a)(6) relates to debts incurred as the result
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of a willful or malicious injury by the debtor to another or to the property of another. The remainder
of this outline will examine these specific code provisions in greater detail.
(a) 523(a)(2)(A)
(1) 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a)(2)(A) provides:

(A) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this
title does not discharge an individual from any debt;
(B) For money, property, services or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of
credit, to the extent obtained by;

(C) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement
respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition.
The United States Supreme Court has held that although the burden of proof rests on the
plaintiff/creditor to establish the elements of 11 U. S.C. §523(a) in such a claim, the burden of proof
required is a preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than that of clear and convincing
evidence. Grogan v. Gamer. 498 U.S. 279, 111 S. Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991).
(2) To succeed in a non-dischargeability claim under §523 (a)(2)(A), a creditor must
prove by preponderance of the evidence that:

(A) The Defendant made certain false statements to the creditor; and,
(B) The Defendant made these representations with the intent to deceive the

creditor; and,
(C) The Creditor reasonably relied on the false representation; and

(D)
The Creditor sustained the loss resulting from the Defendant's
misrepresentation (causation).
See Grogan v. Gamer, supra; Inre Ward, 857F.2d 1082 (6th Cir. 1988); InrePhillips,
804 F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Ritzer, 105 B.R. 424 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989).
In a case under §523(a)(2)(A), the first 2 elements of the analysis essentially focus
on the conduct of the Debtor. In determining whether a debt arising from credit card charging
spree is non-dischargeable for fraud under §523 (a)(2)(A), the question is whether at the time of
making the charges, the debtor did not intend to pay the debt or did not have a reasonable
prospect of being able to the pay debt. See,~, In re Chech. 96 B.R. 781 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1988); In re Pozucek, 73 B.R. 110 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987); In re Daugherty, 57 B.R. 99 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn 1985).
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(3) With respect to the element of intent, a number of factors are considered in
determining the Debtor's actual intentconceming repayment ofa credit card debt or other cash
advances, including but not limited to:

(A)

length of time between the charges or obtaining the credit and filing

bankruptcy;

(BJ
(e)

financial condition of the debtor when he or she obtained the credit; and,
whether the purchases made or credit incurred were for luxuries or

necessities.
In re Lemaster, 142 B.R. 927 (Bankr. D. Id. 1992): In re Marlar, 142 B.R. 304
(Bankr. E. D. Ark. 1992).

(4) Gambling debts present a special "subset" of potential, non-dischargeable debts
under this section. Many courts have held that debts incurred for gambling purposes are
non-dischargeable. Forinstance, in Citibank v. Hansbury, 128 B.R. 320 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991),
the credit card issuer sought a determination that the debt owed to it by the card holder was
excepted from discharge under §523(a)(2)(A). The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant, by using
credit cards issued by the Plaintiff, incurred a debt in the amount of $47,654.28 at a time when
he had no ability to repay and he knew or should have known that he had no ability to repay the
debt. Id. The Defendant denied that he had incurred the debt without intending to repay it. The
Court in Hansbury stated:
"The defendant does not dispute that he incurred the amount of debt that he
is alleged to have incurred. He admits that he incurred most of the debts by
taking cash advances to be used to pay gambling debts, and that he hoped to
repay this debt and all the debt as issue here by gambling and winning big ...
He knew at all times relevant to this proceeding that he lacked the means to
honor the credit card obligations that he was incurring.
"The defendant does not dispute that he incurred the amount of debt that he
is alleged to have incurred. He admits that he incurred most of the debts by
taking cash advances to be used to pay gambling debts, and that he hoped to
repay this debt and all the debt as issue here by gambling and winning big ...
He knew at all times relevant to this proceeding that he lacked the means to
honor the credit card obligations that he was incurring.
Id. at 321.
See also In re Karelin, 109 B.R. 943, 945 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Vermillion. 136 B.R. 225, 226
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (where debtor used card only for cash advances and used money to pay
off other debt or to gamble, the debtor knew that she did not have the ability to repay the debts,
and thus intended to deceive the creditor); In re Bartlett, 128 B.R. 775, 779 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1991) (where credit card advances were taken for gambling purposes and debtor did not have
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reasonable basis for believing she could repay her debt through the gambling winnings, but
merely "hoped" that she would win enough to pay of the debts, the debtor made implied
representation to credit card company when she obtained cash advances and made
misrepresentations and knowing them to be false and with the intention and purposes of
deceiving her creditors).
**NOTE: The above rules may be partially abrogated by the 6th Circuit's ruling in
Rembert and its holding related to subjective intent to deceive (see discussion
below). It is not completely clear what the impact of this new case will be to the body·
of law related to debts incurred for gambling purposes.
Practice Note: Non-Dischargeability May be Presumed: 11 U.S.C. Section
S23(a)(2)(C) states:
"For purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, consumer debts owed to a
single creditor and aggregating more than $1000 [to be adjusted] for "luxury goods
and services", incurred by an individual debtor on or within 60 days before the order
for relief under this title, or cash advances aggregating more than $1000. [to be
adjusted] that are extensions of consumer credit under an open end credit plan
obtained by an individual debtor on or within 60 days before the order of relief under
this title, are presumed to be non-dischargeable; 'luxury goods or services' do not
include goods or services reasonably acquired for the support or maintenance of the
debtor or a dependant of the debtor..."
Thus, in some cases, where a debtor has "loaded up" hislher credit card within 60 days prior
to filing, purchasing non-essential items that qualify as "luxury goods" (hot tubs, mink coats, lavish
vacations, gambling, and other similar items or services), or obtaining large cash advances, the
creditor's burden of proof may be considered satisfied, and the burden of proving an innocent intent
or motive shifts back to the defendant debtor. Watch this carefully, however! The fact that nondischargeability is presumed does not relieve the creditor of its burden of filing an adversary
proceeding to obtain an official ruling on non-dischargeability from the court.
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The third and fourth elements necessary for a finding of fraud essentially focus on the
creditors' conduct. In the vast majority of cases, there is no dispute that the creditor has suffered a
loss (the fourth element), and in any event, this fact may be easily proven. Of course, the issue of
"causation" (whether the loss was caused by the debtor's fraudulent conduct or the creditor's own
negligence) is always in issue.

j

The third element necessary for a creditor to succeed under the statute is reliance, and this
can be a very difficult element to prove. In fact, before filing a complaint under Section
S23(a)(2)(A), a prudent practitioner will conduct a sufficient due-diligence review, particularly
related to this element. Recent court opinions have greatly limited the availability of the claim. For
example, in In re Chincilla, 202 B.R. 1010 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996), the bankruptcy court sternly
admonished the creditor for filing what it considered to be a frivolous complaint:

J
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"AT&T's case is analogous to a gunslinger in the wild west without
ammunition. It does not survive. This court is closing the 523(a)(2)(a) "town
gates" to credit card issuers. Just don't ride into town firing blanks and
kicking up dust in the hope of rustling up a settlement. Come in armed with
facts to prove fraud or you may be driven out of town with a 523(d) bullet in
your tail."
The "523(d) bullet" that the court is referring to is the power of the Bankruptcy Court, under
such section, to award a debtor the "court costs of, and a reasonable attorney's fee for, the proceeding
if the Court finds that the position of the creditor was not substantially justified...
In the Sixth Circuit, our courts have determined that in a complaint under §523(a)(2)(A), the
Plaintiff/Creditor must demonstrate that it reasonably relied on the representations and conduct of
the Debtor. In re Phillips, 804 F.2d 930, 932 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Ward, 857 F.2d 1082 (6th Cir.
1988); Inre Woolum, 979 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1992); Inre Ledford, 970 F.2d 1556 (6th Cir. 1992). In
Ledford, the Court stated that "whether a creditor's reliance is reasonable is a factual determination
to be made in light of the totality of the circumstances." In re Ledford, 970 F.2d at 1560. According
to the Sixth Circuit, the circumstances which may effect the reasonableness ofthe Creditors' reliance
are:

(A) whether the creditor had a close personal relationship or friendship with the
debtor;
(B) whether there had been previous business dealings with the debtor that gave
rise to a relationship trust:

(C) whether the debt was incurred for personal or business reasons;
(D) whether there were any "red flags" that would have alerted the ordinary
prudent lender to the possibility that the representations relied upon were not accurate; and,
(E) whether even minimal investigation would have revealed the inaccuracy of
the debtor's representation. In re Ledford, 970 F.2d. at 1560.
In both Ward and Ledford, the Sixth Circuit held that a credit card issuer has a duty to
investigate and verify a card holder's ability to pay before it issues the card and the Court further
inferred that the credit card issuer may not merely rely on the debtor's signature, but rather should
conduct some form of independent credit report in approving the debtor's credit. However, see In
re Woolum, 979 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1992) (in the context ofa §523(a)(2)(B) case, the requirement of
"reasonable reliance" is not rigorous and is only directed at creditors acting in bad faith; courts
should not undertake subjective evaluation and judgment of creditors' lending practices). In re
Bridges, 51 B.R. 85,90 (Bankr. W.O. Ky. 1985) (under 523(a)(2)(A), creditor only required to make
"some efforts" to verify information contained in debtors' financial statements and an "exhaustive
credit check" is not necessary).
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In November, 1995, the Supreme Court ofthe United States decided Field v. Mans, 116 S.Ct.
437, 133 L.Ed.2d 35 1 (1995). In deciding the case, which was brought by the creditor under §523(a),
the Court concluded, contrary to the authority cited above, that the proper standard for determining
a creditor's reliance was the less rigorous standard of "justifiable reliance". The proper inquiry was
whether the creditor "justifiably" relied on the debtor's conduct in extending the credit. It therefore
appears that the burden on the creditor in establishing reliance in the adversary proceeding context
has been lessened, although, as a practical matter, it is unknown by how much.
However, just when it appeared that the Supreme Court, under Field v. Mans, might be
relaxing the stringent standards courts have imposed on credit card issuers in bringing 523(a)(2)(A)
complaints, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down a decision that severely limits credit
card lenders' ability to recover nondischargeability judgments in adversary proceedings under
§523(a)(2)(A). The decision, Rembert v. AT&T Universal Card Services. Inc., 141 F.3d 277 (6th
Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S.Ct. 438 (1998) is significant for several reasons:
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(i) First, it holds that the proper inquiry to determine a debtor's fraudulent
intent is the debtor's subjective intent to repay; and,

]

(ii) Second, it holds that each time the credit card is used the debtor makes
an implied representation that he intends to repay but not that he has the current ability to repay.

J

In examining the debtor's representations and intent, the Court wrote:
"[T]he focus should not be on whether the debtor was hopelessly insolvent at the
time he made the credit card charges ... ; rather, the express focus must be solely
on whether the debtor maliciously and in bad faith incurred credit card debt with
the intention of petitioning for bankruptcy and avoiding the debt. A finding that
a debt is nondischargeable under §523(a)(2)(A) requires a showing of actual or
positive fraud, not merely fraud implied by law . . . [T]he hopeless state of a
debtor's financial condition should never become a substitute for an actual
finding of bad faith."
This case appears to adopt Ninth Circuit law, follows the reasoning of an increasing number
of courts, and alters current law in the Sixth Circuit. As a result, it now appears that credit card
issuers in this Circuit will not be successful in nondischargeability actions unless they can prove that
the debtor actually intended to defraud them at the time the card was used. Given the obvious
difficulties in proving a debtor's subjective intent, Rembert appears to significantly limit a credit card
creditor's remedies under §523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.

(b) 523(a)(2)(B): Use of a False Statement in Writing.
(1) 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a)(2)(B) states:

(A) A discharge under [this title] does not discharge ... any debt for money,
property, services or an extension, renewal or refmancing of credit, to the extend obtained by:
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(i) Use of a statement in writing that is materially false;
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(ii) respecting the debtor's ... financial condition;
(iii) on which the creditor ... reasonably relied;
(iv) and, that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to

deceive.
Be careful to consider the difference in the reliance standard. Under the decision Field v.
Mans, the standard for reliance under 523(a)(2)(A) is that of "justifiable reliance." Under (a)(2)(B),
the statute requires "reasonable reliance", which appears to be a slightly higher standard.
Further, remember that the statement at issue must be "materially" false. A slight or
insignificant error on the document will not suffice to render the debt nondischargeable. The
question the practitioner should ask is "would my client have made the loan or extension of credit
had it known that this statement was false?"

r

Finally, "intent" is always the hardest element to prove in these cases. Guidance might be
found in the cases cited above related to (a)(2)(A), and in Knoxville Teachers, infra.

r

The burden of proof, like that under (A)(2)(A), is a "preponderance of the evidence." See
Grogan, supra.
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An exhaustive discussion of the elements of this claim is beyond the scope of this summary.
The following cases should be consulted by a prudent Kentucky practitioner considering filing an
(a)(2)(B) complaint: Coman v. Phillips, 804 F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1986); Knoxville Teachers Credit
Union v. Parkey, 790 F.2d 490 (6 th Cir. 1986); In re Woolum, 979 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1992); In re
Duncan, 35 B.R. 323 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983); In re Rosel, 63 B.R. 603 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986).

(c) Section 523(a)(6): Willful and Malicious Injury.
(1) 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a)(6) states:

(A) (a) A discharge under [this title] does not discharge ... a debtor from any

debt(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of
another entity.
In truth, most of the prior case law in Kentucky on this section was abrogated by the ruling
of the United States Supreme Court in Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 118 S.Ct. 974, 140
L.Ed.2d 90 (1998). A detailed overview of the case is instructive on this point:
Margaret Kawaauhau and her husband recovered a state court judgment on a medical
malpractice claim against the debtor-physician, Paul W. Geiger. Dr. Geiger prescribed oral
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antibiotics to Ms. Kawaauhau, although he knew that intravenous antibiotics would be more
effective. Ms. Kawaauhau's condition deteriorated, resulting in the amputation of her leg. Dr. Geiger
later filed for relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The Kawaauhaus brought an adversary
proceeding under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6) to have the debt determined nondischargeable. Ms.
Kawaauhau argued .that Dr. Geiger intentionally rendered inadequate medical care to her that
necessarily led to her injury. The Bankruptcy Court held that Dr. Geiger's treatment "fell far below
the appropriate standard of care and therefore ranked as willful and malicious." Dr. Geiger lost on
appeal to the U.S: District Court for the Eastem District of Missouri and appealed to the Eighth
Circuit, which reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

J
J
J

The Supreme Court's decision focused on the plain language of §523(a)(6), reading it to mean
that "only acts done with the actual intent to cause injury fall within the exception's scope."
According to the Court, the word "willful" in subsection (a) (6) modifies the word "injury," indicating
that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional
act that leads to injury. For these reasons, the Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision and
declared that the debt was, in fact, dischargeable as the plaintiff could not prove that the debtor
actually intended to cause her injury.
.

J
J
J

The ruling is a departure from the standard used in most bankruptcy courts around the
country and will overrule a considerable body of case law which requires a much less rigid showing
of improper conduct. The decision will make it far more difficult for creditors to succeed in a
complaint to deny discharge under the "willful and malicious injury" exception set out in §523(a)(6).
See In re Markowitz, 190 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that unless an actor desires to cause the
consequences of his act, or believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it,
he/she has not committed a ''willful and malicious" injury under the terms ofthis section). A lack
of excuse or justification will not alone make a debt non-dischargeable.

J
J
J

These cases do not, however, make it impossible for a creditor to succeed in the right case
and given proper facts. For example, many causes of action under this section entail a debtor's
conversion of property given as collateral on a creditor's loan. If a debtor sells a creditor's collateral,
without tendering payment from the proceeds of the sale to the creditor, the creditor has a cause of
action under this section. See,~, In re Cline, 52 B.R. 301 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985).

j

Likewise, if the debtor were to assault or batter the complaining creditor, this would clearly
constitute sufficient "intent to harm" rendering the debt nondischargeable. See,~, In re Bishop,
55 B.R. 687 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (where debtor struck plaintiff in the head with a hammer, the
debt for such damage was nondischargeable).
If a debtor fails to keep or secure insurance on a vehicle subject to a lien, is this nondischargeable? Generally the answer is no. See ~ In re Diver, 121 B.R. 509 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1990) (while the court found that the knowing failure to keep and maintain insurance on a vehicle
was in fact wilful, it was not "malicious" so the debt was dischargeable).
The measure of damages under this section is somewhat unclear. Generally, in the sale of
collateral subject to a security agreement, damages are tied to the value of the property sold or
converted. In re Thomas, 36 B.R. 851 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984). In other actions under this section

C-32

J
j

J
J
J
J

(for example, personal injury), damages might be awarded in a state court tort action and sustained
in a bankruptcy court under principals of collateral estoppel.
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Unpublished Opinions by Honorable David T. Stosberg
In re: Robert L. Ray, Case No. 99-31519(3), AP No. 99-3098, decided September 3, 1999. Criminal restitution
obligation of the debtor owed to the plaintiff in the amount of$1800.00 entered by the State Court for driving
under the influence charge was not dischargeable by virtue of Section 523(a)(7). The Court ruled that "any
financial obligation imposed as part ofa criminal sentence is excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(7).
" Relates to Section 5.1 of Outline.
In re: Donald Ray Kennedy and Shirley Jean Kennedy, Case No. 98-40655(3) 7, AP No. 99-4038, decided
January 28, 2000: An adversary proceeding brought by the holder of covenant not to compete, requesting an
order from the court declaring that the covenant was not a "claim" under Section 101(5) which could be
discharged in bankruptcy. The Court determined that the debtors obligation to comply with the covenant did not
constitute a "claim" under the statute. The Court terminated the stay to allow the parties to pursue additional
claims related to the agreements between them. Relates to Section 2.3 of Outline.

In re: Kenneth Wayne Oglesby and Rachel Michelle Olgelsby, Case No. 99-41539(3)(7), AP No. 00-4014,
decided April 5, 2000. Debtor signed a note and mortgage on November 10, 1999 and filed bankruptcy on
November 23, 1999. In an adversary proceeding brought by the Creditor seeking a determination that the
$22,608.00 mortgage indebtedness was non dischargeable under Section 523(a)(2), Court ruled, without
deciding the case on the merits and acknowledging the need for additional evidence, that "the proximity between
the date ofthe execution ofthe note and mortgage and the date ofthe bankruptcy filing supports the Plaintiffs
allegation offraud...." Relates to Section 5.3 of Outline.
In re: Michael W. Payne, Case No. 99-41583(7), AP No. 00-4015, decided May 19,2000. Where the debtors
pledged certain collateral to a creditor under the terms ofa security agreement and later sold the items to private
purchasers and pawn shops, Court refused to declare the obligations non dischargable under Section 523(c)
because, while the Debtor confessed·to the sale of the items, the testimony and evidence at trial presented by
the plaintiff creditor did not establish the debtor's malicious intent to harm the creditor. The Court cited to
Maryfield Grain Co. v. Crump, 247 B.R. 1 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2000), a decision by Judge Wendell Roberts, which
held that in order to prevail in an action 523(a)6), the Creditor must prove the debtor had the intent to harm
either the creditor or the collateral. Relates to Section 5.3 of outline.
Unpublished Opinions by Honorable J. Wendell Roberts
In re: Clayton & Stacey Crump, Case No. 99-50595. AP No. 99-5029, decided March 20,2000. Court overruled
Creditor's Motion to Reconsider Judgment entered on Debtor's behalfon creditor's Section 523(a)(6) claim.
Court ruled that the Debtor's failure to remit proceeds from the sale of collateral (in this case crops) did not
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constitute a willful and malicious injury where it appeared the Debtor was using the proceeds for his farming
business with the motive of keeping the business afloat Relates to Section 5.3 of outline.

In re: Charles Lewis Roberts. Jr.. Case No. 00-30788(2)7, APNo. 00-3067, decided September 14,2000. A final
judgment had been entered for interest on a child support arrearage. The Court held that it was non
dischargeable under Section 523(aX5), citing In re: Coleman, 56 B.R 179. Relates to Section 5.3 of outline•

•

In re: Selma Ann Slaughter. Case No. 99-34948(7), AP No. 00-3004, decided November 6,2000. Court refused

-

to allow the debtor to amend her complaint to state a claim for preferential conveyance under Section 544(b)
and the Kentucky Preference Statute KRS 378.060, ruling that the statute of limitations for avoidance actions
under Section 544 under Section 546(a)(2) barred the amendment where the case was closed on March 14,2000
and the Plaintiff raised the issue on May 8, 2000, after passage of the bar date. Relates to Section 3.5 of
Outline.
Unpublished decisions by Honorable Joan L. Cooper
In re: Nickie Howard Vandagriff, Case No. 99-11171(3)7, decided April 12,2000. Trustee sought an order
declaring that the debtor's IRA Funds were not exempt from estate property. The issue for determination was
whether these funds, which were rolled over from a retirement plan qualified under ERISA into an individual
IRA within 120 days before the bankruptcy petition was filed, were entitled to the exemption under KRS
427.150. The Court ruled that the funds were in fact exempt, holding that the exemption statutes are to be
liberally construed in favor of a debtor and further that, under the IRS Code sections applicable, which are
incorporated by reference into the Kentucky statute, the roller was not a "contribution" to the IRA as used in the
Kentucky Statute. Relates to Section 2.3 of Outline.
In re: Curtis Wayne Rippy, Case No. 98-11756(1), APNo. 99-1012, decided June 7, 2000. Creditor bank filed
adverSary proceeding for exception to discharge related to its loan secured by a Harley Davidson Motorcycle.
The Trustee counterclaimed alleging that the Bank did not hold a perfected security interest in the motorcycle
and other collateral, and that the Bank's sale of said collateral after the bankruptcy violated the stay and
constituted a preferential transfer under Section 547. The Court ruled that the Bank did not properly perfect its
security interest in the collateral under KRS 186A.190, which requires that the Bank's lien be notated on the
Certificate ofTitle. The Court therefore concluded that the motorcycle was property ofthe bankruptcy estate and
that the Bank's lien was unperfected and therefore subordinate to the interest ofthe Trustee. Relates to Section
3.7 of Outline.
In re: Timothy W. Alexander, Case No. 00-10025, decided June 12,2000. Debtor soughtto hold his ex-wife and
her divorce attorney liable for an intentional violation of the stay when, following filing of the petition by the
debtor, they requested the state divorce court to issue an order holding the Debtor in contempt for failure to
make payments on certain debt obligations assigned to the Debtor in the divorce decree. The Court held that
while the ex-wife and her attorney alleged their actions were in good faith, their actions were clearly intended
to enforce a portion of the parties separation agreement which fell into the prohibitions set forth in Section
362(bXl). The Court awarded the Debtor damages in the amount of $1344.20. Relates to Section 1.3 of
Outline.
In re: Martha A. Brumbaugh, Case No. 99-41200 (3) 7, decided July 5, 2000. Debtor sought to avoid judicial
lien against home owned jointly with her husband. The Debtor claimed a homestead exemption against the
property in the amount of $4,500.00. The Creditor objected arguing that the lien did not impair the debtor's
exemption under Section 522(f)(2)(A). The Debtor argued that because, under Kentucky law, a creditor can
attach and sell under execution a debtor-spouse's interest in property, the lien impaired her exemption and was
avoidable. The Court ruled that under the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, Congress provided a
federal definition of"imp.airment" and provided an arithmetic test to determine ifa lien impairs an exemption.
Under the Code, a lien does not impair an exemption unless the sum of the lien, the other liens and the amount
of the exemption the debtor could claim exceed the value ofthe debtor's interest in the property in the absence
ofany liens. Utilizing the test, the. Court overruled the Debtor's motion. Relates to Section 4.4 of Outline.
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9-402

Contents of Financing
Statement

Perfection by Filing

Current Section #

--, -, -.,

-.,

..
-, --, .-, -, -, -,

-,

Names of debtor and secured party;
addresses of both; description of collateral;
10# of debtor; debtor signature

Rule

Names of debtor and secured party;
"indicates" collateral covered

Financing statement sufficiently "indicates"
collateral if complies with 9-108 [identify
by listing, category, or a type of collateral
defined in VCC, e.g. inventory], or
indicates that financing statement covers all
debtor's assets or personal property
No signature of debtor is needed; however,
debtor must authorize the filing; the debtor
authorizes the filing of a financing
statement by signing as or becoming bound
as debtor by a security agreement

9-504

9-502 and Official
Comment 3; 9-509

Rule

1

-, -, -, -,

9-502

Revised Section #

COMPARISON OF CURRENT ARTICLE 9 WITH REVISED ARTICLE 9

'-, .,

"'"

t:;I

CommuniCation of a record to filing office
and tender of fee; or acceptance of record
by tiling office
Filing officer shall refuse to accept a
finanCing statement not including addresses
of debtor and secured party; tiling does not
occur iffiling officer refuses to accept for
that reason
If filing officer nevertheless accepts the
defective statement for filing, it is effective

9-520(a)
9-516(b)(4) & (5)

9-520(c)

Central filing wI Secretary of State's office;
exception for minerals to be extracted,
timber to be cut and fixture filing--file in
office where mortgage on the real property
would be filed

Rule

9-516(a)

9-501

Revised Section #

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

9-403

Present financing statement and tender of
fee; or acceptance 'of statement by filing
officer

Secretary of State filing; submit file
stamped copy of statement filed with
county clerk to Sec. of State office; 20
days; $100 fine; information only, not a
condition of perfection

9-401A

What Constitutes Filing

Local filing with county clerk's office;
place of filing depends on type of c9 II ateral
and location of debtor

Rule

9-401

Place of Filing

Perfection by Filing,
continued

Current Section #

2

I

t::='

U\

9-403

Continuation Statement

9-403

Duration of
Financing Statement

Perfection by filing,
continued

Current Section #

--, -, - , - ,
-,

-,

-,

-,

Continues effectiveness for 5 years; file
within 6 months before expiration

5 years from date of filing

Rule

-,

J

-,

9-515

9-515

Revised Section #

--,

-,

-,

'-'

Same as current rule

Same as current rule

Rule

-,

-,

-,
3

-,

C\

I

o

Rule

The Revised Article 9 does not render
ineffective a financing statement that
satisfies the applicable perfection
requirements under the law ofthe
jurisdiction governing perfection as
provided in cllrrent 9-103, or the law
determining the place of filing as provided
in current 9-401. Financing statement
ceases to be effective at the earlier of period
of effectiveness or June 30, 2006

9-705(c)

Section 9-705(c) saves an effective
financing statement and continues the
perfected status of a security interest valid
under current Article 9, but only until
earlier of June 30, 2006 or expiration of
effectiveness under current Article 9

If security interest perfected under current
Article 9 does not satisfy applicable
requirements for perfection under Revised
Article 9, the security interest is perfected
for one (J) year after Revised Article 9
takes effect (July 1,2001)

Rule.

9-703(b)

Revised Section #

~L....-.~"""L..r....""''-''''''''L-'-''''''-'~''''L..-L-,;'--L-.i

Transition Rules

Current Section #

4

~

o

-, -, -,
-, "

312(5)

Secured Party
Conflicting security interests rank
according to priority in time of filing or
perfection. Priority dates from the time a
filing is first made or the security interest is
first perfected

Buyer in ordinary course of business takes
free of perfected security interest created by
his seller

9-307

Buyer

Filing a financing statement before or
within ten (10) days after debtor receives
possession of collateral allows SP to take
priority over lien creditor whose rights arise
between time of attachment and filing

I',·:.,·

,

I

I
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9-322(a)

9-320

9-3 17(e)

9-317

9-102(52)

Revised Section #

I

-, --.,-", -"i!' /~-,

Unperfected security interest subordinate to
person who becomes a lien creditor before
perfection

Includes bankruptcy trustee

Rule

J

9-301(2)

Lien Creditor and PMSI

9-301

Lien Creditor

Priority of Secured
Creditor

Current Section #

-,
-,
"

-, -,
"

5

Same as current rule

Same as current rule

Same rule; time for filUlg extended to
twenty (20) days after debtor receives
delivery of collateral

Unperfected security interest subordinate to
person who becomes lien creditor before
the earlier of perfection or filing of
financing statement

Same as current rule

Rule

-,
-,

no current section

Perfected PM SIs in inventory or in noninventory collateral have priority over
earlier perfected, conflicting security
interest in the same collateral

Rule

9-325

9-324(a) & (b)

Revised Section #

When debtor acquires property subject to a
security interest created by another debtor
(typically the other debtor is the seller to
the current debtor) a security interest
created by the debtor is subordinate to the
security interest previously created if the
debtor acquired the collateral subject to the
security interest and the security interest
was perfected at that time

Same as current rule

Rule

&....,.'- ..... L-."-- ...... '-- ............. '-- ..... L-- ............................
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o

Double Debtor

9-312(3)&(4)

Purchase Money
Security Interests

Priority of Secured
Creditor, continued

Current Section #

~

6

\0

t::i

-,
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9-107

PMSI Transformation
Rule

Current Section #

--,
\

--,
--,

-,

Even courts that allow PM status to
continue had difficulty allocating the
debtor's payments between PM and nonPM debts

PMSI that secures non-purchase money
obligations, or is secured by non-purchase
money collateral, or is renewed or
refinanced may lose PM status

Rule

-, --, -,

.,

9-103(e)

Allocation of payment in respect to a dual
status Sf is: first, according to parties'
agreement; second, in absence of agreement
according to intention of debtor manifested
at or before the time of payment; or third, to
unsecured obi igations or if more than one
obligation is secured by PMSI, in the order
in which they were incurred

PMSf does not lose PM status even if PM
collateral also secures a non-PM obligation;
the PM obligation is also secured by nonPM collateral; or the PM obligation has
been renewed, refinanced, consolidated or
restructured

9-103(f)

7

Cross collateralization - a PMSI in
inventory can also secure a PM obligation
incurred for other inventory, e.g., PMSI in
goods A can secure PM obligation of goods
B

Rule

-, -, -, -, --, -,

9-103(b)

Revised Section #

--, -,

--,

Q

Rule

.,

9-1 03 (h)

Revised Section #

These rules do not apply to a PMSI in
consumer goods and such limitation is
intended to leave the determination of the
proper rules to the court, with no inference
from the limitation of rules of Revised
Article 9 to non-consumer goods
transactions

~.

Rule

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

.....
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Consumer debtors

Current section #

PMSI Transformation
Rule, continued
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1. Applicability of revised 9 over pre-effective-date (PED) transactions
• Applicability of revised article 9-9-702
• On July 1, 2001, revised 9 immediately applies to PED .
transactions and liens within scope of revised 9 regardless of
whether the transaction was covered by old article 9 '
•

Effect is that secured party must comply with revised 9
requirements to insure continued validity of PED transaction
SAVING CLAUSE-9-702(2) except as otherwise provided by
the transition rules (these "otherwise provided" rules include
length of perfection, and continuation of perfection, discussed
infra), transactions and liens not governed by old 9 remain valid
,
without the necessity of action; they can be terminated,
completed, consummated and enforced under either revised 9
. or law applicable otherwise, 'at option of secured party
EXAMPLE-agriculture liens are not covered by old 9 but are
within scope of revised 9; on July 1, 2001, a PED agriculture
lien is governed by the requirements of revised 9, thus
necessitating the lienholder's compliance with revised 9;
saving clause effect is that the lien remains valid under revised
9 without any action by the lienholder, and lienholder can
choose to enforce lien under either revised 9 or PED applicable
law

D-ll

J
EXCEPTION TO APPLICABILITY OF REVISED 9-9-702(3)
revised 9 does not affect an action, case, or proceeding, i.e.,
litigation, con:tmenced before revised 9 takes effect, July 1,
2001; if litigation involving a security interest is commenced
before July 1, 2001, the requirements of old 9 for enforceability,
perfection, priority, enforcement, etc., apply in the proceeding
regardless of whether revised 9 changes those requirements
•

Priority of security interest-9-709
•

Revised 9 priority rules determine the priority of conflicting
claims regardless of whether the claim arises before or after the
effective date of revised 9
EXAMPLE-SP 1 takes a security interest in debtor's
equipment that attaches on May 1, 2000, but never perfects it;
revised 9 takes effect; SP 2 takes a security interest in the
same equipment on August 1, 2001, and perfects it on August
5, 2001; the priority rules of revised 9 determine the priority of
the competing claims; SP 2 has priority
EXCEPTION-9-709(1) if the relative priorities of the claims
are established before the effective date of revised 9, then old 9
determines the priorities; revised 9 does not define when .
. "relative priorities" are "established," but the official comments
to 9-709 indicate that relative priorities are established
whenever two or more entities have an interest in the same
collateral; priorities are established regardless of whether or
when an actual conflict over the collateral arises
EXAMPLE-SP1 takes a security interest in debtor's
equipment on May 1, 2000, and perfects it on May 7, 2000;
SP 2 takes a security interest in the same equipment on August
1, 2000, and perfects it on August 5, 2000; these priorities are
established before the effective date of revised 9 and are
determined by the priority rules of old 9; SP 1 has priority

• Claimant's action taken after the effective date of revised 9 can
change relative priorities established under old 9 resulting in
revised 9 determining the relative priorities
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EXAMPLE-SP 1 and SP 2 have unperfected security interests
in debtor's equipment prior to effective date of revised 9; old 9
determines the priorities because the relative priorities are
established prior to revised 9; SP 1 has priority; after effective
date of revised 9, SP 2 perfects its security interest by filing a
financing statement; the post-effective-date action of SP 2
changes the relative priorities which are now determined by the
priority rules of revised 9; SP 2 has priority

r
r
r
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• The mere taking effect of revised 9 cannot change relative
priorities established under old 9; in a situation where PED
action of the claimant is not effective to perfect a security
interest under old 9, but is effective to perfect a security interest
under revised 9, the relative priorities are not reestablished
upon the effective date of revised 9; priority is determined
under old 9
EXAMPLE-in March 2000, SP 1 takes a security interest in
debtor's right to payment for lottery winnings, a general
intangible under old 9, but files a financing statement describing
the collateral as "accounts" and is not perfected under old 9; in
August 2000, SP 2 takes a security interest in the same
collateral and files a financing statement describing the
collateral as "accounts and general intangibles" and is
perfected under old 9; the relative priorities are established and
SP 2 has priority; under the accounts definition of revised 9 (9102(2», a right to payment for lottery winnings is an account;
when revised 9 becomes effective, SP 1's financing statement
is effective to perfect its security interest under revised 9
(assuming all other revised 9 perfection requirements are
satisfied); if revised 9 were to govern priority, the first to file or
perfect rule would award priority to SP 1 since it was the first to
file, and SP 1 is now perfected; however, the relative priorities
are not reestablished and SP 2 has priority

r
r
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•

Priority of security interest dates from effective date of revised 9
for security interest in after acquired collateral acquired after
revised 9 effective date-9-709(2); this provision has a narrow
application; it is applicable only for after acquired collateral

"
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acquired by the debtor after revised 9's effective date, and
when secured party's perfection action was not effective to
perfect the security interest under old 9, but is effective to
perfect the security interest under revised 9; priority of such
after acquired property security interest dates from the effective
date of revised 9
EXAMPLE- in March 2000, SP 1 takes a security interest in
debtor's current and after acquired rights to payment for lottery
winnings, a general intangible under old 9, but files a financing
statement describing the collateral as "accounts" and is not
perfected under old 9; when revised 9 becomes effective, SP
1's financing statement.is effective to perfecfits security interest
under revised 9 (assuming all other revised 9 perfection
requirements are satisfied); after revised 9 becomes effective,
the debtor acquires additional rights to payment for lottery
winnings; the priority date for the rights to payment acquired
after revised 9's effective date is July 1, 2001

2.

Security interest enforceable and perfected under both revised 9 and
old 9-9-703(1)
• A security interest that was enforceable and perfected under old 9
or other applicable law 9 (when PED transaction was outside the
scope of old 9) is a perfected security interest under revised 9 if,
when revised 9 becomes effective, the applicable requirements for
enforceability and perfection under revised 9 are satisfied without.
further action
EXAMPLES-purchase money security interest in debtor's
consumer goods automatically perfected upon attachment under
both old 9 and revised 9; security interest in debtor's instruments
. perfected by possession under both old 9 and revised 9; security
interest in debtor's securities account perfected by control under
both old 9 and revised 9

J
J
J
J
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3.
Security interest enforceable and perfected under old 9 but not under
revised 9-9-703(2)
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• Security interest that is enforceable and perfected under old 9 but
does not satisfy the revised 9 requirements for perfection remains
perfected for one year after revised 9 takes effect
• Security interest remains enforceable thereafter if security interest
becomes enforceable under revised 9.requirements before the
year expires
•

Security interest remains perfected thereafter if security interest
becomes perfected under revised 9 requirements before the year
expires
EXAMPLE-SP takes a security interest in debtor's right to
proceeds of a written letter of credit; SP perfects by possession of
the letter of credit (effective under old 9-305); revised 9 becomes
effective; possession of letter of credit does not perfect such
security interest under revised 9 requirements; security interest
remains perfected until June 30, 2002; perfection lapses on June
30, 2002, unless effective perfection action taken between July 1,
2001, and June 30, 2002
EXCEPTION-this rule-security interest remains perfected for
one year--is subject to 9-705, discussed infra at 6, which allows
security interests perfected by filing to remain perfected beyond
June 30, 2002

4 ..Security interest enforceable but not perfected "before effective date of
revised 9-9-704
• Security interest is enforceabl~ under old 9 but is not perfected
under old 9 when revised 9 becomes effective; security interest
remains enforceable for one year after revised 9 becomes
effective regardless of whether security interest satisfies
enforcement requirements of revised 9
• Security interest remains enforceable thereafter if revised 9
enforceability requirements are satisfied during the year; if
requirements not satisfied during the year, security interest lapses
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• Security interest becomes perfected under revised 9 when revised
9 perfection requirements are satisfied, with or without action by
the secured party
EXAMPLE-SP takes a security interest in debtor's instruments
under a security agreement signed by debtor describing the
collateral as "debtor's instruments"; SP fails to take possession of
the instruments and is not perfected under old 9; when revised 9
takes effect the security remains enforceable for one year and
thereafter since the authenticated security agreement satisfies the
enforceability requirements under both old 9 and revised 9; SP
can perfect under revised 9 either by taking possession of the
instruments or by filing a financing statement covering instruments;'
if, prior to revised 9 effective date, SP takes action that is
ineffective to perfect the security interest under old 9, but effective
under revised 9, e.g., files a financing statement that satisfies
revised 9's requirements, the security interest becomes perfected
immediately upon revised 9 becoming effective; this possibility is
less likely in Kentucky since Kentucky filing office will change from
local filing under old 9 to central filing under revised 9

5. After-acquired property under security interest perfected under old 9
other than by filing where perfection action not effective under revised
9-9-705(1)
• Rule has narrow application; affects only security interest in
property acquired after revised 9 effective date, and security
interest is perfected other than by filing under old 9, such action
not being effective to perfect the security interest under revised 9;
in such case the security interest in property acquired after revised
9 effective date is perfected for one year after revised 9 effective
date; after lapse of one year, security interest becomes
unperfected unless secured party takes action effective under
revised 9 within one year of effective date; under 9-703(2) the
security interest in the PED collateral is perfected also for only one
year after revised 9 becomes effective
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EXAMPLE-SP has security interest in debtor's existing and after
acquired instruments; the instruments are held by a bailee who is
not an agent of or under the control of SP or debtor; SP perfects
under old 9-305 by notifying bailee of SP's security interest;
revised 9 takes effect and thereunder SP's perfection action is not
effective; after revised 9 takes effect the debtor acquires
instruments which it delivers to bailee;. the security interest in the
instruments acquired after revised 9 becomes effective remain
perfected for one year from revised 9's effective date; thereafter,
perfection lapses unless SP takes action effective under revised 9,
e.g., bailee acknowledges it holds instruments for SP, or SP files a
financing statement

6. PED filing-9-705(2) & (3)
• Filing effective under revised 9, but ineffective under old 9-9705(2)
• Where PED filing satisfies the perfection requirements of
revised 9, but not the requirements of old 9, the security
interest is perfected when revised 9 takes effect
EXAMPLES-financing statement could be ineffective under
the requirements of old 9 because, for example, the financing
statement description is overly broad, or it is filed in the wrong
jurisdiction under the choice of law rules of old 9-103; if revised
9 validates the financing statement's broad description, or the
jurisdiction is proper under revised 9's choice of law rules, the
security interest is perfected without further action when revised
9 becomes effective
EXAMPLE-SP anticipates the effective ~ate of revised 9 and
files a financing statement under the requirements of revised 9,
although the financing statement is not effective under old 9;
the security interest is effective without further action when
revised 9 becomes effective; SP typically also would make an
effective filing under old 9
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Filing effective under old 9, but ineffective under revised 9-9705(3)
• Security interest is perfected by a PEO filing which is effective
to perfect the security interest under old 9; PEO filing is not
effective to perfect the security interest under revised 9;
nevertheless security interest remains effective until earlier of
remaining period of perfection under old 9, or June 30, 2006;
this is an exception to the one year of perfection rule of 9703(2)
. . .

j

j

J
j

EXAMPLE-SP takes a security interest in debtor's equipment
in August 2000; SP perfects by filing financing statement in the
Kentucky county clerk's office of the county of debtor's
residence; revised 9 takes effect on July 1, 2001; under
revised 9, financing statement in equipment is filed in secretary
of state's office, thus filing is not effective under revised 9;
security interest remains perfected regardless of lack of
effective post-effective-date filing until earlier of normal lapse
date under old 9 or June 30, 2006

J

PRACTICAL EFFECT-SP can do nothing and security interest
perfected by PEO filing remains perfected for both PEO
collateral and post-effective-date collateral

J

7. Continuation of perfection by filing-9-706 & 9-705(4)
• Security interest perfected by PEO filing cannot be continued
beyond lapse date by filing revised 9 continuation statement-9705(4)
EXCEPTION-PEO filing can be continued by timely filing a
revised 9 continuation statement if PEO filing was in the filing
office designated by revised 9; the continuation statement and the
PEO financing statement must satisfy revised 9 requirements for
an initial financing statement-9-705(4) & (6)
PRACTICAL EFFECT-exception is of little value to security
interests perfected by filing in Kentucky because PEO filing
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typically is a county clerk's office filing and effective revised 9 filing
is a secretary of state's office filing, thus effective filings would not
be made in the same office; exception applicable to multi-state
secured transactions where choice of law rules of both old 9 and
revised 9 specify same jurisdiction and same office
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•

Continuing effectiveness of PED filing is accomplished by filing an
initial financing statement "in lieu" of filing a continuation
statement-9-706
• The "in lieu" statement is filed in the filing office designated by
revised 9
• The "in lieu" statement can be filed any time prior to lapse of
effectiveness of PED financing statement; this filing is not
restricted to the normal six month window for filing continuation
statements
• The "in lieu" statement continues the effectiveness of the PED
financing statement for five years from the date of filing the "in
lieu" statement, not five years from the normal lapse date of the
.
PED f i l i n g ·
• The "in lieu" statement can continue the effectiveness of more
than one PED filing against the same debtor provided the "in
lieu" statement properly identifies all the affected filings
• The "in lieu" statement must: 1) satisfy the revised 9
requirements for an initial financing statement (part 5 of revised
9); 2) identify the PED filing by filing office, date of filing, and
file numbers of the PED filing and most recent continuation
statement (if any); and 3) indicate that the PED filing remains
effective

J
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EXAMPLE-SP perfects a security interest in Kentucky
debtor's equipment by filing a PED financing statement in
county of debtor's residence on August 5, 2000; revised 9
takes effect on July 1, 2001, and revised 9 specifies the proper
filing office as the Kentucky secretary of state's office; on
November 11, 2004, SP files, in the Kentucky secretary of
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state's office, an initial financing statement (an "in lieu"
statement) that also satisfies the requirements of 9-706(3) to
continue the PED filing; SP's PED filing is continued for five
years from November 11, 2004, and SP's priority date relates
back to the original priority date

j
j
j

8. Amendment of PED filing-9-707
• Amendment, under the revised 9 definition, includes any filings
made to a financing statement after filing the initial financing
statement, e.g., add or delete collateral, continue or terminate the
financing statement, add or delete debtors/secured parties
• Place of filing amendment-must file amendment in office and
jurisdiction specified by revised 9 regardless of place of PED
filing
EXAMPLES-PED financing statement filed locally in
Kentucky, post-revised 9-effective-date amendment can be filed
only in Kentucky secretary of state's office; in multi-state
secured transaction-PED filing made, for example,· in Indiana
under old 9's choice of law rules; revised 9's choice of law
rules designate Kentucky as the proper jurisdiction; posteffective-date amendment can be filed only in Kentucky
secretary of state's office
EXCEPTION-can terminate effectiveness, i.e., a termination
statement, of PED filing in accordance with law of jurisdiction
where PED filing is made-9-707(2) & (5); termination
"exception" i·s not available if SP has filed a post-effective-date
initial financing statement in office designated by revised 9;
exception may not be available in Kentucky because revised 9
changes filing office from local to central
• Method of amending-9-707(3)
•

J
J

If the PED financing statement and the amendment are filed
in the same office specified by revised 9, then amendment is
only filing required; this method is not generally applicable in

J

J
J

J

J
J
J
J
J
J
J
j

J
j

D - 20

r
r

Kentucky since PED filing is local, and the post-effective-date
amendment filing is central; possible in multi-state secured
transactions where PED filing office is same as revised 9
filing office

r
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•

If the pre and post filing offices are not the same, file posteffective-date initial financing statement in office specified by
revised 9, and therewith or thereafter, file amendment; two
documents filed; the initial financing statement must also
satisfy 9-706(3)-the information required to continue the
effectiveness of the PED filing

•

If the pre and post filing offices are not the $ame, can file
post-effective-date initial financing statement which provides
the amended information in office specified by revised 9; one
document filed; the initial financing statement must also
satisfy 9-706(3)--the information required to continue the
effectiveness of the PED filing

r
r
r

r-

r
r
r

r
r
r

0-21

J

J
J
J
J
J
J
j

J
J
j

J
J
J
J
J
j

D - 22

J
J

Default and Enforcement
in Consumer Transactions
under
Revised Article 9
Christopher W. Frost
Brown Todd & Heyburn Professor of Law
University of Kentucky
College of Law

I.

II.

Introduction
A.

Transition. As of July 1,2001, all transactions will become subject to new default
rules.

B.

Major Changes and Clarifications
1.

Default Rules contained in Part 6

2.

Statutory Distinction between Consumer and Commercial Transactions

3.

Definitional Clarifications of Good Faith and Commercial Reasonableness

4.

Definitional Clarification Regarding Parties

5.

Notice Safe Harbor

6.

Explanation of Deficiency

Commercial v. Consumer Transactions
A.

Definition of Consumer Transactions.
9-102(24) defines "consumer transaction" as a "consumer transaction in which:
(1)
an individual incurs an obligation primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes; and
(2)
a security interest in consumer goods secures the transaction."
9-102(23) defines "consumer goods" as "goods that are used or bought for use
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes."
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B.

Importance
1.

10 day notice safe harbor does not apply to consumer transactions.
R9-612 provides:
(1)

Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section,
whether a notification is sent within a reasonable time is a question
of fact.

(2)

In a transaction other than a consumer transaction, a notification of
disposition sent after default and ten (10) days or more before the
earliest time of disposition set forth in the notification is sent
within a reasonable time before the disposition.

2.

Separate Notice Requirements and Form. See Section V below.

3.

Requirement of Explanation of Calculation of Surplus of Deficiency. See
Section VI below.

4.

Limitations on Strict Foreclosure. R 9-620(5)-(7) provide:
(5)

(6)

(7)

A secured party that has taken possession of collateral shall
dispose ofthe collateral pursuant to KRS 355.9-610 within the
time specified in subsection (6) ofthis section if: .
(a)

Sixty percent (60%) ofthe cash price has been paid in the
case of a purchase-money security interest in consumer
goods; or

(b)

Sixty percent (60%) of the principal amount of the
obligation secured has been paid in the case ofa non
purchase-money security interest in consumer goods.

To comply with subsection (5) of this section, the secured party
shall dispose of the collateral:
(a)

Within ninety (90) days after taking possession; or

(b)

Within any longer period to which the debtor and all
secondary obligors have agreed in an agreement to that
effect entered into and authenticated after default.

In a consumer transaction, a secured party may not accept
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collateral in partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures.
5.

Minimum Damage Provisions. R9-625(3), (5) and (6) provide:
(3)

r
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(5)
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Except as otherwise provided in KRS 355.9-628:
(a)

A person that, at the time of the failure, was a debtor, was
an obligor, or held a security interest in or other lien on the
collateral may recover damages under subsection (2) of this
section for its loss; and

(b)

If the collateral is consumer goods, a person that was a
debtor or a secondary obligor at the time a secured party
failed to comply with this part of this article may recover
for that failure in any event an amount not less than the
credit service charge plus ten percent (l 0%) of the principal
amount of the obligation or the time-price differential plus
ten percent (10%) of the cash price.

In addition to any damages recoverable under subsection (2) of this
section, the debtor, consumer obligor, or person named as a debtor
in a filed record,.as applicable, may recover five hundred dollars
($500) in each case from a person that:
(a)

Fails to comply with KRS 355.9-208;

(b)

Fails to comply with KRS 355.9-209;

(c)

Files a record that the person is not entitled to file under
KRS 355.9-509(1);

(d)

Fails to cause the secured'party of record to file or send a
termination statement as required by KRS 355.9-513(1) or
(3) of this Act;

. (e)

Fails to comply with KRS 355.9-616(2)(a) and whose
failure is part of a pattern, or consistent with a practice, of
noncompliance; or

(f)
(6)

Fails to comply with KRS 355.9-616(2)(b).

A debtor or consumer obligor may recover damages under
subsection (2) of this section and, in addition, five hundred dollars
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($500) in each case from a person that, without reasonable cause,
fails to comply with a request under KRS 355.9-210. A recipient of
a request under KRS 355.9-210 which never claimed an interest in
the collateral or obligations that are the subiect of a request under
that section has a reasonable excuse for failure to comply with the
request within the meaning of this subsection.
6.

III.

Rebuttable Presumption Rule not Statutorily Adopted in Consumer
transactions. Revised Article 9 adopts the rebuttable presumption rule for
violations of Part 6. Under this rule, the value of the collateral is
rebuttably presumed to be the amount of the debt. If the presumption is
not rebutted the effect is that the secured party loses its deficiency claim.
While Revised Article 9 adopts the rule only for non-consumer
transactions, the Kentucky Supreme Court has adopted the rule for all
types of transactions. See Holt v. Peoples Bank ofMt. Washington., 814
S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1991). Where the secured party has failed to provide the
required notice, however, the absolute bar rule applies. Id at 570-71.

Definitions of Good Faith and Commercial Reasonableness

A.

B.

Good Faith

J
J
J
J
j

J

J
J
j

Current Article 9 uses the general VCC definition of good faith contained in 1201(19). Thatsection defines "good faith" as ''honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned."

J
J

R9-102(43) defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact and the observence of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." [emphasis added]

j

Commercial Reasonableness.

J
J
J

R9-627 provides some clarity to the defInition of commercial reasonableness.
That section provides:
355.9-627 Determination of whether conduct was commercially reasonable.
(1)

The fact that a greater amount could have been obtained by a collection,
enforcement, disposition, or acceptance at a different time or in a different
method from that selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to
preclude the secured party from establishing that the collection,
enforcement, disposition, or acceptance was made in a commercially
reasonable manner.
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(2)

A disposition of collateral is made in a commercially reasonable manner if
the disposition is made:
(a) In the usual manner on any recognized market;
(b) At the price current in any recognized market at the time of the
disposition; or
(c) Otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among
dealers in the type of property that was the subject of the disposition.

(3)

A collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance is commercially
reasonable if it has been approved:
(a) In ajudicial proceeding;
(b) By a bona fide creditors' committee;
(c) By a representative of creditors; or
(d) By an assignee for the benefit of creditors.

(4)

IV.

Approval under subsection (3) of this section need not be obtained, and
lack of approval does not mean that the collection, enforcement,
disposition, or acceptance is not commercially reasonable.

Definitions of Debtor, Obligor, and Secondary Obligor
A.

Current Article 9 has created some uncertainty because the definition of "debtor"
includes both the owner of the collateral and the person who owes the obligation,
as the "context" requires.

B.

R9-102 provides separate definitions for;
"debtor" -

the person who owns the collateral;

"obligor" - the person who owes the debt; and
"secondary obligor" - a guarantor.
C.

V.

These definitions are most important when considering the parties entitled to
notice and a commercially reasonable sale.

Notice Requirement. R9-614 provides clarity regarding the form that notice must take.
Under R9-614 completing the following form provides sufficient information:
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<Name and address of secured party>
<Date>
NOTICE OF OUR PLAN TO SELL PROPERTY
<Name and address of any obligor who is also a debtor>
Subject: <Identification of Transaction>
We have your ..... <describe collateral>, because you broke promises in our
agreement.
<For a public disposition:>
We will sell ..... <describe collateral> at public sale. A sale could include a lease
or license. The sale will be held as follows:
Date: .............. .
Time: .............. .
Place: .............. .
You may attend the sale and bring bidders if you want.
<For a private disposition:>
We will sell ..... <describe collateral> at private sale sometime after
..... <date>. A sale could include a lease or license.
The money that we'get from the sale (after paying our costs) will reduce the amount
you owe. If we get less money than you owe, you ..... <will or will not, as applicable>
still owe us the difference. If we get more money than you owe, you will get the extra
money, unless we must pay it to someone else. You can get the property back at any time before
we sell it by paying us the full amount you owe (not just the past due payments), including our
expenses. To learn the exact amount you must pay, call us at ..... <telephone number>.
If you want us to explain to you in writing how we have figured the amount that you
owe us, you may call us at ..... <telephone number> <or write us at ..... <secured
party's address» and request a written explanation. <We will charge you $...•. for the
explanation if we sent you another written explanation of the amount you owe us within
the last six (6) months.>
If you need more infonnation about the sale call us at ..... <telephone number>
<or write us at ..... <secured party's address».
We are sending this notice to the following other people who have an interest in
..... <describe collateral> or who owe money under your agreement:
..... <Names of all other deb~ors and obligors, if any>"
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R9-614 also provides:

VI

(4)

A notification in the form of subsection (3) of this section is sufficient,
even if additional information appears at the end of the form.

(5)

A notification in the form of subsection (3) of this section is sufficient,
even if it includes errors in information not required by subsection (1) of
this section, unless the error is misleading with respect to rights arising
under this article.

(6)

If a notification under this section is not in the fonn of subsection (3) of
this section, law other than this article dc~tennines the effect of including
information not required by subsection (1) of this section.

Explanation of Calculation of Surplus or Deficiency.
A.

When a consumer requests an explanation after a disposition of collateral, R9-616
requires the secured creditor to respond within 14 days with an explanation of the
method of calculation. The secured party must provide one explanation free of
charge in any 6 month period. For additional explanations, the secured party may
charge a fee of up to $25.00.

B.

The explanation must include the following information:
(a)

The aggregate amount of obligations secured by the security interest under
which the disposition was made, and, if the amount reflects a rebate of
unearned interest or credit service charge, an indication ofthat fact,
calculated as of a specified date:
1.

If the secured party takes or receives possession of the collateral
after default, not more than thirty-five (35) days before the secured
party takes or receives possession; or

2.

If the secured party takes or receives possession of the collateral
before default or does not take possession of the collateral, not
more than thirty-five (35) days before the disposition;

(b)

The amount of proceeds of the disposition;

(c)

The aggregate amount of the obligations after deducting the amount of
proceeds;
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c.

(d)

The amount, in the aggregate or by type, and types of expenses, including
expenses ofretaking, holding, preparing for disposition, processing, and
disposing ofthe collateral, and attorney's fees secured by the collateral
which are known to the secured party and relate to the current disposition;

(e)

The amount, in the aggregate or by type, and types of credits, including
rebates of interest or credit service charges, to which the obligor is known
to be entitled and which are not reflected in the amount in paragraph (a) of
this subsection; and
.

(t)

The amount of the surplus or deficiency.

R9-616(4) provides:
A particular phrasing of the explanation is not required. An explanation
complying substantially with the requirements of subsection (1) ofthis
section is sufficient, even if it includes minor errors that are not seriously
misleading.
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HANDLING CASES WITH THE CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE

James D. Lyon
Michael L. Baker
Scott A. Bachert
Cathy S. Pike

I.

PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE

A.

Estate Property Defined

The commencement of a bankruptcy creates an estate, comprised of all property rights the
debtor has in property of every kind and description, legal and equitable, wherever located and by
whomever held, as of the date of filing. 11 USC §541. The definition of estate property is extremely
broad, but the estate generally can have no greater interest in property than did the debtor at the time
of filing. Property of the estate does however include property preserved, recovered or transferred
back to the estate. 11 USC § 541(a)(4) and (5). Property of the estate may include consigned
property, ifno notice of the consignor's interest is given. In re: Andaco. Inc., 226 BR 578 (Bankr.
W.O. Ky. 1998).

1.

In addition to property rights held at the commencement of the case, property received by
bequest or inheritance, property settlement or divorce decree, or through life insurance benefits
within six (6) months of the petition is property of the estate. 11 USC § 541 (a)(5).
2.

r
r

Proceeds of Estate Property

Proceeds, product, offspring, rent or profits of estate property is estate property. This does
not include earning from the debtor's services after the commencement of the case. Note that
post-petition earnings are property of a Chapter 13 and Chapter 12 bankruptcy estate.
3.

Property Not Part ofthe Estate

Some property is not held to be part of the bankruptcy estate. These specific, rarely seen
exceptions involve property held in trust, expired leases of non-residential property, accreditation
as an educational institution, certain interest in hydrocarbons and cash from the sale of certain
money orders. Reference should be made to 11 USC § 541 (b) (1-5).
4.

Effect of Restrictions on Transfer of Property Interest

The property of the debtor becomes property of the estate despite any agreed restriction on
transfer, except for trust restrictions enforceable under state law. 11 USC §541 (c)( 1)(2).
B.

r

Property Received Within Six Months of Petition

Property Of Estate And The Chapter 7 Trustee, Generally

The Chapter 7 trustee has the duty of collecting and reducing to money the property of the
. estate, and is accountable for the property received. 11 USC § 704 (1 )(2).
1.

Property Exemptions
An individual may exempt property from the estate. 11 USC § 522. Kentucky has opted
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for a state, rather than Federal exemption scheme. Exemptions are found in Chapter 427, and
throughout the Kentucky Revised Statues, as well as in applicable Federal Statutes.
2.

Objections to Exemptions

The trustee has thirty (30) days from the date ofthe first scheduled first meeting to object
to a claim of exemption. Failure of the trustee to object within the time period will prevent the
property from being administered, even ifthe claim of exemption is groundless. Talyor v. Freeland
& Kronz. 503 US 638 (1992).

3.

Abandonment of Property

A trustee may abandon property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate, or that is of
inconsequential value and benefit. 11 USC § 554. Abandoned property reverts back to the debtor.
C.

Reference To State Law

Property rights are determined by reference to the relevant state's law. But once that
determination is made, the federal bankruptcy law determines to what extent the debtor's interest
is property of the estate. In re Omegas Group. Inc., 16 F.3d 1443 (6th Cir. 1994); Bavely v. IRS.
911 F2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1990); Garrott & Sons v. Union Planters National Bank of Memphis, 772
F2d 462 (8th Cir. 1985). State law must be applied in a manner consistent with federal bankruptcy
law. Torres v. Eastlick, 767 F. 2d 1573 (9th Cir. 1985).

II.

PREFERENCE LITIGATION

A.

Introduction

J

J
J
J

J
.J
J
J
I

Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §547, is one of the longer statues in the
Bankruptcy Code. No statute so long is simple in either application or interpretation. Yet the
premise of the preference statute is very simple. Preferences are transactions that benefit one
creditor at the expense of others.
11 U.S.C. §S47
(a) In this section(1) "inventory" means personal property leased or furnished, held for
sale or lease, or to be furnished under a contract for service, raw
materials, work in process, or materials used or consumed in a
business, including farm products such as crops or livestock, held
for sale or lease;
(2) "new value" means money or money's worth in goods, services, or
new credit, or release by a transferee of property previously
transferred to such transferee in a transaction that is neither void
nor voidable by the debtor or the Trustee under any applicable law,
including proceeds of such property, but does not include an
obligation substituted for an existing obligation;
(3) "receivable" means right to payment, whether or not sllch right has
been earned by performance; and
(4) a debt for a tax is incurred on the day when such tax is last payable
without penalty, including any extension.
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(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the Trustee may
avoid any transfer of an interest ofthe debtor in property(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made(A)
on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the
petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of
the petition, if such creditor at the time as such transfer was an
insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if(A)
the case were a case under Chapter 7 ofthis title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title.
(c) The Trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer(1) to the extent that such transfer was(A)
intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose
benefit such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous
exchange for new value given to the debtor; and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange;
(2) to the extent that such transfer was(A)
in payment ofa debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary
course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the
transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of
the debtor and the transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms;
(3) that creates a security interest in property acquired by the debtor(A)
to the extent such security interest secures new value that
was(i) given at or after the signing of a security agreement that
contains a description of such property as collateral;
(ii) given by or on behalf of the secured party under such
agreement;
(iii)
given to enable the debtor to acquire such property;
and
iv) in fact by the debtor to acquire such property; and
. (B) that is perfected on or before 20 days after the debtor receives
possession of such property;
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such
transfer, such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of the
debtor(A)
not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest;
and
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not make an
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otherwise avoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such
creditor;
(5) that creates a perfected security interest in inventory or a
receivable or the proceeds of either, except to the extent that the
aggregate of all such transfers to the transferee caused a reduction,
as of the date of the filing of the petition and to the prejudice of
other creditors holding unsecured claims, of any amount by which
the debt secured by such security interest exceeded the value of all
security interests for such debt on the later of(A)
(i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection
(b)(4)(A) ofthis section applies, 90 days before the date of
the filing of the petition; or
(ii) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B) of
this section applies, one year before the date ofthe filing
of the petition; or
(B) the date on which new value was first given under the security
agreement creating such security interest;
(6) that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under
section 545 of this title;
(7) to the extent such transfer was a bona fide payment of a debt to a
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to,
maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection
with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a
Court of record, determination made in accordance with State or
territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement
agreement, but not to the extent that such debt(A)
is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of
law, or otherwise; or
(B) includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance or
support; or
(8) if, in a case filed by an individual debtor whose debts are primarily
consumer debts, the aggregate value of all property that constitutes
or is affected by such transfer is less than $600.00.
(d) The Trustee may avoid a transfer of an interest in property of the
debtor transferred to or for the benefit of a surety to secure
reimbursement of such a surety that furnished a bond or other
obligation to dissolve ajudiciallien that would have been avoidable by
the Trustee under subsection (b) of this section. The liability of such
surety under such bond or obligation shall be discharged to the extent
of the value of such property recovered by the Trustee or the amount
paid to the Trustee.
(e) (1) For the purpose of this section. (A)
a transfer of real property other than fixtures, but including
the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale
of real property, is perfected when a bona fide purchaser of
such property from the debtor against whom applicable law
permits such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest
that is superior to the interest of the transferee; and
(B) a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property is
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perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire
a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee.
(2) For the purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph
(3) of this subsection, a transfer is made(A)
atthe time such transfer takes effect between the transferor
and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10
days after, such time, except as provided. in subsection
(c)(3)(B);
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is
perfected after such 10 days; or
(C) immediately before the date ofthe filing ofthe petition, if such
transfer is not perfected at the later of(i) the commencement of the case; or
(ii) 10 days after such transfer takes effect between the
transferor and the transferee.
(3) For the purpose of this section, a transfer is not made until the
debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred.
(f) For the purposes of this section, the debtor is presumed to have been
insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of
the filing of the petition.
(g) For the purposes of this section, the Trustee has the burden of proving
the avoidability ofa transfer under subsection (b) of this section, and
the creditor or party in interest against whom recovery or avoidance is
sought has the burden of proving the nonavoidability of a transfer
under subsection (c) of this section.
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B.

Preferences - Purpose

The purpose of the preference statute allows a Trustee (or debtor in possession) to preserve
the quality ofdistribution among unsecured creditors by preventing one creditor from enhancing his
position at the expense of all other creditors on the eve of bankruptcy . In re IRFM. Inc., 52 F.3d 228
(9th Cir. 1995). Most importantly, the preference section facilitates an equal distribution of the
debtor's assets among creditors. In re Antweil. 931 F.2d 689, (9th Cir.) affd sub. nOI11., Barnhill V.
Johnson. 503 U.S. 393, 118 L.ED 2d 39, 112 S.Ct. 1386 (1992).
C.

Definitions

I.

§547(a)
11 U.S.C. §547(a) defines the following terms:

a.

Inventory

Inventory is defined as that personal property that is either leased or furnished, sold or
delivered, including raw materials, crops or live stock and materials that are used or consumed in
a business. Inventory is essentially the product that the debtor offers for sale leases or uses in the
course of his business.

b.

New Value
New value is defined as additional money, or new value of goods or services rendered, new
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credit or release of property previously transferred to the debtor including proceeds of property that
is used by the debtor, but does not include an obligation that is substituted for an already existing
obligation. This definition, which creditors use as a defense under §547(c), requires a creditor to
extend additional credit or material to a debtor rather than simply take the existing property of the .
debtor. The purpose of the new value exception encourages a creditor to continue to do business
with a financially troubled debtor who might otherwise avoid bankruptcy. In re IRFM. Inc., 52F.3d
228 (9th Cir. 1995).

c.

Receivable

The term receivable means the right to payment whether or not that right has been earned
by performance.
d.

Taxes

Taxes are defined in terms oftime under §54 7(a)(4). The parties must use the day that the
tax is last payable without penalty, including any extension, rather than the day the tax is actually
paid. Therefore, an income tax payment is due on April 15, unless an extension is granted. The tax
is due on April 15, even ifpaid on March 15.
2.

§547(b) - Elements of Preference

The elements constituting a preferential transfer are found at 11 U.S.C. §547(b). This
straight-forward section defines what a Trustee must assert and prove in order to avoid a preferential
transfer. No transfer is void; it is simply voidable. If a Trustee fails to challenge a transaction, it
remains valid. Clark v. Pure. 151 B.R. 75 (E.D. Pa.1993).
In order to avoid a transfer of an interest of the debtor, not necessarily title, the Trustee must
assert and prove that the transfer:
1)

benefits the creditor;

2)

is payment on an antecedent debt;

3)

made while the debtor is insolvent;

4)

within 90 days of the filing of the bankruptcy, unless the transfer
is to an insider, which calls for a one year reach back period, and

5)

the result ofthe transfer allows the creditor to receive more than it
would receive in a Chapter 7 distribution.

Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 116 L.Ed.2d 514, 112 S.Ct. 527 (1991), on remand. In re
ZZZZ Best Inc., 40 F.3d 317 (9th Cir.. 1994). The state of mind or intent of the parties is not an
element. In re Penna Pacific Properties, 983 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 1992).
a.

Transfer oflnterest of Debtor
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The first element of a preference requires that a transfer of an interest of the debtor must
benefit the preferred creditor. What constitutes a transfer and when it is complete, is a matter of
Federal Law. Barnhill V. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 118 L.ED 2d 39, 112 S.CT 1386 (1991).
However, in the absence of Federal Law, transfer is defined by State law. Barnhill v. Johnson Slpra.
The transfer of an interest of the debtor must benefit a creditor. In the absence of benefit, no
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preference occurs.
b.

Antecedent Debt

The debt must already have existed at the time that a transfer of property of the debtor
occurs. What constitutes an antecedent debt has been the su.bject of some interesting cases. For
example, a check returned for insufficient funds is a credit transaction. A subsequent payment by
the debtor for a dishonored check is a payment on an antecedent debt. A check honored in the
ordinary course is a cash transaction and not a payment on an antecedent debt. In re Car Renovators,
946 F.2d 780 (lIth Cir. 1991), cert.denied sub. nom., Heart of Dixie Nissan v. Reynolds, 504 U.S.
913, 118 L.Ed. 2d 553, 112 S.Ct. 1949 (1992). Reducing future obligations to a present value and
then obtaining cancellation of the debt for payment meets the statutory definition of an antecedent
debt. In the case of In re Futoran, 76 F.3d 265 (9th Cir. 1996), a husband reduced his future
maintenance obligations to a lump sum and paid that to his wife in exchange for cancellation of the
debt. The Court characterized the transaction as payment of an antecedent debt.
c.

Insolvency

Insolvency is defined in § 101 of Title 11, the general definitions section. The presumption
of insolvency generally favors the Trustee; in other words the debtor is presumed insolvent for a
period of time. However, insolvency is rebuttable. 11 U.S.C. §101(32), defines insolvency as a
balance sheet test. The Court will find the debtor insolvent if it determines the debtor's liabilities
exceed his assets. In re Bluegrass Ford-Mercurv. Inc .• 942 F.2d 381 (6th Cir. 1991). Insolvency is
presumed for the ninety (90) days immediately prior to bankruptcy. The Trustee need put no proof
into evidence on the issue of insolvency unless a creditor rebuts the presumption with evidence; or
if the transfer of the interest of the debtor occurred outside the ninety (90) day period immediately
prior to bankruptcy. The Trustee always bears the burden of persuasion to prove each element of
a preferential transfer.

d.

90-DayRule

Except with regard to transfers to insiders, the reach back period is ninety (90) days. The
Trustee will review the period of the ninety (90) days immediately proceeding the filing of the
bankruptcy petition and determine whether transfers that have occurred in that time frame are
preferential, with the knowledge that the debtor is presumed insolvent during those ninety (90) days.
11 U.S.C. §547(f). An affected creditor may challenge the presumption by competent evidence.
Weekends and holidays do not extend the preference period beyond ninety (90) calendar
days. Unlike the holding onn re Butcher, 829 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987), which held that the statute
of Iim itation for filing a preference action was jurisdictional, the ninety (90)-day reach back period
for preferences are deemed substantive rather than procedural. See In re Bergel, 185 B.R. 338 (9th
Cir. B.A.P. 1995).
e.

One Year Rule

With regard to transfers to insiders, as defined in § 10 1(31) of the Bankruptcy Code, a
Trustee may challenge transfers for one (1) year. The ninety (90)-day insolvency presumption still
applies. The Trustee must prove insolvency in cases where the transfer occurs more than ninety (90)
days prior to filing the bankruptcy. See In re PerrY, 158 B.R. 694 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Oh. 1993). Even
though the definition of "insiders" in § 101(31) does not include the debtor's girlfriend, in certain
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circumstances when a long term close relationship has been established, a girlfriend of a Chapter
7 debtor can be deemed an insider. See In re Levy. 185 B.R. 378 (Bkrtcy.S.D. FLA. 1995).
f.

Liquidation Test

The last element that a Trustee must prove to establish a preferential transfer is called the
liquidation analysis. Section 547(b)(5) sets forth a tri-partite test.· The Trustee must show that the
preferred creditor (1) received more than he would have received if the case were liquidated under
Chapter 7; (2) if the transfer had not been made to the preferred creditor; and (3) that such creditor
received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of Title II. The Trustee will
generally prevail and carry his burden of persuasion if he proves that the transfer of an interest of
the debtor that occurred prepetition would have been property of the bankruptcy estate upon filing
of the bankruptcy petition if the transfer had not occurred. Therefore, the issue in these cases
concerns whether the asset transferred would have been property ofthe bankruptcy estate.
A debtor's payment prepetition of trust fund taxes does not constitute a transfer of property
ofthe estate. Hence, the Internal Revenue Service did not receive more than it would receive in a
Chapter 7 distribution. Biegerv. Internal Revenue Service, 496 U.S. 53, 110 L.Ed.2d 46, 110 S.Ct.
2258 (1991). Transfers of trust assets do not constitute preferential transfers. See In re Unicorn
Computer Corporation, 13 F.3d 321 (9th Cir. 1994).
Funds "ear marked" or clearly designated for the benefit of a party other than the debtor
constitutes a transfer outside the scope of the preference section. Yet, a debtor who kites checks
does not create an "earmarking" situation for the affected bank or creditor to utilize as a defense.
See In re Montgomery, 983 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1983).
Funds ofthe debtor held for safekeeping purposes only in an escrow account does constitute
property of the estate. A payment of said funds prepetition can result in a voidable preferential
transfer. In re Winters, 182 B.R. 26 (Bkrtcy. E.D.Ky. 1995).
However, when a general building contractor filed bankruptcy, and the owner paid the
subcontractor directly to avoid the timely filing of a mechanics lien, a Court held that said transfer
did not constitute a transfer of property of the estate, even though the payment reduced the general
contractor's interest. The payment to the subcontractor by the owner was held "ear marked". In re
Steele Vest. Inc., 112 B.R. 852 (Bkrtcy. W.D.Ky. 1990).
Prepetition payments to fully secured creditors are not avoidable preferential transfers
because a Trustee must pay in full a secured creditor if the Trustee sells the collateral. Thus, the
liquidation test fails since that creditor received the same it would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation.
In re C-L Cartage.Jnc., 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990).
Normally, a Trustee need only offer as proof a mathematical analysis that reveals the
preferred creditor benefited to a greater degree than its pro rata share of distribution of the claims
actually filed in a Chapter 7 case. When a creditor receives a beneficial transfer prepetition,
however received, he betters his position over other unsecured creditors. Often, the only asset
recovered in a case will be the preferred transfer.
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The exceptions to the rule include two fact patterns. The first leaves the preferred creditor
as the only creditor. The second pattern is the rare case in which the Trustee recovers other assets
that allow the Trustee to pay other creditors more than the preferred creditor received.
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The preferred creditor receives no distribution from the estate until it repays to the Trustee
the value of the avoided transfer. 11 U.S.C. §502 (d).

D.

Defenses Of Creditors

11 U .S.C. §547(c) enumerates the defenses of a creditor to preference claims raised by the
Trustee. These defenses supplement any claim that the Trustee has not met its burden in proving
one ofthe elements of §547(b). Section 547 (c) assumes thatthe transfers soughtto be avoided have
met the required elements of §547 (b). In addition, section 547 (c) allows for certain transfers and
prohibits recovery by the Trustee for the benefit of all creditors. The enumerated defenses are as
follows:

1.

Contemporaneous Exchange for New Value

TIle Trustee may not avoid a transfer to a creditor that was (1) meant to be a transfer
contemporaneous for new value; and (2) was in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange.
Many cases have discussed what constitutes a contemporaneous exchange.
A check given to a creditor at the time that services or goods are provided is in fact a
contemporaneous exchange, so long as the drawer's bank honors the check. In re Transport
Associates. Inc., 171 B.R. 232 (Bkrtcy. W.O. Ky 1994). Contrast the use of the phrase "date of
transfer" between §547(b) and §547(c) as it applies to checks. The date of transfer of checks under
§547(b) relates to the date the drawer's bank honors the check. Barnhill V. Johnson, supra.
However, the date a creditor receives the check establishes the date of transfer pursuant to §547(c),
so long as the drawer's bank subsequently honors the check. In re Transport. Associates. Inc., supra.
New value requires the creditor to provide the debtor with some benefit after payment by
the debtor. In re Lee, 179 B.R. 149 (9th Cir. BAP 1995). The purpose of the new value exception
protects transfers that do not diminish the bankruptcy estate. In re Cocolat. Inc., 176 B.R. 540
(Bkrtcy N.D. CA. 1995). One test requires the Court to determine to what extent the debtor's estate
was replenished by the creditor when it provided new services or products. In re Riggs, 129 B.R.
494 (Bkrtcy. S.D. OH. 1991).
New value is not the exclusive defense. A creditor can raise other defenses, particularly the
defense of payment in the ordinary course. In re Transport Associates. Inc., 171 B.R. 232 (Bkrtcy.
W.O. Ky. 1994).
2.

Ordinary Course

A Trustee cannot avoid transfers made by a debtor to a creditor in the ordinary course of
business. 11 U.S.C. §547(c). To meet this exception, a creditor must show three elements. First,
the debt must be incurred in the ordinary course of business as between the creditor and the debtor.
Second, the payment of the debt must be made in the ordinary course as between the debtor and
creditor. Third, the payment of the debt, in addition to being in the ordinary course between the
parties, must also be in the ordinary course of the industry involved. The issue of which industry
standard applies is an issue offactual proof. A tri-partite test has been adopted by several circuits.
In re Midway Airlines. Inc., 69 F.3d. 792 (7th Cir. 1996); In re Rublin Industries. Inc., 78 F.3d 30
(2nd Cir. 1996); In re Fred Hawes Organization. Inc., 957 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1992).
The purpose ofthe exception allows parties who have enjoyed a steady business relationship
to continue that relationship, even to the verge of the filing of the bankruptcy. The exception is not
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available to a creditor who has engaged in only one transaction with the debtor. In re Winters, 182
B.R. 26 (Bkrtcy E.D. Ky. 1995).
The creditor asserting that a transfer occurred in the ordinary course of business carries the
burden of proof on that issue. In re Fred Hawes Organization. Inc., supra. Payments on both long
and short term debt may qualify for the ordinary course exception. Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S.
151 116 L.Ed.2d. 514, 112 S.Ct. 527 (1991). See also In re Finn, 909 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1990).
Even late payments can qualify for the exception. In re Fred Hawes Organization. Inc., supra.
Often times creditors couple the defense of ordinary course with the new value exception
discussed supra.
E.

Security Interests

The mere filing of a security interest can be an avoidable preference. This occurs
particularly in cases in which the filing does not encompass an extension of credit for new value
or a transfer in the ordinary course. To the extent that a security interest is filed outside the scope
ofthe timely perfection scheme established by the Uniform Commercial Code, or within the time
frame specified in §S47(c)(3)B twenty (20) days after the debtor receives possession), the interest
can be avoided by the Trustee even if the underlying debt is not preferential. Section 547(c)
specifies that a creditor has twenty (20) days from the date of transfer of the debtor's interest to
perfect its lien on personalty. The perfection then relates back to the date of transfer. When the
transfers involve real estate, in the absence of any particular state statute on perfection, §547(e)
applies. This section requires that perfection occur within ten (10) days after the transfer. A transfer
is perfected when a good faith purchaser for value is put on notice that the interest ofthe transferee
is superior to all others. This requires a filing. See In re Levv, 185 B.R. 378 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Fla.
1995). The transfer must include an interest of the debtor, but may be less than full title. In re
Hed!!ed Investments Associates. Inc., 163 B.R. 841 (Bkrtcy. D. Co. 1994). In cases ofa garnishment
in Kentucky, a transfer occurs on the day the garnishment lien was created, on the day of the filing
ofthe garnishment, and not on the day the garnishment was paid. In re Clark, 171 B.R. 563 (Bkrtcy.
W.D. Ky. 1994).
The essential rule on security interests provides that in the absence of any state statute, a
creditor must perfect its lien on personalty within twenty (20) days. Perfection then relates back.
However, ifreal estate is involved, a recording must be made within ten (10) days ofthe date ofthe
transfer. The waiver of a mechanic's lien right in exchange for a voluntary lien is still preferential
under Kentucky law. A Court avoided as a preferential transfer the filing ofa lien voluntarily given
by the debtor in exchange for a waiver by the affected creditor of its mechanic's lien right. In re
Rexplore Drilling, Inc., 971 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1992).
The primary tenant of this portion of §S47(c) provides that a creditor will prevail so long
as the creditor files timely. The Trustee will prevail if a creditor files late, even if the creditor has
no specific knowledge of the financial plight of the debtor.
F.

Accounts Receivable And Inventory

Accounts receivable and inventory are discussed in §S47(c)(S). Liens on this type of
property, the so-called floating liens, are not avoidable to the extent that the debtor's inventory or
accounts receivable have been replenished. A recorded financing statement and proof of supply of
additional inventory to a debtor is sufficient to defeat a Trustee's claim. A creditor does not receive
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credit for financing a previous loan. In re Blueerass Ford-Mercul)'. Inc., 942 F.2d 381 (6th Cir.
1991). Courts employ a net improvement and position test for floating inventory. Bankruptcy Courts
look at the value ofthe inventory ninety (90) days before the filing ofthe bankruptcy and the value
of the inventory on the date of the petition. To the extent that a Trustee proves more debt was paid
by the debtor than inventory supplied by the creditor, the Trustee may recover the net improvement
in the creditor's position in the ninety (90) days before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. In re
Parker Steel Company, 149 B.R. 834 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Oh. 1992).
G.

Statutory Liens

A Trustee may not be able to avoid statutory liens under §547. Hence, tax liens are
nonavoidable. A Trustee cannot set aside a mechanic's lien timely filed in accordance with KRS 476,
even if the mechanic's lien was filed within ninety (90) days before the filing of the bankruptcy
petition.
H.

Domestic Relations

To the extent that a debtor makes a transfer in good faith to a former spouse for alimony,
child support, maintenance or pursuant to a valid separation agreement or divorce decree, the
payments made by the debtor are not avoidable as a preference. 11 U.S.C. §547(c)(7). The
exception does not apply to assignments of payments to another entity, voluntarily or by operation
of law, nor does it apply to payments designated as alimony, child support or maintenance unless
the payments are actually alimony, maintenance, or child support. However, a separation agreement
that called for periodic payments, reduced to a lump some by agreement of parties and paid prior
to the filing ofthe bankruptcy, was deemed a preferential transfer even though the payment offuture
maintenance was canceled. In re Futoran, 76 F.3d 265 (9th Cir. 1996).
1.

Consumer Minimum

In cases involving consumer debts, §547(c)(8) allows a creditor to defeat what would
otherwise be a preferential transfer if the aggregate value of all of the property of the debtor that is
affected by the transfer is less than $600.00. The purpose of this exception was to remove de
minimis amounts collected by garnishments that occurred immediately preceding the filing of the
bankruptcy. Some conflict exists regarding the term "aggregate value" and the amount of$600.00.
One case in Kentucky in particular asserts that §547 will apply so long as the garnishment collected
totals $600.00 or more in the aggregate that occurred within the ninety (90) days before the filing
of the bankruptcy. In re Clark, 217 B.R. 89 (U.S. Dist. Ct. W.D. Ky. 1995).

J.

Sureties

In the event that a debtor transfers property to a surety in order to secure reimbursement of
a bond or makes other application in order to dissolve ajudiciallien, such as a mechanic's lien, the
transfer of property to secure that bond can be set aside as a preferential transfer. To the extent that
the Trustee recovers property, the amount of the obligation insured by the surety can be reduced by
the recovery made by the estate. See 11 U.S.C. §547(d).
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K.

Real Property Rules

A transfer of an interest in real estate occurs when the instrument is recorded. In re Leyy,
185 B.R. 378 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Fla. 1995). If a creditor records a mortgage outside the ten (10) day lim it
of §S47(e), the transfer of the interest of the debtor occurs when the mortgage is perfected, i.e. the
date of the filing. The creditor also loses the new value and ordinary course exceptions as defenses.
In re Moran, 188 B.R. 492 (Bkrtcy. E.D. NY. 1995). The same rules apply with regard to the filing
of security interest on fixtures. Kentucky law requires that to perfect an interest in a fixture, a
creditor must file a fixture filing in the County Clerk's office. The transfer is not perfected until the
filing occurs. Hence, Kentucky law applies the same rule with reference to fixture filings as it does
to the filing of other interests in the real estate of the debtor, including mortgages. If an instrument
is filed within ten (10) days, the transfer relates back and the defenses of §S47(c) may apply.

L.

Presumption Of Insolvency

11 U.S.C. §S47(f) states that the debtor is presumed to be insolvent for the ninety (90) days
immediately proceeding the filing of the petition. TIle presumption is rebuttable. The test for
determining insolvency is called a balance sheet test. The balance sheet test requires a Court to find
that the liabilities of the debtor exceed the assets ofthe debtor to hold that the debtor is insolvent.
In re Bluegrass Ford-Mercury, Inc., 942 F.2d 381 (6th Cir. 1991). Outside of the ninety (90) day
period, for insider transactions, the Trustee must prove insolvency as a necessary element under
§S47(b). See In re Perry, 158 B.R. 694 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Oh. 1993).
M.

Burdens Of Proof

The Trustee bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence to establish each and
every element under §S47(b). See In re U.S.A. Inns of Eureka Springs. Arkansas. Inc., 9 F.3d 680
(8th Cir. 1993). TIle burden of proof falls on a creditor to establish one of the exceptions under
§547(c). See In re Fred Hawes Organization. Inc., 957 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1992).
N.

Parties

Normally the Trustee brings any action under §S47. The Trustee alone holds the avoiding
power. The Trustee is specifically so authorized under the wording of the statute of §S4 7(b) which
states that "the Trustee may avoid any transfer and interest of the debtor in property". The debtor
assumes the role of the Trustee in cases un~er Chapter 11. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §1107(a) the
debtor-in-possession has all of the powers and standing ofa Trustee to bring a preference action.
A debtor may bring a preference action to the extent that it preserves an exemption which
it holds specific in property. See 11 U.S.C. §S22(g) and (h).
Additionally, in certain circumstances, an individual creditor may bring a preference action.
A creditor has standing to do so if certain conditions are met. First, the creditor must show that a
colorable claim exists which will benefit the estate. Second, the creditor must have demanded that
the Trustee or the debtor-in-possession bring the action. Third, the fiduciary involved must have
refused to bring the action. Fourth, the Court must find that the refusal to bring the action is
unjustifiable in light of the statutory and fiduciary responsibilities placed upon the Trustee or debtor
in possession. After a creditor satisfies the Bankruptcy Court by meeting these conditions, the
burden of proof shifts to the Trustee or debtor in possession to rebut why the preference action
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should not be brought. This type of issue arises more often in Chapter 11 than in Chapter 7 cases.
See In re The Gibson Group. Inc., 66 F.3d 1436 (6th Cir. 1995).
O.

Venue

r
r

Venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1409. Subsection (a) allows a Trustee to file a preference
action in the Bankruptcy Court in which the case arose. The action can be brought regardless of
where the defendant resides. The only limitation is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1409(b), which limits
the Trustee to bring an action for an amount less than $1,000.00 or a consumer debt of less than
$5,000.00 only in the District Court in the district where the defendant resides. Controversies which
do not exceed these amounts often place the defendant at a decided disadvantage where the
defendant resides a substantial distance from the Court in which the bankruptcy case if filed. Venue
often provides an effective weapon to the Trustee in obtaining a preference judgment equal to the
merits of the action itself.

r

P.

r

Statute Of Limitations

r

The statute of limitations applicable to actions under §547 of the Bankruptcy Code is
governed by 11 U.S.C. §546(a). This Code section allows the Trustee the later of either two (2)
years from the day the bankruptcy was filed or one (1) year after the appointment or election of the
first Trustee under either Chapter 7 or 11 U.S.C. §1104, Chapter 12 or Chapter 13, if the
appointment or election occurs before the expiration of two (2) years from the filing of the
bankruptcy.

r

A preference action may not be commenced after the case is closed or dismissed. Hence,
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the period begins to run the day the bankruptcy case is filed. Be aware that the 6th Circuit has ruled
in an often criticized case that the two (2) year statute of limitations is ajurisdictional prerequisite.
In other words, the clerk's office is always open. Thus, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays do not
extend the statute of limitations until the next working day. In re Butcher, 829 F.2d 596 (6th Cir.
1987).

III.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE LITIGATION

The Trustee can avoid fraudulent conveyances which occur within one (1) year ofthe filing
ofthe bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. §548 sets forth the terms and conditions under which a Trustee
may avoid a transfer on the grounds of fraudulent conveyance. The purpose of the fraudulent
conveyance statute is to enhance the pool offunds from which creditors can recover by setting aside
gratuitous transfers made on the eve of the filing ofthe bankruptcy.

11 U.S.C. §548
§548 Fraudulent transfers and obligations.
(a) The Trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or
incurred on or within one year before the date of the filing of the
petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or
became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(2) (A)
received less than a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for such transfer or obligation; and
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(B) (i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or
such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a
result of such transfer or obligation;
(ii) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to
engage in business or a transaction, for which any property
remaining with the debtor was· an unreasonably small
capital; or
(iii)
intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would
incur, debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to
pay as such debts matured.
(b) The Trustee of a partnership debtor may avoid any transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by the
debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year before the date
of the filing of the petition, to a general partner in the debtor, if the
debtor was insolvent on the date such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such
transfer or obligation.
(c) Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation voidable under this
section is voidable under section 544, 545, or 547 of this title, a
transferee or obligee of such a transfer or obligation thattakes for value
and in good faith has a lien on or may retain any interest transferred or
may enforce any obligation incurred, as the case may be, to the extent
that such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor in exchange for
such transfer or obligation.
(d) (1) For the purposes of this section, a transfer is made when stich
transfer is so perfected that a bona fide purchaser from the debtor
against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected
cannot acquire an interest in the property transferred that is
superior to the interest in such property of the transferee, but if
such transfer is not so perfected before the commencement of the
case, such transfer is made immediately before the date of the
filing of the petition.
(2) In this section(A)
"value" means property, or satisfaction or securing of a
present antecedent debt of the debtor, but does not include an
unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a
relative of the debtor;
(B) a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker,
financial institution, or securities clearing agency that receives
a margin payment, as defined in section 101, 741, or 761 of
this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 101 or
741 of this title, takes for value to the extent of such payment;
(C) a repo participant that receives a margin payment, as defined
in section 741 or 761 of this title, or settlement payment, as
defined in section 741 of this title, in connection with a
repurchase agreement, takes for value to the extent of such
payment; and
(D)
a swap participant that receives a transfer in connection
with a swap agreement takes for value to the extent of such
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transfer.
A.

Definitions Under §548

1.

Transfer

Section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a Trustee to avoid any transfer of an interest
of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is incurred either voluntarily
or involuntarily within one (1) year of the filing of the bankruptcy. In determining what constitutes
a transfer, the Trustee must first look to Federal law. Barnhill V. Johnson. 503 U.S. 393, 118 L.E
D 2d 39, 112 S.Ct. 1386 (1992). However, frequently federal law is silent on what constitutes a
transfer. In that instance, the Trustee must look to the interest in property as defined by State law.
In re FBN Food Services. Inc., 185 B.R. 265 (N.D. III. 1995). Courts will examine transfers of
interests in real estate according to the date of recording of the controlling instrument. See In re
Levy, 185 B.R. 378 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Florida 1995). The transfer must necessarily involve an interest
of the debtor, but the debtor may hold less than full title. In re Hedged-Investments Associates. Inc.,
163 B.R. 841 (Bkrtcy. D. Co. 1994). A foreclosure sale is an involuntary severance of the title ofthe
debtor. Prior to 1994, the validity of a foreclosure sale of real estate for less than seventy percent of
its value was open to question. See Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Company. 621 F.2d
201 (5th Cir. 1980). The so called Durrect Rule was abrogated at least with reference to real estate
foreclosure sales in B.F.P. v. Resolution Trust Corporation, _ _ U.S. __ 128 L.ED2d 556, 114
S.Ct 1757 (1994). The Supreme Court in B.F.P. held that, in the absence of evidence of collusion,
the sale price derived from a foreclosure sale properly advertised and conducted pursuant to state
law is reasonably equivalent value as a matter of law. As such, a valid foreclosure sale is sufficient
to defeat a fraudulent conveyance action regardless of the price brought at the forced sale.

2.
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Incur Obligation

The transfer of an interest of the debtor encompasses more than simply the debtor
transferring title. For example, a debtor,who subjects property to a mortgage in favor ofa relative
within one (1) year of the filing of the bankruptcy has made a fraudulent conveyance. The issue of
tithing, which is incurring an obligation in furtherance of worship in one's religion, has created
much concern. A Chapter 7 Trustee recently attacked tithing and brought an action against the
religious institution that received the contributions. In re Tessier, 190 B.R. 396 (Bkrtcy. D.Mont.
1995). However, while finding that tithing was a fraudulent conveyance as defined in §548 of the
Bankruptcy Code, the Eighth Circuit recently held that recovery of religious contributions otherwise
recoverable under §548 violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000b-b. In
re Young, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996).
3.

Intent to Defraud

For purposes of 11 U.S.C. §548, the Trustee must prove either actual intent to defraud or
constructive fraud. Actual fraud is found if the Trustee proves that the transfer of the interest ofthe
debtor was made with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any entity to which the debtor was
already obligated to or became obligated by the debtor within one (1) year of the filing of the
bankruptcy. Actual harm is not an element necessary to prove a fraudulent conveyance. The
Trustee only must show that the debtor acted with intent to hinder or delay creditors. In re Sherman,
67 F.3d 1348 (8th Cir. 1995). Even if the transfer was actually fraudulent as to creditors, if the
requisite intend to defraud is not proven, the transfer will not be avoided under I I U.S.C. §54 7(a)( I).
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In re Vaughn, 244 B.R. 631 (Bankr.

a.

w.o. Ky. 2000).

Actual Fraud

Actual intent to defraud on the part of the debtor may be inferred from the badges of fraud
in a subjective evaluation of the debtor's intent. Badges of fraud that a Court may evaluate include
threatened or actual litigation existing at the time of the transfer, the degree of the transfer of the
interest of the debtor of the property, the state of the debtor's finances atthe time of the transfer, the
special relationship held by the debtor with regard to the transferee and the retention of property by
the debtor despite the transfer.
b.

Constructive Fraud

The Trustee may also set aside transfers of interest of the debtor if the debtor received less
than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and was either insolvent
on that date or was rendered insolvent by such transfer or obligation. The phrase reasonably
equivalent value does not require a finding that the debtor possessed actual intent to defraud. In re
Young, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996). The Trustee can avoid a transfer simply if the debtor received
less than reasonably equivalent value. In re McDonnell, 934 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1991). The issue
in reasonably equivalent value cases is normally whether a creditor paid sufficient consideration.
For purposes of real estate foreclosure sales, the Supreme Court ruled that in the absence of
collusion, and so long as the State statutes which prescribe the procedure for selling real estate and
foreclosure were followed, the sales price was as a matter oflaw reasonably equivalent value. B.F.P.
v. Resolution TrustCorporation,_U.S._128 L.ED2d 556,114 S.Ct. 1757 (1994). The current
trend of cases avoids a specific numerical percentage or formula. Rather the Court must factor fair
market value and the extent of the lack of interest between the parties and transaction. The closer
or more special the relationship is between the parties, the less of an arms length transaction, the
more scrutiny the Court renders the transfer to ensure that the creditor paid fair market value. See
In re Morris Communications. NC, Inc., 914 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1990).
4.

Insolvency

Insolvency is determined as of the time of the transfer using a so-called balance sheet test.
In re Taubman, 160 B.R. 964 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Oh. 1993). The Trustee bears the burden of proof on the
issue of insolvency. In re McConnell, 934 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1991). The Trustee also prevails in
a fraudulent conveyance case ifhe shows that the result of the transaction or transfer of the debtor
reveals that the debtor was unreasonably undercapitalized or that the debtor would be unable to pay
his debts as they matured.
B.

Partnership Transfers

If a partnership files bankruptcy, a Trustee is required to liquidate the assets of the
partnership and then pursue the individual partners for the unpaid bills of the partnership. 11 U .S.C.
§723. If the partnership files bankruptcy, the Trustee of the partnership may avoid transfers that
have occurred with individual partners within one (1) year of the filing of the bankruptcy if the
debtor partnership was either insolvent on the date ofthe transfer or became insolvent as a result of
the transfer. The Trustee of the partnership debtor is not required to show any intent or that the
transfer was for less than an reasonably equivalent value.
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C.

Rights Of Transferees

Initial transferees are those parties who receive property transferred in the fraudulent
conveyance. The initial transferee, if the Trustee succeeds, loses the avoided conveyance, and the
subject property is restored to its status prior to the transfer, subject to the Bankruptcy. A
subsequent transferee who qualifies as a bonafide purchaser will b~ able to defeat a Trustee's claim
under 11 U.S.C. §548, to the extent that the B.F.P. actually gave value in exchange for the transfer.
See In re Coutee, 984 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1993). The transferee bears the burden of proof on the
element of good faith, a basic prerequisite to being a B.F.P. U.S. v. Nordic Village. Inc., 503 U.S.
30, 117 L.Ed.2d 181, 112 S.Ct. 1011 (1992). To the extentthat new value was paid by the transferee
in an avoided transfer, the Trustee must reimburse the transferee. 11 U.S.C. §548(c).
D.

Transfer

Section 548(d)(1) ofthe Bankruptcy Code defines the term "transfer" and its application in
cases of fraudulent conveyance. Contrast the definition with section 547, the preference section,
which fails to define the term "transfer". 11 U.S.C. 548(d)(I) defines "transfer" in terms of
perfection of the conveyance by the creditor and notice to other parties of the change in character
of the subject property.
The date of recording the instrument places all parties on notice of the transfer of the
debtor's interest. That filing perfects the interest of the transferee. At that point in time, a B.F.P.,
a role the Trustee can assume pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §544(a)(3), cannot defeat the interest of the
transferee.
If the transferee fails to perfect its interest until after the filing of the bankruptcy petition,
section 548(d)(1) deems the perfection to have occurred on the day before the filing of the
bankruptcy.
The date of transfer is the key date relating to the date of the bankruptcy petition, because
the transfer must occur within one (I) year offiling of the bankruptcy petition. Thus, a Court held
that the transfer of realty occurred on the day the girlfriend ofthe debtor recorded her deed, which
occurred within one (I) year of the filing of her boyfriend's bankruptcy, not withstanding the fact
that the debtor executed the deed several years prior to the filing ofthe bankruptcy. In re Levy, 185
B.R. 371 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
A creditor perfects his lien on personalty normally by filing a UCC-I although no filing is
required for most consumer purchases.
E.

Value Defined

11 U.S.C. §548(d)(2) defines value as property, or the securing of a present or antecedent
debt ofthe debtor. Value does not include an unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor
or a relative of the debtor. The definition of value differs slightly for fraudulent conveyance
purposes than for preferences or other Bankruptcy Code sections. Commodity brokers, stock
brokers, and financial institutions, or other parties who deal with securities have special rules for
dealing with margin payments or swap agreements. The securities party is entitled to the bonafide
purchaser defense to the extent that he has taken payment or value to the extent of a margin or swap
agreement.
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F.

Parties - Plaintiffs

As in preference actions, normally the Trustee or debtor in possession alone has standing
to bring a fraudulent conveyance action. The statute plainly states that the Trustee is the party
authorized to bring the action. The debtor is also authorized to bring a fraudulent conveyance action
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §522(g) or (h) to the extent that the debtor protects an exemption he claimed
in his property. However, the debtor is not allowed to take advantage of the transfer of either a
preference or a fraudulent conveyance action to the extent that a lien avoided is preserved for the
benefit of the bankruptcy estate against the debtor. 11 U.S.C. §551. The debtor cannot take
advantage through his exemptions when he previously agreed to subordinate his exempt interest in
property to a creditor. The effect oflien preservation is that the Trustee replaces the avoided party
as a secured creditor. The exemption of the debtor remains subordinate to the lien interest of the
bankruptcy estate. The lien against the interest of the debtor remains.
The Sixth Circuit has also addressed whether an individual creditor has standing to bring
a fraudulent conveyance action. In the case onn re The Gibson Group. Inc., 66 F.3d 1436 (6th Cir.
1995), the Court allowed a creditor to bring a §548 action since the creditor alleged a colorable
claim that benefited the estate. The Court agreed with the analysis ofthe creditor that the fraudulent
conveyance action benefited the estate. The Court must find that the creditor demanded that either
the Trustee or the debtor in possession bring the fraudulent conveyance action and that the Trustee
or debtor in possession refused to bring the action. The Court must find that the refusal of the
Trustee or debtor in possession to bring the fraudulent conveyance action was unjustifiable in light
of its statutory and fiduciary responsibilities. While the initial burden is on the individual creditor
to show that it has met these elements, once established, the burden of proof shifts to the Trustee or
debtor in possession to show why the fraudulent conveyance action should not be brought.
G.

Venue

Venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. §I409. Venue normally lies in the Court in which the
bankruptcy case is filed. In the event that the fraudulent conveyance action seeks to recover a
money judgment ofless than $1,000.00 or a consumer debt ofless than $5,000.00, the action must
be brought only in the District where the defendant resides.
H.

Statute Of Limitations

Statute of limitations applicable to fraudulent conveyance actions are defined in 11 U .S.C.
§546(a). This section allows an action to be brought either the later of two (2) years from the date
the bankruptcy petition is filed. or one (1) year after the appointment of the first Trustee if such
appointment occurs before the expiration of two (2) years after the case is originally filed. If the
case is closed or dismissed, there is no standing to bring a fraudulent conveyance action.

I.

State Law

11 U.S.C. §544(b) empowers a Trustee to utilize the state law fraudulent conveyance
scheme. Kentucky Revised Statutes 378.010 allows for a reach back of five (5) years rather than
the one (1) year of 11 U.S.C. §548. The Trustee under state law must establish that a debt existed
on the date of transfer and that the transfer was made with intent to defraud creditors. KRS 378.010.
A Trustee may also employ KRS 378.020 to set aside a transfer made by the debtor when he
received no consideration rather than the standard of reasonably equivalentvalue pursuant to 11
U.S.C. §548.
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A Trustee may utilize the state statutes because he possesses a five (5) year statute of
limitations under KRS 413.120 rather than two (2) under 11 U.S.C. §546. Arguably, a Trustee can
extend the five (5) year statute of limitations to seven (7) years. 11 U.S.C. § 108(a) extends a statute
oflimitations if it otherwise expires before the end oftwo (2) years after the filing of the bankruptcy
petition.
IV.

"STRONG-ARM" POWERS OF A CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE

A.

General Analysis Of A Trustee's Powers

Section -544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, often referred to as the "strong-arm clause,"
provides the Trustee with the power and status of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor, a hypothetical
bona fide purchaser, a creditor that extends credit at the time the bankruptcy case was commenced
and an actual unsecured creditor. Although bankruptcy law confers upon the Trustee the rights of
hypothetical creditors, the Trustee must look to relevant state law to determine what rights and
remedies a creditor would have to avoid transfers of property. Section 544 of the Code confers no
greater rights or powers on the Trustee than the applicable state law affords a creditor occupying the
position assumed by the Trustee.
Since state law governs the powers of the Trustee under § 544, one necessary question is
which state's laws control. If the property of the estate is located in more than one jurisdiction or
affected by contracts of more than one jurisdiction, the tendency of the courts is to utilize the law
of the situs of the property at the commencement of the case. I However, courts are not in consistent
agreement regarding the manner in which the choice of law rules are applied. 2
B.

Trustee's Status As A Lien Creditor

I.

§ 544(a)

Section 544 confers upon the Trustee the rights of certain hypothetical creditors,
specifically:
(1)

a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the
commencement of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with
respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a
creditor on a simple contract could have obtained such ajlidicial
lien, whether or not such a creditor exists;

(2)

a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the
commencement of the case, and obtains, at such time and with
respect to such time, whether or not such a creditor exists; or

(3)

a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fixtures, from the
debtor, against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be
perfected, that obtains the status of a bona fide purchaser at the
time of the commencement of the case, whether or not such a
purchaser exists [and has perfected such transfer].

The rights of these hypothetical creditors, and thus the Trustee, is dependent upon state law.
While, obviously, there is a variety of state statutory laws to apply, many of the actions
brought by the Trustee will be based upon the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 9-301 specifies
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that "an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of ... a person who becomes a lien
creditor before the security interest is perfected ... " TIlerefore, in his/her position as a hypothetical
lien creditor, the Trustee has rights superior to any creditor that is unperfected as of the date offiling
for any of the number of reasons. For goods, the security interest must be perfected by the filing of
a financing statement, pursuant U.C.C. § 9-302. The Trustee gains priority over any creditor that
did not file a perfected security interest, whose filing has lapsed,3 who filed in the wrong location
or in an inappropriate manner,4 who did not identify the security interest properly,S or who failed to
amend the filing to reflect subsequent changes.6
Since the Trustee does not obtain rights greater than a lien creditor under § S44(a), creditors
with a purchase money security interest perfected after the filing but in the time allowed by statute
(twenty (20) days in Kentucky) are not subordinate to the interest ofthe Trustee. It is not a violation
ofthe automatic stay for a creditor to file to perfect such a lien within twenty (20) days from the date
the debtor received possession of the goods.
In addition to the filing requirements for holders of security interests in goods, the Uniform
Commercial Code also sets forth certain notice provisions for a consignment seller under § 2-326(3).
To the extent these notice requirements are not met, the Trustee may avoid the transfer and recover
goods held on consignment.

J
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Although the Uniform Commercial Code sets forth specific rights of the Trustee as to
holders of security interests in goods of a hypothetical lien creditor, this status also provides the
Trustee with power over creditors holding non-Code interests such as unrecorded real estate
mortgages or conveyances. 7
As a hypothetical bona fide purchaser for real estate pursuant to § S44(a)(3), the Trustee
holds rights greater than those of a hypothetical lien creditor. As well as the unrecorded interest that
the Trustee could set aside as a hypothetical lien creditor, a hypothetical bona fide purchaser may
avoid an unrecorded equitable interest, equitable claims under constructive or implied trust, or
interest of a transferee claiming under recorded instruments with minor defects in form or content.
TIle status of a bona fide purchaser gives the Trustee some specific power of actions against
the state government in Kentucky. Kentucky law provides thatthe state, county, city or other taxing
districts shall have a lien on property assessed for taxes for five (5) years following the date when
the taxes became delinquent. The lien may not be defeated by gift, devise, sale, alienation or other
means except by sale to a bona fide purchaser.s
Where the Commonwealth has seized property related to the trafficking in controlled
substances, the seizure of said property may be set aside only by a subsequent bona fide purchaser.9
2.

J
j
j

J
j
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§ S44(b)

While the trustee is given the status of a hypothetical creditor under §S44(a), regardless of
the existence of any such creditor, §S44(b) somewhat broadens the trustee's standing further by
providing,
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property
or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable
law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under
section 502 of this title or that is not allowable only under section S02(e)
of this title.
For the trustee to avoid a transfer pursuant to this subsection there must exist an actual
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creditor with an appropriate claim. This creditor must hold an allowed claim or one that is not
allowable only because of§502(e), which disallows certain claims by co-debtors or sureties. Once
it is established that there is such a creditor, the trustee acts not for the benefit of that creditor but
as trustee for the estate.
Under section 544(b), the Trustee is able to set aside fraudulent transfers or other voidable
transfers under state law. In a case out of the Eastern District ofl(entucky, for example, the trustee
was able to utilize the Kentucky preferential transfer law, KRS §378.060, to set aside a transfer
between the debtor and a third party where the trustee may not have been able to show that the
transfer was a preference under 11 U.S.C. §547(b)}O
Since the trustee's rights to pursue a cause of action is derivative of a specific creditor, it
is generally accepted that any defenses, including estoppel or statute oflimitations, good against the
creditor are good against the trustee. II Therefore, where the creditor has taken some action prior to
the filing of the bankruptcy that would deem the transfer valid, the trustee will be foreclosed from
avoiding the transfer. When the statute of limitations has run before the filing of the bankruptcy,
the trustee is likewise prevented from avoiding the transfer.
When the statute of limitations has not run on the date offiling ofthe petition, there is some
disagreement among the courts regarding whether to apply the state law statute or the limitation set
forth in §546(a) which provides a two (2) year limitation period for actions under §544. The view
that has been adopted by the Bankruptcy Courts in Kentucky is that if the statute of limitations had
not run on the date of filing, the trustee must bring the action to avoid the transfer within the two (2)
year period set forth in §546(a)}2
C.

Trustee's Power to Avoid Statutory Liens

Section 545 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the Trustee may avoid certain statutory
liens. Section 545 states as follows:
The Trustee may avoid the fixing of a statutory lien on property of the
debtor to the extent that such lien (1)

r
r
r

r

r
r

(2)

First becomes effective against the debtor (A)

when a case under this title concerning the debtor is
commenced;

(B)

when an insolvency proceeding other than under this title
concerning the debtor is commenced;

(C)

when a custodian is appointed or authorized to take
possession;

(D)

when the debtor becomes insolvent;

(E)

when the debtor's financial condition fails to meet a
specified standard; or

(F)

at the time of an execution against property of the debtor
levied at the instance of an entity other than the holder of
such statutory lien;

is not perfected or enforceable at the time of the commencement
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of the case against a bona fide purchaser that purchases such
property at the time of the commencement of the case, whether or
not such a purchaser exists;

(3)

is for rent; or

(4)

is a lien of distress for rent.

Section 545 can be generally divided into three categories of statutory liens. First, those
triggered by the insolvency of the debtor; second, those not valid against a bona fide purchaser; and
third, a lien for rent.
The statutory liens referenced in § 545( 1)(A)-(F), allows the Trustee to avoid any lien which
arises solely because the debtor has become insolvent. "Insolvent" is a defined term under § 101 of
the Code, which utilizes the traditional balance sheet definition of insolvency where the debtor is
considered insolvent when his liabilities exceed his assets. This traditional definition of insolvency
is modified by the Code by adding a provision that the debtor's non-exempt assets are excluded from
calculation. J3 However, since the applicable lien is a creature of state law, the state law definition
of insolvency that applies will generally prevail in determining whether such a lien exists. It is
possible, therefore, for the debtor to be insolvent for purposes ofthe Code but not insolvent under
state law. 14
Section 545(2) provides the Trustee with the status of a hypothetical bona fide purchaser
similar to § 544(a)(3). However, § 545(2) does not limit the Trustee to the position of a bona fide
purchaser of real property.
The avoidability of a statutory lien under § 545(2) will typically turn on whether the creditor
has taken the sufficient steps to perfect its interest under state law. Although most interests must
be perfected at the time the case is filed, some interests may be perfected at a later date. Section
546(b) provides that the Trustee's rights under § 545 are subject to any state law that permits
perfection, post-filing, to relate back to a pre-filing date. For instance, in Kentucky, notice of a
mechanic's and materialman's lien must be filed within a certain time of the work being performed.
If the notice is filed within this time, the lien will relate back to the date that the service was
performed. IS Therefore, under § 545, the Trustee cannot avoid a mechanic's and materialman's lien
where the work was performed prior to filing but the creditor perfected its interest within the
statutory time period although post-filing.
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Much litigation under § 545(2) involves federal tax liens. 16 The Internal Revenue Code
creates a lien in favor of the United States on all property by a person liable to pay taxes upon the
assessment that that tax is made." However, that same statute provides that the lien imposed upon
assessment is not valid against "any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's lien or
judgment lien creditor, until notice thereof which meets the requirements of sub-section (f) has been
filed by the secretary or his delegate."ls Therefore, to the extent the Internal Revenue Service has
not filed the requisite notice, the Trustee in his position as hypothetical bona fide purchaser may
avoid the lien in favor of the Internal Revenue Service.
D.

Statute Of Limitations

Section 546(a) sets forth the statute of limitations applicable to the Trustee when taking an
action to avoid a transfer or lien under §§ 544, 545, 547, 548, and 553. Under § 546, the Trustee
may not commence an action after the earlier of:

•
•
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(1)

(2)

the later of -

(A)

Two years after the entry of the order for the relief; or

(B)

One year after the appointment or election of the first
Trustee under §§ 702,1104,1163, 1202, or 1302, ifsuch
appointment of election occurs before the expiration ofthe
period specified in sub-paragraph (A); or

the case is closed or dismissed.

Section 546(a) as described above, is as amended by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.
Prior to the amendment, avoidance actions were barred after the earlier of two dates: two (2) years
after the Trustee's appointment, or the time the case was closed or dismissed. 19 By amending the
statute, the limitation period has generally been reduced to two (2) years from the entry of order for
relief as opposed to two (2) years from the appointment of the Trustee. While an action may be
brought one (1) year from the appointment or election ofthe Trustee, this provision does not take
effect if the two (2) year time limit from the order of relief has expired. Ifno Trustee is appointed
during the first two (2) years, the statute is not revived upon the appointment of a Trustee.

v.

OTHER ISSUES RELATING TO TRUSTEE'S ADMINISTRATION OF THE
BANKRUPTCY ESTATE

A.

Post-Petition Transfers

In general, post-petition transfers are avoidable by the Trustee under § 549 if they are not
authorized by the Court or by some provision of the Bankruptcy Code. 20 Upon the filing of a
Chapter 7 petition, the debtor is not authorized to sell or transfer property, or operate its business.
Any entity taking title from a Chapter 7 debtor does so at his or her own peril. A Chapter 11, 12,
or 13 debtor is authorized to continue operating its own business; therefore, in those cases a
post-petition transfer will not be avoidable.
Two kinds of unauthorized post-petition transfers are, saved from avoidance under §549.
First, until constructive knowledge of the bankruptcy is given by recordation of a copy of notice of
the petition in the appropriate land records office, a good faith transferee of real estate who had no
knowledge of the pending bankruptcy is protected to the extent he gave fair, equivalent value.21
Second, in the interim between the filing of ail involuntary petition and the Order of Rei ief, referred
to as the "gap period", a transferee is protected in any dealings with the debtor to the extent he gave
value for the transfer~22 Finally, under §542(c), one who owes money to the debtor or holds property
of the estate is not liable to the Trustee if, after bankruptcy, that person in good faith and without
knowledge of the filing of the case pays the debtor or transfers the property to someone other than
the transferee. The transferee will bear the burden of proof to establish a valid post-petition
transferP The Trustee must commence the adversary proceeding to avoid these transfers within two
(2) years of the transfer or the time the case is closed or dismissed, whichever is earlier.24

B.

Trustee's Power To Compel Turnover Of Property

Section 704 charges the Trustee with the responsibility to collect and liquidate property of
the estate. The Bankruptcy Code, in two separate sections, gives the Trustee the power to compel
turnover ofproperty which is in the possession ofthird parties, including court-appointed custodians.

r
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1.

§542 Turnover of Property of the Estate

Section 542 requires any entity, other than a custodian, who comes into possession of
property of the estate which "the Trustee may use, sell or lease under § 363" to surrender such
property to the Trustee upon demand. If the third party refuses to surrender possession, the Trustee·
should commence an adversary proceeding to obtain an appropriate court order.

I
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TIle property for which the Trustee can compel turnover is limited to property which the
Trustee can "use, sell or lease under § 363." As a result, if the property is subject to a valid claim
of set-off such as a bank account, the Trustee cannot compel the bank to surrender the proceeds of
the account and defeat the bank's right of set-off. If a creditor has a valid security interest in
property and if the creditor has received relief from the automatic stay, the Trustee will not be
entitled to turnover. In addition, property which is of "inconsequential value or benefit to the estate"
cannot be compelled through turnover.25
Ifa Trustee commences an adversary proceeding, it will be the Trustee's burden to prove:
(a) possession and control of property by the .entity; (b) that the property can be uti Iized by the estate
under § 363; and (c) that the property's value is more than inconsequential. 26
This section will also authorize the Trustee to compel turnover of records and documents
regarding the debtor's property and financial affairs from the debtor's attorney, accountants, or other
third parties. This turnover is subject to any applicable privilege.2' The attorney/client privilege of
a corporate debtor is held, however, by the Trustee who has the power to waive as to pre-petition
communications.28

2.

§543 Turnover of Property by Custodian

J
J

J
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In addition to the powers of turnover set forth in § 542, the Trustee has the power to compel
turnover of property from a "custodian." A "custodian" is defined by the Bankruptcy Code to mean:
(A) receiver or Trustee of any of the property of the debtor, appointed in a
case or proceeding not under this title; (B) assignee under a general
assignment for the benefit of the debtor's creditors, or (C) Trustee receiver
or agent under applicable law, or under a contract, that is appointed or
authorized to take charge of property of the debtor for the purpose of
enforcing a lien against such property, or for the purpose of general
administration of such property for the benefit of the debtor's creditors.
Once a custodian has knowledge of the bankruptcy, the custodian is prohibited from making any
disbursements of property of the estate or take any action in the administration of that property
except as may be necessary for its preservation.29 This statute affirmatively directs the custodian
to deliver to the Trustee all of the property ofthe debtor and its proceeds and to provide the Trustee
with an accounting of all the property which came into the custodian's possession.JO

J

1
.J

j

The property which is to be turned over by the custodian is not limited, as in the case of
§S42, to property which the Trustee could use, sell, or lease as no such limitation exists in §S43.
In the appropriate case, the Bankruptcy Court can allow the custodian to remain in
possession ofthe property of the estate if it would be in the best interest of the creditors. Special
circumstances may exist if the custodian had been charged with liquidating the property of the
debtor and it would be in the best interest of the creditor for the custodian to continue with the
liquidation process.
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If a custodian is directed to turn over property of the estate, the Bankruptcy Court, after
notice and hearing, is empowered to provide for the payment of the custodian's expenses and fees.
The Court can also provide for the payment of any third party or entity to which the custodian has
become obligated.
C.

Trustee's Standing To Object To Or Revoke Discharge

Although seldom used, the Trustee has standing under the Code to oppose the grant of a
discharge or within the time limits seek a revocation of that discharge. Section 727 outlines specific
circumstances in which a debtor can be denied a discharge. For example, a discharge can be denied
ifthe debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified or failed to keep or preserve books or
records concerning his or her financial condition or business transactions, knowingly
and-fraudulently gave a false oath, failed to adequately explain loss of assets or deficiency of assets
or with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor, has transferred or concealed property within
one year before the filing of the petition. Under certain circumstances, a Trustee or creditor may
seek to revoke a discharge previously granted ifthe discharge was obtained through fraud or if the
debtor acquired property ofthe estate and fraudulently failed to report the acquisition of the property
or failed to surrender such property to the Trustee.31 The Trustee in that circumstance could file an
adversary proceeding seekingthe revocation ofthe discharge in the case offraud within one (I) year
after the discharge is granted, or in the circumstance in which property ofthe estate is acquired by
the debtor which is not surrendered, one (I) year after the granting of the discharge or one (1) year
after the date the case is closed whichever is later.
D.

Operation Of The Debtor's Business

In most Chapter 7 proceedings, upon the filing of the petition for relief, any business
operations ofthe debtor must immediately cease, and the Trustee is charged to take possession of
the business assets and begin liquidating those assets for future distribution to the creditors. In some
limited circumstances, it may be in the best interest of the creditors for the debtor's business to
continue operating on at least a temporary basis. For example, it may be in the creditors' interest for
the Trustee to sell the business as a going concern as opposed to liquidating its individual assets.
Section 721 authorizes the Trustee, with Court approval, "to operate the business of the debtor for
a limited period." Ifthe Court, after notice and opportunity for hearing, authorizes the temporary
operation of the business, the Trustee may use, lease or sell property ofthe estate consistent with the
requirements of §363, or obtain credit pursuant to the terms of §364. Like a debtor~in-possession
in a reorganization proceeding, the Trustee is prohibited from using cash collateral without Court
approval or creditor consent.32 Section 704(8) will require that the Trustee file periodic reports and
summaries of the operation and provide those reports to the Court, the U.S. Trustee, and all
governmental units responsible for the collection of taxes.
E.

General Duties And Responsibilities Of A Trustee

Upon his or her appointment or election, the Trustee is charged with certain responsibilities
to the creditors, the estate, and the Court. The Trustee will owe a fiduciary duty to the estate and
the creditors in the performance of these duties. In order to fulfill this responsibility, the bankruptcy
Trustee will have standing to bring certain causes of action and will have the power to avoid certain
transfers. The Trustee is required to exercise due diligence and act in the best interest of the
creditors.33
This section will examine the general responsibilities of a Trustee as set forth by §704 of
the Code.
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1.

Control Property of the Estate

The Bankruptcy Code vests exclusive control of the property ofthe estate in the Trustee.
Section 704(a) requires that the Trustee collect and reduce to money the property of the estate and.
to be accountable for the property received. The powers given the. Trustee to avoid transfers and
compel turnover of property are to be exercised to fulfill this duty. In addition, the Trustee should
give notice to all banks, utility companies, landlords, and insurance companies issuing a policy with
cash surrender value payable to the debtor.34
Once the property is collected, if it has value over and above the mortgages or security
interests, and the debtors' exemptions, then the Trustee is to liquidate the property in a manner so
as to produce the best dividend for the unsecured creditor. This sale typically will be conducted
pursuant to §363 free and clear of all liens. If the property has no value to the unsecured creditors,
the Trustee should abandon his interest. Upon abandonment, title to the property re-vests in the
debtor.3s
After his or her appointment, the Trustee is to file a physical inventory of the property of
the debtor. This inventory is to be based upon the Trustee's review of the debtors' petition as well
as the Trustee's own investigation.36 As the Trustee administers the estate, the Trustee is to maintain
appropriate books and records showing all receipts and disbursements. 37
Since the Trustee is vested with exclusive control of the property during the administration
of the estate, the Trustee is also accountable for all property.38 To satisfy the Trustee's fiduciary
duties, the Trustee may need to obtain insurance protecting the property and the estate from any loss
or damage.
2.

Insure Debtor's Performance of §521 Intentions

In 1984, the Bankruptcy Code was amended to require that the debtor file within thirty (30)
days ofthe date of filing the petition a statement of his or her intent with respect to the retention or
surrender of property. The debtor is required to specify whether the property is exempt, whether the
debtor intends to redeem the property, or reaffirm the debt secured by such property. Within
forty-five (45) days after the filing ofthe notice of intent, the debtor is directed to perform his or her
intentions.39
Section 704(3) charges the Trustee with responsibility for insuring that the debtor performs
his intentions concerning the retention or surrender of property. The Trustee can inquire of the
debtor at the §341 meeting, but unfortunately in many cases the §341 meeting will be conducted
prior to the expiration of the time period set forth in §521. It may be appropriate for the Trustee to
continue the §341 first meeting of creditors in order to give the debtor the opportunity to complete
his or her intentions, or for the Trustee to have follow-up contact with debtor's counsel.
3.

Duty to Examine Debtor Concerning Knowledge of the Bankruptcy Proceedings

In the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, §341 regarding the first meeting of the
creditors was amended to require that the Trustee question the debtor to insure that the debtor
understands:

(1)
(2)

The potential consequences of seeking a discharge in bankruptcy,
including the effects on credit histories;
The debtors' ability to file a petition under a different chapter of
this title;
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(3)

The effect of receiving a discharge of debts under this title;

(4)

The effect ofreaffirming a debt, including the debtors' knowledge
of the provisions of §524(d)
"

Section 524 regarding reaffirmation agreements was also amended so that a court hearing
approving the reaffirmation agreement is no longer necessary if the debtor was represented by
counsel in the known negotiation of the agreement. Since no court hearing will be held to approve
the reaffirmation agreement, the Bankruptcy Code has charged the Trustee with responsibility to
insure that the debtors understand the legal effect and consequences of a reaffirmation agreement
and a default under that agreement as well as to insure that the debtor understands that the
reaffirmation agreement is a voluntary agreement.
4.

Duty to Investigate Financial Affairs of Debtor

In order to fulfill his or her fiduciary duties and to collect all the property of the estate
available, the Trustee cannot rely solely upon the debtors' bankruptcy petition and schedule of assets
and liabilities. The Trustee must perform his or her own independent investigation. This
investigation can be performed informally through a review of the debtors' books and records. The
Trustee will have the opportunity to question the debtor at the §341 first meeting of creditors. If a
more extensive questioning is required, the Trustee is authorized to conduct such examinations
pursuant to Rule 2004 which allows for an examination in a manner substantially equivalent to a
civil discovery deposition. Rule 2004 is not limited to debtors. Under this Rule, the Court can order
an examination of "any entity". This rule would allow the Trustee to depose the debtor, any creditor,
any transferee of property, the accountant of the debtor or any other person who has knowledge
concerning the assets, liabilities, or financial affairs and transactions of the debtors. As part of this
examination, the debtor, or any party in interest, has the right to compel production of documents.
The debtor is charged with the duty to cooperate with the Trustee to enable the Trustee to
perform his or her duties.40 Should the debtor fail to cooperate, such failure may be a basis to oppose
the discharge ofthe debtor pursuant to §727.
5.

Examination of Proof of Claims

In order to have an allowed claim for purposes of distribution of proceeds of the estate, a
creditor, or some entity on behalf of the creditor, must file a proof of claim setting forth the nature
of the claim, the amount of the debt, and appropriate documentation of the claim.41 Upon receipt
of the proof of claims, and before making disbursements of the proceeds ofthe estate, the Trustee
must examine each of the proof of claims and if appropriate, object to any improper claim. The
objection should be in a form consistent with Bankruptcy Rule 3007.

6.

Duty to Furnish Information

Section 704 imposes upon the Trustee the duty to "furnish such information concerning the
estate and the estate's administration as is requested by a party in interest." Often the Trustee will
receive requests for information from creditors or even the debtor concerning liquidation of assets,
filing of claims, and more often, the likelihood of a distribution to the unsecured creditors. The
Trustee should respond to these requests if the information is available to the Trustee. Certainly the
Trustee is under no obligation to incur substantial expense on behalf of the estate in order to obtain
information on behalf of a creditor.
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The duty to provide information is limited to "a party in interest." The Trustee is therefore
not obligated to provide information to the media.
7.

Duty to File a Final Account

The Trustee is to either liquidate or abandon the property. Upon completion of the
administration of all assets, §704(9) requires that the Trustee file ~ final report and an account of
his or her administration of the assets. This report will set forth all property and monies received
and disbursed by the Trustee. Upon approval by the Court of this final report, the Trustee will
then disburse all final dividends to the unsecured creditors. Ninety (90) days after making the
final disbursement, if any check is remaining unpaid, the Trustee will place a stop order on that
check and pay over to the Bankruptcy Court clerk all unclaimed funds. 41 At that time, the
Trustee is required by Bankruptcy Rule 3011 to file a statement setting forth that he or she has
complied with the provisions of § 347. Upon filing such report, the Court should discharge the
Trustee from further service and obligation and release the Trustee's bond.
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Introduction

The purpose of this discussion is to advise

pra~itioners

on methods and strategies

regarding on issues to address with the Chapter 7 panel Trustee appointed by the United States
Trustee. The general theme of this discussion is to advise practitioners how to satisfy the
demands of the panel Trustee without drawing a Motion to Dismiss or other sanctions. A
working knowledge of the powers of the Trustee, particularly the strong arm powers, is
necessary. Practitioners should refer to the Consumer Bankruptcy Practice in Kentucky: Chapter
7 Practice published by the University of Kentucky as a Monograph in 1996, Chapter 6, for a
discussion of the powers of the Trustee. This author does not intend to restate all of those
powers, although comments will be made when appropriate as to current practices and
procedures.

Commencement of the Case

With the commencement of any Chapter 7 petition filed in the Eastern District of
Kentucky, several matters arise at once that require the attention of Counsel. The first is the
assignment of a case number. Contemporaneously with the assignment of the case number, the
clerk appoints a Trustee on a random revolving basis from the list of panel Trustees, assigns a
date for the meeting of creditors, and enters information onto the BANCAP system to issue what
is called a "Order to Debtor". A copy of the Order to Debtor is attached for your review.
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The Order to Debtor requires the Debtor to produce within ten (10) days various
documents, which assists the Trustee is determination of whether an asset exists for liquidation
or not. Please note that this Order is not issued in the Western District of Kentucky. No similar
requirement exists in the Western District that compels Debtors to turnover documents.
The Debtors must produce within ten (10) days the following:

1.

copies of deeds, mortgages or other interests in real
estate;

2.

copies of bank statements and cancelled checks;

3.

copies of titles to motor vehicles, mobile homes, trailers
or boats (registrations are not acceptable);

4.

certificates of stocks, bonds, and keys to safety deposit
boxes;

5.

copies of the Debtors' last filed state and federal income
tax returns;

6.

any other papers that pertain to ownership of property.

Failure to produce these documents on a timely basis will result in a Motion to Dismiss.
Pursuant to the Court's amended Standing Orders, which are available for review on the Court's
website at www.kyeb.uscourts.govr a copy of which is attached hereto, the Trustee has no
discretion but to move to dismiss for failure to produce these documents.
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Counsel is reminded to contact the individual Trustee to determine his or her individual
requirements regarding the fulfillment of this Order. Some Trustees are more strict than others.
However, the general practice is to produce these documents as soon as the identity of the
Trustee is known.

Practice Tip

Except for exigent circumstances, Counsel should obtain all of the required documents
prior to filing the petition. The one document that cannot be obtained in advance is the bank
statement that shows accounts balances through the date of filing. However, other than that,
Counsel should require the production of all necessary documents before filing the petition.
The Order to Debtor referenced herein also enjoins the Debtor from disposing of any
property of the estate without the consent of the Trustee or Order of the Court. Frequently this
author encounters situations where vehicles have been abandoned, turned over or allowed to
be repossessed. Other collateral seems to disappear. The wiser approach is for Counsel to
contact the Trustee to receive authorization for the intended course of action. The Debtor
should not retain vehicles any longer than necessary, particularly if uninsured. However, to
allow repossession of the vehicle without the Trustee's ability to inspect the title and verify that
the lien is properly perfected, places the Debtor in the position of violating this order (as well as
the relative creditor). In such cases, the property should not be turned over until a properly
executed Order of Abandonment or Agreed Order Lifting Stay is executed.
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Meeting of Creditors

The meeting of creditors is contained in the initial notice issued by the Bankruptcy Court
to all creditors, parties of interest, the Debtor, attorney for the Debtor and the Trustee for the
Debtor. The clerk also includes this information on the print out of the receipt that is returned
to Counsel. Attendance at the meeting of creditors by Counsel and by Counsel's client is
mandatory. If either should fail to attend the meeting of creditors, pursuant to the Court's latest
standing Order, issued June 1, 2000, a copy of which is attached, the Trustee is directed to file
a Motion to Dismiss.
If Counsel becomes aware that a conflict exists, a Motion to Continue, coupled with an
Affidavit and a proposed Order, must be filed immediately. Notice of the Motion must be served
upon all creditors and parties of interest. In addition to filing the Motion, contact the affected
Trustee and try to obtain an agreed upon rescheduled date. This date can be included in your
proposed Order so that certification of the Order is limited to one distribution instead of two.
Should a Motion to Continue not be necessary, Counsel and the Debtor should appear at
the meeting of creditors at the time and place as scheduled. Ordinarily these hearings last only
a few minutes. At the hearing, Counsel should be prepared to address each asset of the Debtor
with the Trustee. While the meeting is conducted by the Trustee, who shall address questions
to the Debtors, Counsel should be familiar with the assets of the Debtor and be prepared to
discuss' these with the Trustee.
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Of a particular interest to any Trustee is any pending litigation, any pending claim or any
other matter that is contingent. Other matters of interest include any inheritance, lottery
winnings, lien perfection issues, and equity available to the Debtor.
To the extent that Counsel is informed that any potential asset may be subject to
administration, the better practice is to inform the Trustee of the status of that asset prior to the
meeting of creditors. This information will allow the Trustee to focus on the matters that need
to be administered. In addition, Counsel should inform the Debtor that resolution of the
personal injury or the contingent mater will rest with the Trustee and that the Debtor has no
authority to adjudicate, settle or otherwise dispose of any contingent claim. The Debtors remedy
is limited to objection to any proposed solution made by the Trustee and to properly schedule
exemptions of said claims.
An interesting development over the last several years has been the redemption of assets
by Debtors in favor of either the estate or a perfected secured creditor. Companies have been
formed whose primary purpose is to finance Debtors who have filed bankruptcy to allow those
Debtors to either retain property that is listed in the bankruptcy or finance the acquisition of the
new assets following the petition. To the extent that this issue may be appropriate, Counsel is
urged to discuss this matter with the Debtor and with the Trustee prior to the meeting of
creditors, if possible. For example, if the Debtor presents a title which Counsel knows lists an
unperfected lien or lists a lien that is avoidable because it is preferential, an inquiry into the
Debtor's desire to retain that item is necessary before the meeting of creditors. When the
meeting of creditors occurs, the Trustee can be informed of the Debtor's intent to redeem.
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It is this author's opinion that redemption pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 722 includes property

of the estate. The Debtor is required to pay the fair market value of the tangible personal
property intended for personal family or household use by paying "the holder of such lien the
amount of the allowed secured claim of such holder that is secured by such lien". Nothing in this
section prohibits that the holder of such lien would be the Trustee in Bankruptcy. The Trustee
stands in the shoes of an unperfected secured creditor pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 551, which allows
the preservation of the lien avoided by the trustee in favor of the estate as against the Debtor.
Thus, should redemption be desired, an inquiry into the ability of the Debtor to redeem must be
made prior to the meeting of creditors. Otherwise, the Debtors stand an excellent chance of
having the asset, particularly a vehicle, removed from their possession and sold at auction or by
other appropriate means by the Trustee.
In sum, the meeting of creditors is the vehicle used by the Trustee to refine what assets
of the estate need to be liquidated. Counsel for the Debtor should use the meeting of creditors
as an opportunity to refine that process for the Trustee. By assisting the Trustee, Counsel can
also facilitate the wishes of the Debtor by appropriately seeking alternatives. If the Debtor is
aware that an asset is subject to liquidation before the meeting of creditors, the Debtor has been
properly informed and is not surprised to learn that a valuable asset is to be turned over at the
meeting of creditors. A surprised Debtor makes for an unhappy Counsel. Full disclosure of all
possibilities to the Debtor prior to the meeting of creditors will confirm the confidence the Debtor
has placed in Counsel. Disclosure of assets to be liquidated to the Trustee prior to the meeting
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of creditors will engender good faith with the Trustee and allow for a better recovery for both
the estate and the Debtor.

The Difficult Debtor/Issues of Discharge

In the Eastern District, the Court entertains Motions to Dismiss for the failure of Debtors
to produce necessary documents or attend necessary hearings. Necessary hearings not only
include the meeting of creditors but properly scheduled Rule 2004 examinations. Debtors can
also be compelled to provide testimony in adversary proceedings. The Debtor has a continuing
duty to cooperate with the Trustee. 11 U.s.c. § 521.
On rare occasions, the Debtor does not' either fully cooperate with the Trustee. Instead
of full disclosure, the Debtor attempts to conceal assets, delay production of documents or fail
to provide full disclosure of transfers that apply prior to the filing of the bankruptcy. Both the
Trustee and creditors have available as a sanction a complaint that objects to the discharge of
the Debtor. Unlike nondischargeability issues under § 532 of the Code, dischargeability issues
fall under 11 U.S.C. § 727. Once filed, a case cannot be settled without full disclosure to
creditors and the Court.
Trustees are increasingly becoming more litigious in the area of discharge. Trustees
particularly rely on 11 U.S.C. § 727(d), which required the Court to revoke a discharge if a
discharge was obtained through the fraud of the Debtor and the Trustee did not become aware
of the fraud until after the discharge had been granted; the Debtor acquired property that was
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property of the estate and failed knowingly and fraudulently to report the acquisition or
entitlement of such property or refused to deliver said property to the Trustee or the Debtor has
refused to obey a lawful order of the Court. The Debtor's discharge can also be revoked if one
transferred, removed, mutilated or concealed property of the estate or what could have been
property of the estate within one(1) year before the filing of the petition and failed to disclose
it or if the Debtor lied, made false oath or attempted to bribe the Trustee. The conduct of the
Debtor includes not only an examination of conduct after the filing of the petition, but also
before the filing of the petition.
Recently the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the "continuous concealment
doctrine". This doctrine provides that should the Debtor conceal assets more than one (1) year
prior to the filing of the petition, but exercises dominion over said asset into the one (1) year
before the filing of the bankruptcy and the

Debt~r

fails to disclose either the transfer or the

exercise of control, then the Debtor's discharge can be revoked for failure to disclose and for
making a false oath by signing the petition. In Re: Keeney, 200 Fed. App. 0341P, (filed
September 26, 2000). A copy of the opinion is attached for your review.
Counsel does not normally partiCipate in such conduct with the Debtor. To do so invites
potential criminal sanctions. In such situations, Counsel needs to walk a fine line between .
properly advising one's client, maintaining confidences under the Code of Professional
Responsibility and not participating in a fraud upon the Court and reporting such fraud to the
appropriate authorities, including the Trustee and the United States Trustee.
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Practice lips

Advise one's client in writing to make full disclosure of all assets, transfers, or potential
assets prior to the filing of the petition and prior to the meeting of creditors. At least advise your
client that a fraudulent conveyance action should not be coupled with a discharge revocation
action. Advise the Debtor of the powers of the Trustee's "strong arm" powers pursuant to § 544
553 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Duties After Meeting of Creditors

The Debtor's duty to cooperate with the Trustee extends until the close of the case.
Therefore, Counsel needs to maintain contact with the Trustee in the event that any asset needs
to be administered. Counsel particularly needs to be vigilant in the assertion of appropriate
exemptions. If a Trustee undertakes the prosecution of a personal injury claim that belong to
the Debtor and then seeks to settle the matter, Counsel needs to review the proposed
settlement with the Debtor to ensure that the Debtor's interest are properly represented. The
Debtors are allowed exemptions which are fully delineated in·KRS 427.150. Pain and suffering
has been adjudicated to be excluded from the exemption as stated in KRS 427.150. The Trustee
is required to furnish information concerning the estate to a party in interest. 11 U.S.c. §
704(7). Thus, Counsel should maintain contact with the Trustee to determine the status of the
pending litigation, should the Debtor believe that a viable exemption exists. Maintain with the
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Trustee that an exemption by the Debtor is claimed and that any resolution of the case, short
of jury findings, that settles the case strictly along the lines of pain and suffering will be opposed.
The same admonition to creditors and creditor's Counsels exists with regard to Debtors and
Debtors Counsel in these actions. Vigilance is essential.
The same vigilance applies to activities that must be undertaken by the Debtor after the
filing of the petition that cannot be produced by the meeting of creditors. Examples of these
type of activities include preparing the filing tax returns, receiving and properly disbursing tax
refunds or other activities that simply could not be performed by the meeting of creditors.
Counsel should advise Debtors not to cash tax refund checks until cleared by the Trustee.
Maintain contact by Counsel between the Debtors and the Trustee will ensure that no
inappropriate actions will be filed, such as a complaint to revoke the discharge.

Dealings With the Trustee in Representation of Creditors

Creditors has one disadvantage in a bankruptcy in that, except for the rare instance of
an involuntary petition, creditors do not select the place of filing. Counsel who represents
creditors are not under the same statutory requirements to cooperate with the Trustee that the
Debtor and Debtors Counsel have. However, even in adversary Situations, the more sensible
approach by creditor's Counsel should be to communicate and to cooperate with the Trustee.
Creditors Counsel normally have contact with the Trustee in the following situations:
1.

Relief matters;
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2.

lien avoidance matters;

3.

sale of secured assets; and

4.

representation of unsecured creditors.

Regardless of the type of proceeding, Counsel will find that cooperation with the Trustee
will produce a more effective administration of the case, result in a more efficient distribution
of funds to creditors and enable Counsel to make speedier dispositions of assets that are secured
in favor of their client's.

Relief Matters
In the Eastern District of Kentucky, relief from stay can be obtained by Motion in one of
two ways. The first is by noticing the Motion on a fifteen (15) day opportunity notice. If another
party in interest wishes to object to the Motion for Relief, then the matter will be set for motion
docket. The alternative is to notice it for a date certain. Motion dockets are conducted on a
regular basis in the Eastern District of Kentucky and are set forth in Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014
1. Counsel is urged to review any changes to the date and times on the Court's web page at

www.kyeb.uscourts.gov. Recently, Judge Howard changed the motion hour for the Covington
division from the first Tuesday of the month to the second Tuesday of the month to
accommodate his new duties as a member of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel.
On relief matters, Counsel must attach a copy of the proof of claim to the Motion for
Relief. The Motion must also set forth the basis by which relief should be granted, including the
recording information that is pertinent to the asset that ought to be released from the
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bankruptcy. Unlike some jurisdictions, a request for an abandonment of the property may be
included in the Motion for Relief.
An alternative to filing the Motion is to seek an Agreed Order with Counsel for the Debtor
and the Trustee. The same information must be disclosed. Counsel must provide to the Trustee
the documentation that shows the perfection of the lien on the asset in question. Often times,
Counsel attaches a copy of a mortgage or other instrument which does not contain the recording
information. Trustee's review, proofs of claims, Motions for Relief and other documents for
information that shows clearly that the lien of the punitive secured creditor is perfected in a
timely manner and is not otherwise avoidable under the Trustee's strong arm powers.
Absent such information, the Trustee shou!d object to the Motion for Relief or refuse to
sign the proposed Agreed Order. Providing such information the first instance provides a
smoother, more efficient administration of the estate and allows Counsel to seek liquidation of
the asset on behalf of the secured creditor on a speedier and more efficient basis. An Order
must accompany the Motion for Relief.

Lien Avoidance Matters

The most important aspect of representation of a creditor by Counsel when a Trustee
seeks to avoid a lien is to accurately assess the merits of the Trustee's position. To litigate
simply to stall for time frequently costs creditors substantial dividends. The cost of litigation Is
borne by the estate and therefore decreases the amount of funds available for distribution, not
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to mention the time spent litigating causes delays in which distribution can occur. If Counsel
concludes that the Trustee's position is sound and no basis exists to defeat the proposed lien
avoidance, the best representation is to concede and to facilitate a liquidation of the asset so
that Counsel's client can receive a greater dividend. While the creditor will suffer a loss, for it
is a rare case in which a lien avoidance matter results in a 100% dividend, the accurate
assessment of a Trustee's case at the beginning of a case wJII allow the creditor to recover the
maximum amount possible. Of course, if Counsel concludes that the Trustee's action is not
warranted, defense of the litigation is proper, even if the result is adverse to Counsel's client in
the end. Most Trustees are cognizant of the cost of litigation, the time expended in litigation and
have already performed a cost benefit analysis before undertaking the proposed litigation. Most
Trustees are normally considerate of settlement in these matters because the goal is to return
funds to creditors as quickly as possible.
If Counsel has determined that viable defenses exists to the Trustee's proposed action,
the information that establishes the defense should be provided to the Trustee as soon as
practicable. Most Trustee's are aware of the potential defenses to any action. Providing the
documentation or offering testimony, that supports the defenses will quickly frame the issues.
Counsel should be aware of the intent by the Bankruptcy Court in the Eastern District of
Kentucky to bring matters to trial in an expeditious manner. Therefore, no time exists by which
to deray discovery. On the contrary, if discovery needs to be undertaken, do so at once. The
burden of proof does rest with the Trustee. Normally, the key witness for the Trustee will be
the Debtor. If not the Debtor, it is documentation provided to the Debtor that forms that basis
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of the complaint. The Debtor is required to cooperate with the Trustee. Therefore, if his
testimony is necessary, do not hesitate to take his deposition. The trial procedures in the
Eastern District require all Counsel to enter into stipulations to refine the issues to be heard by
the Court. Normally in lien avoidance actions, the litigation centers on one element. For
example, frequently in preference litigation, the issue is an industry standard to determine
whether the payment was made on an antecedent debt. Focus on the issues that benefit your
client's the most. If the Trustee cannot prevail on all of the elements, the Trustee fails to meet
the burden of proof. If Counsel can convince the Trustee that the elements cannot be met, the
dismissal of the action should be obtained.

Liquidation Analysis

Whether Counsel represents a creditor who holds a lien or is simply unsecured, Counsel
for creditors need to perform a liquidation analysis of the Debtor's assets. If the creditor
represented is a lien creditor, the focus would be limited to the asset that is encumbered.
Nonnally, the liquidation analysis for representing a secured creditor goes hand-in-hand with
whether Counsel should prepare a Motion for Relief from Stay or seek and Agreed Order lifting
the stay. Simply put, the Trustee undergoes a mathematical analysis. The Trustee must deduct
the administrative costs from any hypothetical sale. The administrative costs include the
Trustee's commiSSion, which is set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 326, any professional fee, such as
auctioneer, real estate commission, attorney's fees, any tax costs as a result of the sale,
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particularly any capital gains tax and any other costs that the Trustee must consider before
performing the sale.

In addition to the administrative costs, the Trustee must consider

distribution to co-owners, if applicable, and, of course, the amount owed to the lien holders.
Interest continues to accrue on the valid liens that encumber the asset. In addition to all of
these factors, the Trustee must also consider applicable exemptions, particularly homestead
exemptions in real estate sales. After all of these costs are deducted and a benefit remains to
the estate to sell the property, it is in the interest of the secured creditor to facilitate a sale as
well as the Trustee. After all, the secured creditor will be paid in full from the sale of the asset.
If the creditor becomes convinced that a sale will not in fact pay all of these costs, then Counsel
should employ the relief from stay mechanisms.
If Counsel represents an unsecured creditor, Counsel should ask one's client to what
extent that client may have knowledge of assets of the Debtor that can be liqUidated. It is in
the unsecured creditors interest to find assets that can be liquidated. Unsecured creditors, of
course,.only get paid a dividend from assets that are liquidated. Otherwise, the case becomes
a no asset case and the client receives nothing. Counsel can determine quickly what assets of
the Debtor hold potential value for the estate, and brings these matters to the attention of the
Trustee. Counsel can assist the Trustee to make sure that creditors receive a substantial
dividend. The services of Counsel in this area are limited to support for the trustee. However,
aTrustee normally sells assets only after parties bring the value of those assets to the Trustee's
attention. Many times Debtors understate or simply don't appreciate the value of property that
they own. Thus, if Counselor Counsel's client holds knowledge of the value of certain assets,
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even if the Debtor does not agree with that assessment, the Trustee may be able to realize a
dividend to that creditor when otherwise the Trustee would be prepared to file a report of no
distribution. The vigilant creditor is normally the creditor who gets paid. When representing an
unsecured creditor, Counsel must file proofs of claims to preserve the right of the creditor to
receive a dividend.

Conclusion

When Counsel must engage with a Chapter 7 Trustee, two attributes most often work for
the benefit of all concerned. Those attributes are cooperation and disclosure to the Trustee.
In order for the bankruptcy system to work at its best, the system must be efficient. It is the
duty of Counsel to facilitate and perform those necessary tasks to make the system work more
efficiently. It is in the interest of all concerned, the Debtors, Trustee, and creditors, that the
system work efficiently. The faster the system works, the faster Debtors leave the bankruptcy
system and place this unpleasant chapter behind their lives. The faster the system works, the
faster the creditors get paid and realize the full extent of their loss or recovery. Of course, the
faster the system works, the faster the trustee gets paid as well. But more importantly, and
efficient bankruptcy system brings credibility an respectability to what is now a meck maligned
system.
This author does not advocate that one should abandon a client when one disagrees with
the Trustee. However, focusing on the area of disagreement, rather than litigating everything,
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can only be in everybody's interest. The shorter the litigation, the lower the costs. The lower
the costs represents a higher dividend to creditors. A lower ligation cost, also can result in more
favorable, negotiated settlements for the Debtor or the creditor. Failure to communicate with
the Trustee results in Motions to Dismiss with regard to the Debtors, more extensive litigation
with regard to creditors, greater administration costs and lower dividends to everyone. The only
person who makes more money when a lack of cooperation and the communication exists is the
Trustee's Counsel.

Practice in the Eastern District of Kentucky requires cooperation and

disclosure of information. Debtor's must timely disclose assets and documentation supporting
those assets. Creditors must disclose documents that prove perfection of liens. litigants are
required to engage in meaningful stipulations and settlement discussions. Failure by one party
to engage in a cooperative course can and probably will adversely impact that litigant. Cander
before the Bankruptcy Court is a virtue and is normally not penalized. The required cooperation
is perhaps the principal fundamental difference between litigating in the Bankruptcy Court and
litigating in any other Court.
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OPINION
ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge. Milton W. Keeney,
debtor in this bankruptcy action, appeals from the order of the
bankruptcy court denying his petition for discharge in
bankruptcy. The denial was based upon the court's finding
that he had concealed property interests and made a false oath.
We affirm the order.

I.
I In 1971, Appellee, Mary Jean Smith, obtained a judgment
against Keeney for injuries she sustained in a car accident.
Smith has been unable to collect on this judgment.

In 1982, a tract of real property was purchased in lhe names
. of Keeney's parents, Winfre~ and Ruth Keeney.· They
mortgaged this property to Mutual Federal Savings and Loan
("Mutual Federal"). Keeney and his then-wife, Barbara
Keeney, lived on the property for about a year, and paid his
parents no rent. Keeney or his business entity, K-Bar Trailer
Manufacturing ("K-Bar"), made all ofthe mortgage payments
for the property. In 1985 Keeney executed a note for $89,960
to Mutual Federal secured by a new mortgage from Keeney's
parents on this property, as well as all of K-Bar's inventory,
fixtures and equipment. Keeney or K-Bar made all the
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payments on this note and mortgage. This property was
eventually transferred by his parents for the sum of $15,000,
which was paid to Mutual Federal.

Keeney placed the winning bid for a second piece of real
estate in 1983, which was purchased in his parents' names for
the sum of $61,700. Of that sum, $52,000 was borrowed
from Mutual Federal. Keeney or K-Bar paid $9255 down for
this property from K-Bar's checking account, and thereafter
Keeney paid $52,455 from K-Bar's checking account for the
balance due on the purchase price. Keeney and his wife
moved onto this property at about the time it was conveyed to
his parents and lived there until the time of their separation in
1994 or 1995. Keeney continues to live there. Keeney or K
Bar paid for improvements on this property and made all
Keeney does not pay rent to his parents
for hiS use of the property.
mort~age payments.

Glen Gadberry, Assistant Vice President at Alliance Bank,
formerly Mutual Federal, testified that the only remaining
records relating to the above property mortgages were in
Keeney's name, rather than his parents', although many ofthe
records had been destroyed.

Keeney filed for bankruptcy in 1996. Smith filed a
complaint with the bankruptcy court seeking to bar Keeney's
discharge in bankruptcy, alleging that the real estate
conveyances were made in an effort to conceal property
actually belonging to Keeney.

The bankruptcy court denied Keeney discharge in
bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A), finding that he
had continuously concealed his beneficial interest in the
above described property:

The record in this case indicates that the debtor had
propertf titled in his parents' names while retaining a
benefiCial interest in it, so as to invoke the continuous
concealment doctrine. While his parents had legal title
to two different tracts of real estate, the defendant made
his home on both at various times. He has stated that he
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made all the mortgage payments on them, and a down
payment on one. In examining the defendant's intent,the
Court notes that these transfers took place while a
judgment was pending against him in favor of the
plaintiff. The defendant listed none of these property
mterests on his schedules when he filed his bankruptcy
case.

. Smith v. Keeney (In re Keeney), 221 B.R. 401, 403 (Bankr.
. B.D. Ky. 1998). The court further found that Keeney had
violated II U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) by making a fals~ oath
when he omitted the property from his bankruptcy schedules.
ld. at 404.
The district court affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy
court. It also relied upon the continuing concealment doctrine
to conclude that Keeney had concealed property in violation
of 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A). The court noted that Keeney
produced only self-serving affidavits from himself and his
parents stating that he had no interest in the property, and that
no explanation was given for placing property that Keeney
purchased and used into his parents' names. Thedistrictcourt
~Iso concluded that Keeney had made a false oath in violation
of 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) by failing to disclose his interests
in the property to the bankruptcy court.

n.
Keeney appeals the denial ofdischarge in bankruptcy to this
court, arguing that application of the continuous concealment
doctrine to bar his discharge was improper. This court
reviews the bankruptcy court's findings offact for clear error,
and the district court's conclusions of law de "ovo. See
Wesballco Bank Barnesville v. RafOl" (In re Baker & Gelty
Fill. Servs.,illc.), 106 F.3d 1255, 1259 (6thCir.), cerl. dellied,
522 U.S. 816 (1997). The elements of a violation of II
U.S.C. § 727 must be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence to merit denial ofdischarge. See BarclayslAmerican
Bus. Credit, lire. v. Adams (In re Adams), 31 F.3d 389, 394
(6th Cir. 1994), cerl. dellied, 513 U.S. 1111 (1995). The
Bankruptcy Code should be construed liberally in favor of the
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debtor. See Gullickson v. Brown (In re Brown), 108 F.3d
1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 1997).

A.

Keeney first argues that the bankruptcy and district courts
erred in applying the continuing concealment doctrine to find
that he had violated section 727(a)(2)(A). That section
specifies that:

(a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless

(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a
creditor or an officer of the estate charged with custody
of property under this title, has .•• concealed, or has
.
permitted to be .•. concealed-

(A) property of the debtor, within one year before the
date of the filing of the petition[.]

11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A) (1993). This section encompasses
two elements: 1) a disposition of property, such as
concealment, and 2) "a SUbjective intent on the debtor's part
to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor through the act disposing
of the property." Hughes v. Lawson (In re Lawson), 122 F.3d
1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 1997).

The bankruptcy and district courts determined that Keeney
had concealed his beneficial interest in the two properties by
placing them in his parents' names, with the requisite intent
to defraud. Keeney argues on appeal that he had nothing to
conceal because he has no interest in the property. A
beneficial interest of ownership in the property can be
inferred, however, from Keeney's payment for and use oCthe
properties, including his rent-free residence on each and
payment of all mortgage obligations. As noted by the district
court, no explanation was provided as to why the properties
were titled in the parents' names. Courts have found that a
debtor retained a beneficial interest in property under similar
circumstances. See, e.g.,Hughes,122F.3d 1237; Thibodeaux
v. Olivier (In re Olivier), 819 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1987). Under
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the facts of this case, the bankruptcy court did not commit
clear error in its detennination that Keeney held a beneficial
interest in the properties. The requisite intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud was also permissibly inferred by the bankruptcy
court in this case. See In re Snyder, 152 F.3d 596, 601 (7th
Cir. 1998) (citation omitted) (a debtor's intent '''may be
inferred from the circumstances surrounding his objectionable
conduct"').
Keeney next argues that even if he holds a beneficial
interest in the subject properties, this court should not
recognize the continuous concealment doctrine to bring the
violation within the requirements of section 727(a)(2)(A).
That statute specifies that both elements (the act of
concealment and requisite intent) must occur within a year
11 U.S.C.
before the bankruptcy petition is filed.
§ 727(a)(2)(A) (1993). The bankruptcy and district courts
relied upon a continuing concealment to bring the transfers of
property in this case, all performed over one year before
filing, within the statute.
"Under the 'continuing
concealment' doctrine,.a transfer made and recorded more
than one year prior to filing may serve as evidence of the
requisite act of concealment where the debtor retains a secret
benefit of ownership in the transferred property within the
year prior to filing." Hughes, 122 F.3d at 1240; see also
Rosen v. Bezner, 996 F.2d 1527, 1531 (3d Cir. 1993)
(describing the doctrine by stating that "a concealment will be
found to exist during the year before bankruptcy even if the
initial act of concealment took place before this one year
period as long as the debtor allowed the property to remain
concealed into the critical ),ear"). In Hughes, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth CirCUit found a continuing concealment
where a debtor retained an interest in her house after
transferring it to her mother, because the debtor had lived in
the house and subordinated her mother's deed oftmst in order
to obtain a loan. [d. at 1241. In Friedell v. Kauffman (In re
Kauffmatl), 675 F.2d 127, 128 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam),
the coul1 concluded that a debtor held a beneficial interest in
a house where the debtor lived in the house, made mortgage,
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tax, and escrow payments, and used the house as collateral for
loans.

Thibodeaux, 819 F.2d 550, presents a situation similar to
that here. Olivier was involved in a car accident that injured
Thibodeaux. After the accident, Olivier transferred title 10 his
home to his mother for, in effect, no consideration. The
Oliviers continued to live in the house and be responsible for
all costs associated with it. Thibodeaux obtained ajudgment
against Olivier, but was unable to collect. Six years later,
Olivier filed for bankruptcy. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of discharge under section
727(a)(2)(A). The court noted that the intent element could
be inferred from Olivier's continued use of the transferred
property. [d. at 553. The court then affirmed the use of the
doctrine of continuing concealment in that case:

[T]he Oliviers' motivation, their continuing occupancy of
the house rent-free, their prompt return of all the
"purchase money," and their acts of ownership such as
insuring and maintaining the property taken together
amply support the conclusion that notwithstanding the
purportedly complete transfer they retained a significant
beneficial interest in the property and have "continue[d]
to use the property as [their] own...... .

... Here the purported transfer by appellants occurred
more than a year before bankruptcy, but appellants
continued the concealment of their secretly retained
interest in the propel1y. The courts below relied on the
well-settled doctrine that in this character ofsituation the
concealment ofan interest in an asset that continues, with
the requisite intent, into the year before bankruptcy
constitutes a form of concealment which occurs within
the year before bankruptcy and, therefore, that such
concealment is within the reach of section 727(a)(2)(A).

/d. at 554-55; see also Friedell, 675 F.2d at 128 ("A
concealment ... need not be literally concealed. The transfer
of title with auendant circumstances indicating that the
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bank1l1pt continues to use the property as his own is sufficient
to constitute a concealment.").
Keeney points out that this court has never been presented
with a case concerning continuing concealment, and urges us
not to adopt the doctrine. Alternatively, he cites Rosell,
supra, to support his argument that the doctrine's application
is not proper in this case. In Rosen, however, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court's
denial of discharge because there was a material Issue of fact
on the intent clement, so that the case was not proper for
summary judgment disposition. Rosen, 996 F.2d at 1532.
Application of the continuing concealment doctrine is proper
under the facts of this case, and we join those having adopted
the doctrine.
Keeney also notes that under Kentucky law, Smith cannot
recover the subject property because the statute of limitations
has run. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 413.120, 413.130
(Banks-Baldwin 1998). He argues that even if a violation of
section 727(a)(2)(A) can otherwise be shown, that fact is
irrelevant because Smith is too late to reach the property.
This argument fails. "[C]oncealment or transfer under
§ 727(a)(2) may occur even if no creditors are harmed by it.
'Proof of harm is not a required element of a cause of action
under Section 727.... Peterson v. Scoll (In re Scott), 172 F.3d
959,968 (7th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).

B.
In addilion to relying upon a violation of section
727(a)(2)(A), the bankruptcy and district courts also based the
denial of discharge on Keeney's making of a false oath when
he omitted his beneficial interest in the properties from his
benefit schedules filed with the bankruptcy court, in violation
of section 727(a)(4)(A).
(a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless
(4) lite debtor knowingly and fraudulently. in or in
connection with the case-

No. 99-5949
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In order to deny a debtor discharge under this section, a
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
1) the debtor made a statement under oath; 2) the statement
was false; 3) the debtor knew the statement was false; 4) the
debtor made the statement with fraudulent intent; and 5) the
statement related materially to the bankruptcy case. See
Beaubouefv. Beaubouef(ln re Beaubouej), 966 F.2d 174, 178
(5th Cir. 1992). Whether a debtor has made a false oalh
under section 727(a)(4)(A) is a question of fact. See
Williamson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 249,251
(4th Cir. 1987).

"'Complete financial disclosure'" is a prerequisite to the
privilege of discharge. Peterson, 172 F.3d at 967. The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has explained that intent to
defraud "involves a material representation that you know to
be false, or, what amounts to the same thing, an omission that
you know will create an erroneous impression." In l'e Chav;Il,
150 F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1998). A reckless disregard as to
whether a representation is true will also satisfy the intent
requirement. See ;d. "'[C]ourts may deduce fraudulent intent
from all the facls and circumstances of a case.... Williamsoll,
828 F.2d at 252 (citation omitted). However, a debtor is
entitled to discharge if false information is the result of
mistake or inadvertence. See Gullickson, 108 F.3d at 1294.
The subject of a false oath is material if it "'bears a
relationship to the bankrupt's business transactions or estate,
or concerns the discovery of assets, business dealings, or the
existence and dispOSition of his property...' Beaubouef, 966
F.2d at 178 (citation omitted).

Keeney argues that because he has no interest in the subject
property, he could not have made a false oath concerning it.
As explained in the previous section, there was no error in the
finding that Keeney held a beneficial interest in the property.
By omitting this interest from his filings he made a false oath.
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Keeney claims that even if he did make a false oath, it was
not done knowingly. and that the bankruptcy court failed to
find the intent element. Although the court was brief, it did
find that Keeney had the requisite intent when not listing his
interest in the property in his schedules. The bankruptcy court
did not clearly err in mferring from the circumstances of this
case that Keeney knowingly (or at least with reckless
disregard) omitted his interest in the property with an intent
to defraud. Keeney held a substantial beneficial interest in the
properties, and the facts of this case make the bankruptcy
court's inference ofintent entirely proper. Accordingly denial
of discharge under section 727(a)(4)(A) was proper.

m.
For the foregoing reasons, the denial of discharge is
affinned.
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UN.ITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
Eastern District of Kentucky

Covington Division

. Mailing Address' po BOT] 11 ] Texington KY 40588-11 J 1

In re: •

Case No: 00 .'

aka/dba:

Chapter: 7

WSH

Trustee: Michael L. Baker
541 Buttermilk Pike #500
PO Box 175710
Covington, KY 41017-5710

Debtor(s)

859-426-1300

CHAPTER 7 ORDER TO DEBTOR
The above-named debtor shall within 10 days from the date of this order turn over to the trustee,
whose name and address appear above, the following documents:
1. All books, records of account, bank books, bank statements and cancelled checks for the 6
months preceding bankruptcy (the last bank statement must show the amount on deposit on the date
of bankiuptcy.);
2. The original or a certified copy of the deed or contract under which the debtor holds title to or
any interest In real estate, and certIfied copies of all recorded mortgages. liens, or encumbrances
upon said real estate (these documents may'De obtained from the office of the county court clerk of
tlie county in which the real estate is locateo.);
3. Title papers to any motor vehicles mobile homes, trailers or boats (if original papers have been
lostt duplicates must be obtained from the office of the county court clerk of tlie counly in which the
vehicles are registered.);
4. Certificates of stock, bonds and keys to any safety deposit boxes;
5. Contracts of life or burial insurance;
6. Copies of the debtor's last state and federal income tax returns;
7. Contracts or title papers pertaining to any property of the debtor; and
8. Copies of all notes, security a~ments, loan disclosure statements and other documents
relating to loan transactions to whiCh tlie debtor is a party.
Except for surrender of the aforementioned documents to the trustee, the debtor is restrained and
enjoined fro~ transferring, abandoning, releasing to creditors. or in any way disposing of property of
the estate until further order of the court.

• F~ure to
Within case.

timely comply with this order will result in the filing of a motion to dismiss th

Counsel for the debtor is responsible for seeing that the debtor complies with this order.
Dated: 10123/00
By the court

F I LED
I

I
I

10/23/00

;

i
I

Willian~

~

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

j

Clerk. I:.S. Baukruplcy Court
Lexiugton. KY
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United States Bankruptcy Court
Eastern District of Kentucky
Notice*Notice*Notice

e>-

The Court has instructed the Trustees that 341 meetings are not to be continued unless
they have an Order sustaining a Motion to Continue. If they do not have an Order sustaining a
Motion to Continue, they are directed t~ file the attached .Motion to Dismiss. Any Motion to
Continue the 341 meeting must be accompanied by an Affidavit of the person so requesting
(debtor or counsel) and must be served upon the Trustee, the U.S. Trustee and all creditors
listed on the matrix of the debtor(s). (See suggested form Motion and Order below.) Note the
changes in the §341 Notice and Order to the Debtor for cases filed after June 1, 2000.

e>- We are going to reduce the time it takes to enter a Chapter 7 discharge from 120 days to 60
days. 'Ve have already reduced the time to 110 days and will be reducing the time by 10 days
each month. In November 2000, discharges will be entered 60 days after the 341 meeting,
absent a complaint being filed objecting to discharge.

f;:> 'Ve will no longer sustain a Motion to Withhold a Chapter 7 Discharge for failure to file
tax returns, failure to turn over tax refunds, failure to turn over other assets, etc. The Trustees
are instructed to file a Motion to Dismiss.

~ The Chapter 13 Trustee is instructed to file a Motion to Dismiss if the debtor is two (2)
monthly or three (3) biweekly or five (5) weekly payments in arrears. All Motions to Dismiss
will be heard by the court.

~ From the FYI Department:
a) The court will no longer accept Agreed Orders of Non discharge ability. An
adversary proceeding must be filed.
b) Multiple, unrelated defendants in adversary proceedings will be dismissed.
Separate causes of action require separate adversary proceedings even if conduct is
similar and defendants are represented.
c) The court will discourage extensions of time to file Complaints to Determine
Dischargeability of Debt and will be reluctant to approve Agreed Orders extending
time.
d) For Judge Howard's adversaries - the trial will be set approximately 60 days
after the pre-trial.
e) Beginning in October, 2000, trustee-held Chapter 13 confirmation hearings will
be scheduled approximately 30 days after the 341 meeting. A confirmation hearing
continued for any reason will be scheduled approximately 30 days after the
trustee's confirmation hearing and will be conducted by the court.
t) The Chapter 13 Trustee is drafting a standardized Chapter 13 Plan to be used in

http://www.kyeb.uscourts.gov.lkyeblRules/rules-potice_OS2400.htm
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this District. It is expected to be distributed on or about June 1,2000, and will be
required after July 1, 2000. A new local rule will be issued. A copy of the Plan will
be added to the Court's website.

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

------ Division
In re:
Case No. _ _ _ _ _ __
Debtor(s)

MOTION TO DISMISS CH. 7 CASE
The trustee asks the Court to dismiss this case because
the debtor(s) did not appear at the §341 First :Meeting of Creditors.
the attorney for the debtor(s) did not appear at the §341 First Meeting of
Creditors.
the debtor(s) did not timely provide the documents required by the Court's
Order to Debtor.

DATE: _ _ _ __
Trustee

NOTICE
This motion to dismiss will be brought on for hearing at _ _ _ _ on _ _ _ _ - ' 20-,
United States Bankruptcy Court _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.

CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that the above motion was served upon the debtor(s), counsel for the debtor(s),
the U.S. Trustee and all creditors listed on the debtor's matrix on this the _ _ day of
11114/2000
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_ _ _....:>,20_.

Trustee

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
_ _ _ _ _ _ Division
In re:

Case No. _ _ _ _ __

Debtor(s)

MOTION TO DISMISS CH. 13 CASE

The trustee asks the Court to dismiss this case because
[

] the debtor(s) did not appear at the §341 First Meeting of Creditors.

[

] the attorney for the debtor(s) did not appear at the §341 First Meeting of
Creditors.

[

the debtor(s) did not timely provide the documents required by the Court's
Order to Debtor.

DATE: _ _ _ __
Trustee
11/14/2000
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NOTICE

This motion to dismiss will be brought on for hearing at _ _ _ _ on _ _ _ _ - - - J 20-,
United States Bankruptcy Court _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---'

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the above motion was served on the parties listed below on this the _ _
dayof
,20_,

Trustee

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

------ Division
In re:
Case No. _ _ _ _ _ __

Debtor(s)

MOTION TO CONTINUE
Comes now counsel for the above-captioned debtor(s) and moYes the Court for an order
continuing the scheduled §341 First Meeting of Creditors. An affidavit in support of said

11114/2000
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motion is attached.

DATE: _ _ _ __
Counsel for Debtor(s)

CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that the above motion was served upon the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and all
creditors listed on the debtor's matrix on this the
date of
, 20_.

Counsel for Debtor(s)

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

------ Division
In re:
Case No. _ _ _ _ _ __

Debtor(s)

ORDER

Upon the timely-filed motion of the debtor(s) to continue the §341 First Meeting of Creditors
and the Court having reviewed the record and being othenvise properly and sufficiently
advised,

11114/2000
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the §341 First Meeting of Creditors be and
same is hereby continued to a date and time to be set by the trustee.
DATED: __________
JUDGE

Copy to: Trustee
Attorney for Debtor(s)

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

------ Division
In re:
Case No. _ _ _ _ _ __
Debtor(s)

ORDER
The trustee having moved the Court to dismiss the within case and same having come on for
hearing and the Court having reviewed the record and being othen"ise properly and
sufficiently advised,

IT IS ORDERED that the above-captioned case should be and hereby is
DISMISSED.
DATED: ________

11114/2000
E(b) - 32

I.

•

Nptice regarding Rules for u.s. Bankruptcy Court, E.D.Ky.

Page 7 of7

JUDGE

Copy to:

Debtor(s)
Counsel for the Debtor(s)
Trustee
Notice to all creditors and parties in interest

Return to main menu
Please let us know any questions about these procedures.

- ...
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LIQUIDATION OF ASSETS ON THE INTERNET BY
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Stout Law Office
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WAVE OF THE FUTURE?
UOUIDATION OF ASSETS ON THE INTERNET BY TRUSTEES AND CREDITORS
BY: ALAN C. STOUT
.s.to.P..tJ.3F.@ap.e.~Jl~t

L OVERVIEW

'Change, before you have to. "-Jack Welch, CEO, General Electric.
Under the terms of Bankruptcy Code Section 363 (II U.S.C. 363), the trustee "after
notice and a hearing" may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business,
property of the estate.
Under Rule 6004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure ("FRBP"), notice to be
provided in conformity with Rule 2002 of the FRBP. Rule 6004(t) recognizes that a sale not in
the ordinary course of business can be by private sale or public auction. It also indicates that
"unless it is impracticable, an itemized statement of the property sold, the name of each purchaser,
and the price received for each item for a lot or for the property as a whole if sold in bulk shall be
filed on completion of a sale." FRBP 6004(t).
The Internet provides a unique opportunity for bankruptcy trustees to liquidate assets of
bankruptcy estates. This is particularly true with assets which were previously difficult to marketand eventually abandoned by the Trustee. Subjecting bankruptcy assets to sale before a worldwide market also may increase the value of the assets to be sold. An awareness of the
opportunities the internet brings to the liquidation arena can be beneficial to debtors' counse~
creditors' counsel and all members of the insolvency community. Any party having an interest in
maximizing value to the estate should benefit. For example, thru maximizing value to the estate,
the liquidation analysis in chapter 11 and chapter 13 venues may be impacted, thereby increasing
the dividend to unsecured creditors.
Advantages of internet liquidation of assets include:
1. Market for hard to sell assets, specialty items or items not suited for locale;
2. Market for highly specialized assets (i.e., target marketing or automatic notification
service);
3. Can assist in obtaining abandonment of assets (some courts have actually required
proof of web exposure for abandonment of certain types of assets-ND NY & SDCA) ;
4. Less expensive;
5. Administrative ease;
6. Maximize recovery.
ll. CONSIDERATIONS ON WHETHER OR NOT TO USE INTERNET
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marketing of a specific asset is - what methodology to utilize?
Generally, there are three options for utilization of the Internet for liquidation of assets by
Trustees:
•
Asset Listing Service: Utilizes a traditional sale (i.e., public auction through
auctioneer or private sale through listing of assets through broker). The Internet is
used to market the asset only (i.e., through a listing service such as nabt.com or
bankruptcysales.com); or
•
Online Auction Service: Use the Internet for the actual auction through an Internet
auctioneer or asset disposition service (i.e., ebay.com, bid4assets.com or
bankruptcymarket.com).
•
Simulcast Auctions: Hybrid auction where traditional auction on-site is combined
with internet auction
The methodology utilized will depend on the type of asset, location, and market appeal of
a specific asset.
See, generally LawYers Weekly USA, September 20, 1999, attached as Exhibit A.
III. TYPES OF ASSETS SUCCESSFULLY MARKETED ON INTERNET

Types of bankruptcy assets that have been successfully marketed on the Internet include:
•
"ehicles
Time shares
•
•
Inventory
•

•
•
•
•

•

Art

Jewelry
Real estate (particularly commercial leases-everything from shopping centers to
office buildings to convenience stores)
Commercial paper (notes, judgments)
Restaurant equipment- In re: Mama's Oriiinal Foods, Inc., 234 BR 500
(S.D.Calif., 1999), the Court held that where a chapter 7 trustee held restaurant
equipment and there was no "recognized market" for such assets, the trustee was
required to advertise the assets on the internet and by newspapers.
Partnerships or corporate ownership interests

Note, the internet is actually becoming the "recognized market" for certain technology-based
assets. However, disposition of these assets create a new range of issues. Some of these assets
are:

•

Intellectual properties-An obvious market for intellectual property includes
businesses whch might actually have a use for the property. However, in some
cases businesses may have a use for the intellectual property for" offensive" or
"defensive" purposes. In the offensive market, the purchaser would acquire the
right to prosecute potential patent infringement litigation against companies which
may have infringed on the rights of the patent. In the defensive setting, the
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IV.

acquiring company could maintain potential suits against new entrants into a
particular industry. Many times new entrants into a particular manufacturing
industry are wlnerable to infringement litigation.
Customer lists, financial information, credit card numbers, etc. However, this may
create public access v privacy concerns, see USTP-Privacy Study-Comments and
Summary, available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/ustlprivacy!comments-elements.htm
for a summary of the public comments received by the U. S. Department of Justice
"Study on FiIiancial Privacy and Bankruptcy" (Original deadline -Sept. 8, 2000
extended to Sept. 22, 2000)
Dot com companies and assets-What better way to sell? As the tech sector begins
to falter, a whole new area of bankruptcy is developing with issues unique to the
industry. See, "Sifting the Dot-Com Rubble", The Washington Post, August 10,
2000. Exhibit B, and "Firms auction off assets on-line", The Washington post, July
18,2000. Exhibit C.
Domain names
Preference & Fraud claims- The Ninth Circuit recently held that preference &
fraud claims in a bankruptcy case can be sold. In re: Duckor,Spralding 8{. Metzger
y. Baum Trust an re P.RT.C., Inc.), 177 F3d 774 (9th Cir., 1999).
Bankruptcy claims - A market has developed over the internet for the sale of
bankruptcy claims of all types.

A "SAMPLING" OF WEBSITES AVAILABLE FOR LIQUIDATION OF ASSETS
BY TRUSTEES

A. nabt.com - Created in 1997 by the National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees
(NABT) as a FREE service to Chapter 7 Trustee membership - The website includes NABT
member listings; provides e-mail list service features to members and NABT Board; Library and
links to other bankruptcy related sites; legislative updates and other information about
organization in addition to asset sale po stings by NABT trustee members. There are
approximately 1200 Chapter 7 trustees nationwide - of which, over 900 are members ofNABT.
This site provides listing for:
•
Upcoming bankruptcy sales
•
Bankruptcy assets listed for sale
Provides basic information on sales and contact information regarding the sales of assets by
Chapter 7 Trustees.
•
Approximately 260 assets listed as of November 1, 2000
Approximately 100,000 hits per month
•
R bankruptcysales.com-NABT and American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) have
completed formation of a joint Internet Committee to form bankruptcysales.com. This a new site
for noticing of Chapter 7, 11, and 13 bankruptcy sales of assets which will serve as a listing
service and will have links to auction sites. This service will be available to the entire insolvency
community for liquidation of assets. As these materials are prepared, bankruptcysales. com is
scheduled to go on-line on November 20,2000.
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Heavy marketing
Launched on November 15, 1999 designed specifically for sale of government,
bankruptcy, foreclosed assets, and financial instruments
•
Various bankruptcy pleadings available on line (application to employ, declaration,
report of sale)
C. bankruptcymarket.com - online auction service and posting service
Approximately 41 assets listed as of September 4,2000
D. liquidation. com - online marketplace for business surplus inventory
E. ebay. com - The premier auction website. Over 2 million items and over 1 million
users at any given time
F. jairmarket.com - Specializes in sale of large volumes of retail related items
G. tradeout. com - Surplus items and business to business items

v.

ISSUES WITH INTERNET LIQUIDATION OF ASSETS

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Court approval of employment of auctioneers as professionals - 11 USC §327(a)
and §328(a) FRBP 6004(a)
Bonding and insurance
Turnover of proceeds
Security concerns
Auctioneer's report
U S Trustee concerns
Auctioneer fee applications and commissions generally - guidelines contained in
Trustee's handbook (See Handbook for Chapter 7 Trustees, Chapter 8, section m6), effective January 1, 1998. No specific rules on internet auctions are in place at
this time. However, it is contemplated that new rules will be included in handbook
reVISIOns.

•

Shipping, packaging, and order processing

VI. ACTUAL SALE RESULTS
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A. Atlantic Rancher Case
B. nabt.com
C. bid4assets.com

J
J

1

.J

J

E(c) - 4

J
J

r

EXHIBIT A

r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r

LAWYERS WEEKLY USA
THE NATIONAL

NEWSPAPER

REPIlINTED FROM SEPTEMBER 20, 1999

FOR SMALL-FIRM

LAWYERS

A BI-WEEI<LY NEWSPAPER FROM LAWYERS WEEKLY INC.

B~ptcyTrustees Are

Using the
Internet to Sell Debtors' Property
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"

opens it up to anybody to
get into the bidding
process," says Eugene Crane
of Chicago, a Chapter 7
trustee.
Online bidding is ideal for
office equipment, cars, commercial real estate, jewelry,
and other inventory, as well
as intangibles such as notes,
judgments or partnerShip interests, experts say.
In fact, debtors' lawyers
may want to start advising
their clients that some items
that used to be routinely
By Sylvia Hsieh
Instead of hiring an auc- abandoned may suddenly
tioneer, taking out newspa- be up for sale.
Bankruptcy trustees have per ads or holding a tradi"A time share or an intera new tool for selling tional sale, trustees can post est in a condo is a classic exdebtors' property - Internet property on the Web and let ample where it becomes
cost-prohibitive to run ads in
the bidding begin!
auctions.:
However, most lawyers all the local newspapers. But
It's already been used successfully in at least one agree that a number of wrin-. if you put it on the Internet,
bankruptcy case, and Ides in the process have to be it's easier to find a buyer,"
trustees are predicting this ironed out before on-line says Dan Goldberg of Houscould be the wave of the fu- auctions fully catch on.
ton, president of the Comture. It can net a wider aumercial Law League of
dience and better prices, as Going Once, Going Twice... America.
Chapter 7 trustees say this
Friedman, who has sold
well as saving on administrative costs, many trustees new tool will allow con- several time-shares over the
sumers around the' world to Interne-t this year, agrees.
''';
say.
"This is the hottest, bid for property and ulti- ''Trustees never used to sell
fastest-growing, most inno- mately put more money in time-shares. Now, we're
.
turning dollars out of nothvative area in bankruptcy creditors' pockets.
"This will increase bank- ing."
liquidation in 50 years," says
Other items appropriate
'Lawrence Friedman of ruptcy sales because it enSouthfield, Mich., vice presi- larges our market. Anybody for online auctioning include
dent of the National Associa- can click a button and see . out-of-sta'te property or
tion of Bankruptcy Trustees. what's being sold. This property that doesn't fit the
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local market.
"You won't get anything
for a fur coat in Arizona in
August, but put it on the
Web and someone back East
might be more interested,"
says Davi.d Birdsell, a Mesa,
Ariz., Chapter 7 trustee.
Some trustees expect this
new tool to work in both
consumer and business
bankruptcies.
But others say that consumer debtors' property
may be too personalized to
sell over the Internet.
"A sofa at the debtor'S
house can be sold at a garage
sale or flea market. And the
shipping cost for smaller
items like a refrigerator may
weigh against buying from
outside the locale," says
Neal Batson of Atlanta, who
represents creditors.
Small and medium-size
businesses ale better candidates for Internet auctions,
he says.

How It Works
The idea is so novel that
trustees are still experimenting with how online auctions will work.
A number of auction websites catering specifically to
bankruptcy estates are beginning to pop up, notes
Friedman.

J
j
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And the National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees
(NABT) has been experimenting with posting items
for sale on its website, hoping to attract consumers as
well as liquidation specialists.
A recent sampling of those
listings includes a jewelry
store's inventory, vacant
land in~kansas, an assisted
living facility in Florida, a
debtor's 1,100+ compact disc
collection, and a $948 annuity payment from an estate.
The organization is now
considering linking to an
auction site that will handle
online bidding, says Fried-

J
...,t
J
J

J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J

man.

Trustees can try to sell directly to consumers by posting items on auction websites, such as eBay, Yahoo! or
Amazon.com.
But the problem with
those sites is that the trustee
would have to front the costs
and the Internet provider
would have. to sign court
documents to be appointed
as an auctioneer - something
providers have so far shown
little interest in doing, notes
Birdsell. .
In Massachusetts, a website provider recently set up
an auction directly on the
debtor's home page, using
pictures of the items and
product desaiptions scanned
directly from the debtor's
catalogue.
. The trustee is still responsible for the sales, but instead of taking out newspa'"
per ads in the local paper, he
or she scans diSital pictures
and uploads' product descriptions onto a server.
The trustee may also have
to "pick ~ choose" which
items to put up for auction
and set the reserve prices,
says Boston attorney John
Aquino, the ~pter 7 trustee

in the Massachusetts case.
method..s that can be used,
. This is partict.iiarly true depending 'on the type of
where there is a large inven- . property being sold, .says
tory of similar items that are Warren Agin of Boston, who
being auctioned directly to represents creditors and
retail consumers online, he trustees.
adds.
In addition, there are a va- The Upside.
riety of different auctioning
Trustees who have at-

J

tempted to sell property online say they get higher bids
because of the wider exposure.
Although the exact cost is
unknown, most trustees predict that Internet auctions
will be cheaper than traditional auctions.

..I

J
J
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A lot of Internet auctions
operate on a small listing fee
and percentage compared to
what you would pay an auctioneer," says Agin.
The provider in the Massachusetts case, Fairmarket
Inc., waived the set-up costs
in exchange for 10 percent of
the auction sales.
Another
company,
Bid4Assets;com in Washington, will launch its website
next month. It plans to
charge 6-8 percent of sales,
depending on the size of the
assets, according to Tom
Kohn, the company's CEO.
Trustees who aren't NABT
members will be charged a
listing fee, and the company
will also charge a fee for
scanning photos, blueprints
or other documents, he says.
But Birdsell predicts that
as more. companies begin
prOviding this service, the
cost will drop to 3-5% of
sales, compared to the 10%
that is paid to a traditional
auctioneer.
The result is that debtors
may lose more property if
trustees can put items on the
auction block so cheaply, experts say.
Because trustees can set
the reserve price, they can
post an item for sale and
withdraw· it if nobody bids
above that price, without
risking major advertising or
listing fees, says Agin.
"If the asset is marginal, I
might put it on the Internet
with a reserve price and· see
II

if I get a bite," he says.

tion, says Birdsell.
"It's very complicated beThe Wrinkles
cause there are so many difSince online auctioning of ferent variations. The aucbankruptcy property is still tion companies would have
so new, lawyers say there are to jump through whatever
a lot of kinks to work out be- hoops are required before
fore this type of sale be- they get paid their commiscomes accepted.
sion. They would have to
"The area is going to have understand that the trustee
to be monitored and fleshed can't just write out a check,"
out over time," says Chris
he says.
. Marshall, the U.s. Trustee
In some jurisdictions, the
"in Boston, who adds that his auctioneer must post a bond,
office is watching the Massa- and it's unclear whether this
chusetts case to "see the re- will apply to Internet com.
sults and what issues it rais- panies.
es."
A trustee would also have
Trustees who are used to to ask the court to waive any
doing things a certain way local requirement that an
may be slow to convert to auctioneer attend the sale
such a novel and unpre- since this would be "imposdictable process.
sible" over the Internet, says
In addition, any type of Marshall.
sale must be approved by
Some jurisdictions require
the court, and Internet auc- post-sale confirmation by
tions are a totally new terri- the court.
This could be "stifling" to
tory for judges.
"I question whether a online purchasers, says
judge would approve an In- William Schorling of
ternet auction because of no- Philadelphia, who repretice to the creditors. Lots of sents debtors and creditors.
people don't have c~J!lput "Who wants to bid on someers and wouldn't search for thing only to wait for the
it," says Alexander Knop£ler, judge to approve it?"
In jurisdictions that rea Chapter 7 trustee in Chicaquire auctions to take place
go.
But most trustees predict in the courtroom, the trustee
they'll get little objection could arrange a real-time onfrom creditors, who will line auction in front of the
benefit from the sales.
judge, Birdsell suggests.
Another issue is that the
Another potential probInternet auction provider lem with selling property
will have to be familiar with from a bankruptcy estate onthe different procedural re- line is that buyers can't requirements for each jurisdic- turn the property and have

to be aware of the risks, such
as liens or other encumbrances.
Some local rules require
that auctions identify the estate name and number, so
that people know that
they're buying out of a bankruptcy estate, not from an established merchant, Marshall notes.
Objections from debtors,
creditors or disapPointed
bidders "happen all the
time," and require a hearing
on whether the sale was conducted properly and
whether the buyer is a bona
fide purchaser, says Schorling.
This could be a problem if
the buyer has to travel to attend a hearing, he notes.
The potential for fraud in
online bidding is another
problem, given the recent
tale of a
13-year-old who bid up to
$3 million on eBay for a
Corvette, property in Florida
and a Van Gogh painting.
One solution would be to
give passwords only to bidders who put up a deposit.
"That way if you get involved in bidding, you're
pretty sure you're bidding
against other real bidders,"
says Schorling.
But for large assets, many
consumers may not have the
available limit on their credit cards for such a big deposit, he notes.
I!!l!I!1

Reprinted with permission from ~IS Weekly liSA. September 20. 1999.41 West Street. Boston. MA 02111·1233.
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Sifting the Dot-Com Rubble
Assets Of Failed Firms
By ROB GARRETSON
IfIuIt/apll FDn SttIJIWriIIr

For. sellers, Bld4Assets provides services such
as pre-qualiCying buyers, Including checking
their credit, or accepIIng deposits required of
bidders on high-priced assets. 1be company also
actively promotes lis inventory with coDectol'S
and other likely buyers, which a banlauptcy
trustee or a government agency that has seized
an asset is UDIikeJ.y to do.
Bld4Assecs also helps bu)'el'S by olferlng,
online Inspedion of auc:laI cIocumenlS, such as
deeds, title records and lnspec:Iion c:ertific:ates.

Though she didn't gain the intemallonal
headlines garnered by Internet failure Boo.com,
the story of entrepreneur Andria Mc:CeIIan is
well known throughout the Washington technology
community.
Her business, Qviczone.com, which ofered .
Web IiDks between dtizeIls and loal gcwemments,
fell info bankruptcy in May when funds ran short.
But the final chapter of Qvlaone's story won't
be written untillaler Ibis month, when its
remaining assets will be auctioned 10 pay off the
company's creditors.
Out of the ashes of one local dotcom Dameout, another loal dotcom hopes 10 build a profitable business.
Blcl4Assets.com of SlIver Spring is the online
auctioneer for the CMcmne bankruptcy sale, and
the eigbt-month-old company is gearing up for
what It ezpecIS to be a wave of Internet failures,
res1rUcturings and consoIidaIIoDS.
Founded by a pair of businessmen who grew
up aaoss the street from each other in SlIver
Spring, Bid4Assecs is a Web-based auction site
Bill Kead...... chief operatlnc ofBcer 01
designed to bring together sellers and buyers of
BkMAaea.com, and CEO Tom Kohn with
• bacIcMe. one of tha many thlnes their
assets such as real estate, &uandaI lDsIrumenlS,
Iumry goods and other Items typically disposed of company auctions oft
in baDkruptdes or seized by pemment qenc:ies.
Among the assets feaIured on Bld4Assecs was
"It's a wln-win siIwdIon aD around,"
the IOrmer presidential yacbl 1m SequoIa, which Mc:aetIan said. 'Me bankrupt company wilJlikeIy
sold for an undisdosed amount in mess of $1
gamer more doIIm for Its assets and be able to
million, according to Tom John, the company's
pay off more creditors, and folks that are In the
chief execu1he.
market for disIressed assets wiD \me more emAmong the happy customers is warren E.
dent means of viewing many more' assets. And
Agio, a bankmptcy lawyer at Swigart a: AgIo in
certainly the 1ruStees win, because it eases their
Boston and author of a book on Internet bankpain slplftcandy."
ruptcy. Acdng as a IIquIdadon c:ouuseI, AgIo used
Though online aucllons offer eIBcIency for
Bid4Assets to get $28,000 for the domain name
most types of bankruptdes, there are particular
pJanetrock.com.
advmIIgeS for Internet businesses forced to Bq"It's really a great business modeIlhey \me
uidate assets, Mc:CeIJan said.
down there," AgIo said.
"'l'he bankruptcy process and the court sysUnlike olber popular generalpurpose auellon tem in general has been around for decades IIld
sites such as ~ or mass online merchants
isn't really geared IOWard the emdent sale of
such as AmIzon.com, Bld4Asse!s' site handles
InteIIecIuaI property and assets from dot-com
property that requires more due diligence to buy enterprises... [Online auctions) provide a l'I:~ ..
or seD than used CDs, consumer eledronlcs or
emdent means [of) pining some wlue from
other household merc:bandise do.
those assets."

E(c) - 9

Privacy advocaIes are concerned, however,
about the auctioning of customer IisIs and other
personal Infol'lllllion gathered by Web siles, partlc:uIarly when those that buy Ibis infonnatlon
\men't disclosed how they wiD handle It
Though the privacr issues surrounding failed
d01-C01DS are still cloudy, online banlauptcy auction sites such as Bld4Assets can help Mid
problems, according to Richard 'DIton, a bank·
ruptcy IaVI)'I!l' at Greenberg Traurig in New York.
"Any buyer who wants to buy daI3bases has to
be concerned about the cost of litigating the
privacy issue, which can be incredibly high if
you're 6ghtlng with 50 Slates and the rrc," he
said. "Buyers undersIand dearly that they have
to bend over backwards to comply with
ezIstIng policy statements and maybe even go
beyond them."
By making those privacy statements available
online for bu)'el'S to Inspect, Bid4Assets wiD help
potential bu)'el'S judge the wlue of infonnatlon assets and sidestep privacy concerns before they
bid on them, he added.
Bld4Assets was launched in November of last
year, after one of the founders, Norman
Understein, had shivered through an outdoor
auction of a $5 million property in Baltimore.
There had to be a better ft); he and co-founder
Rick ZIIeIman figured,
The company has listed more than $1 billion
of assets for sale in the past six monlhs, according to Iohn, a ftIeran of America 0nBne Inc.,
Freeloader.com and most recently USA Today
Online.
Though CiYiczone.com wiD be the 6rst failed
dot-com that Bid4Assets has liquidated, it won't
be the last, Iohn predicted.
"When we started this business, lntemet companies could reaDy do no wrong. and we're just
now beginning to feel the effects of the nwket
c:orrec:tion In AprIl," he said. "And it's taking
this long because the banlauptcy process takes
so tong."
Qvlczone.com, &led for Chapter 7 liquidation In AlexandrIa on May, 31,IistIng assets of
between $100,001 and $500,000 and liabilities
ofbetween $500,000 and $1 mlIIIon. Its assets
headed for auction Include some custom-deveIoped Web software and about 100 dolll3ln
names, plus computers, printers and ofIice
equipment, The auction will close at 3:00 p.m.
on Aug. 24, 2000.
"Bid4Assets is the natural extentlon of the
life cycle of a dot-com," CiYiczone's Mc:CeDan
observed. "I can't iJUging doing Ibis any
other way. •
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By William Glanz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

On-line businesses that sell the assets
of bankrupt companies are springing up
.to convert others' hard times into revenuc. 'Ibcy have customer lists full of
failed enterprises.
Bid4Assets.com, a Silver Spring company, is selling everything from domain
names of failed dotcom companies to
DDpaid debt to tangible assets like buildings and art.
"We don't get pcr50nal enjoyment out
of others' fanures. We're just trying to
run a business:' said Thomas Kohn, chief
executivc of the privately held company.
They aren't the only ones.
Cambridge, Mass.-based Bankruptcy
Exchange and Auction Marlcct Inc.
debuted its Web site last week.
'"Traditional auctions are very
parochial, and wc're changing that,"
Bankruptcy Exchange and Auction
Marlcct President lack Pascal said.
New York-based EreoIg.com will
begin Web auctions in August of distressed loaus.
The assets of failed companies evcrything from furniture and computers
to DDpaid debt - reached an estimated
$250 billion last year alone, according to
Bid4Asscts.
1bc sale and purchase of most of
those items is done at traditional auctious, Mr. Pascal said.
But auctious are inefficient because
they atIract a regional audience and few
people bid on the assets companies are
forced to liquidate, the emerging Web
auction companies argue.
On the Web, the potential audience is
1aIgcr. 'Ibc bigger the audience, the
greater the chance an asset will be purchased, on-line auctioneers say. More
potential buyers also makes bidding
more vigorous and can boost the purchase price.
That makes on-line auctions valuable
to creditors, because Web deals can help
creditors of failed companies recoup
more money than they would recover at

Thomas Kohn, Bid4Assets.com CEO,
displays a toy with the auction site's
logo at Its Silver Spring offices.

traditional auctions, Boston-based bankruptcy lawyer Warren Agio said.
The sites that market assets of bankrupt companies aren't specializing in
nickel-and-dime trinkets. On Ebay.com,
the world's 1aIgcst on-line marketplace,
the average transaction amounts to $40.
On Bid4Asscts, it amoDDts to S2S,ooo.
Last month, an auction on Bid4Assets
resulted in the sale of the former presidential yacht USS Sequoia, used from
the Harding administration in the 1920s
forward, until President Carter sold it
in 1m.

Even with a strong
economy, 17-month
old Bid4Assets already
has listed $1 billion
worth ofassets.
NorsbipCo, a Norfolk-based shipbuilder and dry-docking company, repossessed the l04-foot yacht after its OWD-

ers, Presidential Yacht Sequoia
FODDdation, based in Alexandria, failed
to pay the $3 million it cost to' renovate
the vcsscl.
NorshipCo sold the ship for an undisclosed price - but more than $1 millionin a scaled bid auction to Sequoia LLC, a
group ofTcxas investors.

E(c) -11

Bid4Assets, started With $5 million in
capital, makes money by collecting a fcc
of up to 8 percent for each item sold on
its Web site.
Even with a strong economy,
17-month old Bid4Assets already has
listed $1 billion worth of assets on its
Web site already.
If the economy slows and companies
begin failing, business at Bid4Asscts,
EreoIg.com and Bankruptcy Exchange
and Auction Market could flourish.
"We're definitely coDDtercyclical,"
Bid4Assets Vice President of
Development David Marchick said.
With more Intemet companies failing,
Web auction sites selling assets of bankrupt companies expect more business.
Dot-com companies used to simply
close their doors, Mr. Agin said.
Now they are taking advantage of
Chapter 11 bankruptcy to sen off assets,
reorganize and reopen for business.
. "We'vc not seen that before. 'Ibcy're
doing it now because they realize they do
have assets," Mr. Agin said.
The intangible assets of dotcoms domain names, patents, copyrights and
trademarks - are potentially their most
valuable assets, Mr. Agio said.
"When it comes to selling a domain
name, the Internet is a natural. If you tty
to think of another way other than the
Internet to sell a domain name, your
mind just goes blank," he said.
Mr. Agio sold a domain name
www.planctrock.com - owned by bankrupt Massachusetts-based Internet company WebSecure at, an on-line auction
on Bid4Asscts for $28,000 to a
London-based radio group.
If the deep wc11 of venture capital
aval1able to dot-coms dries up, the failure rate of the lntemct companies will
surge, Mr. Marcbick predicts.
So will business for the companies
swooping in to sell their asset on-line.
"We didn't think about [dot-com
failures] wbcn we started, but we're
starting to get calls and we've shifted
resources to handle it," Mr. Marchick
said••
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I.

TIle scope ofthis chapter is limited to the most common examples of cases filed to challenge
the dischargeability of a specific debt or to challenge the debtor's discharge, generally. This subject
is frequently addressed in multi-day seminars and this chapter is but a brief glimpse at the intricacies
involved in the litigation of these type cases. For those interested in a more replete examination of
this topic, the author recommends The Fraud Book by William R. Mapother, Creditors Law Center,
1989 and 1993 Supplement. For information concerning that treatise, contact Creditor Law Center
at (502) 587-5451.

II.

There is a vast difference between attempting to hold a debt nondischargeable and seeking
a denial of the debtor's discharge. The first is specific and the second is general.
A.

r

r

Non-Dischargeable Debt

A "non-dischargeable debt" is one where a creditor seeks to have an individual debt
excepted from the discharge provisions ofthe Bankruptcy Code. This is done by filing an Adversary
Proceeding pursuant to §523 of the Bankruptcy Code.
For the purposes of this chapter, the following provisions of §523 will be examined:

r

r

BANKRUPTCY TERMINOLOGY AND CONCEPTS

Before reviewing the specific cases and statutes involved in this area of the law, it is
important for the reader to understand some of the basic terminology used by judges and
practitioners.

r
r

r

INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

•

§523(a)(2)(A) - Debts incurred through false pretenses, false
misrepresentations or actual fraud;

•

§523(a)(2)(B) - Debts incurred through the use of false financial
statements;

•
•

§523(a)(5) and (15) - Obligations incident to a divorce;

•

§523(a)(6) - Situations where a debtor's collateral is converted by
the debtor; and
§523(a)(8) - Student loans.

In each one of these situations, other than cases predicated upon §523(a)(5), an Adversary
Proceeding must be filed.
B.

Denial Of Debtor's Discharge

When a creditor seeks to have the debtor's discharge denied in its entirety, that Adversary
Proceeding must be based upon 11 U.S.C. §727(a) and (c). Ifacreditoris successful, then he would
deprive the debtor of the ultimate relief sought in a Chapter 7 proceeding, that is, relieffrom all of
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his debts. Obviously, this is an extreme result, and this issue will be discussed at length later at IV
below.
C.

Adversary Proceedings

Adversary Proceedings are the Complaint filed by a creditor in the Bankruptcy Court
seeking to hold a debt nondischargeable or seeking to deny generally the debtor's discharge. Such
Adversary Complaints must be filed within sixty (60) days from the date originally set for the first
meeting of creditors. This is mandated by Bankruptcy Rules 4004 and 4007.
Note that this is sixty (60) days from the date first set for the meeting of creditors. In other
words, if the meeting of creditors is continued, the sixty (60) days is calculated from the original
date,!!Q! the continued date. Peerless Ins. Co. v. Miller (In re Miller), 228 B.R. 399 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.
1999)
This sixty (60) day deadline is absolute. If an individual files on the 61 st day, the Complaint
will be dismissed.
Note, however, the Courts are generally liberal about granting an extension of that time
period. Such extensions are authorized under Bankruptcy Rules 9006(b), 4004(b) and 4007(c). The
Motion for Extension must be filed prior to the expiration of the original sixty (60) day deadline.
The Motion should be accompanied by some reason for the extension oftime. Generally accepted
grounds for such a Motion are the need for additional time to conduct discovery to see whether a
Complaint is warranted, availability of records from the debtor or from the creditor, and the
unwillingness ofa debtor to submit himself to an examination pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004,
etc.
While Courts are generally liberal about granting a first extension, practitioners should have
ample reason for requesting a second extension. One such example would be if a potential
nondischargeability case is settled via the use ofa Reaffirmation Agreement.
D.

Reaffirmation Of Debts

II U.S.C. §524(c) is the Bankruptcy Code section which allows for the reaffirmation of
debts in Chapter 7 proceedings. 11 U.S.C. §524(c)(4) allows the debtor the later of the sixty (60)
days from the filing ofthe Reaffirmation Agreement with the Bankruptcy Court, or the entry of the
Discharge Order, to rescind the Reaffirmation Agreement. An unweary creditor's attorney could
fall into the following trap.
Remember, one has only sixty (60) days from the original date set for the first meeting of
creditors to file an Adversary Complaint. Ifthe potential nondischargeability case is settled via a
Reaffirmation Agreement, the debtor would have, at a minimum, sixty (60) days from the entry of
the Reaffirmation Agreement with the Court to rescind that Reaffirmation Agreement.
Say for example the Reaffirmation Agreement used to settle the potential
nondischargeability case is filed with the Court on the 45th day after the first date originally set for
the meeting of creditors. The creditor would have fifteen (15) days to file the Adversary Complaint.
The debtor would have forty-five (45) days after the expiration of the creditor's time to file the
nondischargeability suit to rescind the Reaffirmation Agreement. The debtor could agree to
reaffirm, allow the nondischargeability deadline to run, and then rescind the Reaffirmation
Agreement. If there is collateral involved, the lien survives the bankruptcy and the creditor could
seek return of the collateral. However, if the potential nondischargeability suit were based upon
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credit card fraud or some other unsecured type of credit, then this author would suggest placing your
malpractice carrier on notice.
E.

Procedure In Adversary Proceedings

The initiation of an Adversary Proceeding is largely governed by Bankruptcy Rule 7001.
It is very similar to civil actions filed in State or Federal Court. The filing fee for an Adversary
Proceeding is currently $150.00. Bankruptcy Rule 7003, like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3,
states that an Adversary Proceeding is commenced by the filing of the Complaint with the Court.
Like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, Bankruptcy Rule 7004 dictates the rules on summonses and
service of those summonses. This author would recommend that a practitioner new to this area
review Official Form 160 on the proper caption for a Adversary Proceeding and Official Form B250,
the summons form used by the Bankruptcy Court.
For those practicing in the Western District of Kentucky, a reading ofLBR (W.O. Ky.) 8
would be advisable. This is found in the Kentucky Rules of Court, Federal, published by West
Publishing Company.
Practitioners will also find that most of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
incorporated into the Bankruptcy Rules many times without change. The author would commit to
your reading the Advisory Committee notes to Bankruptcy Rule 7001 which gives a "conversion
table" for many of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the Bankruptcy Rules.
. After, the initial filing ofthe case, it proceeds forward like a regular civil action. The Judges
in both the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky have standard pretrial Orders that will issue
soon after the initiation of the Adversary Complaint. Practitioners would be well-advised to adhere
to the requirements and deadlines of those pretrial Orders to the "tee". While one would think this
would go without saying, the author has seen many an Adversary Proceeding dismissed (recalcitrant
creditors counsel) and Judgment entered (dilatory debtor's counsel) for failure to adhere to these
deadlines.
The burden of proof in an Adversary Proceeding is by a preponderance of the evidence.
This is made clear in the case of Grogan v. Garner, 111 S.Ct. 654 (1991). This standard was also
reiterated in the case ofIn re McLaren, 983 F.2d 56 (6th Cir. 1993).
Likewise, the burden of persuasion is on the plaintiff. See Bankruptcy Rule 4005.

ID.

BANKRUPTCY CODE §523 - NON-DISCHARGEABILITY

A.

§523(a)(2)(A) - False Pretense, False Representation or Actual Fraud
11 USC Section 523(a)(2)(A) provides as follows:
(a)

A discharge under section 727,1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b)
ofthis title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt

(2)

for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or
refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained, by(A)

false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud,
other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an
insider's financial condition.

F-3

J
J
Any practitioner preparing a Complaint to be filed under §523(a)(2)(A) must read the case
ofIn re Ward, 857 F.2d 1082 (6th Cir. 1988). The Ward court found that a creditor had to prove
four elements to be successful in an action under this Code provision.
1.

The debtor knowingly made false statements to the creditor, and

2.

These representations (false statements) were made with the intent
to deceive the creditor, and

3.

The financial institution
representations, and

4.

This reliance was the proximate cause of the creditor's loss.

reasonably

relied

upon

these

The creditor must prove all four of these factors in order to make its case. For guidance, the
author would recommend as reading the cases ofIn re Martin, 761 F.2d 1163 (6th Cir. 1985), and
In re Parkey, 790 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1986).
The most difficult ofthese four factors to prove is element number 3, "reasonable reliance".
Fortunately, a recent case from the United States Supreme Court appears to have lessened this
standard.
In the case ofField v. Mans, 116 S.Ct. 437 (1995) the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the creditor must show, only, that it "justifiably relied" on the false representations made
by the debtor.
Unfortunately, "justifiable reliance" was not succinctly defined by the Supreme Court in its
opinion. The theory, and thus the definition, was extrapolated from the Restatement (2nd) of Torts
(1976). The Court made it clear that the debtor's conduct need not conform to a "community
standard" of a "reasonable man". In fact, at page 444 of the Field decision, the Supreme Court
quoted from Prosser's Law of Torts (1978), §108 at 717. This is as close to a definition of
"justifiable reliance" as can be found in the opinion:
An individual standard ofthe plaintiWs own capacity and the knowledge
which he has, or which may fairly be charged against him from the facts
within his observation in the light of his individual case.
In other words, these matters will be examined on a case-by-case basis. The debtor's
conduct will not be measured against some hypothetical "reasonable man". The debtor's conduct
will be adjudged by examining his background, education and life experiences to determine whether
he knew or should have known that his statements were false and would be relied upon by the
financial institution in order to make its credit decision.
This Supreme Court decision will make litigation of these type cases very fact-intensive.
Was it reasonable for a creditor to rely upon the statements made by an adult with an 8th-grade
education as to whether he had pledged certain pieces of personal property on other loans? Is it
reasonable for a creditor to expect an individual with a college degree in finance and 12 years'
experience in his own business to be able to discern between collateral actually belonging to him
versus to his corporation? Should a creditor be able to rely on statements made by a debtor as to his
annual income without verification from his employer? It is this author's opinion that these are the
issues that will have to be examined by the Court in light of the ruling in Field v. Mans, supra.
1.
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Case Law: §523(a)(2)(A)
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The Sixth Circuit has also provided some guidance in cases that fall under §523(a)(2)(A).
A case can be made under this section by showing that the debtor was "grossly reckless" in
providing the information to the creditor. In the case onn re Phillips, 804 F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1986),
the debtor provided the creditor a very misleading deed. The Sixth Circuit found that this
"statement" was so grossly reckless that it rose to the level of fraud that §523(a)(2)(A) was drafted
to remedy.
Likewise, the fraud of one partner can be imputed to another. See In re Ledford, 970 F.2d
1556 (6th Cir. 1992).
. In re Rembert. 141 F.3d 277 (6 th Cir. 1998) declared thatthe debtor who used a credit card
is only representing at most an intent to repay, not the ability to repay. Thus the proper inquiry is
what the debtor's subjective intent was after considering all of the circumstances surrounding the
situation. Here a gambler (hourly wage factory inspector for 28 years) who had previously obtained
a second mortgage on her home to pay her credit card debts and continued to gamble was found to
lack the subjective intent to defraud. Note that two credit card issuers went to the 6th Circuit for two
debts totaling $11,623.48.
In re Shartz, 221 B.R. 397 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998) followed Rembert and indicated that the
court was not going to overturn the decision ofthe bankruptcy court when the debtor, who was laid
off ran up $12,500 in debt while attempting to get a job, had not made any luxury purchases and
had not attempted a "one last hurrah" at the creditors expense. The decision affirmed that the
creditor had failed to meet the burden of proof. Pro se Debtor.
In re Francis. 226 B.R. 385 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998) states that a general release in prepetition
settlement agreement does not release a §523(a)(2)(A) nondischargeability claim.
Many times, a creditor will initiate a civil action in state or federal court to redress damages
incurred by it due to false representation or actual fraud on the defendant's part. The reaction to a
judgment favorable to the creditor is the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The Sixth Circuit case of
In re Batie, 995 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1993) addresses this. If the issue of fraud is properly determined
in the civil action, then the debtor could be collaterally estopped from relitigating this case in the
bankruptcy arena. A creditor can plead its civil judgment as collateral estoppel against the debtor
in the adversary proceeding filed under §523.
Likewise, there are several cases decided by the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District
of Kentucky in this area. A debtor's sale of stock that he did not own led to an adverse decision for
the debtor in the case onn re Pallo, 65 B.R. 101 (W.D. Ky. 1986). See also the cases ofIn re
Sustarich, 73 B.R. 731 (W.D. Ky. 1983); In re Tabers, 28 B.R. 679 (W.D. Ky. 1983); In re Donald,
26 B.R. 521 (W.D. Ky. 1983); and In re Fox, 13 B.R. 827 (W.D. Ky. 1982).
Note also, that a future promise to tum over a tax return is not a "false representation" or
"false pretense". In re Roeder, 61 B.R. 179 (W.D. Ky. 1986). Likewise, a promise to pay and give
creditor a lien on a replacement vehicle in the future also does not arise to the level of a
nondischargeable debt. In re Todd, 34 B.R. 633 (W.D. Ky. 1983). In both of these cases, note that
it was a future promise that was determined not to give rise to a complaint under §523(a)(2)(A).
Two cases from the Eastern District of Kentucky also shed some light on this area of the
law. In the case onn re O'Bryan, 190 B.R. 290 (E.D.Ky. 1995), Judge Howard discusses the use
of collateral estoppel from a judgment rendered in a state or federal civil action. This case also
offers an excellent discussion of the dischargeability of punitive damages. Likewise, see In re
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Parriman, 190 B.R. 88 (E.D.Ky. 1995), specifically discussing collateral estoppel from a state court
judgment.
B.

§523(a)(2)(C) - Luxury Goods
11 USC Section 523(a)(2)(C) provides as follows:
(a)

1.

A discharge under section 727,1141, 1228(a), 1228(b)or 1328(b)
of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt
-(C) for purposes. of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph,
consumer debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating more
than $1075 for "luxury goods or services" incurred by an
individual debtor on or within sixty (60) days before the order for
relief under this title (11 USCS Sections 101 et seq.), or cash
advances aggregating more than $1,075 that are extensions of
consumer credit under an open end credit plan obtained by an
individual debtor on or within sixty (60) days before the order for
reliefunderthis title (11 USCS Sections 101 et seq.), are presumed
to be nondischargeable; "luxury goods or services" do not include
goods or services reasonably acquired for the support or
maintenance of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; an
extension of consumer credit under an open end credit plan is to be
defined for purposes of this subparagraph as it is defined in the
Consumer Credit Protection Act.

Presumption Periods

J
J
J
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Many people have a basic misunderstanding of 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(C). Some creditors
feel that if they have a debt that falls within the parameters set forth in this subsection of the
Bankruptcy Code that the debt is ~ ~ nondischargeable. This is a fatal error.

J

Specifically, this subsection of the Bankruptcy Code states that consumer debts to a single
creditor aggregating more than $1,075 for a "luxury" goods or services obtained within sixty (60)
days of the filing of the bankruptcy, or cash advances exceeding $1,075 taken on a consumer credit
or open-end plan within sixty (60) days of the filing of the Bankruptcy are presumed to be
nondischargeable. This does not absolve a creditor from having to file an Adversary Proceeding in
order to determine the dischargeability of this debt. The presumption merely shifts the burden to
the debtor to prove why the debt should not be discharged.

j

11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(C) also defines luxury goods and services. These are goods and
services not reasonably required for the support or maintenance of the debtor or the debtor's
dependents. Such examples would be lavish vacations, a gambling binge, mink 'Coats, travel trailers,
etc.

C.

§523(a)(2)(B) - Use Of A False Statement In Writing
11 USC Section 523(a)(2)(B) provides as follows:
(a)

A discharge under section 727,1141, 1228(a), 1228 (b), or 1328(b)
of this title does not disc~arge an individual debtor from any debt

F-6
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(2)

for money, property, services or an extension, renewal or
refinancing of credit, to the extent by -

(B)

use of a statement in writing (i)
(ii)
(iii)

(iv)

that is materially false;
respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial
condition;
on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable
for such money, property, services, or credit
reasonably relied; and
that the debtor caused to be made or published
with intent to deceive.

In order to maintain an action under this provision of the Bankruptcy Code, a creditor must
prove five (5) elements:

1.

The statement must be in writing,

2.

It must be materially false,

3.

Respecting a debtor's or insider's financial condition,

4.

Upon which the creditor extending the credit reasonably rei ied, and

5.

Published by the debtor with the intent to deceive.

r

Note the material difference now between the cases filed under §523(a)(2)(A) and
§523(a)(2)(B). Under §523(a)(2)(A), a creditor can show "justifiable reliance". Cases filed under
§S23(a)(2)(B) must show "reasonable reliance", which is, in the author's opinion, a higher standard.

r
r
r

Note also that the statement in writing must be materially false. In other words, had the
written statement been properly completed, would the creditor have still made the loan to the debtor?

r
r
r
r
r

Proof ofthis element is often difficult. Hopefully, the financial institution has well-written
lending policies. Many times, those lending policies dictate certain debt-to-income ratios which
must be met before the loan is to be made. Ideally, a creditor could show that if debts omitted from
a financial statement had been properly listed, then the ratios would have been exceeded and the loan
not made. The author would submit that the creditor has gone a long way towards meeting this
burden of proof.
Additionally, was the reliance by the creditor "reasonable"? In other words, did the creditor
have another means by which to secure the information omitted from the financial statement?
It is common, almost to the point of being required, that a creditor show that it ran a credit
bureau report or Dun & Bradstreet report prior to the extension of credit to an individual. Of course,
the credit bureau report must be run at the time of the taking of the application, or soon thereafter,
but before the decision to loan the money has been made.

If the debts omitted from the application appear on the credit bureau report, then the
creditor's case will not be persuasive. The Court could hold that creditor had another means to
ascertain this information, and it is "reasonable" to expect creditor to do so.
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However, creditors would be surprised at the number of financial institutions that do not
report to the credit bureau. If the debts were not listed on the application and did not appear on the
credit bureau report, then the creditor has gone a long way toward proving this necessary element.
The most difficult of these elements to prove is "intent to deceive". Any requirement to
prove such a "state of mind" makes these cases difficult to prosecute. Such intent must be shown
by circumstantial evidence, as it is rare that a debtor will ever admit that he meant to deceive the
creditor.
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Many times, the false statement comes in the nature of grossly understating living expenses
or grossly overstating income. As concerns the living expenses, it is very important for a creditor
to conduct the proper discovery to ascertain whether the debtor purposefully understated living
expenses in order to meet minimum requirements of the creditor in order to make the loan.

j

Remember, each debtor must file a Schedule I and J with their petition. Schedule I lists the
debtors' income and Schedule J lists their expenditures. A creditor would be well-advised to review
the Schedule J with the debtors to see if their living expenses have changed greatly from the time
they made application for credit.
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Additionally, see if such a budget were taken at the time of the application for the loan .
. Compare the two and-try to ascertain the nature of any significant differences.
Also examine the Schedule I very closely. Has the debtor suddenly claimed a number of
exemptions in order to artificially create a large tax refund atthe end of the year? Is there overtime
or other income that appeared on the debtor's original application that do not appear on the Schedule
J? Did the debtor's income depend largely upon commissions and that was not revealed in the
application? Does the application reveal a second source of income not listed on the Schedule I?
One point of inquiry from the Court will be whether a creditor attempted to verify a debtor's
employment. In other words, did they ask for a pay stub or contact the debtor's payroll department
upon application for credit? If a creditor simply took the word of a debtor, then the reasonable
reliance requirement may not have been met.
1.

Case Law: §523(a)(2)(B)

Like §523(a)(2)(A), the burden of proof is the preponderance of the evidence. See the
Grogan and McLaren cases cited above. There are a number of cases from the Sixth Circuit which
provide examples of what types of false writings have been determined actionable: Coman v.
Phillips, 804 F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1986) [false representation of acreage in deed held reasonable so
debt discharged], But see, Knoxville Teachers Credit Union v. Parkey, 790 F .2d 490 (6th Cir. 1986)
[misrepresentation of liabilities grossly reckless and debt determined to be nondischargeable].
"Extension of credit" includes a fraudulently obtained promise to forbear collection. As a
result an otherwise dischargeable debt can become nondischargeable even though the creditor did
not suffer any damage as a result of the forbearance. In re Campbell, 159 F .3d 963 (6th Cir. 1998).
The case onn re Woollums, 979 F.2d 71 (6th Cir.1992) is also very instructive. There, an
incomplete, unsigned and erroneous financial statement was submitted to a creditor. Later, when
the debtor filed bankruptcy, the creditor moved to hold the debt nondischargeable pursuant to
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§523(a)(2)(B).
The bankruptcy court ruled against the debtor, but the district court reversed. The district
court found that there was no way that any competent financial institution could reasonably rely
upon such a poorly-completed financial statement. The standard to be applied is to safeguard against
a creditor acting in bad faith. In other words, it would not be fair for a creditor, on one hand, to
accept so deficient a financial statement and then use the same financial statement as grounds for
holding the debt nondischargeable. Creditors have to play by the rules. The Sixth Circuit reinstated
the bankruptcy court decision denying dischargeability to the two loans. It determined that
reasonable reliance should not allow the court to undertake subjective evaluation and judgment of
a lenders policies and practices.
Another interesting case is that onn re Martin, 761 F.2d 1163 (6th Cir. 1985). Generally,
11 U .S.C. §506(b) will allow a creditor to recover reasonable fees (attorney fees) and costs provided
that the creditor is oversecured. The value of its collateral must exceed the debt.
However, the Sixth Circuit found that the creditor was entitled to an award of attorney fees
based on its contract only. Here, the contract called for the recovery of attorney fees in the
collection of a debt. It was this clause that the Court focused on, not simply §506. The Court
allowed for the recovery ofthe attorney fees despite creditor's undersecured status. Creditors should
use this case when filing any case under §523 for the proposition that it should be allowed to collect
its attorney fees.
In the Eastern District of Kentucky there appears to be only one case on the court's web site
which discusses §523(a)(2)(B). It is Judge Lee's 1990 decision in In re Snyder, Adv. No. 84-0151
(Bankr. E. D. Ky. 1990). The debtor prevailed when the creditorwas unable to meet the burden of
proof as to reliance and intent to deceive.
There are a litany of cases decided under §523(a)(2)(B) from the Western District of
Kentucky. Note that the holding in some ofthe cases from the Western District of Kentucky could
now be different since the standard of proof has changed. Prior to the Grogan' case, the standard of
proof was clear and convincing. It would be interesting to try to determine whether the holdings in
any of these cases would have changed under the new preponderance of the evidence standard.
In the case onn re Rosel, 63 B.R. 603 (W.D. Ky. 1986), a debtor understated his debts by
$20,000 and overstated his income by $21,000. Additionally, his assets were overstated by $20,000
for a total of $61 ,000. In reviewing the case, the Court found that the reliance on this statement by
the creditor was so outrageous that the reliance was not deemed to be "reasonable". The debt was
discharged.
In the case onn re Bridges, 51 B.R. 85 (W.D. Ky. 1985), a creditor was denied the relief
it sought in its Adversary Complaint because it failed to verify the information in the written
statement (application). This is a lesson well taught and the author would refer the reader to the
discussion ofthis subject above.
Where a bank was actually aware ofthe debtor's financial condition, reliance on a financial
statement was not reasonable. See In re Duncan, 35 B.R. 323 (W.D. Ky. 1983). Likewise, see In
re Whitehouse, 26 B.R. 239 (W.D. Ky. 1982) to again show how a bank failed to show reasonable
reliance. The author would also refer the reader to the case onn re Perez, 52 B.R. 824 (W.D. Ky.
1985) and In re Peterson, 49 B.R. 1 (W.D. Ky. 1984).
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While not a case out of the Western District or Sixth Circuit, recommended reading would
be the case orIn re Rickey, 8 B.R. 860 (M.D. Fl. 1981). As stated above, "intent to deceive" is
probably the most difficult element to prove when trying to make a case under §523(a)(2)(B). The
Rickey Court held that intent can be shown by:
1. False statement made by the debtor with actual knowledge it was false,
2. Made with reckless indifference to the truth,
3. Made by the debtor without checking sources readily available to him,
4. Madewithout reasonable grounds to believe it was true.
This sentiment is echoed in the Knoxville Teachers Credit Union v. Parkey case, supra.
D.

Unjustified 523(a)(2) Claims

Creditors should not loosely file cases under §523(a)(2). §523(d) does allow a consumer
debtor to petition the Court for costs and reasonable attorney fees from a creditor if that creditor files
an action under §523(a)(2) and loses. To do so, the Court must show that the creditor's position was
not substantially justified unless special circumstances exist that would make the award unjust. See
In re Carmen, 723 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1983).
This is why the author advocates taking a Bankruptcy Rule 2004 exam prior to the fi ling of
a suit. The evidence adduced at that examination will determine whether your lawsuit is viable. As
long as the creditor feels, after that examination, that its position would be substantially justified,
an award under §523(d) should not be forthcoming. Unless such an examination is performed or
deposition taken, a creditor may find the insult of defeat compounded by the injury of an award of
attorney fees and costs against it.
E.
§523(a)(6) Willful And Malicious Injury [Conversion; Assault and Battery; Breach of
Contract]
11 USC Section 523(a)(6) provides as follows:
(a)

A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b),or 1328(b)
of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt
(6)

for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another
entity or to the property of another entity.

A cause ofaction under this Bankruptcy Code section usually entails the debtor's conversion
of property given as collateral on a creditor's loan. A small primer on secured transactions (Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code) is appropriate at this juncture.
Remember that perfection of a security interest is a notice provision only. In other words,
the security interest is still valid as between the creditor and the debtor. Lack of perfection affects
third parties only. A Trustee in bankruptcy, a bona fide purchaser for value or an intervening lien
creditor may have rights superior to the unperfected lien creditor. However, the creditor's rights are
still superior to the debtor's. This lack of perfection does not invalidate this separate contract (a
security agreement) between the debtor and creditor that the property will stand as collateral for the
loan.
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If a debtor sells a creditor's collateral in derogation of a security agreement, what is the
measure of damages? The answer in the Western District of Kentucky seems to be the value ofthe
property so converted. See In re Thomas, 36 B.R. 851 (W.D. Ky. 1984) [value of automobile
converted]; and In re Stevens, 26 B.R. 389 (W.O. Ky. 1983) [sum for which property was sold].
However, there is another case holding that the entire amount of the debt, not just the value
ofthe collateral converted, is the measure of damages. See Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank v. Case,
755 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir. 1985). Since the Birmingham Trust case was decided after these two cases
from the Western District, the issue of the measure of damages may need to be revisited.
In order to sustain a case under §523(a)(6), a creditor must prove that the injury was both
"willful" and "malicious". Willful has been defined as deliberate and intentional. See In re Thomas,
supra at 853; Wheelerv. Laundani, 783 F.2d 610 (6th Cir. 1986); and In re Bex, 143 B.R. 835 (E.D.
Ky. 1992).
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 118 S.Ct. 974,140 L. Ed 2d 90 (1998) has changed the
landscape for "willful and malicious" because the proof must establish that the actor "desires to
cause the consequences of his act, or ... believes that the consequences are substantially certain to
result from it." In Geiger the court held that a medical malpractice judgment based upon negligent
or reckless conduct could not be the basis for a §523(a)(6) nondischargeable debt. The Eighth
Circuit held that the debtor cannot just intend to do the act but must also intend the consequences
of the act and the Supreme Court affirmed ..

1.

Case Law: §523(a)(6)

The ability to sustain a case under §523(a)(6) is very fact-intensive. For instance, in In re
. Hawkins, supra, the Court found no malice since the· debtor gave the creditor $188 of the $300
actually received for the sale of the car. The debt was allowed to be discharged.

The most recent Sixth Circuit case is that of In re Markowitz, 190 Fjd 455 (6th Cir. 1999).
Neither the jury verdict for legal malpractice nor the state court' refusal to submit a special
interrogatory has collateral estoppel effect. Plaintiff obtained a prepetition legal malpractice
jUdgment against the debtor for negligence. Collateral estoppel is applicable if "(1) the law of
collateral estoppel in the state in which the issue was litigated would preclude relitigation of such
issue, and (2) the issue was fully and fairly litigated in state court." Michigan law uses collateral
estoppel when "the prior proceeding culminated in a valid, final judgment and the issue was actually
litigated and necessarily determined... An issue is actually litigated if it is put into issue by the
pleadings, submitted to the trier offact and determined by the trier offact.. .. The jury verdict did not
actually decide the issue of willful and malicious injury; it was not actually litigated." (Emphasis
added). The more important use of Markowitz is its new definition of "willful and malicious" taken
from Geiger, supra, to require "the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or ... believes that
the consequences are substantially certain to result from it". The court declared that Perkins v.
Scharffe, 817 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1987) was overruled by the Supreme Court in Kawaauhau v. Geiger,
523 U.S. 57, 118 S.Ct. 974, 140 L.Ed2d 90 (1998). The court sent back a judgment against an
attorney as not establishing willful and malicious injury even though the attorney had admitted that
he knew that failure to file an answer would result in a default judgment.
However, in Abbo v. Rossi. McCreery & Assoc. (In re Abbo), 168 F.3d (6d' Cir. 1999) the
court found that a malicious prosecution judgment established "willful and malicious" injury for
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§523(a)(6). The jury verdict had required a finding that the defendant had acted "maliciously".
Spring Works. Inc. v. Sarff (In re Sarff), 242 B.R. 620 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2000) held that a
state court judgment for breach of covenant not to compete, breach of contract, breach of duty of
loyalty, misappropriation of trade secrets and intentional interference with business relations is
nondischargeable under 523(a)(6). The debtor was found guilty of intending to cause injury by
taking customers from former employer. Reliance on advice of counsel can be a defense to
523(a)(6) action but the reliance must be reasonable. Continuing to violate an injunction on advice
of counsel, did not allow an escape for the debtor.
.
In re Crump, 247 B.R. 1 (Bankr. W.O. Ky. 2000) granted debtor relief because his failure
to remit proceeds generated from the sale of crop in which creditor had a security interest did not
establish any intent to cause injury to the creditor. Instead, the court found that the debtor's use of
the funds in the farming operation constituted his attempt to keep the business going so the debt
could be repaid.
In the case ofIn re Cline, 52 B.R. 301 (W.D. Ky. 1985), the creditor was found to have
expressly or impliedly consented to the sale of the livestock. Since the creditor was charged with
this knowledge, there could be no malice since the creditor could not show that the debtor intended
to do harm. This debt was allowed to be discharged. For other cases involving cattle, see In re
Brame, 23 B.R. 196 (W.O. Ky. 1982), and In re Vance, 43 B.R. 99 (W.O. Ky. 1984).
In re Ouncan, 30 B.R. 754 (W.D. Ky. 1983) dealt with another livestock situation. There,
a creditor's loan was .secured by a corn crop~ The debtor used this corn to feed hogs which stood as .
security for another creditor's loan. The Court allowed this debt to be discharged because the debtor
received no pecuniary gain from the "conversion".
The author questions the holding that there was no "pecuniary gain" since the hogs had
obviously been "improved" by the use ofthe feed and the eventual sale of the hogs. Perhaps that
may lead to some suit between the respective secured creditors under a quantum meruit theory of
law. Perhaps the creditor who had the security interest in the corn could sustain such a suit against
the debtor. Reliance upon §523(a)(6) should not be blind. Common law theories such as quantum
meruit are valid in these instances.
An adjudication of such willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the
property of another entity may have been litigated previously and decided in state court. The party
prevailing in state court may be able to plead collateral estoppel to any adversary proceeding filed
in the Bankruptcy Court. See In re Stillwell, 96 B.R. 102 (W.O. Ky. 1988), and In re Davis, 23 B.R.
633 (W.D. Ky. 1982), both dealing with civil rights judgments.
There is also a line of cases dealing with assault and battery. See In re Kirby, 167 B.R. 91
(E.O. Ky. 1994) [no collateral estoppel effect given to default judgment entered in state court] See
a/so, Spillman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1981); In re Bishop, 55 B.R. 687 (W.D. Ky. 1985)
[damage sustained by a creditor after being struck in head with hammer by debtor held
nondischargeable. See the cases cited at page 688 ofthat decision]; In re Beach, 39 B.R. 56 (W.O.
Ky. 1984) [damages sustained by a waitress shot in bar fight held nondischargeable. See footnote
1 at page 56 of that decision for other cases]; In re Thompson, 39 B.R. 270 (W.O. Ky. 1984) [since
no punitive damages were awarded in state court, the Court did not allow collateral estoppel and
allowed the debtto be discharged]. Conpare In re Cooney, 8 B.R. 76 (W.D. Ky. 1980) [where debt
held nondischargeable with!!Q award of punitive damages].
The case onn re Daniels, 130 B.R. 239 (E.O. Ky. 1991) dealt with a reclamation obligation.
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There, the Court held that obligations requiring an expenditure of money by the creditor were
dischargeable. However, damages occasioned by illegal surface coal mining activities were
nondischargeable.
The case orIn re Oruen, 121 B.R. 509 (W.O. Ky. 1990) deals with the issue of lapsed
automobile insurance. There, the Court held that while a knowing failure to secure automobile
insurance could be determined willful, it was not malicious so the debt was allowed to be
discharged. For those of you with under age drivers, you can rest easy knowing that if your
insurance lapses or is not in effect and your child causes injury to a third party, you can file
bankruptcy and the injured party cannot use §523(a)(6) to attempt to declare the debt
nondischargeable as to you. In re Bex, 143 B.R. 835 (Bankr. E.D.Ky. 1992).
However, the author would remind the reader that any damages resulting from death or
personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated gives rise to
a cause ofaction under §523(a)(9). Unlike causes of action under §523(a)(6), causes of action under
(a)(9) are mll:~ nondischargeable. See also, In re Bex, 143 B.R. 835 (E.O. Ky. 1992) which again
found that lack of insurance did not rise to the level of being willful so the debt was allowed to be
discharged.
For miscellaneous other causes of action under §523(a)(6), see In re Smith, 95 B.R. 473
(W.O. Ky. 1988) [state court jury instruction focused on a "wanton and reckless", not "willful and
malicious" standard]; In re Howard, 946 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir. 1991) [since guarantor personally
participated in conversion, debt held nondischargeable] and In re Stevens, 26 B.R. 389 (W.O. Ky.
1983) [sale of musical instruments].
The key in any case filed under §523(a)(6) is to focus on the direction given in the cases
cited above to establish that the injury is "willful and malicious". Bringing your cause of action
within the ambit of these definitions is critical.
11 U.S.C.§523(a)(7):

F.

" ... for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental
unit, ... not for compensation of actual pecuniary loss, other than tax penalty .... "
In re Maxwell, 229 B.R. 400 (Bankr. W.O. Ky. 1998) held costs incurred for debtor's
incarceration are nondischargeable under §523(a)(7).
In re Ray, 240 B.R. 260 (Bankr. W.O. Ky. 1999) held restitution adjudged as condition for
probation would be nondischargeable under §523 (a)(7) even though payable to the victim in amount
of damages suffered by the victim ($1800 property damage on charge of wanton endangerment).
Court said that Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986) mandates that "any condition a state criminal
court imposes as part of a criminal sentence" is nondischargeable under 523 (a)(7).
G.

§523(a)(8) - Student Loans

11 USC Section 523(a)(8) provides as follows:
(a)

A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b)
of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt

(8)
for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made,
insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit or made under any program
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funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or a nonprofit institution,
or for an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit,
scholarship or stipend, unless excepting such debt from discharge under
this paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the
debtor's dependents.
Note: Effective for all cases filed after October 8, 1998, there is no longer a period of
time after which the debt can be discharged. For cases filed before October 8, 1998, a student
loan could be discharged if consolidated loan first became due more than seven years before filing
of bankruptcy. Debtor argued 7 year period should run from date on which original loan matured.
Rudnicki v. Southern College ofOptometrv (In re Rudnickil, 28 B.R. 179 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999)
Unlike the other causes of action discussed to this point, this is an Adversary Proceeding
filed by the debtor seeking to discharge a student loan. Unless the debtor moves to have the student
loan debt declared dischargeable, it is 3!: ~ nondischargeable.
Since it is the debtor seeking the relief in the Adversary Proceeding, the burden of proof here
is on the debtor. See B.R. 4005. The standard ofthe burden of proof is by the preponderance of the
evidence. See Grogan v. Garner, supra.
In order to sustain his burden of proof, the debtor must show that
requiring the debtor
to pay this obligation will impose an undue hardship on the debtor or the debtor's dependents ..
Note also thatthe debtor must show that this is an educational loan (a) insured or guaranteed
by a governmental unit, or (b) made under a program funded by a governmental unit or nonprofit
institution. The definition of nonprofit institution is a subject of discussion when it comes to credit
unions.
There was an apparent split of authority over whether a credit union was a "nonprofit
organization" and thus whether student loans made by it would enjoy the protection of §523(a)(8).
The case of In re Roberts, 149 B.R. 547 (C.D. Ill. 1993) found credit unions to be nonprofit
organizations. Two other cases that should be examined are the In re Sinclair-Ganos, 133 B.R. 382
(Bankr. W.O. Mich. 1991) and In re Simmons, 1995 B.R. 624 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994), which are
both cited in the Roberts opinion.
Coming to the same holding, i.e., student loans made by credit unions enjoy the protections
under §523(a)(8), but by a different means, is the case ofT! Federal Credit Union v. Delbonis, 72
F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1995). Here, the Court found not that the credit union was a nonprofit
organization, but was a governmental unit. Note that this holding applies to federal credit unions,
only.
Given the apparent split in the Circuits on the issue of what constitutes a "nonprofit
organization", the author surmises that this battle will rage on.
1.

Case Law: §S23(a)(8)

The seminal case on student loans from the Western District of Kentucky is In re
Berthiaume, 138 B.R. 516 (W.O. Ky. 1992). The Berthiaume Court examined the dischargeability
of a student loan under a tripartite test: (1) the mechanical test, (2) the good faith test, and (3) the
policy test.
The mechanical test examines whether the debtor's financial resources in the foreseeable
future are sufficient to allow the debtor to live at a subsistence level while repaying the student loan.
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"Subsistence level" is usually equated with the poverty level. Poverty level statistics for a
given year can be obtained in the Federal Register. For current figures, you may contact the Federal
Information Center at (800) 688-9889 or try the Department of Health and Human Services at (202)
690-6141.
The "good faith test" examines whether the debtor has made a bona fide attempt to find a
good-paying job, maximize financial resources and minimize expenses. This should be a point of
inquiry by a student loan creditor at the discovery level, both in the form of a Request for Production
of Documents and questions to be asked at a Rule 2004 exam or a deposition. The debtor should
be examined concerning the Schedules I and J filed with the petition concerning income and
expenses. Debtor should also produce copies of any resumes, letters, letters of rejection from
potential employers, etc. to sustain the debtor's burden of proof under this test.
Lastly, the "policy test" examines whether the debtor's motivation in filing the bankruptcy
was the type of abuse that §523(a)(8)(B) was enacted to prevent. Some of the questions that will
be asked by the Court are:

rt

(a)

How much time expired between the date the loan was taken and
the bankruptcy filed?

r
r
r

(b)

How much time expired between when the debtor graduated from
school and the bankruptcy was filed?

(c)

What percentage of overall debt does the educational loan
comprise?

(d)

What sort of degree did the debtor get?

(e)

What benefit did the debtor derive from the education?

r
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Pursuant to Berthiaume, the foreseeable future is 10 years. The debtor must show that his financial
condition will not improve over the next 10 years in order to allow some small payment to the
creditor.

While not specifically made a part of the statute, there seems to be ajudicial sentiment that
the debtor must have received some benefit from the education. That benefit would include not only
the education that the debtor received, i.e., did it make the debtor more employable, but also what
assistance the school rendered in helping the debtor find employment.
The author has been involved in several Adversary Proceedings dealing with "trade
schools". In those cases where the "trade school" did nothing to make the debtor more employable,
nor provided any assistance in order to help the debtor secure employment, the author's "batting
average" has been less than enviable.
The "hardship" that must be endured by the debtor is not the "garden variety hardship" or
"unpleasantness". Berthiaume at 521. In other words, the Court will require the debtors to "tighten
up the purse strings" before they will be afforded the relief sought under §523(a)(8). An
examination of the debtor's present financial condition and potential future employability is a
requirement for litigation under this Code section. The Bertiaume court did find that while the
husband failed to meet the test, his wife's health problems were sufficient to allow her student loans
to be discharged.
The case onn re Cheesman, 25 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S 1081, 115
S.Ct. 731, 130 L.Ed. 2d 634 (1995) allows the Court to be imaginative in crafting its relief. Here,
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the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower Court's decision to defer final ruling on the dischargeability of
the debt for 18 months. This was done to see if the debtor's circumstances would change and
whether undue hardships still existed. It exercised the Court's equitable powers under §10S(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code in order to shape this relief.
The latitude evinced by the Sixth Circuit allows the parties to be imaginative in any
settlement negotiations. Deferment of payments, "stepped up payments" in recognition of potential
increases in income,judicial reexamination of the debtor's financial condition, etc., are all tools to
be used in crafting a settlement of cases filed under §S23(a)(8). Options allowed in the following
cases:
1. Wait 18 months or 2 years and require the debtor to advise of change
of circumstances before the court will rule on the adversary. In re
Cheesman, supra.

2.
Repayment and accrual of interest deferred for 2 years.
Dennehy, 201 B.R. 1008 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1996).

In re

3. Loan not dischargeable, but repayment deferred for 6 months while
debtor gets settled in new job or obtains stable employment. In re
O'Donnell, 198 B.R.l (Bankr. N.H. 1996).

J
J
J
J
j

J
J
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4. Each loan considered separately for S23(a)(8) purposes. Therefore,
bankruptcy court can discharge two loans and declare one loan
nondischargeable. In re Andresen, 232 B.R. 127 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999).
S. In re Hornsby, 144 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 1998) said debtors not entitled
to discharge but § 1OS would allow bankruptcy court to consider some
amount less than full amount to be declared dischargeable. Debtors had not
minimized expenses, were above poverty level, had $200 per month surplus
income, and had never paid the first penny on the $30,000.00 student loans.

H.

§S23(a)(S) And (1S) - Obligations Incident To A Divorce
11 USC Section S23(a)(S) provides as follows:
(a)

A discharge under section 727,1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b)
of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt
(S)

to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for
alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or
child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce
decree or other order of a court of record, determination
made in accordance with State or territorial law by a
governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but
not to the extent that (A)

such debt is assigned to another entity,
voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise
(other than debts assinged pursuant to section

F-16

j

J
J
j

1

.J

J
j

.

J

,.
i

r
r
I

r
r

408(a)(3) of the Social Security Act, or any such
debt which has been assigned to the Federal
Government or to a State or any political
subdivision of such State); or
(B)
such debt includes a liability designated as
alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such
liability is actually in the nature of alimony,
maintenance, or support.
In addition, 11 USC Section 523(a)(IS) provides as follows:
(a)

!

r

r

A discharge under section 727,1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b)
of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt
- (15) not of the kind described in paragraph (5) that is incurred
by the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or in
connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other
order of a court of record, a determination made in accordance
with State or territorial law by a governmental unit unless -

(A)

the debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt from
income or property ofthe debtor not reasonably necessary
to be expended for the maintenance or support of the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor and, if the debtor is
engaged in a business, for the payment of expenditures
necessary for the continuation, preservation, and operation
of such business; or

(B)

discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the
debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to a
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor.
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The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 introduced 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(15) into the Bankruptcy
Code. The Bankruptcy Courts in Kentucky have not been spared from the furor that this section has
caused. For an exhaustive examination of both §523(a)(5) and (a)(15), the author recommends the
excellent article authored by C.R. (Chip) Bowles, former law clerk to the Honorable Judge Henry
Dickinson, Bankruptcy Judge for the Western District of Kentucky. Mr. Bowles analyzes this
situation in his usual replete style and would answer many of the questions merely raised by this
article. It can be found in 34 U.L.J. Fam. L. 521 (1996).
If an obligation incident to a divorce falls under the mantle of §523(a)(S), it is deemed
automatically nondischargeable, that is, no Adversary Proceeding has to be filed. Included in that
genre of obligations are debts to a spouse, former spouse or child of a debtor for:

(a)

Alimony to,

r

(b)

Maintenance for,

(c)

Support of such spouse or child,

r
r

(d)

In connection with a Separation Agreement, Divorce Decree or
other Order of a Court of record, or

(e)

A Property Settlement Agreement.

r
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Excepted from this group of automatically nondischargeable debts are any debts to the
extent that:
(a)

The debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by the operation
of law or otherwise [unless it is a debt assigned under the Social
Security Act, §408(a)(3)] or any debt assigned to the federal
government, state or any political subdivision of the state.

In other words, the debt actually has to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support.
A practice tip to remember when the state comes to collect for medical expenses incurred for the
mother and child. In re Lambdin, Adv. 97-6035 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1998) held that if the parent was
not married to the mother, the state can only collect as a nondischargeable debt the amount of
medical expenses incurred for the child and the DNA testing to determine paternity. The mother's
medical expenses are dischargeable. The reader should examine the cases of Fitzgerald v.
Fitzgerald, 9 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 1993) and Long v. Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983) for the
tests used to determine whether the debt is in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support.
The author would note that the Calhoun decision does represent the minority view by
allowing a Bankruptcy Court to inquire into the party's changed financial conditions. Other courts,
including the Second, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, have specifically rejected the Calhoun analysis.
See Forsdick v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801 (2nd Cir. 1987); In re Draper, 7790 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1986);
and In re Harrell, 754 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1985).
. Calhoun was further explicated by the holdingofthe case onn re Fitzgerald, 9 F 3d 517 (6th
Cir. 1993). At page 520 of its decision, the Court held that:
The applicability of Calhoun, especially the second step's "present needs"
inquiry, to support obligations other than assumptions of debt have been
the source of some confusion in the lower courts of this circuit.
This comment is especially pertinent since the author ofthe Fitzgerald decision was also the
author of the Calhoun decision. Specifically, Judge Kennedy stated, again at page 520 of the
decision, that:
The writer regrets that it [Calhoun] has been applied more broadly than
intended. Fortunately, a majority of courts in other circuits have rejected
the "present needs" test when applied to alimony or child support.
Indeed, this seems to overrule that portion of Calhoun that will go behind the divorce decree.
Instead, the Court now seems to focus on the intent of the parties at the time of the divorce, and does
not focus on the "present needs" at the time ofthe filing ofthe bankruptcy. The "present needs" test
has been criticized on many grounds opining that it permits undue federal interference with a state
Court's domestic authority.
Additionally, it has been held that the "present needs" analysis punishes a non-debtor's
spouse who has struggled to become self-supporting. It would result in the discharge of an
overwhelming high number of support obligations simply because a non-bankrupt, ex-spouse has
become self-reliant by the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. At page 521 of the decision,
Judge Kennedy states:
Calhoun was not intended to intrude into the state's traditional authority
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over domestic relations and the risk of injustice to the non-debtor spouse
or children.
With that being said, the state of the law in the Sixth Circuit is, generally, that if the divorce
decree specifically states that the award was for alimony, maintenance or support, the Court should
not go behind that finding to challenge the intent of the parties at the time of the filing of the divorce
decree. With all that being said, how does that impact §S23(a)(1S)?
.
Section S23(a)(IS) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the debtor will not be allowed to
discharge debts ofthe kind described in §S23(a)(S) incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce
or separation or in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other Order of the
Court of record unless the debtor can show one of the following:

i

a.

The debtor does not have the ability to pay the debt from income
or property of the debtor not reasonably necessary to be expended
for the maintenance or support of the debtor or dependent of the
debtor. If the debtor is engaged in business, then the debtor must
show that paying these debts would endanger the continuation,
preservation or operation of such business; or

b.

discharging the debt would result in a benefit to the debtor that
outweighs the detrimental consequences to the spouse, former
spouse or child of the debtor.
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I.

Case Law: §§S23(a)(S) and (15)

In re Sorah. 163 F.3d 397 (6 th Cir. 1998) found that a "label such alimony, support or
maintenance in the decree or agreement" is one of three "traditional state law indices" which
produce a "conclusive presumption" of support and shift the burden of proof.
In re Molino, 225 B.R. 904 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998) "If debtor's standard of living will fall
materially below the creditor's standard of living if the debt is not discharged, then the debt should
be discharged". Eleven nonexclusive factors to consider.(They are same as in Smither, infra) Ability
to pay considers debtor's prior, current and future prospects as well as debtor's voluntary removal
of self from the job market or purposeful underemployment. Fact intensive and balance of factors
required. Debtor had $48,000 annual income before divorce, now claiming income of $50 to $90
per week. Former spouse paid $22,434 to creditors which was subject to hold harmless clause and
debtor could repay over several years on manageable terms. Note the burden of proofthat the debt
fits §S23(a)(IS) is on the creditor. But the burden of proof to establish the defenses to
dischargeability are on the debtor.
In the case ofIn re Smither, 194 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996), Judge Dickinson held
that a debtor's obligation to pay his ex-wife's attorney fees was nondischargeable under §S23(a)( 15) .
as being in the nature of support. Additionally, the Court held that the equalization of the debtor's
marital property obligation was also nondischargeable. Any decision under §S23(a)(l 5) is extremely
fact-specific, and the author would refer the reader to this opinion for the details surrounding the
Court's holding. Debtor has ability to pay ifhe can pay "all or a material part ... within a reasonable
amount of time." The eleven non-exclusive factors he considered were:
1. Amount of debt, including payment terms

r
r
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2. Current income ofthe debtor, objecting creditor and their respective spouses
3. Current expenses of debtor, objecting creditor and their respective spouses
4. Current assets, including exempt assets of the debtor, objecting creditor,
and their respective spouses
5. Current liabilities, excluding those discharged by debtor's bankruptcy,
of the debtor, objecting creditor and their respective spouses
6. Health,job skills, training, age and education of the debtor, objecting creditor
and their respective spouses
7. Dependents of the debtor, objecting creditor, and their spouses, their ages and
any special needs which they may have
8. Any changes in the financial conditions of the debtor and the objecting creditor
which may have occurred since the entry of the divorce decree
9. Amount of debt which has been or will be discharged in the bankruptcy
10. Whether creditor is eligible for relief under the Bankruptcy Code
11. Whether the parties have acted in good faith in the filing of the bankruptcy and
the litigation of the 11 U.S.C.§S23(a)(IS) issues.
Judge Dickinson's analysis has been approved in an the unpublished decision of the Sixth
Circuit, In re Patterson, 132 F.3d 33 (6 th Cir. 1997) and in the BAP decision in Molino, supra.
For those in the Eastern District of Kentucky, the Hon. Judge William S. Howard has
rendered an opinion in In re Owens, 191 B.R. 669 (Bankr. E.D. Ky., 1996). Here, the Court held that
the debtor was required to continue making payments on a loan for a motor vehicle driven by the
former spouse as discharging the same would result in a benefit to the debtor that would outweigh
the detrimental consequences to the spouse.
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Note however that the court held that a debtor's obligation under a property settlement
agreement to pay debts on a note did not come within the discharge exception given the absence of
hold-harmless language. This sentiment is common amongst other Courts in exam ining the situation
of the hold-harmless language. See also, In re Richardson, 212 B.R. 842 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1997)
where court found that debtto debtor's ex-spouse's mother was dischargeable because there was no
hold harmless language.

J

It is interesting to note that in determining whether the debtor had the ability to pay debts
owed to his ex-spouse, the Court in Owens would not consider payments being made by the debtor
on a note secured by the residence of the debtor's mother. The Court held that these payments were
not reasonably necessary to be expended for maintenance or support of the debtor or debtor's
dependent and therefore could not be considered in determining whether the debtor lacked the abil ity
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to pay such debts from his own income or property. Attorneys filing §523(a)(15) cases in "the
Eastern District of Kentucky are advised to read In re Owens as the Court's analysis under the case
is very complete and well-written.
In re Milburn, 218 B.R. 862 (Bankr. W.O. Ky. 1998) provides an example of how not to
litigate in state court and expect to come to bankruptcy court and re-litigate. If the ex-spouse
attempts to litigate in state court over a debt that the debtor believes was discharged, the debtor must
immediately remove the matter to the bankruptcy court.
A very recent decision, In re Romer, 254 B.R. 207 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000), determined that
the ability to pay would not include consideration of the funds the debtor was spending to support
his live in girl friend nor the funds he was spending on his adult children.

In a decision by a district court, In re Cameron, 243 B.R. 117 (M.D.Ala. 1999), the court
determined that the bankruptcy judge should not consider the IRS guidelines for expenses in
determining ability to pay, but instead should use the actual expenses, to the extent they were
reasonably necessary and make that determination as of the time of trial. The court suggested the
chapter 13 "disposable income" analysis would work well in this context.
I.

The Automatic Stay And §523 Judgment Collection

One last aside. The Sixth Circuit held in the case ofln re Embry, 10 F 3d 401 (6th Cir.
1993) that itis!lQ! necessary for a creditor to seek relief from the §362 Automatic Stay to pursue
collection of a judgment entered in a nondischargeability suit pursuant to §523. A determination
by the court that the debt is nondischargeable terminates the stay as to that particular debt. This
allows a creditor to begin collection actions immediately.

IV.

11 U.S.C. §727 - DENIAL OF DISCHARGE
11 USC Section 727(a) provides as follows:
(a)

The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless (1)

the debtor is not an individual;

(2)

the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a
creditor or an officer ofthe estate charged with custody of
property under this title [11 USCA Sections 101 et seq.],
has transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or
concealed, or has permitted to be transferred, removed,
destroyed, mutilated, or concealed-

,

r

r
r

(A)

(3)

property ofthe debtor, within one year before the
date of the filing of the petition; or
(B)
property of the estate, after the date of the filing
of the petition;
the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified,
or failed to keep or preserve any recorded information,

r
".
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including books, documents, records, and papers, from
which the debtor's financial condition or business
transactions might be ascertained, unless such act or
failure to act was justified under all of the circumstances
of the case;
(4)

the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in connection with
the case(A)
(B)
(C)

(5)

(6)

made a false oath or account;
presented or used a false claim;
gave, offered, received, or attempted to obtain
money, property, or advantage, or a promise of
money, property, or advantage, for acting or
forbearing to act; or
(D)
withheld from an officer of the estate entitled to
possession under this title [11 USCS Sections 101
et seq.], any recorded information, including
books, documents, records, and papers, relating to
the debtor's property or financial affairs;
the debtor has failed to explain satisfactorily, before
determination of denial of discharge under this paragraph,
any loss of assets or deficiency of assets to meet the
debtor's liabilities;
the debtor has refused, in the case to obey any lawful order of the court, other than
an order to respond to a material question or to
testify;
(B)
on the ground of privilege against
self-incrimination, to respond to a material
question approved by the court or to testify, after
the debtor has been granted immunity with respect
to the matter concerning which such privilege was
invoked; or
(C)
on a ground other than the properly invoked
privilege against self-incrimination, to respond to
a material question approved by the court or to
testify;
the debtor has committed any act specified in paragraph
(2), (3), (4), (5), or (6) of this subsection, on or within one
year before the date of the filing of the petition, or during
the case, in connection with another case, under this title
[11 USCA Sections 101 et seq.] or under the Bankruptcy
Act, concerning an insider;

(A)

(7)

(8)

the debtor has been granted a discharge under this section,
under section 1141 of this title [11 USCS Section 1141],
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or under section 14,371, or 476 of the Bankruptcy Act, in
a case commenced within six years before the date of the
filing of the petition;

r

r

(9)
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100 percent of the allowed unsecured claims in
such case; or
(B)
(i)
70 percent of such claims; and
(ii) the plan was proposed by the debtor in good
faith,
and was the debtor's best effort; or
the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed
by the debtor after the order for relief under this chapter.
11 USCS Sections 701 et seq.
(A)

,

r

the debtor has been granted a discharge under section 1228
or 1328 of this title or under 660 or 661 of the Bankruptcy
Act [11 USCS Sections 1060, 1061], in a case
commenced within six years before the date of the filing
of the petition, unless payments under the plan in such
case totaled at least -

(10)

An Adversary Proceeding seeking to deny the debtor's discharge must be distinguished from
an attempt to dismiss the debtor's bankruptcy petition, in its entirety, under §707. Dismissals under
§707 cannot be at the request or suggestion ofa creditor. 11 U.S.C. §707(S). Additionally, the legal
grounds for these two Code provisions are quite different.
Dismissal of the case is like the petition was never filed at all. Denial of the debtor's
discharge, while not dismissing the case, robs the debtor of the ultimate relief that he sought, that
is, relief from his non-reaffirmed obligations.

Likewise, an Adversary Proceeding filed under §727 of the Bankruptcy Code is different
from an Adversary Proceeding filed under §S23. Remember, an Adversary Proceeding filed under
§S23 seeks to except an individual debt from discharge. Cases filed under §727 seek to deny
discharge of all debts, and therefore is a case to the benefit of all creditors.
Also, unlike cases under §S23, cases under §727 cannot be settled easily. If the debtor is
guilty of actions that give rise to a complaint under §727, then the discharge should be denied and
no single creditor should be allowed to capitalize on that knowledge. Bankr. R. 7041 provides
judicial oversight for the plaintiff's dismissal of a complaint to deny the discharge. There must be
notice to the U.S. Trustee and the chapter 7 trustee and the court can condition a dismissal on such
terms and conditions as it deems proper. Those terms do not deny the court the ability to allow
compromises of claims made in an adversary proceeding to deny the debtor's discharge but they do .
allow additional judicial oversight to prevent "sale of the discharge". In these circumstances, the
courts have allowed other creditors to pursue the denial ofthe discharge ifthe creditor who brought
the action is no longer interested in pursuing it.
The lesson is do not file an Adversary
Proceeding under §727 unless you are willing to take it all the way through trial and that you
have a case that falls in one of the 10 enumerated grounds for denying discharge under
§727(a).
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To improperly use a discharge complaint to coerce a settlement on a §523 claim could be
considered in violation of 18 U.S.C. §152. It is a bankruptcy crime to knowingly and fraudulently
give, offer, receive, attempt to obtain any money or property, remuneration, compensation, reward,
advantage or promise thereof for acting or forbearing to act in any case under title 11.

A.

Case Law: §727

Despite the rarity of §727 actions, there is some case law authority to give the practitioner
guidance in the event that a creditor wishes to pursue this avenue of relief. In re Adams, 31 F.3d 389
(6th Cir. 1994) involved a transfer of accounts receivable which served as collateral for a creditor's
loan. The debtor transferred the accounts receivable into a corporation's operating account rather
than into the creditor's dominion account. The monies were then used to pay other suppliers.
The Court denied discharge since the debtor attempted to defraud a creditor by transferring
property of the debtor within one year before the date of the filing of a bankruptcy petition. If it had
been done postpetition, it would also qualify for denial of discharge under §727(a)(2)(B).
The Adams case also stands for the proposition that the standard of proof of §727 actions
is by a preponderance of the evidence.
In re Keeney, 227 F.3d 679 (6 th Cir. 2000) is a case of Judge Howard's from the Eastern
District in which the debtor purchased property over many years and titled it in his parents' names.
He was attempting to avoid payment of a personal injury judgment. Although the debtor made the
purchases outside the relevant statutes of limitation the court used the "continuing concealment"
doctrine to find that the concealment continued into the one year limit set by 727(a)(2)(A). His
discharge was denied under both 727(a)(2)(A) and 727(a)(4). Note that the creditor whose judgment
was being hindered was no 10ngercollectibJe because the statute of limitations had expired. The
Sixth Circuit expressly adopted the "continuing concealment" doctrine and noted that denial of
discharge does not require proof of harm. Complete financial disclosure is required by the
Bankruptcy Code to obtain the discharge.
Interesting reading is the case onn re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1989). Here, the Court
actually dismissed a case where the Court found that the debtor had sufficient future income. The
Sixth Circuit opined that the petitioner's seeking relief under the Bankruptcy Code was an abuse of
the "fresh start" theory that permeates the Bankruptcy Code. The lavish lifestyle and other excesses
evidenced by the debtor postpetition further demonstrated the abuse that §727 was initiated to deter.
Examples from the Western District of Kentucky under §727(a)(2) are In re Terrell, 114
B.R. 907 (W.O. Ky. 1989) [ex-husband's transfer of vehicles to then-girlfriend {now wife} held
insufficient to deny discharge. NOTE: that the Court used the clear and convincing standard. See
In re Adams, supra; In re Yokley. 61 B.R. 198 (W.O. Ky. 1986) [four large withdrawals of money
within three months of filing held to be transfer of property of the debtor with an intent to defraud
the creditor]; In re Lineberry, 55 B.R. 510 (W.O. Ky. 1985) [debtor's failure to listQM investment'
account insufficientto deny discharge when debtor's ex-wife admitted she was aware of the account.
This case also examines §727(a)(3), (4) and (5)]; In re Hargis, 50 B.R. 698 (W.O. Ky. 1985) [debtor
concealed that his wife was a partner in partnership and the wife held partnership assets. Discharge
denied. See also, 44 B.R. 225 (W.O. Ky. 1984)].
Section 727(a)(3) requires the debtor to keep and preserve records from which his financial
affairs can be understood. In re Scott, 172 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 1999) involved a debtor with 435 boxes
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of documents which "effectively concealed" the financial maze created by the debtor's interrelated
entities. The Code places the burden on· the debtor to create books and records accurately
documenting his business affairs. In re Strbac; 235 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999)denied debtor's
discharge on summary judgment because debtor owned two unincorporated businesses whose
records he "kept in his head". No tax returns were provided, and not one piece of paper relating to
financial activities. Case by case analysis considering debtor's occupation, financial structure,
education, experience, sophistication and any other factors which should be considered in the
interest ofjustice.
Section 727(a)(4)(A) requires no knowing and fraudulent false oaths. In re Hamo, 233 B.R.
718 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999) Debtor discharge denied when he did not reveal that he was president of
a company that bought and sold nine pieces of real estate including 1 just 2 days before bankruptcy;
did not list $50,000 personal injury claim, and did not disclose $62,304.00 judgment against another
company. Standard requires proof of:
1. Debtor made a statement under oath
2. Statement was false
3. Statement related materially to the bankruptcy case (fact is material if
it concerns discovery of assets, business dealings or existence or
disposition of property)
4. Debtor knew statement was false
5. Debtor made statement with fraudulent intent. Intent determined from
course of conduct of debtor.
Another detailed case discussing the requirements of §727(a)(4)(A) is In re Schultz, 2000
WL 575505 (Bankr. N.D. Oh.). See also In re Keeney, 227 F.3d 679(6th Cir. 2000).
The other options for §727(a)(4) include the knowing and fraudulent withholding of
recorded information from the trustee, presenting or using a false claim or giving offering, receiving,
or attempting to obtain money, property or advantage or a promise of money, property or advantage,
for acting or forbearing to act.
Quite commonly, the debtor cannot explain a loss of assets. This falls under §727(a)(5) of
the Bankruptcy Code. Example of cases litigated under that section are as follows: In re Dolin, 799
F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1986) [debtor testified that the loss of assets were due to his expenditures for
cocaine and gambling addictions. Held: insufficient to overcome presumption and discharge
denied. This case also addresses §727(a)(3) concerning failure to keep records]; In re Yokley, 61
B.R. 198 (W.O. Ky. 1986) [debtor was unable to document what two large withdrawals within three
months of the filing of the bankruptcy petition were used for. Held: discharge denied]; In re
Schermer, 59 B.R. 924 (W.O. Ky. 1986) [the debtor was unable to explain the disappearance of
$26,000 in cash, inventories and receivables within two months of the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. Held: discharge denied].
The trustee is most likely to use §727(a)(6) "failure to comply with a lawful order of the
court" to obtain assets which were to be turned over and then when the asset is not provided, the
discharge is denied.
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Section 727(a)(7) permits denial of the discharge when the debtor has committed any act
specified in paragraph (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6) of this subsection, on or within one year before the
date of the filing of the petition, or during the case, in connection with another case, under this title
[11 USCA Sections 10 1 et seq.] or under the Bankruptcy Act, concerning an insider. TIl at is helpful
when the debtor as a corporate officer has not complied with the standards in the corporate case and
then files a personal bankruptcy. See In re Adams, 31 F.3d 389 (6 th Cir. 1994). In re Dolin, 799 F.3d
251 (6th Cir. 1986). In re Barman, 237 B.R. 342 (Bankr. E. D. Mich. 1999).
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Seeking a denial of the debtor's discharge under §727 is an all-or-nothing proposition.
Given the severity of the relief requested, creditors should seek this as a last resort and only when
they are willing to commit the resources necessary to take a case of this type all the way through
litigation.

J

V.

j

PRACTICE TIPS

Listed below are some practice tips used by the author's firm found to be very sllccessful
in litigation under §523 and §727. The tips are in no particular order and are simply offered as an
aid to the practitioner.
A.

Rule 2004 Exams

Bankruptcy Code 2004 allows you to examine the debtor much like the taking of a
deposition. As had been suggested in this chapter, this exam should be perfomed prior to the filing
of an Adversary Proceeding or a complaint seeking to deny the debtor's discharge. Not only will
this allow the creditor to evaluate the case, but may insulate a creditor from an attorney's fee
demand under §523(d).
Bankruptcy Rule 7030 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(4) allow for the taking of
a deposition or Rule 2004 exam by non-stenographic means. This author takes the 2004 exams by
video tape. TIlis can be done by agreement or Order of the Court. The only expense involved is the
cost of the tape and an initial investment of portable video equipment.
The author has found that this procedure provides the creditor's counsel with a
psychological advantage. It is suggested that the television being used as the monitor be positioned
so that the debtor can see himself. Many psychological studies have found that a person is much less
likely to lie if they can see their own face. The debtor is then caught within the contlict of watching
them self lie or tell the truth. This psychological pressure often results in more truthful testimony.
Conduct a deposition or examination as if it will have to be transcribed. Many courts are
not set up to play video. Even if they are, some judges may not be willing to use them.
Additionally, opposing counsel may request a transcription ofthe testimony for use at trial. Using.
tape to impeach a witness can be cumbersome.
Make sure that all objections are properly preserved for the record. It is also suggested that
the practitioner have a backup source in the form of an audio tape. That way, ifthe videotape were
somehow destroyed prior to the transcription being made, there would be a record of the exam.
Practitioners are advised to observe all of the usual strictures of a deposition such as the
swearing-in of the witness, identification of the parties and the like. This is often explicated in the
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Order to take the 2004 exam itself.

B.

The Subpoena Duces Tecum

In taking a Rule 2004 exam or deposition, the use of a subpoena duces tecum is highly
recommended. Items to request under the subpoena are discussed below.
1.

Checking and Savings Account Records

First, ask for checking and savings account statements and canceled checks for the last 12
to 24 months, looking for preferential or fraudulent transfers. These transfers could be to family,
friends, business partners, relatives, creditors, or simply unexplained transfers of money.
The practitioner should also check for extravagant expenditures, especially postpetition.
This can be very valuable,in a case filed under §S23(a)(8) where the debtor is claiming an undue
hardship. Ifthe debtor is able to afford luxuries postpetition, then it is unlikely that he or she will
be able to convince the Court that the payment of the student loan obligation will work an undue
hardship.
Ifthe case was filed under §S23(a)(2)(A), the checking account could show that the debtor
was using cash advances to support a luxurious lifestyle or simply to pay other creditors. It is
amazing how often debtors will take multiple cash advances very shortly before the filing of the
bankruptcy petition and deposit that money into the checking account. Possession of these checks
and bank statements could show the flow of those funds.
A review ofthe checking and savings account records can also provide evidence of possible
conversion. If collateral was sold, many times the proceeds from the sale will be placed into one
of these accounts. Review of the records reveals where the money went, and what it was used for.
Other proceeds, such as insurance proceeds not turned over to a creditor find their way into
these accounts. If they were transferred to third parties for "safekeeping" or used for something
other than car repairs, the checking account may prove to be the key in a case.
Many times, such proceeds are used to purchase other exemptible assets. Equivalent to
"bankruptcy planning for the indigent", such evidence can be used to show fraudulent intent and may
convince the Court to impress an equitable lien on the property. A transcript of the deposition or
copy of the tape given to the Trustee may give rise to a fraudulent transfer action under §S48 of the
Bankruptcy Code or a preferential transfer under §S47.
2.

Policies of Property Insurance and Riders

This practitioner often requests policies of property insurance and riders on homeowners'
insurance policies. Quite often, this reveals valuable assets either not scheduled or undervalued on
the debtor's schedule.
Most homeowners' insurance policies do not cover items such as jewelry, antiques, furs,
oriental rugs or the like. They are often covered by separate riders. Many times this will provide
the "persuasion" needed to convince the debtors that they should settle the case.

C.

Use of Written Discovery
If the practitioner has already filed an Adversary Proceeding and is preparing to take a
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deposition in the matter, the use of written discovery should be considered. Responses to written
discovery provides a background to the case and will aid in formulating questions to be asked at the
upcoming deposition. Similarly, the use of Requests For Production will often provide materials
to review in advance of the deposition. Finally, documents and written responses received in
response to written discovery may lead to a request for additional and different documents at the
deposition via the subpoena duces tecum.
The use of written discovery will many times yield facts unknown to even the debtor's
counsel. Providing evidence to the debtor's counsel that his or her client has not been forthcoming
may provide an avenue for potential settlement of the matter.
D.

J
J
J

J
J
j

Settlement Document
Ifan Adversary Proceeding has been filed, this author often enters into an Agreed Judgment.

The Judgment should declare that the debt is not discharged. Be specific as to what
Bankruptcy Code section led to the Judgment as this may have an impact if the debtor files for relief
under the Bankruptcy Code at a future date. This could be considered res judicata or collateral
estoppel in state court proceedings as well.

J

The creditor should also seek a personal judgment against the debtor for the monies due and
owing. If the debtor later defaults, the Agreed Judgment could be "localized" by filing suit on the
judgment in state or federal court and initiating proceedings supplemental to collect the debt.

j

If an Adversary Proceeding has not been filed, the creditor should use a combination of a
Reaffirmation Agreement and Agreed Order extending timeto file a nondischargeability suit.

J

Recall that the debtor has sixty (60) days from the filing of the Reaffirmation Agreement
with the Court, or entry of the Discharge Order within which to rescind the Reaffirmation
Agreement. The creditor should get an extension of time past that last day so that he does not fall
into the "Catch-22" previously described in this chapter.

J

There are certain disadvantages of not filing an Adversary Proceeding and getting an Agreed
Judgment. The Reaffirmation Agreement does not carry the weight of a Judgment. If a debtor
reaffirms and then defaults on the Reaffirmation Agreement, it will be necessary to file suit. The
basis ofthe lawsuit will not be the original contract, but the Reaffirmation Agreement. Localizing
and collecting on a Judgment is much different than on a Reaffirmation Agreement.
Additionally, with the Reaffirmation Agreement, the creditor does not have a personal
judgment. This is why the creditor would have to sue on the Reaffirmation Agreement. One cannot
immediately move to execute on the Reaffirmation Agreement and it has no res judicata or collateral
estoppel effect.
Obviously, there are some advantages to entering into a Reaffirmation Agreement and
extension of time over an Agreed Judgment. It is usually quicker. The Reaffirmation Agreement
and Agreed Order can often be negotiated at the first meeting of creditors and the case can be over
within a few short days.
Secondly, there is less expense involved in negotiating the Reaffirmation Agreement. You
do not have the initial outlay of $150 for the court costs, nor the associated attorney time in the
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litigation of the case.
The Reaffirmation Agreement does "revive" the creditor's debt. That is, the debt survives
discharge and can be collected postpetition. Much like an Agreed Judgment, the terms of repayment
can be spelled-out in the Reaffirmation Agreement.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This has been only a brief examination of common Adversary Proceedings filed both for the
discharge of an individual debt and Adversary Proceedings seeking to deny the debtor's discharge.
Each case must tum on its own facts and a rereading ofthe Bankruptcy Code is always suggested
prior to the filing of any Adversary Proceeding.
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A.

WHY CHAPTER 13? WHEN TO CONSIDER CHAPTER 13 AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO CHAPrER 7
1.

Definition.

A Chapter 13 case is one of several remedies available to

individual debtors who have a regular income and a limited amount of debt.
2.

Alternatives. An individual debtor may file a Chapter 7 liquidation,

Chapter 11 reorganization, a Chapter 12 farmer's plan or a Chapter 13 wage earner's
plan.

3.

Purpose of Chapter 13.

The debtor is obligated to propose a wage

earner plan that proposes payments out of the debtor's future earnings to a Chapter 13
Trustee who will in turn pay those payments to the debtor's creditors in the order of
priority fixed either by the plan, the Code or the Court, thus paying the creditors either
in full or in part.
4.

Reason for Filine a Chapter 13. If the debtor has assets that would

otherwise be lost in a Chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy, he should file a Chapter 13 if
he has future earnings sufficient to pay the creditors more than what they would receive

in a Chapter 7 over a period not to exceed sixty months.

s.

Lower Cost. A Chapter 13 case is far simpler, less costly and less time

consuming than a Chapter 11 case. Different from a Chapter 11 case, a Chapter 13 may

r
,

r
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be filed only by the debtor and the plan is approved by the Court without a vote by the
creditors if it meets the statutory criteria. Chapter 13 creditors neither may defeat a plan
by voting, nor can they propose their own plan. See In the Matter of Workman, 108
B.R. 826 (Bkrtcy. Ga. 1989) and Memphis Bank & Trust v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427
(6th eire 1982).

6.

Broader Discharee Provisions.

J
J

J
J

Chapter 13 cases also provide a

discharge far broader than that available under either Chapter 7 or 11. Under Chapter
13, all debts are discharged except for certain long-term debts; taxes; certain educational
loans; debts for death or injury caused while operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated;
and criminal restitution awards.

Most importantly, the· remaining debts which are

J
J
I

nondischargeable under Code §523(a) are dischargeable in a Chapter 13. See also, Code

J

§1322(b)(2).

J

7.

Major Drawbacks to Chapter 13. The major "drawback" to a Chapter

13 is that a debtor must commit all of his disposable income in plan payments for the
plan to be confirmed. This requirement (along with certain other restrictions discussed

J

J

hereinafter) is the principal limitation on this type of relief under the Code.

B.

REQUIREMENTS OF CHAPTER 13 PLAN FEASmILITY AND GOOD FAITH.
1.

Debt EIiKibility.

-

ELIGmILITY,

J

Only an individual who has secured debts at the time

offiling of $250,000 or less and unsecured debts of $750,000 can ftle a Chapter 13. The

j

debts must be non-contingent and liquidated to count. Code § 109(e) also requires a
Chapter 13 debtor to be an individual, not a corporation or partnership.

....

1
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2.

Good Faith. Code §1325(a)(3) requires that the plan be filed in good

faith with intent to payoff or pay down the debtor's creditors. Although "good faith"
is not specifically defined in the Code, courts have interpreted it to mean the ability of
the debtor to achieve a confirmed plan.

3.

Feasibility.

Code §1325 authorizes the Court to confirm a plan only if

(a) it complies with the provisions of the Code; (b) all fees required by the Code or by
the plan to be paid before confirmation have been paid; (c) it is proposed in good faith
and not by any means forbidden by law; (d) the value of property to be distributed under
the plan on payments are not less than the amounts that would be paid on such claim if
the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7; (e) as to each allowed secured claim
provided for by the plan, either the holder of such claim has accepted the plan; the plan
provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim; the value of
property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the
allowed amount of such claim; or the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim
to such holder; and (t) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and
to comply with the plan terms.

4.

Limitations on Confirmation.

allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirmation of the plan, then the court may not
approve the plan unless the value of the property to be distributed under the plan is not
less than the amount of such claim; or the plan provides that all the debtor's projected
"disposable income" to be received in the payback period beginning on the date that the
first payment is due under the plan will be applied to make payments under the plan.

r.

r

If the trustee or the holder of an
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For purposes of Code §1325, "disposable income" means the debtor's income that is not
reasonably necessary for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor; and if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures
necessary for the continuation, preservation and operation of such business.

C.

HOW TO COMPUTE AND PLAN - PAYING OFF THE CREDITORS.

1.

Mandato[), Provisions of the Plan. Code §1322(a) sets forth certain

provisions of the plan that are mandatory and must be included in the plan.
(a)

Submission of the debtor's income to the Trustee. The plan must

provide that all of the debtor's income or a portion of the debtor's income necessary to

j
!

.J

J

J
J

J
j

fund the plan must be paid to the Chapter 13 Trustee.
(b)

Pay all priority claims in full. The plan must provide for payment

in full of all priority claims defined as such under Code §507, such as administrative

J
~

.J

expenses, taxes, attorneys' fees and other similar expenses as described therein.
(c)

Equal treatment for each particular class. If the plan contains

provisions classifying the claims, all claims within each particular class must receive

J
J

equal treatment.
(d)

Imposition of mandatory rules under local provisions. Each

J

!

judicial district may have its own local rules which may contain other mandatory
provisions within that district.

2.

Permissive Provisions of the Plan. Code § 1322(b) provides that there

J

are certain provisions which may permissively be included in the plan.

J
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(a)

Designate classes of unsecured claims. The plan may designate

classes of unsecured claims or other classes of claims so long as all the unsecured classes
receive equal treatment under the plan and equal treatment within each class. Public Fin.
Com. v. Freeman, 712 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1983).
(b)

Modify the rights of secured claimants. The plan may modify

the rights of the holders of secured claims from the original lending terms or by a writedown under Code §506 to the fair market value of the collateral, except that a claim
secured only by the debtor's principal residence may not be modified in any manner.
Nobleman v. Amer. Savings Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993).
(c)

Cure or waive any default. The plan may cure or waive any

default. The cure of any default, however, must be provided for in the plan and must

I

r
r

,..
I

r

r

r
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r

be accomplished within a reasonable period of time. "Reasonable" is determined by the
Court under the circumstances of the individual case.
(d)

Concurrently pay secured and unsecured creditors. This plan

may provide payments to secured and unsecured debts concurrently, even though it
would normally provide for payments in the order of the priorities set forth in either the
plan or the Code.
(e)

Cure defaults on long-term debts. The plan may cure defaults

on long-terms debts that would otherwise survive the plan term and reinstate provisions
of the creditor's debt instruments if those defaults are cured within a "reasonable" time.
(I)

Provide for payment of post-petition claims.

contain provisions for the payment of post-petition claims.

,

r
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The plan may

J
(g)

Assume, reject or assign executory contracts or unexpired

leases. The plan may make provisions for the assumption, rejection or assignment of
executory contracts or unexpired leases, subject to the limitations contained in Code
§365. In re Ford, 159 B.R. 90 (Bkrtcy. Wash. 1993).
(h)

Provide for payment of all or part of claims from property of

the estate or property of the debtor. The plan may contain provisions for the payment

J
J
J

of all or part of the various claims from either the property of the estate or property of

J

the debtor and can also propose payments made by a third party entity.

j

(i)

Provide for the vesting of property of the estate. The plan may

provide for the vesting of property of the estate, either at confirmation or a later time,

J

either in the debtor or another entity. If there is no provision made for the vesting of

J

the property, then the vesting would be controlled by Code §1327(b) which revests the
debtor's assets in the debtor upon confirmation of the plan.
(j)

.J•

Other provisions not inconsistent with the title. The plan may

include any other provision not inconsistent with the Code. Such authorization gives the

J

debtor a wide latitude in formulating plan terms and tailoring those terms to suit the
debtor's individual needs and requirements.

3.

Classification of Claims. A plan may contain classes of creditors, some

of which or all of which may be paid concurrently pursuant to the terms of the plan, or
they may be paid in the order of priority as fIXed either in the plan or as provided for
in Code §503 and §507.
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(a)

Administrative claims. The plan may set up a separate class for

administrative claims or administrative expenses. The Code describes an "administrative
expense" in Code §503(b)(I)(A) as including "the actual common necessary costs and
expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services
rendered after the commencement of the case." One such administrative expense would
be court costs and the Chapter 13 Trustee's commissions.

(b)

Professional fee claims. The plan may also contain a provision

for the separate payment of attorneys' fees or other fees incurred by professionals, such
as auctioneers, accountants, realtors or engineers as a Code §503(b)(2) expense. Under
Code §503(b)(2), compensation and reimbursement may be awarded under Code
§330(a)(I) which defines compensation for officers of the Court.

Under Code

§330(a)(1), the Court may "award to a trustee, an examiner or a professional person
employed under §327... (A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services
rendered by the ... professional person, or attorney and by any paraprofessional person
employed by any such person; and (B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses. "
See In re Busy Beaver Building Centers. Inc., 19 F.3d 833 (3rd Cir. 1993). At the time
of the filing of the petition, the debtor's attorney of record becomes a "professional
person" for purposes of allowance of compensation under the limitations set forth in
Code §330.
Many Bankruptcy Courts have placed limitations on Chapter 13 attorneys'
fees, limiting them either to a routine case fee or an extraordinary case fee, the former
of which is normally a flat fee and the latter of which is a fee allowed by the Court upon
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the presentation of the attorney's affidavit containing his time charges and actual
expenses incurred. In both cases, an order must be entered allowing the compensation
and ordering that the compensation be paid pursuant to the treatment of that particular
class set forth in the plan.
Due to the advent of bankruptcy clinics, many courts including Kentucky's
have limited attorneys' fees to

$600~$750

for

"run~of~the~mill

garden variety" Chapter

13 cases. If the attorney desires a higher fee allowance, then the attorney must file a fee
application, with adequate notice, containing itemized time charges, and obtain court
approval for the fee.
(c)

J
J

,

..J

J

J
J

J
j

Tax claims.

Code §503(b)(I)(B) requires the allowance of "any

tax" (i) incurred by the estate or any "fine, penalty or reduction in credit relating to a
tax, after application, a hearing and entry of an order." Even though taxes are normally

J
j

non-dischargeable in bankruptcy under Code §523(a), Code §1328(a) provides that a tax
claim is discharged at the end of the term of the plan, but Code §1322(a) requires
provisions that the tax claims be paid in full as a condition precedent to confrrmation.

J

J

If the debtor defaults later in the plan and obtains what is known as "hardship discharge"
under Code §1328(b), then such a discharge would not discharge taxes. This means that
the debtor must provide for payment in full of the taxes and successfully complete the
plan to obtain the discharge of his taxes.
(d)

Cured claims. A cured claims class may be provided for in the

plan if its treatment provisions are reasonable and such provisions cure the default within
a reasonable time. The cure may be for either a real or personal property claim in
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arrears, requiring payments to bring the claim into conformity with the original lending
terms. Failure to cure would give the secured creditor a right to relief from the stay and
the curing under the plan would preclude the Court from granting such relief. The usual
method used by the debtors in their plans is to classify the cure claims and then provide
that early distribution payments go to them from the Chapter 13 Trustee until such time
as the claims have been brought current. The plan may also contain provisions that the
current payments be made by the debtor outside of the Chapter 13 case directly to the
creditor.
(e)

Secured claims. A Chapter 13 plan may make provisions for the

payment of a secured claim either through the plan or outside of the plan. If there are
mortgage, automobile, or other consumer property installment payments that are owed

t

r
r

by the debtor, those payments may be scheduled to be paid outside of the plan and kept
current by the debtor to preclude any default caused by delay of payments from the
Chapter 13 Trustee to the secured creditor. The debtor's plan may otherwise provide

I

r
r
r

r
r

that payments be made to the Chapter 13 Trustee who in tum would make the payments
to the secured creditor. If a secured creditor's claim is written-down to the value of the
collateral pursuant to Code §506(a), the payment normally would be made directly to the
trustee who in tum would pay the secured claim to the extent of the fixed value of the
collateral and the secured creditor's deficiency would become a part of the unsecured
creditors' class and treated as such in that class. Memphis Bank v. Whitman, supra.
Value is either fIXed by the plan or, if contested by the creditor, determined by the Court
at a valuation. Many courts are hearing valuation on cross-affidavits, with only cross-

r

r
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examination of the appraisers at the scheduled hearings.
(I')

Unsecured claims. Unsecured claims are normally treated in one

class and provisions are made for payment either (A) in full of that class, or (B) of a
percentage of the total of the claims in that class, or (C) of a specific amount to be paid
to the creditors in that class regardless of the total amount of the aggregate claims,

i.~.,

a pool plan. Payment in full would be determined by taking the total amount of the
unsecured creditors and dividing it by the length of the plan and the resulting sum would

J
j

j

J
i

approximately equate to the monthly payment to be paid by the debtor either directly or

j

by wage deductions payable by the debtor's employer to the Chapter 13 Trustee. A

j

percentage payment would propose a certain percentage payback of the total allowed
claims in the unsecured creditors class, which method can create problems in determining
the exact amount of the monthly payment. A pool plan provides that a certain amount
of money paid to the Chapter 13 Trustee over the life of the plan term would go to the
unsecured creditors, regardless of what the total aggregate class debt amount would be.
The debtor would not care what the total amount of the aggregate unsecured creditors'
debts were because he would be paying only a specific sum for the plan duration.
Trustee's fees would be added to all of these types of plans to obtain the exact payment.
(g)

j

J
J
J
J

Insider claims. An "insider" is defined by Code §101(31)(A) as

a relative of the debtor but this definition is not inclusive because other persons, even if
they are not relatives, may have such a close relationship to the debtor that they could

j

be deemed insiders. Insider debt may be one of two kinds of debts: one that is payable
as part of the unsecured creditors' class or one which is subject to grounds for objection
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for inclusion in the unsecured creditors' class. Creditors will object to including an

r

continued making loans to the debtor knowing that the debtor was insolvent and!or

r

insider in an unsecured creditors' class if the insider has taken steps that would give the
insider an advantage that other creditors would not have had, for example, the insider

bankrupt for the purpose of the watering down the unsecured creditors' class.

r

Notwithstanding the Code §1322(b)(1) prohibition that the classification of unsecured

r

propose a different treatment for a co-obligor's consumer debt if that individual is liable

r

on such consumer debt with the debtor. This means that a claim arising from a personal

,.
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claims may not discriminate unfairly against any class so designated, the plan may

guarantee by a relative may be treated differently without violating the prohibition against
unfair discrimination. The non-bankrupt co-debtor is protected by the debtor's automatic
stay, but only to the extent of the amount of the debt being paid through the plan.
Several courts require the debtor to treat all unsecured claims, insiders and
others, in one class for the first 36-month term under the plan. Since the Code mandates
all disposable income to be used to finance the plan for the fIrSt 36-month term, then the
debtor would be free to pledge his disposable income in any way he pleases for the final
24 months of the term.
4.

Modification of Secured Debt. Code §1322(b)(2) authorizes the debtor

to file a plan that will "modify the rights of holders of secured claims, .... "
(a)

Definition of secured claims. Code §506(a) provides that "an

allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an
interest, or that is subject to set off under §553 of this title, is a secured claim to the

G-ll
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extent of the value of such creditor's interest the estate's interest in such property ... and
is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the amount
so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim." To allow a secured
claim in a Chapter 13, the Court must determine the value of the asset secured by the
lien thereon, which value amount becomes the secured claim, and subtract that value
from the total claim; the resultant figure is the allowed amount of the unsecured claim.

J
J
J

J
j

In re 680 Fifth Avenue Associates, 156 B.R. 10tO (Bkrtcy. N.Y. 1993). Often the
allowance of secured claims is reached by negotiated agreement with the secured
creditor, otherwise the Court must determine the amount of the allowed claim at a
valuation hearing. See (e), supra.
(b)

Reduction of secured claim to value. The debtor may write down

or reduce the secured creditor's claim to an allowed amount equal to the value of the
collateral under Code §506(a). Once the valuation of the collateral is determined, the

J

J

J

J
~

claim amount is written down to the fair value ofthe collateral and allowed as a secured

.J

claim in that amount, then the remaining· debt or the deficiency becomes an unsecured

J
J
J

claim and may be treated in the unsecured creditors' class. If, however, the secured
creditor's collateral is valued greater than the debt, then the secured creditor is entitled
to payment in full pursuant to its debt instrument terms and the plan, otherwise such
failure would justify the Court in granting relief from the automatic stay. If the debtor's
plan reduces the secured creditor's claim to the value of the collateral, the debtor

J

nevertheless must pay the creditor the present day value or interest on the debt to obtain
confirmation.
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(c)

Exception to the real estate residence. Notwithstanding Code

§1322(b)(2) that authorizes modification of secured claims, this section contains an
exception, described as "other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor's principal residence, ... ," which effectively prohibits the
modification of the debtor's residence's mortgage.

Code §1322(c) provides that,

notwithstanding Code §1322(b)(2) and applicable non-bankruptcy law, any default with
respect to or that gave rise to a lien on the debtor's residence may be cured at any time
up to such time as when the residence is sold in a foreclosure sale and if the case is one
where the last payment on the original payment schedule is due before the date in which
the final payment under the plan term is due, the plan may provide for the payment of
the claim as modified to a later date beyond the duration of the plan. This means the

~

r

r
r
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r

r
r

debtor can extend the final mortgage payments to the end of the term or beyond it.
The prohibition against modification of the claim against the residence,
however, is mandatory, but if the Court determines that the secured creditor's claim is
not secured "only" by a security interest in real property,

i.~.,

is also secured by other

collateral, then such a partially secured claim can be treated and modified under the plan.
Although the debtor may modify the rights of the secured creditor, such modifications
must be confined to the limitations or parameters of Code §1325(a) which mandate that
the holder of the allowed secured claim has either accepted the plan, or the plan provides
that the holders such claim retain it's underlying lien and the value of the property to be
distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the amount of the
allowed claim, or the collateral must be surrendered to the secured creditor.
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There is a split among the circuits as to whether the claim can be
bifurcated into two separate classes. Some courts: prohibit bifurcation and some allow
bifurcation. Compare Lomas Mtge USA v. Wiese, 980 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1992) with
Nobleman v. American Savings Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993).
(d)

Avoidance of lien on consumer property. The debtor either by

J

J
J

J

motion or as part of his plan may use Code §522(f)(1) to avoid the fixing of a lien or
interest on the debtor's property to such an extent that such a lien impairs an exemption
which the debtor would have been entitled to if such lien were a judicial lien or a nonpossessory, non-purchase money security interest in household goods, furnishings,
wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments or jewelry that
are held primarily for personal, family or household use by the debtor or a dependant of
the debtor, and implements, professional books or tools of the trade of the debtor or the
trade of a dependent of the debtor, or professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor
or a dependant of the debtor. A judicial lien that secures a debt to a spouse, former
spouse or child of the debtor for alimony to, maintenance for support of such spouse or
child in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court
of record, if such debt has not been assigned to another entity either voluntarily or by
operation of law, cannot be set aside. For purposes of determining how the lien and the
dollar values may be avoided, reference should be made to the formula set forth in Code

J

J

J

J
J
J
J
J
J

J

§522(f)(2)(A).
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s.

Legtb of Plan.
(a)

Minimum and maximum terms. A Chapter 13 plan may be any

length of time not to exceed 60 months calculated from the date the payments commence.
Code §1322(d).

Since filing a Chapter 13 is limited to an individual with regular

income, this normally indicates that the debtor is a wage earner receiving a regular
paycheck. Thus a Chapter 13 plan would normally propose the payment of a certain
amount of money out of each paycheck, either paid voluntarily to the Chapter 13 Trustee

r

or by a payroll deduction order from his paycheck. Nothing, however, precludes a plan

r

from providing that the Chapter 13 payment be made irregularly or quarterly or even

r

r
r
r
r
r

r
!r

semi-annually or annually, depending on the type of income received by the debtor. The
plan payment temi therefore may be tailored to fit the debtor's individual needs. The
court cannot confirm a plan that will take longer than 60 months to be administered.
(b)

Calculation of payback amount. In formulating the plan, the

debtor's counsel will normally require the debtor to prepare a precise monthly budget.
He would deduct the total of living expenses from the net take-home pay and the
remaining amount of money available would be the debtor's disposable income. The
disposable income would then be the amount of the Chapter 13 payment. That amount
then would be multiplied by 36 to 60 months to determine the maximum payment that
the debtor is capable of making, and then the total would be compared to the floor or
minimum payment required for purposes of confirmation. There is no requirement that
the debtor pay all indebtedness in fulf; rather, the test is that the debtor must pay to the
creditors an amount equal to what they would receive in case of a Chapter 7 liquidation.

r
r
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That figure, derived from a Chapter 7 analysis of the debtor's assets and liabilities,
would determine the floor.

The maximum is determined by the debtor's disposable

income, determined to be the best effort that the debtor can make in paying the most to
his creditors. Add to the payables any allowable attorneys' fees, other professional fees,
Court costs and the Chapter 13 Trustee's commissions and expenses, usually 8% - 91h %
of the payable amount, and the payback sum is determined.
6.

Discbaraeability Considerations. At the end of every successful Chapter

J
J
J
J
J
t

13. a discharge of any remaining unpaid indebtedness is ordered by the Court.

j

Dischargeability of a Chapter 13 debtor is treated in Code §1328 at the end of a term.

J
J
J
J
J
J

This discharge is different from the discharge that is normally entered in a Chapter 7
bankruptcy case.
(a)

Discbargeability in Chapter 7. Under Code §523, certain debts

in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. These debts include
taxes~

a debt incurred by fraud, a debt not listed in the petition; a debt incurred by fraud

or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement or larceny; a debt due
a

spouse~

former spouse or child of the debtor for alimony to, maintenance for support

of such spouse or child in connection with the separation agreement, divorce decree or
other determination made under law by governmental unit; a debt for a fine, penalty or

J

forfeiture payable to or for the benefit governmental unit; a debt incurred for an
educational benefit or loan made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit; a debt

J

incurred for death or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle
while being intoxicated from using alcohol, drug or another substance; a debt that was
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or could have been listed or scheduled by the debtor in a prior bankruptcy case under
which he waived his discharge; a debt provided for any final judgment, reviewable order
or consent order or decree entered in a United States or State Court issued by a Federal
depository institution's regulatory agency rising from any act of fraud or defalcation
while acting in a fiduciary capacity committed with respect to a depository institution or
insured credit union; a debt incurred for malicious or reckless failure to fulfill a
commitment by the debtor to a Federal depository institution's regulatory agency to
maintain capital of that institution; a debt incurred for the payment of an order of
restitution issued under the criminal code; a debt incurred to pay a tax to the United
States that would otherwise be non-dischargeable; and a debt incurred for a property
settlement division or separation agreement or divorce decree relating to property unless
the debtor does not have the ability to payor discharging such debt would result in a
benefit to the debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to a spouse, former
spouse or child of the debtor. All other debts, except these, are dischargeable in a
Chapter 7, but some would otherwise be dischargeable in a completed Chapter 13 plan.
(b)

Super-Dischargeability in Chapter 13. Code §1328 provides two

types of discharges, both of which have some super-dischargeability consequences that
are different from the discharge in a Chapter 7. At the successful completion of all
payments under the plan, unless the Court approves a written waiver of discharge
executed by the debtor after the bankruptcy has been filed, the Court grants a discharge
of all debts provided for in the plan or disallowed under the plan, except for debts that
are provided in the plan to survive the discharge where the last payment is due after the
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date of which the final payment of the plan is due; for restitution or a criminal fine in
a sentence on the debtor's conviction of the crime; and debts due a spouse, former
spouse or child of the debtor for alimony, maintenance or support; debts due for an
educational benefit or loan made by an insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit;
and debts incurred by death or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a
motor vehicle when the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another
substance. This means that debts incurred by fraud and debts due for taxes and the other

J
J
J
J
j

J
J
~

exceptions listed in Code §S23(a) are otherwise dischargeable if the Court confirms and

J

the debtor completes the plan. Note that taxes are required to be provided for in full.

J

Code §1328(a) provides that "the Court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts
provided for by the plan ... ," even though said debts are not paid in full.

The

conditioned limitation is that the debtor has to complete the payments under the plan.
(c)

Hardship Discharge of claims in Chapter 13. Code §1328(b)

provides for a second kind of discharge in a Chapter 13, known as the hardship
discharge. The Court may grant a discharge to the debtor under this section even though
he has not completed the payments under the plan if the debtor's failure to complete such
payments was due to circumstances for which the debtor should be justly held
accountable and the debtor has paid to the creditors upon the date of the discharge or the
application therefor a sum equal to what the creditors would have received if the debtor
had filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy on the original filing date; and if a modification of the

J
J
J

J

J
J

J

plan to provide for other payment terms is not practicable. This discharge will discharge
this debtor from all unsecured debts provided in the plan, except debts that were

...I
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scheduled to be paid beyond the payment date last due under the plan and excepts all of
the Code §523(a) debts from the discharge. This means that tax debts, fraud debts and
all of the non-dischargeable debts specified in Code §523 would not be discharged under
the Code §1328(b) discharge, but could be discharged under a Code §1328(a) discharge.
(d)

Mandatory payments in full. To obtain the right to the Code

§1328(a) discharge, the plan payments must be paid in full in conformity with Code
§1322(a) for the debtor to be entitled to the discharge. Since Code §1322(a) contains
mandatory provisions for the payment of certain debts, i.e., all claims entitled to a
priority under Code §507, then for the debtor to obtain the super-discharge under
§1328(a), all payments proposed by the plan, must be paid in full.

(e)

Treatment of Domestic Relations Claims. A line of cases has

developed that give to the debtor the right to create separate classes with separate
provisions for debts due for alimony, maintenance, or child support. See In re Gianakas,
917 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1990).

There is a split of authority as to whether such

classifications can properly be included in a plan, although the majority interpretation of
most courts is that separate classification can be made. The limitation, however, is that
the plan payments must not unfairly discriminate against another class of creditors, and
if a former spouse, entitled to alimony, maintenance or support, is preferred over other
creditors, then probably the plan itself is not confirmable under Code §1322(a). The
October, 1995 amendments added Code §523(a)15, giving non-dischargeability status
to debts incurred for property division arising out of divorce· decrees and property
settlements. A debtor would therefore normally attempt to either include the former

r

r
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spouse in a separate class for special treatment or alternatively include the spouse as an
unsecured creditor in the
§1328(a) discharge.

unsecured creditors' pool and avail himself of the Code

The hardship discharge under 1328(b), however, would not

discharge any spousal debts remaining unpaid at the time of the termination of the plan.
(I')

Effect of Confirmation. Notwithstanding the discharge that is

entered under Code §1328 after the completion of the plan, the confirmation of the plan
itself has consequences that are beneficial to the debtor. First, the provisions of the
confirmed plan bind not only the debtor but each creditor, whether or not the claim of
such creditor is provided for by the plan and whether or not such creditor has objected
to, has accepted or has rejected the plan. Secondly, except as otherwise provided in the
plan or the order confirming the plan, once the plan is confirmed all of the property of
the estate is vested in the debtor, and under Code §1327(c), the vesting of said property
in the debtor is free and clear of any claim or interest of the debtor provided for by the
plan. This means that once the plan is confirmed, any property that was property of the
estate for purposes of determining the minimum payment due the unsecured creditors is
thereafter free of any creditor's claims and may be disposed of by the debtor in any

J
J
J

J

J
J
J

J

J

J

J
J
\

manner chosen by him. The disposal of the property, however, does not eliminate the

J

debtor's obligation to make the plan payments, but any conversion of a Chapter 7 would

J

revert back to the date of the bankruptcy action when the order of relief was entered and
thereby bind the debtor to the Chapter 7 Trustee for the value of the property of the
estate that existed at the time of the filing of the Chapter 13 since converted to a Chapter
7. If the debtor has disposed of the property, the debtor may not be able to raise the
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contracts may either assumed, rejected or assumed and assigned either by motion during

r

as authorized by Code §365.

r
r

7.

Leases and ExecutotY Contracts.

Unexpired leases and executory

the pendency of a Chapter 13 or pursuant to the terms of a confirmed Chapter 13 plan

(a)

Assumption. Under Code §365(b)(l)(C), if there is an unexpired

lease or an executory contract, the debtor has the option to assume such lease or contract
if he either cures or provides adequate assurance that he will promptly cure any pre-

r
r

existing default; compensates or provides adequate assurance that he will compensate the

r

example would be that if the debtor is a party to an automobile lease, he may, either by

r
r

r
r
r

r

r
r
j

cash necessary to satisfy the Chapter 7 Trustee and thereby could forfeit his discharge.

party to the contract for any actual pecuniary loss resulting from such default and
"provides adequate assurance of future performance under such contract or lease." An

motion or pursuant to the plan, assume that lease and provide for a separate classification
for the curing of any arrearage due by providing for early payments to such creditor and
continuing to make the monthly lease payments outside of the plan. Even though the
creditor may oppose the assumption of such lease or unexpired contract, so long as the
debtor meets the conditions set forth in Code §365(a), then the Court should approve the
assumption.
(b)

Rejection. The debtor may, either by motion or as a part of the

terms of the plan, reject any unexpired lease or executory contract. Any rejection again,
like an assumption, must be approved by the Court and the rejection of a lease or
contract will probably result in damage to the rejected party. That damage then becomes
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J
J
an unsecured claim presumed to have been in existence as of the date of the filing of the
bankruptcy.
(c)

Assignment. Code §365(t) also authorizes the assumption and the

assignment of an unexpired lease or executory contract. If, for example, an automobile
lease has value, the debtor may assume the contract, cure the default and comply with
the provisions of Code §365(b)(1)(A),(B) and (C), and then under Code §365(t)(2), the

debtor may assign the executory contract or unexpired lease, but only if he gives
adequate assurance of future performance by the assignee of such contract or lease. The
latter requirement applies even if there has not been a default in such contract or lease.
S.

Mort&a&e on Debtor's Principal Residence. The plan may make various

provisions relating to the debtor's residence.
(a)

Treatment in Plan. Upon the filing of the bankruptcy, if the

debtor owns his real estate residence, whether with or without a mortgage thereon or
with or without equity, various treatments may be made with respect to the residence
debt. As discussed before, if the plan attempts to modify a secured creditor's claim, one
of the Code limitations is that modification cannot be made as to the debtor's principal
residence. This means that if there is a mortgage, the mortgage must be reaffirmed by

J

J
J
J
J
J

J

J
J
J
J
J

the debtor as a part of the plan, any arrearages cured and paid according to the terms
thereunder or the debtor will be subject to the lifting of the stay.
(b)

Use of state exemption statute.

If the debtor's real estate

residence is unencumbered, then the debtor may use the state exemption statute of $5,000
per person or a total of $10,000 for a married couple (and may use the general
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exemption of $1,000 for each debtor) against the residence for purposes of lowering the
total amount of equity that would otherwise result in calculating the minimum or floor
payments due under the Chapter 13 plan. Thus, if married debtors owned a residence
valued at $25,000, the debtor could use their $10,000 real estate residence exemption to
reduce the net equity to the creditors to $15,000 to establish the floor or minimum
payments for purposes of the plan. As noted above, the disposable income test would
determine the maximum amount but the floor would be the amount used for purposes of
determining the Code §1328(b) confirmation or hardship discharge requirements later.
(c)

Abandonment of an asset.

If the debtor's residence is fully

encumbered and the debtor is unable to either make plan payments or to cure any
arrearage for purposes of preventing the lifting of the stay, then the debtor may abandon
the asset.

The abandonment of the asset simply means that the Bankruptcy Court

jurisdiction is ended upon the entry of the Court's order approving the abandonment and
the stay, if thereafter lifted, would enable the secured creditor to file a foreclosure suit,
force a sale and receive the proceeds from the sale for application on its mortgage debt.
Any deficiency would become an unsecured claim and would be treated by the plan's
unsecured creditors' pr,?visions. Abandonment is determined by a debtor when there is
an inability to pay the mortgage payments through the terms of the plan and there is no
significant equity that needs to be preserved by the debtors in retaining the asset.

(d)

Putting the Plan Together. A sample plan, usually fitting for most

debtors, is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. and references in this section shall be made to
said Exhibit.

G-23

(1)

Steps for Formulatig Plan. The debtor's attorney, using

the information obtained from the debtor as set forth in the previous section, would
perform the following:

(2)

(a)

Calculate the debtor's budget

(b)

Determine the floor payments by doing a Chapter 7
Liquidation Analysis

(c)

Calculate the debtor's "best effort" or "disposed
income" ,

(d)

Determine the length of the plan,

(e)

Create the creditor's classifications,

(t)

Obtain debtor's authorization to proceed, and

(g)

Obtain debtor's signature on plan.

Service of Plan.

The

plan

should

be

J
filed

contemporaneously with the filing of the Petition and Schedules, but can be filed within
15 days thereafter, or even longer if approved by the Court. All creditors, the standing
Chapter 13 Trustee and all known attorneys representing creditors must be served. The
debtor's attorney is required to file in court his certificate of service of the plan.

(3)

Confirmation Bearin.:.

J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J

The proposed plan is argued

before the court at the Confirmation Hearing. The Chapter 13 Trustee will have filed
his recommendations and comments and any creditor will have filed their objections to
the plan. The court, after hearing arguments will either confirm, order amendments to
the plan or refuse to confirm. If confirmation cannot be obtained, the debtor can either

J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J

dismiss the Chapter 13 or convert to Chapter 7; the court cannot order involuntary

G-24

-

r
r

r
r
r
r

r
r
r
r
r

r
r

r
r
r

r
r

r

conversion.

D.

POST CONFIRMATION DEFAULT.

1.

Effect of Default.

If a debtor fails to comply with the provisions of his

plan, he may obtain a modification of the plan, convert to Chapter 7 or dismiss the
Chapter 13.

2.

Modification of the Plan. Code §1329 allows the debtor to modify his

plan by either increasing or reducing his plan payments, extending or reducing the time
for such payments or by altering the terms of distribution to the creditors. Modifications
have to be approved by the Court, but the limitations and conditions applicable to
confirmation of the original plan still apply to the approval of the modified plan. Code
§1329(b)(I).
3.

Dismissal or Conversion.

Under Code §1307 , the debtor may

voluntarily elect to convert to a Chapter 7 (or to a Chapter 11 or 12), but only if the
debtor so elects to be converted.

The case can be dismissed by the Court for

unreasonable delay that is prejudicial to the creditors, non-payment of fees, failure to file
a timely plan, denial of confmnation of the proposed plan, material default of a plan
term, revocation of the confirmation order, or failure to file timely such information
required to be delivered to the trustee. The above list is merely illustrative; the reason
for dismissal must be "for cause" as determined by the Court.

E.

POST-PETITION DEBT.
1.

No New Debt Intended.

The purpose of the Chapter 13 pay-back is

to payoff old debt, not to incur new debt. Any new debt that is incurred would be
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legally binding on the debtor, but because his income has been submitted to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court, a post-petition creditor cannot garnish or attach the
debtor's income being used to fund the plan. The creditor must wait until the plan is
either completed or the debtor's case is dismissed. If there is a conversion to Chapter

7, however, the post-petition-incurred debt is includable in the debt pool and is
dischargeable through the Chapter 7.

2.

Tax Debts.

Code §1305(a)(l) provides that if post-petition tax debts are

incurred, the taxing unit may file a proof of claim and seek payment through the Chapter
13. The Bankruptcy Rules provide that if the taxing unit fails to file a proof of claim,
the debtor can file one for the taxing unit so it will be paid under the plan.

3.

Consumer Debts.

Code §1305(a)(2) provides that if consumer debts are

incurred after the Chapter 13 case if filed, the creditor may file a proof of claim and seek
payment through the Chapter 13. If, however, the consumer creditor "knew or should
have known" that prior approval by the trustee of the debtor's incurring the obligation
was practicable but was not obtained, its proof of claim will be disallowed under Code
§1305(c).

4.

Non-dischar&e of Post-petition Debt.

If the debtor incurs post-petition

debt without obtaining the trustee's permission and such permission time was practicable,
then under Code §1328(d), that post-petition debt would not be included in the debtor's
discharge at the completion of the Chapter 13, but would survive the bankruptcy as a

J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
j

J
J
J
j

J
J

non-dischargeable debt.

..
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
Eastern District of Kentucky
LEXINGTON DMSION
In re:

r

r
r
r
r
r

r

Case No.
Chapter ' : : 3 : - - - - - - - -

sample

CHAPTER 13 PLAN
NOTICE
THIS PLAN CONTAINS EVIDENTIARY MATTER WHICH, IF NOT CONTROVERTED, MAYBE ACCEPTED BY
THE COURT AS TRUE. CREDITORS CANNOT VOTE ON THIS PLAN BUT MAY OBJECT TO ITS
CONFIRMATION PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY CODE § 1324, AND LOCAL RULES. ABSENT ANY SUCH
OBJECTION, THE COURT MAY CONFIRM THIS PLAN AND ACCEPT THE VALUATION AND ALLEGATIONS
CONTAINED HEREIN.
The Debtor(s) above named hereby proposes the following plan.

I. ~ All debts are provided for by this Plan. Only creditors holding claims duly proved and allowed shall be entitled to payments from
the Trustee. (See Notice of Filing for Bar Date.) Trustee shall not file a claim on behalf of any creditor.
2. Payments. As of the date of this Plan, the debtor has paid $0.00 to the Trustee. Debtor and/or any entity from whom the income shall
, for 60 months for total of $0.00 or until such
pay to the Trustee the sum of $0.00 Monthly, commencing
amounts are paid that will afford payment of all allowed and proven claims in the amounts payable under this Plan.

3. Plan Payments. The Trustee, from available funds, shall make payments to creditors in the following amounts and order. All dates for
beginning of payments are estimates only and may be adjusted by the Trustee as necessary to carry out the terms of this plan.
A. DEBTOR'S
ATTORNEY

FEE
REQUESTED

PAID TO
DATE

BALANCE
DUE

--- PAYMENT SCHEDULE --PAYMENT MONTH LENGTH

TOTAL
PAYMENTS

NOIfE

r
r
r

B. Mortgage Arrears. (Regular monthly payments to be made by Debtor and to start on the first due date after date of filing petition.)

r

i.

r

D.

r

D. Prioritv Claims. (Unsecured claims entitled to priority under II U.S.C. § 507 shall be paid in full as foIlows.)

r
r
r

CREDITOR

RAtE

ARREARS

--- PAYMENT SCHEDULE - PAYMENT MONTH LENGTH

TOTAL
PAYMENTS

NONE
C. Secured Claims. (A creditor's secured claim shall be the net amount due as of date of filing or the value of the collateral to which
creditor's lien attaches, whichever is less. Interest shall be allowed at contract rate or 12.00% APR whichever is less. Creditor shall retain
its lien until the allowed secured portion of the claim is fully paid.)
CREDITOR &
COLLATERAL

RATE

CLAIM

- - PAYMENT SCHEDULE --PAYMENT MONTH LENGTH

TOTAL
PAYMENTS

Secured Claims - Paid in full

NOIfE
Secured Claims - Cure default only

NOIfE

PRIORITY
CLAIM

CREDITOR

- - PAYMENT SCHEDULE --PAYMENT MONTH LENGTH

TOTAL
PAYMENTS

NONE
E. Separate Class of Unsecured Claims. (May include co-signed debts as provided for by II U.S.C. § 1301, including interest at contract
rate.)
CREDITOR &
CLASSIFICATION

RATE

UNSECURED
CLAIM

NOIfE

Chapter 13 Plan - Page I of 3

G-27

--- PAYMENT SCHEDULE --PAYMENT MONTH LENGTH

TOTAL
PAYMENTS

In re:

Case No. :::-_ _ _ _ _ __
Chapter 13

sample

F. Unsecured Creditors. (All other creditors not scheduled above are deemed unsecured without priority and shall be paid pro rata from
funds remaining after payment of the above scheduled claims. Debtor estimates the unsecured claims to total $0.00, and proposes to
provide at least $0.00, which will pay in full said creditors claims, or in no event, provide a composition percentage ofIess than 0%.
(Funds ProvidedlUnsecured Claims)
G. Lien Avoidance. (Debtor intends to file a motion, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 4003(d) to avoid all nonpossessory, nonpurchase
money security interests and judicial liens as provided by I I U .S.C. §522(f), and the plan herein provides for payment of such liens as
general unsecured claims only. Any creditors claim or portion thereof not listed in paragraph C. above is to be treated as unsecured and,
unless objected to, such unsecured status, for purposes of this plan, will be binding upon confirmation, but the lien shall survive unless
avoided.
H. Leases and Contracts. The Debtor hereby assumes the following unexpired leases and executory contracts, and rejects all others.
NAME OF CREDITOR

DESCRIPTION

HOD
L

Miscellaneous Provisions.

HOD
4. Secured Claims - Paid directly by debtor!s>. The following creditors' claims are fully secured, shall be paid directly by the debtors;
and shall receive no payments under paragraph 3 above:
CREDITOR

COLLATERAL

~TVALUE

AMOUNTOFCLMM

HOllE
5. Future Income. Debtor(s} submits all future earnings or other future income to such supervision and control of the Trustee as is necessary for
the execution of this Plan.
6. Standing Trustee Percentage Fee. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §586(e)(B), the Attorney General, after consultation with the United States Trustee,
sets a percentage fee not to exceed ten percent of payments made to creditors by the Trustee under the terms of this Plan.

J
J
J
j

J
J
J
J
J
J

J
j

J
J
J
J
J

1

J
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In re:

r
r

Case No. :=-_ _ _ _ _ __
Chapter 13

sample

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF PLAN PAYMENTS TO BE MADE BY TRUSTEE

A. Total debt provided under the Plan and administrative expenses
Attorney Fees
Mortgage Arrears
Secured Claims
Priority Claims
S. Separate Class of Unsecured Claims
6. All other unsecured Creditors

r

* Total payments must equal total of payments set forth in paragraph 2 on page I of this Plan.

r
r

B. Reconciliation with Chapter 7
I. Interest of unsecured creditors if Chapter 7 tiled
a. Total property of debtor
b. Property securing debt
c. Exempt property
d. Priority unsecured claims
e. Funds for Chapter 7 distribution (est.)

r

r

r

0.00
0.00
0.00

Total payments to above Creditors
Trustee percentage
* Total Debtor payments to the Plan

r

r
Ir
Ir

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

1.
2.
3.
4.

2. Percent of unsecured, nonpriority claims paid under Plan

0%

3. Percent of unsecured, nonpriority claims paid if Chapter 7 tiled (est.)

0%

Attorney for Debtor(s):

Signed:
sample, Debtor

Barno.
BUNCH & BROCK
271 WEST SHORT STREET, SUITE 80S
P.O. BOX 2086
LEXINGTON KY 40588-2086
(606)254-5522
Signed:

Dated:

r
r
r
r

r

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
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WORKING WITH THE CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE'S OFFICE

Beverly M. Burden
Chapter 13 Trustee
U.S. Bankruptcy Court
Eastern District ofKentucky
Lexington, Kentucky
and

William W. Lawrence
Attorney at Law
Chapter 13 Trustee
U.S. Bankruptcy Court
Western District of Kentucky
Louisville, Kentucky
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r
r
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Copyright 2000, Beverly M. Burden, William W. Lawrence
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WORKING WITH THE CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE'S OFFICE
IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

BEVERLY M. BURDEN
CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE

MAILING ADDRESS:

PO Box 2204
Lexington KY 40588

PAYMENT ADDRESS:

Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY
PO Box 1766
Memphis TN 38101-1766

LOCATION:

100 East Vine Street
Suite 500
Lexington KY 40507

TELEPHONE:

859-233-1527

FAX:

859-255-3143

E-MAIL ADDRESS
(FOR GENERAL INQUIRIES):

questions@ch13edky.com

r

WEBSITE:

r

CASE INFO. AVAILABLE
FOR AUTHORIZED USERS AT:

www.ch13edky.com

www.13network.com

r
r
r
,
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOCAL RULES & FORMS SPECIFIC TO CHAPTER 13 CASES
LOCAL RULES

1.1

Below is tIre hypertext versioll ofthe Local Rules and Orders for the US Bankruptcy COllrt, Eastem District of
Kenlllcky. Ifyou 'd prefer, you can also clroose Adobe Acrobat (PDF) versions ofour Local Rules and Standing Orders
or tire 1999 amendments to tile Federal Rules QfBankruptq procedure. Ifyou do not have tile free Acrobat Reader,
you can also get it "ere. (l'lrese files are large-you may wislr to right-click on the lilrks and save tIre documelns to your
local drive.) There are a number ofonlille versions ofthe Federal Rilles ofBallkruptcy. YOll may find tIre L6gJzL
I,,/Ormation Inuitute version at Cornell Law Sellool website helpfuL

For Proofs of Claim and other official bankruptcy forms
visit bttp:llwww.uSCQurts.govlbankform/
Ifyou need these materials in an another format, please call us at (859) 233-2608, x. 134, or seud us e-lUaU.

Local Rules and Forms of the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky
Effective May 1, 1997

Note: These Rilles were amended by

~

r dated JanuaO' 1.199£ November 1, 1998.
• IAII these are reproduced at the end of this
page. Please refer to those amen menls as well as to the text of the Rules.

My 1.1999, December 29, 1999, an

Note also that a new lJl1J},{~fir11lation Agreemendrasbeenisslled by tire
Administrative Office of the Courts.

Also, effective February 15, 1999, motions for relief in Jlldge Howard's cases must be noticed for
hearing in the division to which the case is assigned. Except where an order allowing a hearing in a
different division is obtained prior to tlte filing of a motion for relief, no relief motions sltall be
noticed for Itearing on Lexington motion days otlter titan cases in tlte Lexington division.
HONORABLE WILLIAM S. HOWARD, CHIEF JUDGE
HONORABLE JOE LEE, JUDGE

TABLE OF RULES
1001-1. Citation and Author~
1001-2. Organization of Local Rules
1002-1. Petition - General- Number of Copies of Petition and Schedules Required to be Filed
With the Clerk
1002-2. Petitjoll=.Ats.embJ.e~.le
1002-3. Petition - Corporation
1004-1. Petiilim - Partn.ership.
1006-1. Fees - Installment payments
1007-1. Lists, Schedules & Statements - Petition not Accompanied bUclwlyleS.J}J.!d..staleme.nts
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LOCAL RULES
1007-2. Mailing - List or Matrix
1071-1. Dhisions - Bankruptcy Court
2002-1. Notice to Creditors & Other Interested Parties -- General 10 Day Notice Requirement
2016-1. Compensation of Professionals - Requirements Supplemental Fee Applications
1/3001-1. Claims and Equity Security Interests General
lA002-1. Claim - Proof of by Creditor Holding a Secured Claim in Chapter 13 Case
3003-1. Claims - Chapter 11 Case
3009-1. Dividends - Chapter 7 Asset Cases - Deadline for Amending Claims
\/3015-1. Chapter 13 - Plan - Service of Plan
LAOI5-2. Chapter 13 Amendments to Plans Service of Plan .
~015-3.

Chapter 13 - Confirmation

3017-1. Disclosure Statement - Approval
3020-1. Confirmation of Chapter 11 Plan - Hearing on
4001-1. Automatic Stay - Relief From
4001-4. Hearings on Motions for Relief From Stay in the Lexington Division
4001-5. Hearings on Motions for Relief From Stay in Divisions Other Than Lexington
4003-1. Exemptions
4003-2. Lien Avoidance
4008-1. Reaffirmation
5001-2. Clerk- Office LocationlHours
5005-1. Filing Papers - Requirements
5006-1. Court Papers - Uncertified Copies
6004-1. Sale of Estate Property
6008-1. Redemption
7007-1. Motion Practice (in Adversary Proceedings)
7026- t. Discovery - General
7067-1. Registry Fund
9014-1. Hearings on Motions
9014-2. Contested Matters - Under Submission
9022-1. Judgments & Orders - Notice of

FORMS
1. Special Reqyirements for Mailing List Matrix
(see an importantNotitconcerning the Matrix)
&1'2. Chapter 13 Plan.
l1e"I(c'" ~'1
S1"",.Jl)'N~ Cou.qf O~Mc2.
1,\ I., ~ (. v
I)
3• Certificate of Service of Plan.
4. Order Confirming Chapter 13 Plan.
of Au, US1' I J 20 aO
5. Motion for Relief From Stay.
6. Objection to Exemptions.
7(1). Motion for Order Avoiding Lien on Exempthap~.
7M. Motion for Order Ayoiding Lien on Exempt.lr.o.p~.
8...Motion for Approval of Reaffirmation Agreement.
9. Motion to Redeem Prop~

.v

.v.

J
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LOCAL RULES

section 327 or 1103 of title 11 must have attached thereto a copy of the order of retention or
authorization.
Supplemental fee applications shall, in the same manner as original fee applications, contain all the
infonnation required by Rule 2016 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

/

RULE 3001-1. CLAIMS AND EQt1lTY SECURITY INTERESTS - GENERAL
Each proof of claim, with supporting documents evidencing the claim and the perfection of a security
interest, if any, shall be submitted in duplicate, one original copy, complete with supporting
documents, for the court case file, and one conformed copy, complete with supporting documents, for
the trustee's case file. The original copy, which must bear the original signature of the claimant, shall
be retained by the clerk in the court case file. The conformed copy, which may bear a photocopy of the
claimant's signature, but which otherwise shall be complete in all respects with supporting documents,
shall be forwarded by the clerk to the trustee.
The trustee shall examine and object to any defective or insufficiently documented claim, if any useful
purpose would be served thereby.
Upon request, the Clerk of Court shall provide claimants with instructions for filing proofs of claim.
The requirements for filing in duplicate and documenting proofs of claim apply with equal force to any
proof of an equity security interest in a debtor corporation.

/

RULE 3002-1. CLAIM - PROOF OF BY CREDITOR HOLDING A SECURED CLAIM IN
CHAPTER 13 CASE

A proof of claim in conformity with Local Rule 3001-1 by or on behalf of a creditor, including a
creditor holding a secured claim, other than a claim secured by an interest in real estate, must be filed in
a chapter 13 case before the debtor or trustee may make payments to such creditor in accordance with
the plan. Proof of a secured claim filed after the expiration of the time fixed by Rule 3002(c) of the
Federal Rules of Banlcruptcy Procedure for filing claims shall be allowed only to the extent of the value
of the collateral securing the claim.
RULE 3003-1. CLAIMS - CHAPTER 11 CASE

Unless the court for cause shown orders otherwise, the cutoff date for filing unscheduled claims or
claims scheduled as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated in a chapter 11 case shall· be the date of the
order approving the disclosure statement.
RULE 3009-1. DMDENDS - CHAPTER 7 ASSET CASES - DEADLINE FOR AMENDING
CLAIMS

When estate funds are available in a chapter 7 case for payment of a dividend to creditors holding
allowed unsecured claims, the deadline for filing an amended claim for any deficiency remaining after
the liquidation of collateral or for requesting an extension of time within which to file an amended
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LOCAL RULES

r

claim shall be the date of the final hearing on applications for compensation or, in divisions other than
the Lexington division, if applications for compensation are filed on a notice and opportunity basis,
such deadline shall be the last date for objecting to such applications for compensation in accordance
with the notice. No dividend shall be paid on an amended claim filed after that date by a creditor who
did not timely request an extension of time within which to amend the claim.

r

r/
r
r

RULE 3015-1. CRAPTER 13 - PLAN - SERVICE OF PLA N

~a.

~o

(a) Foun of plan.
pter 13 plan shall conform substantially Form No.2 with such alterations as
may be approprif ~y- suit .the circumstances.
. R.l"'st~ 6'1 srt1N ~ ''''6-Cott'li OJ( 6l~ nAT( I)
(b) Service of plan. Concurrently with the filing ofthe plan the debtor or the debtor's attorney shall

cause a copy of the plan to be served by first class mail upon all creditors of the debtor and other
parties in interest. The debtor or the debtor's attorney shall file with the plan a certificate of service in
the form prescribed by Form No.3 certifying that a copy of the plan has been served by first class mail
upon all creditors of the debtor and parties in interest.
RULE 3015-2. CHAPTER 13 - AMENDMENTS TO PLANS - SERVICE OF PLAN

r

r/
r

r
r
r
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r
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A modified chapter 13 plan shall be served upon all creditors and parties in interest and shall be
accompanied by a certificate of service in the same manner as the original plan. The modified plan and
the order confirming a modified plan shall identify the plan as the First, Second, etc. Modified Plan
Dated _ _ _ _,
RULE 3015-3. CHAPTER 13 - CONFIRMATION
uq~~o.sJ;oJ.~lfiDtDaJw·:m..

An objection to confirmation of a chapter 13 plan is governed by
deral Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Such objection shall be filed with the court
ays prior to the hearing on confirmation of the plan, shall be served upon the debtor,
e debtor and the chapter 13 trustee, and shall be noticed for hearing at the hearing on
confirmation f
plan. An objection by a creditor to the reconunendation of the chapter 13 trustee as
to the allow tl amo t of the secured claim of such creditor may be presented at thelhraring on
confirmati of the Ian.
~l V\StD 0'1 srAN~IJ\lG- OR!)(wt O~ g , o'D
(2) Hearing on Confinnation. The court shall rule on confirmation ofa chapter 13 plan after hearing on'
notice to the debtor, the attorney for the debtor, and all creditors, including creditors holding secured
claims, and any creditor who has timely filed an objection to confirmation of the plan. Notice of the
hearing on confirmation of a chapter 13 plan may be combined with the notice of the meeting of
creditors given pursuant to Rule 2002 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Ifno objection is
timely filed, the court, without hearing evidence, may find that the plan has been proposed in good
faith and not by any means forbidden by law.
~""""""""'~""""'''''''l''~'I.U.

The order of confirmation of a chapter 13 plan shall conform substantially
copy of the order shall be served promptly upon the debtor or the attorney for the
trustee, and any creditor who timely filed an objection to confirmation of the

{(HIS( D 81./ STA.AI ~lN"
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
STANDING ORDER
Effective August 1.2000. Local Rules 30IS-1(a}. 301S-3(a)(1) and 301S-3(b) [E.D. Ky. LBR 30 IS-I(a}.
aD. Ky. LBR 30IS-3(a)(I) and E.D. Ky. LBR 301S-(b)] arc hereby amended to rcad as follows:
RULE 3015-1. CHAPTER 13 - PLAN - SERVICE OF PLAN
(a) Fonn of Plan. A chapter 13 plan shall conform to Form No.2 as revised 08/01/00.
RULE 3015-3. CHAPTER 13 - CONFIRMATION
(a)( 1) Objections to Confinnation. An objection to confirmation of a chapter 13 plan is governed
by Rule 9014 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. In cases pending in all divisions except

j
i,

~-

j

•j
'.,l'~

I
I

Lexington. such objection to confirmation. for any reason. including valuation. shall b~ fjled with the court
and served upon the debtor. the attorney for the debtor and the chapter 13 trustee at or p~or to the date first
set for the meeting of creditors and in cases pending in the Lexington division within ten (10) days after the
date first set for the meeting of creditors. The objection to confirmation shall be noticed for hearing at the
hearing on confirmation of the plan.
(b) Order of Confirmation. The order of confirmation of a chapter 13 plan shall conform
substantially to Form No.4 as revised 08/01100 and a copy of the order shall be served promptly upon the
debtor or the attorney for the debtor. the chapter 13 trustee. and any creditor who timely filed an objection
to

confirmation of the plan.
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FORM NO.2
(rev. 08101/00)
~~TEDSTATESBANKRUPTCYCOURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
_ _ _ _ DIVISION

INRE:
CASE NO. _ _ __

r

DEBTOR(S)

r

Reference to "Debtor" herein shall include both Debtors in ajoint case.

r

CHAPTER 13 PLAN

I.

PROPOSED PLAN PAYMENTS AND DURATION OF THE PLAN.

A.
Plan Payments. The Debtor submits all or such portion of Debtor's future earnings or other income as is
necessary for the execution of the plan to the control of the Trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(I).

r
r

1.

o

the sum of $_ _ each _ _"

OR

o

r

r
r

The Debtor shall pay to the Trustee out of Debtor's future earnings or other income (check one):

the monthly step plan payments set forth below:

I

through
through

2.

The Debtor shall also pay to the Trustee periodic payments as follows:
Frequency of Payment

Payment Due Date

Source of Periodic Payment

B.
Duration (pool Plan Only). The duration of the plan shall be _ _ months. (If blank. the duration of the
plan shall be sixty (60) months).
C.
Total Amount to be Paid (pool Plan Only). The Debtor shall pay a ''pool'' amount of $_ _ to the
Trustee to complete payments under the plan (pool amount equals monthly payments times duration plus additional
periodic payments).

r
r

r
r
r

D.

Method of Payment. Plan payments shall be made to the Trustee by (check one):

o

Payroll Deduction:
(specify 0 H or 0 W in joint case)
Employer Name:
Address:
and
Phone Number:

OR

o

Direct payments by the Debtor. However, Payroll Deductions will start if the Debtor does not
make payments when due.

H-7
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ll.

TREATMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.

A.
Attorney's Fee. An attorney's fee for Debtor's counsel will be requested by separate application and shall
be paid as allowed by the Court. It is estimated that the amount of the attorney's fee to be paid through the plan is
$_ _. Unless otherwise ordered, the attorney's fee will be paid before creditors receive payments.
B.
Trustee's Fee. The percentage fee payable to the Trustee shall be paid before or at the time of each
payment to creditors and other claimants.
Other Administrative Expenses. All other expenses entitled to administrative priority under 11 U.S.C. §
C.
507(a)(I) shall be paid before creditors are paid.

m.

TREATMENT OF SECURED CLAIMS.

A.

Secured Claims To Be Paid Inside the Plan.

1.
Unless otherwise provided in the plan or ordered by the Court, each of the following secured
claims, if allowed, shall be paid inside the plan, on a pro rata basis with all other allowed secured claims, to the
extent of the proposed secured value or the amount of the claim, whichever is less. Any remaining portion of the
claim shall be treated as a general unsecured claim.

Secured Creditor

Collateral Description

Estimated
AmountoC
Claim

Proposed
Secured
Value

Proposed
Interest
Rate*

* If blank, the mterest rate shall be the contract rate.
2.
The holder of any allowed secured claim provided for by the plan shall retain a lien until the
allowed secured portion of the claim is fully paid.
3.
Secured claims shall be paid after administrative claims are paid and before all other priority
claims are paid.

j

I
i
j

I
I
I
I
I
I'·
..

B.

Mortgages, Leases, and Other Debts To Be Paid Outside the Plan.

1.
Payments Outside the Plan by Debtor. The Debtor shall pay the following claims, except any
prepetition arrearage, outside the plan by making payments directly to the creditors. The claims of such creditors
shall be paid pursuant to the underlying contracts.

Secured
Creditor

Collateral
Description

Maturity
DateoC
Note

Estimated
AmountoC
Arrearages

Interest
Rate on
Arrearage*

* Ifblank, the mterest rate shall be the contract rate.
2.
Payments Outside the Plan by Third Party. The following claims shall be paid outside the plan
by a non-filing third party making payments directly to the creditor. The claims of such creditors shall be paid
pursuant to the underlying contracts.
Secured
Creditor

Collateral
Description

Name oC Party to
Make Payments

H-8
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C.
Prepetition Arrearages To Be Paid Inside the Plan. Unless Section VII of the Plan ("Special
Provisions") specifically provides otherwise, any claim filed by a creditor for prepetition arrearages on a debt to be
paid outside the plan shall be treated as a secured claim to be paid inside the plan concurrently with all other allowed
secured claims. If no interest rate is specified, interest shall be paid at the contract rate.
Surrender of Property. The Debtor surrenders the following property. Upon confmnation the automatic
D.
stay is terminated as to the collateral being surrendered. No distnbutions shall be made to the secured creditor until
such time as an amended claim for the deficiency is filed by the creditor. Any allowed claim for a deficiency shall
be treated as a general unsecured claim.
Secured Creditor

Collateral Description

E.
Avoidance ofUens under 11 U.s.C. § 522(1). The liens of the following creditors are avoided under 11
U.S.C. § 522(1). The allowed claims of such creditors shall be treated as general unsecured claims.
Secured Creditor

Collateral Description

F.
All Other Secured Claims. Any creditor filing a claim as secured that is not otherwise provided for by
this plan or Court order shall be treated as a claim secured to the extent of the value of the collateral set forth in the
proof of claim, to be paid inside the plan with interest at the contract rate.

G.
Orders Granting Relief From Stay. If at any time during the life of the plan an order terminating the
automatic stay is entered, no further distributions shall be made to the secured creditor obtaining stay relief until
such time as such creditor files an amended claim. Any allowed claim for a deficiency shall be treated as a general
unsecured claim.
IV.

TREATl\IENT OF PRIORITY CLAIMS.

Priority Claims To Be Paid Inside the Plan. The following claims are entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. § 507
and shall be paid inside the pian in full, in deferred cash payments, after administrative claims and secured claims
are paid and before unsecured non-priority claims are paid. (Claims entitled to administrative priority are paid
pursuant to Section IT of the plan).
Creditor Holding Priority Claim

Description of Claim

Estimated Amount of Claim

v.

TREATMENT OF UNSECURED CLAIMS.

A.

Estimated Amount of Unsecured Debt (from Schedule F): _ _

B.

General Unsecured Claims.

1.
The claims of creditors holding allowed unsecured claims shall be paid pro-rata over the period of
the plan after payment of administrative, secured and priority claims.

2.

General unsecured claims shall be paid (check one):

o

In full;

o

o

OR
To the extent of _ _ cents on the dollar ("fixed percentage plan")*;
OR
To the greatest extent possible from payments to be made by the Debtor ("pool plan").

* A fixed percentage plan shall be treated as a 36-month pool plan if unsecured creditors will receive more.
H-9

3.
No interest accruing after the date of the filing of the petition shall be paid on the claims of·
creditors holding unsecured claims.
C.
Co-Signed Debts To Be Paid in Full. The following creditors holding unsecured claims for which a nonfiling debtor is also liable shall be paid in full, without interest, concurrently with other unsecured creditors.
Creditor

VI.

Description of Claim

Co-Signer

Relationship to Debtor

REJECTION OF LEASES AND EXECUTORY CONTRACTS.

The Debtor hereby rejects the following leases and executory contracts and will surrender the leased property.
Creditor

Vll.

Description of Leased Property or Nature of Contract

SPECIAL PROVISIONS.

The Debtor proposes the following special provisions.

DATED: ____________________

DEBTOR

DEBTOR

ATTORNEY FOR DEBTOR
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FORM NO. 4
(rev. 08/01100)
UNnED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR mE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
_ _ _ _ DMSION
INRE

r
r

CASE NO. _ _ __
DEBTOR(S}
ORDER CONFIRMING CHAPTER 13 PLAN
DATED _ _ _ __

A plan under chapter 13 having been filed and served by the debtor on all creditors, and it appearing that

r

the plan meets the requirements for confirmation, IT IS ORDERED:

I

r

The plan is confirmed.
The trustee shall serve copies of this order on the persons named below.

r

r
r

r

r,..

Dated:

By thecoun,.

Bankruptcy Judge

Copies to be served by the chapter 13 trustee on:

#

r
r

r

r
,r
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Chapter 13 Trustee
Eastern District of Kentucky
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Chapter 13 § 341 Meeting Procedures .....
effective June 1,2000

Attendance by debtors: The court has instructed the trustee that 341 meetings are not to
be continued unless the trustee has an order sustaining a mo"tion to continue the meeting. If the
trustee does not have an order sustaining a motion to continue the 341 meeting, the trustee is
required to file a motion to dismiss. Any motion to continue the 341 meeting must be
accompanied by an affidavit of the person so requesting (debtor or counsel) and must be served
on the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and all creditors listed on the debtor's mailing matrix.
In the event an emergency prevents the debtor from attending the 341 meeting and
counsel is thereby unable to obtain an order continuing the 341 meeting prior to the meeting, it is
advisable for counsel to file the motion to continue, accompanied by the requisite affidavit, and
notice it for hearing at the same time as the trustee's motion to dismiss. The court generally does
not consider "I couldn't get off work" to be a sufficient reason to avoid dismissal.
If a debtor is incapacitated and physically unable to attend the 341 meeting even at a later
date, a motion requesting that the debtor be permitted to undergo the 341 examination by
interrogatories should be filed.

Attendance by counsel for debtor: Failure of an attorney to appear or to make advance
arrangements for a colleague to appear in hislher behalf could result in the filing of a motion" to
dismiss. The trustee does not object to another attorney volunteering at the 341 to fill in for the
absent attorney so that the debtors do not suffer as a result of the attorney's failure to appear.
However, unless the absent attorney subsequently files a motion to excuse the attorney's absence
and an affidavit in support thereof, the trustee will likely object to counsel's fees.
Production of documents: When a bankruptcy petition is filed, an Order to Debtor is
issued by the court within a day and is served on the debtor immediately. The Order requires the
debtor to send to the trustee within 10 days of the Order (which usually means 10 or 11 days
after the petition is filed) the following documents:

>
~

~

>
>

a copy of all deeds, land contracts, etc.
a copy of recorded mortgages, liens, etc.
a copy of certificates of title for cars, mobile homes, 4-wheelers, boats, trailers, motor
homes, motorcycles, campers, motor homes, etc.
a copy of the last state and federal income tax returns
a copy of paycheck stubs for the preceding month

The Order provides that "Counsel for the debtor is responsible for seeing that the
debtor complies with this order."
The Order further provides that "Failure to timely comply with this order will result in
the filing of a motion to dismiss the within case."

H-13
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Although some attorneys have their clients send the documents to the trustee directly,
most attorneys collect the documents from their client and forward copies to the trustee. The
trustee prefers the latter practice and is especially appreciative when the documents are
accompanied by a checklist showing what is included. No matter how the documents are
transmitted to the trustee, the debtor's name and case number must be identified either on each
document or in a cover sheet affixed to the documents.
In the past debtors were directed to bring documents to the 341 meeting. Because of the
fast-track confinnation procedure, it is imperative that documents be provided as ordered.

Please note that the chapter 13 trustee does not need bank statements, pleadings in
foreclosure actions, proof of insurance, contracts for the purchase of personal property, and other
documents other than those required to be produced by the Order to Debtor. The trustee will
request additional documents on an as-needed basis.
Examination of debtor: The trustee will swear in the debtor. Counsel for the debtor will
then ask a series of questions as prescribed by the trustee, and the trustee will also ask a series of
questions as appropriate and necessary. Any creditors in attendance will also be given an
opportunity to ask questions. If necessarY, the trustee may continue the 341 if additional time is
needed to complete the examination.
Counsel should advise their clients immediately preceding the examination to speak up,
to answer all questions ''yes'' or ''no'' rather than by head-nodding or "uh-huh", and that both
debtors must answer all questions in a joint case.
Payments: The trustee will not accept plan payments at the 341 meeting (or at any
hearing). All payments must be mailed to the trustee's lockbox address.
In all divisions but Lexington, by the time of the 341 meeting, the debtor should have
made the first payment due under the plan. In some instances if the plan was filed subsequent to
the petition, the first payment might not yet be due. The trustee will verify this, and the debtor
will be expected to know when the first payment is due. Please refer to the "Chapter 13
Delinquency Procedure" for further infonnation.

J
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EASI'ERL~ DlSIRIcr OF KENTUCKY

(tee) 233-1527

's~

BEVERLY M. BURDEN, 'IRUS'IEE

./11

CAS t ;Ii:

r
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... PA)1MENTS ...

r
r
r.
r
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1. Monthly payments to the Trustee are:
2. Your fia:t payment is due on or before:
3. Man your personal check or money order to:
Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY
P. O. Box 1766

Memphis, 'IN 38101-1766
4. Write your CASE NUMBER AND NAME on every check,
money order or cashiers check.

s.

DO NOT SEND CASH OR POST DATED CHECKS III

6. Office hours are from 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM weekdays.
... PA'l?R.OIJ, DEPUCI]ON ...

can us with the exact NAME and ADDRESS ofyour Employer IE you
want your Chapter 13 payments taken directly from your paycheck.
payron Deducdons should begin within a week or two. Check w.1th
your employer Ifthey do not! You will get a copy oCthe Order
when your employer does•.. (We cannot set up pa-yments to be sent directly from your checldng or savings- account.)
Yellow or Golden Rod

H:"15
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..··l\USCELLANEOUS INFORMATION'"
1. The Trustee's office advises Bankruptcy Court whether or not
your Chapter 13 plan should be approved. We also handle the
money to pay your creditors (people you owe) after Court
approves or ·confirmsn your plan.
••••••• Paym.ents wn not be made to your creditors until
your case Is conf1rm.ed by the Court ........

S,'"

2. We mall a report oCyour case to you every "hy e. months.
CHECK TInS REPORT CAREF1JLLY.
All your creditors that
med a clajm will be Bsted on the report. ICyou disagree with
any oCthe amounts given to us by your creditors, call your

attorney immediately to me an objection to the claim.
3. You must get the permission oCthe Trustee and Bankruptcy
Court beCore seJling, giving away or getting rid of any ofyour
property or possessions whlle in bankruptcy. (Thls permission'
needs to be In the Corm. of,a written Order).
4. Do not buy anything on credit without the permission oCthe

Trustee and the Court.
5. Do not make any direct paym.ents to creditors without court
approvaL (This may not apply to your house or car payments).
Ask your attorney iCyou are supposed to make any direct
.

paym.ents ·outside the plan..
6. Give us: Your NEW address and phone number iCyou move.
Your NEW employers name and address iCit cbanges.

Give: Bankruptcy Court your NEW address also (606-233-2608).
7. You must pay your regular home mortgage paym.ents on time.

Call your attorney iCyour mortgage company does not accept
your paym.ent.
8. Call your attorney With any quesdons about your Chapter 13

plan.
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Chapter 13 Trustee's Office
Payment Schedule

M.CfM8!.( looo}
11I[~£

LAIJrl5

Please use this check-list to help you keep track of IJl (JR.~v' be ~ A1 rtf [.
the Chapter 13 payments you have made.
341 ftf.til JJ~.

Day of Month Payments are Due: XX

(OVfIJN /3001($ WILL
No L.o,,}G-£ R.

r

r
r
r
r

8[ PRo'l' Md

A fTtl( C<J,v n~""A1'I(J/J.
May-04
June-04
July-04
August-04
September-04
October-04

r
r

WIL.L

Some plans are set up for less than 60 payments. Please check your plan to see
how many months you need to pay and how much your payments are.
Attached are labels printed with your name and case number.
Please place these labels in the "note" or "memo" section of every check or money
order you send to ensure that your payment is posted to your case.
Send payments to:
CHAPTERI3TRUSTEE,EDKY
POBOX 1766
MEMPHIS TN 38101-1766
We are also enclosing labels with this address for your convenience.
We will not accept payments at our Lexington office or at any court hearing.
H-17

Debtor
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PAYROLL DEDUCTION INFORMATION.
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IF you would like your Chapter 13 Bankruptcy payments
to be deducted from your paycheck by your employer,

please provide us with the following inform.ation:
Your Chapter 13 Case Number _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Payroll Deducdon Is for:
(Your Nam.e)
Name and Address ofYour Employer:
(Where your payroll actually comes from)

Phone Number and Person to Contact at Payroll Office:
.(Circle one below)
How Do You Get Paid:
Weekly
Bi-Weekly
Semi-Monthly
(every 2 weeks)
(15th, 30th)

Monthly

The Trusteels Office will send a Court Order to your
Employer. It should take a week or two for payments to
begin. (CONTINUE MAKING YOUR REGUlAR
PAYMENTS TO 'I'IIE TRUSTEE UNTn.. YOU SEE IT HAS
STAR.'IED COMING OUT OF YOUR PAYCHECK!)
MAIL TInS FORM TO: PDO CLERK

(859) 233-1527

CHAPI'ER 13 rmUS'IEEIS OFFICE
P. O. Box 2204
Lexington, KY 40588-2204

IIA payroll deduction order can only be started by a
signed Court Order by the Judge and can only be stopped
by a signed Court Order by the Judge:1

Green
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
Eastern District of Kentucky
Lexington Division

Case No:
aka/dba:

Chapter: 13

Debtur(s)

r

r
r
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r
r
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r

r

i. . .

In rc:

Trustee: Beverly M Burden
100 E Vine St #500
PO Box 2204
Lexington, KY 40588-2204
859-233-1527

CHAPTER 13 ORDER TO DEBTOR
The debtor shan send the following documents to the trustee, whose name and address appear above,
within] () days from the date of thIS order. The debtor's name and case number must be Identified on
each document or in a cover letter affixed to the documents:

1. A copy of all deeds or contracts under which the debtor holds title to or any interest in
reaT estate (copies may be obtained from the office of the county cOUl1 Clerk of the county in
which the real estate is located);
2. A copy of all recorded mortgages, liens, or encumbrances on all real estate in which the
debtor holds an interest (copIes may be obtained from the oiIice of the county court clerk of
the county in which the real estate is· located);

3. A coPY of all Certificates of Title on which the debtor's name appears as owner
indIvidually or jointly of any motor vehicles, mobile homes, trailers, boats, motor homes,
campers, motorcycles, or all-terrain vehicles (do not send Oliginals)(if original titles have
he en lost, duplicates must be obtained from the office of the county court clerk of the county
in which the vehicles are registered);

4. A copy or the debtor's last state and federal income tax returns (do not send originals);

5. A cop)' of paycheck stubs or equivalent documents issued by the debtor's employer
showing gross earnings and an deductions for the month ended just before the filing·of the
casco
The debtor is rcstrained and enjoined from selling, transferring, abandoning, releasing to ("Teditors, or
in any way disposing of property until further orders of the COUl1.

Failure to timely comply with this order will result in the filing of a motion to dismiss the
within case.
Counsel for the debtor is responsible for seeing that the debtor complies with this order.
Dated:
By the court-

.- .

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
H- 21
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MESSAGE TO CHAPTER 13 DEBTORS
ABOUT TODAYS MEETING OF CREDITORS

Today you are attending the "341 Meeting" 01' a "Meeting of Cl'editors." Someone
from the Chapter 13 Trustee's Office presides at the meeting. This meeting is tape
recorded. You will be asked to take an oath that everything you say is true and
COl"rect to the best of your knowledge. You will be asked questions about YOUl'
bankruptcy case. Your testimony is under penalty of perjury.
•

Please speak up so that your voice can be heard on the tape.

•

Please answer the questions "yes" or "no" instead of "uh-huh" or nodding your
head.

•

If you have filed a joint petition with your spouse, both of you need to answer
every question.

•

If you do not understand a question, please say so.

• Please feel fi.·ee to explain your answel'S.
•

Remember, you must answer all questions truthfully and completely....
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CHAPTER 13 CREDITOR MEETINGS

Please state your name and social security number for the record.

r

{SHOW DEBTOR A COPY OF PAGE 2 OF PETITION) Is this your signature?

r

In the paperwork you filed with the Bankruptcy Court, did you list everything that you
own?

r
r

Did you list everyone that you owe money to?

r

Is all the information contained in the petition and schedules true and correct to the best
of your knowledge?
Has anything changed since you filed your bankruptcy?
Are there any corrections or additions you need to make?

r

Have you ever filed bankruptcy before?
(IF YES):
When?

r

Have you made your first chapter 13 payment yet?

r
r

r

(IF A DEBTOR IS EMPLOYED): Are there any deductions from your paycheck for:
retirementJ401 k
profit sharing
stock purchase plan
Christmas club or vacation account
credit union or other savings
child support
garnishment
car payment or other debt

r
r

r
r
r
r
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QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED BY TRUSTEE (as appropriate or necessary)

Can you afford $__ per month for your chapter 13 payment?
Do you receive overtime on a regular basis?
Do you receive (or have you in the past received) bonuses? Howoften? How much?
Do you expect your income to change within the next 3-5 years as a result of retirement,
loss of child support or maintenance, change in disability status, loss of unemployment
payments or workers' comp payments, or other reason?
Do you have any claims, pending lawsuits, or potential lawsuits against anyone?
Describe the nature of the claim or lawsuit.
State the name of any attorney you have consulted about the lawsuit.

[IF YES]:

If you own real estate, how much do you think it would sell for today?
Child support: paid:_ _
for how many children
how much $
how long
current?

received:

--

Notes:
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Division

Inre:
Case No. _ _ _ _ _ __
Debtor(s)
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MOTION TO DISMISS CH. 13 CASE
The trustee asks the Court to dismiss this case because
[

]

the debtor(s) did not appear at the §341 First Meeting of Creditors.

[

]

the attorney for the debtor(s) did not appear at the §341 First Meeting
of Creditors.

[

]

the debtor(s) did not timely provide the documents required by the
Court's Order to Debtor.

DATE: _ _ _ __
Trustee
NOTICE
This motion to dismiss will be· brought on for hearing at _ _ _ _ on _ _ __
__,20-, United States Bankruptcy Court _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that the above motion was served on the parties listed below on this the
_ _ day of
,20_.

Trustee

r
r
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

--------

Division

Inre:
Case No.

-------

Debtor(s)

MOTION TO CONTINUE
Comes now counsel for the above-captioned debtor(s) and moves the Court for an order
continuing the scheduled §341 First Meeting of Creditors. An affidavit in support of said
motion is attached.
DATE: _ _ _ __
Counsel for Debtor( s)

CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that the above motion was served upon the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and
all creditors listed on the debtor's matrix on this the
date of
.20_.

Counsel for Debtor(s)
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Division
Inre:

r
r
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Case No. _ _ _ _ _ __
Debtor(s)
ORDER
Upon the timely-filed motion of the debtor(s) to continue the §341 First Meeting of
Creditors and the Court having reviewed the record and being otherwise properly and
sufficiently advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the §341 First Meeting of Creditors be
and same is hereby continued to a date and time to be set by the trustee.
DATED: __________
JUDGE

Copy to: Trustee
Attorney for Debtor(s)
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Chapter 13 Trustee
Eastern District Of Kentucky
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Chapter 13 Confirmation Procedure ~
effective August 1, 2000
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Chapter 13 Plan: A standardized plan has been adopted for this district for all
Sff fO~M it 2. Of LoeA. L iUtCS
chapter 13 cases filed on or after August 1,2000.
The standardized plan is the centerpiece of the revised chapter 13 confinnation
and delinquency procedures. It will:
)- facilitate the review of the plan for feasibility
)- offer consistency in the language of common plan provisions while
retaining the flexibility needed to address debtors' special circumstances

>-

eliminate common reasons for defective plan notices and pre-confinnation
plan amendments

>-

provide secured creditors with early infonnation about how their claims
are to be treated, which in tum means an early bar date for filing
objections to confinnation can be set

>-

speed up confinnation so that some plans can be confinned immediately
following the 341 meeting of creditors, and most plans should be
confinnable within 30 days after the 341

)- enable more accurate tracking of plan payment requirements as compared
to payments actually made
The plan is presently available as a Microsoft Word 2000 template or in
WordPerfect 8 from the Chapter 13 Trustee or the Bankruptcy Court. Please visit
www.kyeb.uscourts.gov or www.13network.comllexhome.htm; www.chI3edky.com is
under construction and will be operational soon. Instructions for using the standardized
plan explain the reasons for including certain provisions, and point out variances between
current practice and the standardized plan.
With the use of a standardized plan, the time-frame needed for confinnation can
be abbreviated. The first confinnation hearing will be about 30 days after the 341
meeting, and the second confinnation hearing, which will be conducted by the court, will
take place approximately 30 days after the first confinnation hearing. Previously, the 341
meeting and confinnation hearings were scheduled 60 days apart.
Defective Plan Notice: The Trustee will notify debtor's counsel if there are
problems preventing plan confinnation by serving on debtor's counsel a Defective Plan
Notice ("orange sheet"). The Defective Plan Notice may be amended and supplemented
prior to confinnation as necessary.
Creditors' Objections to Confinnation: Any creditor objecting to the treatment of
its claim in the chapter 13 plan must file with the Court and serve on the Trustee an
objection on or before the date and time first set for the Meeting of Creditors in Divisions
other than Lexington. In Lexington Division cases, creditors' objections must be filed
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with the Court and served on the Trustee within ten (10) days following the Meeting of.
Creditors. Creditors and creditors' counsel should be aware that in the absence of an
objection, the value of their collateral is established by the debtor's plan. The Trustee in
this district does not make an independent determination of the value of property subject
to liens.
If an obj ection to confirmation is filed, the Court will schedule an evidentiary
hearing to be conducted approximately 60 days following the Meeting of Creditors. This
evidentiary hearing and second confirmation hearing will be conducted by the Court at
the same time.
341 Meeting of Creditors:. If no objections to ·confirmation haveb.een timely
filed, and if the Trustee has not served on debtor's counsel a Defective Plan Notice and
does not intend to serve a Defective Plan Notice following the 341 meeting, the Trustee
will tender to the Court an order confirming the chapter 13 plan.
First Confirmation Hearing: The notice of the confirmation hearing is combined
with the notice of the meeting of creditors that is sent to all creditors. The first
confirmation hearing is conducted by the Trustee's office about 30 days following the
meeting of creditors. The debtor is not required to attend the confirmation hearing;
however, the debtor's presence may be beneficial to the parties depending on the nature
of the objections to the plan.
If the Trustee has served a Defective Plan Notice on counsel for the debtor, or if a
creditor has filed an objection to confirmation and the objection is unresolved, or if a
motion for relief from stay has been filed, debtor's counsel is required to attend the first'
confirmation hearing. At that hearing any problems that can be resolved by the parties
should be resolved, and the appropriate amendments, agreed orders and· other needed
documentation should be filed within 15 days thereafter to allow for confirmation.
The confirmation hearing will be continued for approximately 30 days and will be
scheduled for hearing on the Court's docket. The Trustee is instructed not to continue the
confirmation hearing to the Trustee's docket for any reason, and not to continue the
confirmation hearing for a longer period than the approximately 30-40 days until the next
date on which the court will conduct hearings in the division in which the case is
pending.
If there are no unresolved objections to confirmation from the Trustee or any
creditor, counsel for the debtor is not required to attend the hearing. The Trustee's office
will give notice of cases which can be confirmed without a hearing (the "short-list'') to
the Court and to the appropriate counsel for the debtors no later than approximately 5
days prior to the. date of the first confirmation hearing. The Trustee will tender to the
Court an order confirming the plan.
The Trustee will not file a Trustee's Report and Recommendation prior to the first
conf11ll1ation hearing. The TR&R is not needed to advise debtors' counsel of whether the
plan is confirmable; the Defective Plan Notice will serve that purpose. And the TR&R is
no longer needed to advise secured creditors of how their claims are to be treated under
the plan; the standardized plan serves that purpose.
Second Confirmation Hearing and Valuation Hearing: Problems addressed in the
Defective Plan Notice must be cured within 15 days after the first confirmation hearing in
order to obtain a favorable recommendation from the Trustee as to confirmation. The
H-30
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Trustee will file a Trustee's Report and Recommendation approximately 7 to 10 days'
prior to the second confmnation hearing. If the Trustee recommends confirmation of the
plan and objections to confirmation have been resolved by agreed order or otherwise, the
Trustee's office will tender to the Court an order confirming the plan. The Trustee's
office will give notice of cases which can be confinned without a hearing (the "shortlist'') to the Court and to the appropriate counsel for the debtors approximately 5 days
prior to the date of the confinnation hearing so that the cases can be removed from the
Court's docket.
The confirmation hearing in cases which are not "short-listed" will be conducted
by the Court. The Court does not require attendance of the debtors at confirmation
hearings which it conducts. In addition, any valuation hearing or other hearing on a
creditor's objection to confirmation will be conducted by the Court at the same time as
the second confirmation hearing.
At the second confinnation hearing, the Court will not take any papers for filing
such as last minute agreed orders, last minute amended plans, etc. The Court will
consider only what has been properly and timely filed in time for all parties to react to it.
Motion to Continue Confirmation Hearing: If a debtor has special problems such
as tax claims that require more time to address, debtor's counsel should file a motion to
continue the second confirmation hearing and set forth in the motion the reasons for' the '
requested continuance and a proposed time frame needed to resolve the issues. The
motion to continue must be noticed for hearing no later than the date of the second'
confirmation hearing. The Court may, upon request of the Trustee or of any secured
creditor, direct counsel for the debtor to tender agreed orders of adequate protection so '
that payments can be made to secw:ed creditors during the extended period needed for
confirmation.
Payment Delinquencies at Time of Confirmation: No case will be confirmed
unless the debtors are substantially current in payments, both to the Trustee and to
secured creditors. If the debtors have not made any payments within 40 days after the
plan is filed, the Trustee will file a motion to dismiss the case which will be heard by the
Court in lieu of the first confirmation hearing. Cases in which the debtors are not
substantially current in payments at the second confirmation hearing will be dismissed at
that hearing. The failure of debtors to be substantially current in payments is not a valid
reason for requesting that the second confmnation hearing be continued.
Notice of Allowance of Claims: After the bar date for filing proofs of claims by
governmental units, the Trustee will file with the Court and serve on debtor, debtor's
counsel, and all creditors a Notice of Allowance of Claims, which will set forth how the
Trustee's office has set up all filed claims for payment. By the time this Notice is served,
disbursements on claims filed as secured will have commenced. It is advisable that
debtor's counsel review all claims filed as secured so that disbursements will not be made
on claims which were filed as secured but which the debtor believes are unsecured. See
Standardized Plan Instructions, Section ITI.F, for more information. Parties will have 10
days in which to object to the Notice of Allowance of Claims. In the absence of
objections, the claims will be deemed allowed.

r
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Chapter 13 Trustee
Eastern District Of Kentucky
~

Standardized Plan Instructions ....
effective August 1, 2000

Section I.A.I. Step Plan Payments:
Generally the plan will call for payments of $X for X months. However, for a variety of
reasons, debtors' payments may need to vary during the life of the plan. In those instances, the
monthly step payment schedule should be used. Examples:
•

income is expected to increase (anticipated job promotion; car loan is almost paid in full).

•

income is expected to decrease (loss of child support when child turns 18).

•

plan payments will increase for a period of time to cure a delinquency.

•

income fluctuates seasonally.

•

***plan payments need to be amended (pre-confirmation) or modified (postconfirmation).***

The use of a step payment schedule is a significant change in local practice and is
required for the trustee's new delinquency program. Consider the following example:

Debtor's plan calls for payments of $1 00 per month for 60 months. Debtor makes
two payments (total paid in: $200). Debtor's plan then must be amended (preconfirmation) to increase payments to $200 per month. The amended plan looks
just like the original plan except it now says "Debtor will pay $200 per month for
60 months." The tnlStee's new system will show payments are due from month 1
through month 60 at $200 per month for a total pool amount of $12,000. When the
plan is confirmed, the debtor will be behind $200, because in month 1 and 2 he paid
only $100 per month, not $200 per month. The correct way to show the amended
payments is using the step payment plan: month 1-2: $100; month 3-60: $200,·
total pool: $11,800. Another option, which is rarely feasible, is for the debtor to
catch up the past due amount so that the pool amount remains $12,000.
The importance of using the step payment schedule cannot be emphasized enough. It is
the key to the trustee's delinquency program, and along with the total pool amount (Section I.C.)
will accurately track the balance remaining to be paid in to the plan at any given time.

Section I.A.2. Periodic Plan Payments:
In addition to making regular payments, the debtor may also need to make periodic
payments, for example, quarterly bonuses or annual tax refunds; or one-time lump-sum
payments, for example, proceeds from the sale of real estate or non-exempt proceeds from a
personal injury action. (See also Section VII).
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Estimated Payments: If the debtor must pay the entire bonus or tax refund or sales
proceeds or whatever into the plan but the amounts of those payments are unknown~ the amount'
to be received should be estimated so that a dollar amount can be used in evaluating feasibility of
the plan. If the amount of the payment is less than estimated, the debtor will not be delinquent.
Actual Payments: On the other hand, if the debtor knows she must pay, for example,
$1,000 of her tax refund every year into the plan in order to make the plan work, that payment
should be identified as "actual." If the debtor fails to make the entire actual payment, she
becomes delinquent, and arrangements must be made to cure the delinquency.
Section I.C. Total Amount To Be Paid (pool Plan Only):
The plan must specify the total amount to be paid over the duration of a pool plan. A
separate "pool plan calculator" is available to use with the monthly step payment schedule. The
pool plan calculator allows the user to input specific dates, and it will calculate the number of
months.
The amount of the pool is important if a subsequent plan modification is needed to cure
plan delinquencies. Also, having a fixed pool amount will help debtors and debtors' counsel
quickly determine how much remains due under the plan (pool amount minus total paid in equals·
payoff amount).
Section I.D. lVlethod of Payment:
If the debtor is employed, a request for a Payroll Deduction Order (PDO) may be made in
the plan. The trustee will process the PD~ so that payments can commence within 30 days.
Because a debtor's chances of succeeding in chapter 13 are greater when plan payments are
payroll-deducted, the trustee strongly recommends payments by PDO.
Section III. Treatment of Secured Claims:
Every secured claim listed in Schedule D must be itemized in the plan. This is a
significant change in local practice. Many plans used by debtors' attorneys do not identify the
value of collateral in the plan. Instead, reference must be made to the· Schedules. The
standardized plan requires that all information, including value of collateral, must be set forth in
the plan.
Section III is the most likely place to identify how a secured claim will be treated.
However, the debtor may want to treat all or part of the claim in a manner not addressed in
Section III. For example, a third party may be paying the mortgage arrearage outside the plan.
Section vn should be used if Section III does not fit the debtor's needs.
Ifa secured claim is listed in Schedule D (Creditors Holding Secured Claims) and is not
specifically addressed in Section III or Section vn of the plan, by default the claim will be paid
inside the plan at the contract rate of interest. If the contract rate is greater than the present
market rate of interest, the trustee will object to payment of contract rate, confirmation will be
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delayed, and an amended plan will be necessary. See Section ill.F. Do not omit from the plan
any secured creditor listed in Schedule D.
Section III.A. Secured Claims to be Paid Inside the Plan:
The name of the creditor, collateral description, amount of claim, and proposed secured
value come straight from Schedule D (Creditors Holding Secured Claims). Of course, if for
example the debtor owes ABC Credit Union on a car and on a boat and wants to pay the car
inside the plan and surrender the boat, separate values need to be placed on each item of
collateral in the plan itself.
An interest rate must be specified for each claim to be paid inside the plan. If the
interest rate field is blank for any creditor, the default interest rate in the plan is the contract rate.
If the contract rate is higher than the current market rate of interest, the trustee will object to
payment of contract rate, confirmation will be delayed, and an amended plan will be necessary.
Do not leave the interest rate field blank on any row in this section.

Section III.B.l. Payments "OSEA" - Outside Except Arrearages:
By default, any claim to be paid outside the plan will be treated as being "outside except
arrearages," and the arrearage claim will be treated inside the plan (see Section ill.C.). The
monthly payment on an OSEA debt must be reflected in Schedule J (Current Expenditures of
Individual Debtors) (the budget).
The plan also asks for the date on which the note matures. If the note will be fully paid
during the life of the plan, plan payments must increase at that time. Asking for the maturity
date of the note will serve as a reminder to use the step payment schedule (See Section LA. I.).

It is important to identify "OSEA" claims because of the effect of such claims on
feasibility issues. If, for example, a mortgage debt is listed in Schedule D (Creditors Holding
Secured Claims) and the plan does not specify it is to be paid outside the plan, it will be treated
as a secured claim to be paid inside the plan. See Section ill.F.; see also11 U.S.C. § 1326(c)
(unless the plan provides otherwise, "the trustee shall make payments to creditors under the
plan"). That of course will make the plan, not feasible. This is a common reason for Defective
Plan Notices.
If the debtor believes there is an arrearage on a debt to be paid outside the plan, put the
estimated amount of the arrearage and the interest rate at which the arrearage claim should be
paid in this section. Ifno interest is to be paid, insert 0%. If the debtor does not believe a
prepetition arrearage is owed, insert an interest rate - even 0% if appropriate - anyway.
See Section III.C.
Section III.B.2. Payments "OSTP" - Outside by Third Party:
List claims that someone other than the debtor will pay. The name of the third party and
the relationship of that person to the debtor is also required.
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It is important to distinguish OSTP claims from OSEA claims. Frequently a plan will

state only that the debt is to be paid outside the plan without reference to the fact that it is to be' .
paid by someone other than the debtors. The trustee will object to the plan if that outside
payment is not listed on Schedule J (CUlTent Expenditures of Individual Debtors) and will
question whether the debtor can afford both the chapter 13 payment and the outside payment. Or
it may be that a boat or extra car is to be paid by the debtor's parents, for example, but that fact is
not disclosed in the plan. The trustee will object to the debtor keeping unnecessary property, and
confirmation is delayed while an amendment to the plan is prepared.
Section III.C. Arrearages:
Frequently the debtor does not believe he is in arrears, yet the proof of claim flIed by the
creditor has an arrearage amount listed. In the past, this caused problems because the plan did
not specify how that arrearage claim should be paid, and a Defective Plan Notice was sent so that
the plan could be amended.
The standardized plan provides that by default any arrearage claim will be paid inside the
plan as a secured debt. That means it will be paid concUlTently with all other secured debts. The
plan also specifies that interest on the arrearage claim will be paid at the contract rate unless the
plan specifies otherwise. Once again, if the contract rate is higher than the market rate of· ,.
interest, the trustee will object. That is why it is important to state an interest rate that will be
paid on any arrearage claim that might be flIed by a creditor listed in Section ill.B.I., even if the
debtor does not believe an arrearage is due.
Arrearage claims can be treated differently. For example, if the arrearage is to be cured
by the debtor's parents when they assume the debtor's mortgage payment, Section VII can so
specify, and the arrearage claim will be set up as OSTP.
Section III.D. Surrender of Property:

r
r
r
r

r

Specify the property which the debtor intends to sUlTender to the secured creditor.
Include any collateral repossessed prepetition if the debtor does not wish to regain possession
and the collateral had not been sold by the creditor as of the date of the filing of the petition.
This information is necessary so that when the claim is filed, the trustee will not make
disbursements on the claim as a secured claim.
This section also provides that the automatic stay will be deemed terminated upon
confirmation of the plan as to property sUlTendered pursuant to this section of the plan. This is a
new practice. Furthermore, this section reminds secured creditors that they need to flIe an
amended proof of claim for any deficiency remaining after the collateral is sold. See also
Section ill.G.
Section III.E. Avoidance of Liens Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(1). This paragraph reflects current
practice that liens can be avoided under section 522(f) in the plan itself.

r
r
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Section III.F. All Other Secured Claims:
This paragraph provides a default treatment of secured claims and is required in the
standardized plan. There are three primary situations this default paragraph is intended to
address. Section III.F makes a significant change from current practice with respect to the
second and third situations.
The first reason for the default paragraph is to make sure every claim listed in Schedule D
(Creditors Holding Secured Claims) is treated in the plan. Frequently a claim listed in Schedule
D is not addressed anywhere in a plan. The trustee must send a Defective Plan Notice because
the treatment of a particular claim was not specified, and the plan must be amended before it can
be confirmed. If a secured claim is listed in Schedule D and is not specifically addressed in
Section ill or Section VII of the plan, by default the claim will be paid inside the plan at the
contract rate of interest. In many instances this will correct the oversight. However, if the
contract rate is greater than the present market rate of interest, the trustee will object to payment
at contract rate, confirmation will be delayed, and an amended plan will be necessary. It is
important to include in the plan every claim listed in Schedule D.
The second scenario occurs when a secured creditor listed in Schedule D has mUltiple
items of collateral, including property that the'debtor does not list as owning. Perhaps the
collateral was repossessed pre-petition and the debtor does not want to regain possession. Or it
may be that the collateral is in the possession of the debtor's former spouse in accordance with
the pre-petition property settlement agreement. In current practice the trustee makes an
assumption that such claims are unsecured as to the debtor. The standardized plan will treat such
claims as secured to the extent ofthe value of the collateral set forth in the creditor's proof of
claim unless the plan provides otherwise. It is important that the plan specifically address those
claims ("to be surrendered"; "OSTP"; etc.) so that the default provision does not apply.
The third situation involves a discrepancy between the plan or schedules and the proof of claim.
For example, the debtor schedules a claim as unsecured (or forgets to list the creditor at all), but
the creditor files a proof of claim as secured. In the past the trustee has treated these claims as
unsecured. The standardized plan will treat such claims as if secured to the extent of the value of
the collateral as set forth in the creditor's proof of claim, to be paid inside the plan with interest
at the contract rate. The debtor or the trustee can always object to the claim if appropriate, and
the claim will be paid only to the extent it is allowed. The drawback to applying Section ill.F in
this third situation is that if the contract rate of interest is higher than the current market rate, the
trustee will object to confinnation, or may require.the debtor to modify the plan.
While debtor and.debtor' s counsel have control over the first two scenarios and can take
steps to prevent the default paragraph from being applied, they may not be able to prevent the
third situation. For example, a creditor may file a proof of claim as secured under the mistaken
belief that it holds a security interest. This happens on occasion. On the other hand, the situation
often occurs when the debtor did not provide to counsel all the necessary documentation to
enable counsel to determine that a particular claim is secured.
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Debtor's counsel will need to review claims carefully to make sure an unsecured claim is
not set up to be paid as a secured claim; There are two alternatives for debtor's counsel. First,··
Section VII can provide that if any claim is scheduled as unsecured but the creditor files a proof
of claim as secured, the claim will be treated as an unsecured claim. Second, the plan can be
amended or modified as necessary to address the particular claim ("to be surrendered"; "OSTP";
522(f); etc.).
Debtor's counsel will need to be especially vigilant with respect to creditors claiming
nonpossessory, non-purchase money security interests in household goods that can be avoided
under II.U.S.C.§ 522(f) so that an appropriate amendment to the plan or an objection to the
claim or a motion to avoid the lien can be filed.

It is important to remember that the trustee will no longer presumptively treat certain
claims as unsecured if the proof of claim indicates it is a secured claim. Instead, such claims will
be treated as specified in the proof of claim absent some instruction in the plan to the contrary.
Section III.G. Orders Granting Relief From Stay: Upon entry of an order granting relief
from stay, the trustee will not make any further disbursements to the secured creditor obtaining
stay relief until the creditor files an amended claim for any deficiency. This provision reflects
current practice. The purpose of putting it in the plan is to negate the need for the trustee to file
a memorandum of understanding as to each order terminating the automatic stay.
Section IV. Treatment of Priority Claims:
All priority claims listed on Schedule E (Creditors Holding Priority Claims) must be
listed in Section IV or in Section VII of the plan. Otherwise a Defective Plan Notice will be
sent.
Section V.A. Estimated Amount of Unsecured Debt (from Schedule F):

r
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The purpose of requesting the total dollar figure of unsecured debts from Schedule F
(Creditors Holding Unsecured Nonpriority Claims) in the plan is to facilitate the evaluation of
feasibility and the liquidation test. General unsecured claims do not need to be itemized in the
plan.
Section V.B. General Unsecured Claims:
There are three ways unsecured claims can be treated: paid in full, paid X% (the "fixed
, percentage plan"), or paid to the greatest extent possible from the "pool" of funds paid in by the
debtor (the "pool plan").
Generally speaking, the fixed percentage plan is an anomaly, but it is still used by several
attorneys. One of two problems frequently arise in fixed percentage plans. The first problem
arises when it will take fewer than 36 months to pay X%. This might occur when, for example,
several unsecured creditors did not file proofs of claims, or claims were filed but disallowed as
tardy. The debtor is required to pay all of his disposable income into the plan for at least 36
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months (unless unsecured debts are paid in full). In the past, either a Defective Plan Notice
required the debtor to amend the plan, or the trustee filed a plan modification after confinnation:.!
to convert the fixed percentage plan into a 36-month pool plan. The standardized plan will now
automatically change a deficient fixed percentage plan into a 36-month pool plan.
The second problem with fixed percentage plans is at the other end of the spectrum. The
problem arises when it will take more than 60 months to pay the fixed percentage. The trustee
will continue to send Defective Plan Notices in these instances because the plan is not feasible.
The use of a pool plan will usually prevent this type of defect, but it will be up to debtor's
counsel to file amendments to cure any' plan that exceeds 60 months.
The fixed percentage plan is strongly discouraged, but is 'pennitted, with a standard
proviso now that it will automatically convert to a 36-month pool plan if it is detennined that the
plan will pay the. fixed percentage in fewer than 36 months. The pool plan is preferable.

Section V.C. Co-Signed Debts to be Paid in Full:
The debtor may not want to pay in full every debt listed on Schedule H (Co-Debtors), so
the plan should specify which co-signed debts are to be paid in full.

Section VII. Special Provisions:
If the debtor's intended treatment ofa claim will not fit anywhere else in the plan, it
should be addressed here in Section VII. Also, there may be additional provisions needed to
address situations such as the sale of real estate or the addition of personal injury proceeds to the
plan. The trustee's office has prepared draft Addenda to address these situations which will
provide guidelines as to what infonnation is necessary to evaluate these special circumstances.
"Business" chapter 13 cases may also require special attention in Section VII.
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ADDENDUM No.
ADDITION OF NON-EXEM-P-T-P-R-OCEEDS
TO THE PLAN PAYMENTS
(Lawsuits for Personal Injury, Breach of Contract, etc.)
1.
The Debtor(s) have certain causes of action identified below. Upon
confirmation of the plan, said causes of action shall revest in the Debtor for
prosecution during the pendency of the case. Upon receipt of an offer to
compromise any cause of action, the Debtor(s) shall notice all parties in interest,
creditors, the Trustee and the Court by providing appropriate notice and sufficient
opportunity to object to the proposed compromise.
Description of Cause(s) of Action
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2.
Any non-exempt recovery arising from the aforementioned causes
of action exercised by the Debtor(s), net of Court costs and attorney fees and
cost, shall be paid to the Trustee for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate and
disbursed as follows:
(a) First, to administrative claimants and costs whose efforts and
actions resulted in recovery benefiting the estate;
(b) Second, to unsecured and undersecured creditors pro-rata
pursuant to the priorities set forth in 11 U.S.C. Sec 726;
(c) Third, to the secured creditors, pro-rata; and
(d) Fourth, after payment of all remaining claims, administrative
costs and expenses of the estate, the balance shall be refunded to the
Debtor(s).
3.
Any non-exempt recovery by the Debtor(s) shall be paid to the
Trustee in addition to the plan payments and shall not alter or reduce the periodic
payments due under the plan, nor shall the duration of the plan be shortened,
except to the extent said recovery shall result in payment in full to all creditors
and administrative costs.

r

r
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ADDENDUM ADDING NON-EXEMPT SALE PROCEEDS
DERIVED FROM REAL PROPERTY
(Sale by Realtor)

1.

The Debtor(s) are proposing to sell certain real property commonly
known
as
("Property").
Debtor(s) attaches herewith copy of the proposed Listing
Agreement setting forth the asking price and terms of the sale offer. Upon
receipt of a bona fide offer to purchase. the Debtor(s) shall notice all parties in
interest. creditors; the Trustee and the Court by providing appropriate notice and
sufficient opportunity to object to the proposed sale.
2.

Debtor(s)

shall

cause

the

Property to be listed with
("Realtor") for _ __
months. Should the Property fail to receive a written offer to purchase. Debtor(s)
shall then offer the Property for sale to the highest and best bidder at public
auction within
months after expiration of the aforementioned listing period.
3.
Upon confirmation of the plan. the Realtor shall be approved to
offer the Property for sale. and to receive compensation as·· set· forth· in the
attached Listing Agreement upon closing the sale.
4.
Any non-exempt proceeds received from aforementioned sale of
property net of commissions. fees and costs of sale. shall be paid to the Trustee·
for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate and disbursed as follows:
(a) First. to administrative claimants and costs whose efforts and
actions resulted in the sale benefiting the estate;
(b) Second, to unsecured and undersecured creditors pro-rata
pursuant to the priorities set forth in 11 U.S.C. Sec 726;
(c) Third, to the secured creditors. pro-rata; and
(d) Fourth. after payment of all remaining claims. administrative
costs and expenses of the estate, the balance shall be refunded to the
Debtor(s).
5.
The non-exempt proceeds shall be paid to the Trustee in addition to
the plan payments and shall not alter or reduce the periodic payments due under
the plan. nor shall the duration ofthe plan be shortened, excepUo the extent said
recovery shall result in payment in full to all creditors and administrative costs.
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
DIVISION
IN RE:

DEBTOR(S)

CASE NO.:

Defective Plan Notice
This plan will not be recommended for confirmation for the following reasons:
[J

Is the regular monthly Mortgage Payment to be paid inside or outside the plan?

[J

Is the Mortgage Arrearage to be paid inside or outside the plan?

[J

Is this plan a pool or percentage plan?

[J

The Trustee interprets the pool amount to be $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

[J

The plan goes over 60 months.

[J

Secured and/or priority creditors will not be paid in full.

[J

The plan doesn't provide an adequate percentage to be paid to unsecured creditors.

[J

Plans lasting less than 36 months must pay unsecured creditors 100%.

o

The plan should not specify the amount of monthly payment to be made by the Trustee to any creditor.

[J

The plan lists conflicting interest rates.

[J

The plan should not forbid the Chapter 13 Trustee from filing claims on behalf of any creditor.

[J

The plan proposes to pay undersecured creditors outside the plan. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

[J

The liquidation test is not met. See attachment.

o

The plan should specify that non-exempt proceeds from tort claims will be paid to the Trustee in addition
to regular plan payments.

[J

The budget contains questionable expenses as follows:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

[J

Expenses are included on the budget for debts that are to be paid by the Trustee.

[J

The plan proposed does not comply with the standardized plan required to be used with all cases filed after
08/01/00.

[J

Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

Dated: 11/16/00
To: Attorney for the Debtor
Beverly M. Burden, Trustee
P.O. Box 2204
Lexington, KY 40588-2204

The dreaded orange sheet!
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Chapter 13 Trustee
Eastern District of Kentucky
~

Chapter 13 Delinquency Procedures

~

effective November 1, 2000
SUMMARY:
~

first payment is due 30 days after plan is filed

~

plan will be confirmed only if all payments are current

>>>

plan arrearages must be cured, usually with double payments
probation order means automatic dismissal if a single payment is 7 days late
payroll deduction order will not cover payments to cure plan arrearage

~

plan modification may be necessary to cure arrearages in older cases

~

debtor's attorney must be more active in delinquent cases

~

do not have debtors call the trustee's office about a motion to dismiss

Pre-Confirmation:
The debtor is required to commence making the payments proposed by a plan within 30
days after the plan is filed. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). The plan must be filed within 15 days after
the petition is filed. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 301S(b). The preferred practice given the fast track
procedures on confirmation is to file the plan with the petition and schedules. When the plan is .
received, the trustee sends to the debtor a letter on bright yellow- or goldenrod-colored paper
containing payment information. This is the only notice the debtors receive from the trustee
about the amount and due date of their payments.
If the trustee's office has not received and posted the debtor's first payment within 35
days after the petition date, the trustee will send a letter to the debtor and debtor's attorney, and if
the debtor is employed, a payroll deduction order will be entered immediately. We wait 35 days
because of the time it takes for checks to be mailed to the trustee's lockbox in Memphis,
Tennessee, and the resulting 2-day delay for the payment to be posted to the debtor's chapter 13
account. In addition, at the 341 the debtor will be instructed to make the first payment
immediately_ If the first payment is not made forthwith, or if a payroll deduction order is not
possible, and certainly if the debtor misses a second payment, a motion to dismiss will be filed.
Sometimes there is a delay between the time a payroll deduction order is requested and
when monies begin to be deducted from the debtor7 s paycheck.. If a payment is due before the
payroll deduction order has been effectuated, the debtor needs to make at least a partial payment
directly on or before the payment due date and be prepared to pay the balance of the payment
due by the end of the month if the payroll deduction still has not come out ofthe debtor's check.
That way the debtor has made a full monthly payment in the first month.
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The trustee in the Eastern District of Kentucky does not accept payments at the 341
meeting or at any hearing. All payments must be mailed to the trustee's lockbox address:
Chapter 13 Trustee EDKY, PO Box 1766, Memphis TN 38101-1766.
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Because of the new fast-track confinnation procedures, it will be rare that a case will be
confinned if even one payment has been missed. The debtor needs to establish a willingness and
an ability to make payments for the plan to be confinned.
Post-Confirmation:
Until June of2000, the trustee had some flexibility in working with debtors to arrange for
them to catch up on missed payments. When in June of this year the judges began to preside
over the trustee's motions to dismiss, the trustee was instructed that motions to dismiss could be
withdrawn only if the trustee had received payments sufficient to bring the debtor completely
current in payments prior to the hearing.
Also, in the past, motions to dismiss were generated when the debtor missed consecutive
payments. A skipped payment here and there did not usually trigger the filing of a motion to
dismiss. Now, however, the judges have instructed the trustee to file motions to dismiss in every
case in which the dollar amount of the total delinquency during the life of the case is the
equivalent of two or more monthly payments, three or more bi-weekly payments, or five or more
weekly payments. The purpose of doing this is twofold. One, by detecting a delinquent case
early (Le., when the debtor has missed only two payments), there is an increased likelihood the
debtor can cure the plan arrearage and remain in chapter 13. The greater the delinquency, the
harder it is (and the longer it takes) to catch up. Two, dealing with delinquencies immediately
will decrease the chance that the plan will not complete within 60 months. If a debtor who
missed two payments can double up on payments for two months, the duration of the plan is not
affected. The judges have now taken a hard-line approach on cases that exceed 60 months and
will dismiss a case that is in its 61st month.
The trustee is still in the process of adopting a new delinquency program that will be able
to detennine a delinquent case based on the money paid in to date compared to what should have
been paid in to date. Cases in which the debtor has recently missed two payments will continue
to be the subject of motions to dismiss. The court has prescribed several acceptable ways of
curing plan arrearages in these cases, which are discussed below. However, this revised program
will also generate motions to dismiss in cases in which the debtors are presently current but have
missed payments in the past. No longer will the court pennit these missed payments to be tacked
on at the end of the plan in 60-month cases. This holds true with suspended payments as well.
Instead, debtor and debtor's counsel will have to take action to eliminate the past arrearage. In
the coming months there will be an increased number of motions to dismiss filed, especially in
older cases, even though the debtor is presently current in payments. And because the trustee is
no longer able to work out payment plans with a delinquent debtor, debtor's counsel must
assume a more active role in addressing plan arrearages than in the past. Any proposal to cure
plan arrearages must be approved by the court.
At the request of the judges, all motions to dismiss will soon disclose the amount of the
plan arrearage and the equivalent number of months it would take to cure the arrearage .. In
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addition, we will provide to debtors a printout showing the payments we have received. Counsel
has access to the receipt history via the 13network.com website.
"Present Delinquencies". We will use this tenn to describe cases in which the debtor has
missed two or more monthly payments in the past twelve months. Please note that for purposes
of filing a motion to dismiss, it does not matter when the delinquency occurred; only the dollar
amount of the delinquency in relation to the monthly payment due is relevant. However, from
the perspective of the trustee (and debtor's counsel), the age of the arrearage may have some
bearing on how it should be addressed, as discussed below.
The methods of curing arrearages as prescribed by the court are well-suited to cases with
recent delinquencies. The court generally pennits the debtor to cure an arrearage comprising up
to 4 (sometimes 5}months' worth of payments. The court generally requires that plan arrearages
be cured within a relatively short period of time, and the cure must start reasonably soon after the
hearing. We tried last year using tax. refunds to cure arrearages, and the result was an abysmal
failure. Consequently, that is no longer an option. Most frequently the judges require double
payments or a payment and a half to be made until current, with extra payments to start on the
next due date following the date of the hearing. Sometimes, based on representations of debtors
that they can become current right away (a frequent response to the court's question "how soon
can you get caught up?" of a debtor who is fearful that the case will be dismissed), the judge will
grant them a brief period (generally not exceeding 30 days) in which to bring payments
completely current. Your clients might be well-advised to offer double payments, and if they are
able to be current in 30 days (without skipping a mortgage payment), great; if not, they still have
a chance to get caught up. There are no brownie points given for curing a plan arrearage in 10
days versus 4 months.
It is important to note that payroll deduction orders will not be amended to capture
the extra payments required to cure plan arrearages. Besides the fact that it would impose
an administrative burden on my office, in my view the debtors should have to expend some
effort to make the missed payments themselves. Therefore, debtors whose payments' are made
via payroll deduction need to know how much to pay each month, how long to make the extra
payments, and where to send the payments. We will.not calculate this for debtors or counsel, but
by providing the amount of the arrearage and the receipt history with the motion to dismiss, we
have given the debtor and counsel the infonnation they need to figure it out.

r

Regardless of how the arrearage will be cured, a probation order is sure to be issued. The
probation order is effective for one year.. During the next twelve months, if any single payment
is received by the trustee more than 7 days after the due date, the trustee must file a notice of
noncompliance and tender an order of dismissal, which will be entered immediately without
further hearing or opportunity to cure. It is the ultimate "drop-dead" order. Whether it will have
any bearing on eligibility issues if a subsequent case is filed within 180 days after the order of
dismissal is entered is an open question right now.

r

Prior Delinquencies. In the coming months there will be an increased number of motions
to dismiss filed, especially in older cases,' even though the debtor is presently current in
payments. It is the trustee's intention to notify counsel by letter of cases in which missed or
suspended payments are likely to cause a plan to exceed 60 months as measured from the date of
confinnation and give you sufficient opportunity to resolve the matter before a motion to dismiss
the case is filed. If you have older cases that are at risk of being dismissed because of prior

r

r
r
r
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j
unaddressed delinquencies, or because delinquencies and suspensions will cause the plan to
exceed 60 months, you have several options. Please note that the methods of curing plan
arrearages prescribed by the court and discussed above will not work if the arrearage is
substantial (e.g., more than 5 months' worth of payments). The judges have made clear that it is
too late to catch up a substantial delinquency by making double payments; those cases are being
dismissed. Consequently, other options should be considered.
You might want to file a plan modification to keep the case from being dismissed. You
can increase the debtors' monthly payments so that they still pay in the total "pool" amount
within 60 months. That would have no adverse effect on creditors, ~o you would only need to
notice the trustee. In fact, that can easily be done by agreed order signed by the debtor (and
counsel) and the trustee.
However, sometimes the debtors can't afford to increase their payments and may in fact
need to reduce their payments. In those instances you might want to modify the plan to reduce
the total "pool" amount being paid into the plan. The plan modification may also provide for a
decrease in monthly payments, depending on the debtors' present financial condition. You
might be able to wipe out a delinquency by modifying the plan to "total paid in as of x date plus
$x per month for the remaining x months of the plan". This would require notice to all creditors,
and an amended Schedule I and J must be filed in support of reduced payments.
Remember that any modified plan still has to be feasible, and the debtor still must satisfY "
the liquidation test, so a plan modification may not work in all cases. You can use the claims
information and the summary information in the "debt breakdown" section from the
13network.com website to assist you in your evaluation of the feasibility of a plan modificatiolt
Don't forget to include in your calculations an estimate of the amount of the supplemental "fee to" "
which you will likely be entitled (upon application and order approving) for your efforts in
keeping your client in chapter 13.
Of course the other available options are to convert the case to a chapter 7 case or to
allow the chapter 13 case to be dismissed and consider whether the debtor would benefit from
refiling. Regardless of which route you choose, all proposals to cure plan delinquencies are
subject to court scrutiny and approval, and there is no guarantee that the trustee's agreement to
the proposal will ensure it will be approved by the court.
Because the trustee can no longer work with debtors to arrange for them to catch up on
missed payments, please do not tell your clients to call my office. There is nothing we can do. I
have instructed my staff to inforin debtors who call about a motion to dismiss that they need to
call their attorneys. Also, we will soon be sending a letter to debtors along with the motion to
dismiss advising them to call their attorneys.
This is a significant change from past practice, but it is necessary given the emphasis the
court is now placing on the 60-month limit. We need to consider not only a debtor's monthly
payments, but also the total ''pool'' amount to be paid into the plan and the time it will take for a
debtor to complete payments under the pool plan in light of missed and suspended payments.
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CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE

r

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
POBOX 2204
LEXINGTON KY 40588

r
r

r

r

r

Dear Chapter 13 Debtor:
The Chapter 13 Trustee's office has filed a Motion to Dismiss your bankruptcy
case because you have fallen behind on your plan payments to the Trustee.

r

This motion to dismiss does not mean that your case will automatically be
dismissed. You might have several options to keep your bankruptcy case from being
thrown out.

r

I urge you to contact your bankruptcy.attorney-as soon as possible. Your attorney
can advise you on your options. For example, you might be able to file a new plan to
change your payments. Or you might be able to bring your plan current by making extra
payments. You might even decide that chapter 13 no longer works for you. Only you
and your attorney can decide what is best for you.

r

r

r

The Trustee's office cannot cancel or withdraw this motion to dismiss, so please
do not call this office asking that we do so. Do plan to attend the hearing on the date and
time listed on the motion. But first contact your attorney.
Yours truly,

.r,

'r

r

Beverly M. Burden
Chapter 13 Trustee

cc: Debtor's Counsel

r
r
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PROBATION NOTICE

The court has placed you on probation in your chapter 13
case. For the next year, if any single payment is 7 days (or
more) late, your case will· automatically be dismissed. The
trustee must receive and post your payment within the 7-day
grace period.
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PROBATION NOTICE

The court has placed you on probation in your chapter 13
case. For the next year, if any single payment is 7 days (or
more) late, your case will automatically be dismissed. The
trustee must receive and post your payment within the 7-day
grace period.
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Chapter 13 Trustee
Eastern District of Kentucky
.. Chapter 13 Payment Suspension ....
effective November 1, 2000
The trustee generally does not object to requests that plan payments be suspended
for a period not to exceed 90 days where the motion shows cause to suspend the
payments. In the past, suspended payments have been tacked on to the end of the plan.
However, with the court's emphasis on the 60-month limit for plan durations, that may
not be possible, and other arrangements must be made for the debtor to make up the
suspended payments. If the plan was confinned as a 55-month plan (for example) rather
than a 60-month plan, the trustee would not object to payments continuing past the 55th
month until the suspended payments are completed, provided the plan does not thereby
last longer than 60 months.
It is the position of the court that if the debtor is delinquent at the time the motion
to suspend payments is filed, the missed payments are to be· counted in the suspended
period. In other words, the debtor cannot miss two payments, ask for a 3-month
suspension, and thereby avoid making payments for 5 months.

The trustee would prefer that the order granting the suspension of plan payments '.
specify the months in which payments will not be made rather than requestiIig a vague
"60-day" or "90-day" suspension. Also, the order should specify how the debtor will
make up the suspended payments. The attached order should be used as a guideline (and
can be modified as necessary).
There may be times when the suspension is due to a significant change in the
debtor's financial condition (e.g., loss of employment) such that the debtor is unable at
the time of the suspension to project whether and how suspended payments can be caught
up. In that instance the debtor may want to wait until the suspension is over, slhe has
resumed payments, and then propose a cure for the suspended· payments. This delayed
proposal should be filed within 30 days after the date on which plan payments resume.
The debtor must resume payments at the current monthly payment until a subsequent
plan modification is confinned. A plan modification will require notice to all creditors,
and an amended Schedule I and I must be filed in support of the modification. In the
alternative, an agreed order signed by the trustee and requiring the debtor to make
additional payments until the suspended payments are caught up will not require notice to
creditors as they are not adversely affected.

If a payroll deduction order is in effect, counsel for the debtor, not the trustee,
is responsible for serving the debtor's employer. Also, when payments are to resume,
the debtor is responsible for making payments if the employer does Dot resume the
payroll deduction.
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
_ _ _ _ DIVISION

J

INRE:
CASE NO.
DEBTOR(S)
ORDER SUSPENDING PAYMENTS
This matter having come on for hearing on the debtor's motion to suspend plan
payments, IT IS ORDERED:

1. The debtor's plan payments are suspended for the following month(s) [please specifY]:
_ _ _ _ 20 .
2. The debtor shall resume payments in the month of _ _ _ _---', 20_.

3. [if applicable] The Payroll Deduction Order is also suspended for the months
specified.
4. The debtor shall make up the suspended payments by:
increasing payments to $_ _ per month for the remaining duration of the
plan, which shall not exceed 60 months;
making [double] payments when payments resume for
months,
provided that if a payroll deduction order is in effect, the debtor shall
make the extra payments to the trustee directly and not through payroll
deduction;
making a lump sum payment in the amount of $
on or before
_ _ _,,20 ;
filing a motion to modify the plan, which motion shall be filed within 30 days
after the date on which payments are to resume; OR
other (describe) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

J
J
J

J
J
J

o
o

j

o
o
o

j

J
j

By the court -

.J
J

Bankruptcy Judge

J

5. [if applicable] Counsel for the debtor shall serve this order on the employer if a
Payroll Deduction Order is in effect.

Dated:

•
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Chapter 13 Trustee
Eastern District of Kentucky
~

Claims in Chapter 13 Cases ~

"under construction"
see Defective Claim Letter, Objection to Claim, attached.
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3E,\TSRLY IV!. 5u'KDElT
C==--;'?TE~ 13 TRUSTEE
SUITE 500, CGlVl..ND"1'TITY TEUST BUII.:DING
P. O. BOX 2204
I

L:2:XINGTON, K::::NTliCK.Y
(606)

40582-2204

233-1527

August 24, J.999

NO

5'1AlfJv\fJ\JT OF' Ace 0 UN!

'7

Re:
~SSN:

L

22

AQi~-??12_66S6IL!3£6

Chapter J.3 Bankruptcy Case No. 51 - -

0

Dear Sir or Madam:
This office Ser--;res as the: Trustee in the above refere!lced Chapte2:' l3
case. As Trustee, we must object to claims that are lacking ac.e·~..::.ate
documentation. Your claim in the amount of $
13Q~u.~7 is not supoortea
by a statement of account that correlates with the:amount of your claim.
The statement of account can take the form of a ledger card or computer
printout.
Regardless, your statement must clearly demonstrate how you
arrived at the amount of your claim.

Please provide us with ade~..::.ate documentation along with a copy of this
letter and mail to:
Chapter J.3 Trustee, P.O. Box 204, Lexington, KY
40588-2204.
If we do not receive the requested documents within thirty
days, we have no choice other than to object to your claim in its entirety.
If you have any questions or comments, please do not hesitate to
contact us.
Yours truly,
Chapter 3.3 Office
Department

AccotL~ting
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
, T7 ' iT DIVISION
IN RE:

•

•

it

CASE NUMBER: ........S_ _.:lC
SSN:
7
-

DEBTORS

m_

••

NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING
AND OBJECTION TO CLAIM
TO:
1)

!)t'3"(J~'S CO\l.N~H..
277-PSS.
. !Ii.
i

I

lUI

C~rbITOA...

2)~~==:::::::::i""""""
• 1111

i£O

&

I ..

NOTICE OF HEARING
Notice is hereby given of this Objection to Claim.
Response and Request for Hearing, stating

gro~~ds

•

Unless a

for opposing the

Objection is filed within thirty (30) days of service of this Notice,
an Order will be tendered sustaining the Objection and the matter will
be submitted to the Court for decision.
a timely request for hearing is filed.

No hearing will be held u."less
Notice is further given that

the attached order sustaining this objection is being tendered herewith.
CERTIFIC~TE

OF SERVICE

It is hereby certified that a true copy of the foregoing was
mailed on this the

\~-t\.Jday of ()~1nb{.r"

1m,

to the persons and

addresses indicated above.
OBjECTION TO CLAIM
The Trustee objects to the claim of 4iiMlI••"_".III!C!!I!."L!'.,,-'IJII!IllilIiiT"73171i511i·iliTiI~ii-Ii'ilT_-.-ii·Ti:i'~T,
filed as claim number 0009 in the amount of $13,974.27

on the grounds

that the claim was defective when filed and was never amended.

Beverly
Burden, Trustee
P.O. Box 2204
. Lexington, ~~ 40588-2204
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Chapter 13 Trustee
Eastern District of Kentucky
~ Application to Incur Debt ~

r
r

see attached forms

r
r

r
:r
r

'r
r
r
r
t

r
r
r
t

r
H-61

J
j
Beverly M. Burden
Chapter 13 Trustee
P.O. Box 2204
Lexington, KY 40588-2204
(859) 233-1527
Dear Practitioner:

J
j

J
j

We have received an inquiry from one of your clients regarding the·
; .possibility of incurring additional debt and/or re-financing a mortgage
for the purpose of paying out their Chapter 13 case. We have asked
your client to contact you directly for assistance with this matter.
Enclosed is the information you and your client need: an application to
incur additional debt ,an order, a creditor's commitment, and
instructions. In addition, amended Schedules I and J (the budget)
must accompany the application. Please retain this packet as a master
copy and use it when any of your clients desire to incur additional
debt, or refinance existing debt, while their Chapter 13 case is open.
These forms are also available on our website at www.ch13edky.com.
Also enclosed is our policy on obtaining payoff balances. Please review
this policy and share it with your clients. It is especially important to
note that we will not provide payoff balances to prospective lenders.
We will provide the information only to the debtors or their attorneys.

j

J
j

,j

J
j
]

J
J

Yours truly,
Chapter 13 Trustee

....I

•
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•

BEVERLY M. BURDEN, CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE
SUITE 500, COMMUNITY TRUST BUILDING
P.O. BOX 2204
LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY 40588-2204
(859) 233-1527
November 20, 2000

VIRGIL JACKSON
#1, BOX 164
BERRY

Re:

and SANDRA JANE FRYMAN

KY 41003

Chapter 13 Bankruptcy
Case Number: 5-00-1332

1)

The approximate balance of your Chapter 13 case is $

2)

This balance is an ESTIMATE ONLY.

3)

If you intend to either refinance your home, or borrow funds, in
order to payout your Chapter 13 case, you are REQUIRED to obtain
an order from the U. S. Bankruptcy Court before doing so. Contact
your attorney for infor.mation about this process.

4)

The exact payoff will not be determined until your case has
audited.

5)

An estimate of your balance will only be provided once every
sixty (60) days.

6)

If you prefer to make your future requests bye-mail, you may
send your request to erogers@ch13edky.com.

Thank you,
Erin Rogers
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
APPl JCATlON FOR ADDITIONAl, DEBT

(Type forms and complete fully for approval)
1.

Fill out, sign and date the application.

2.

File an amended schedule I and J with the U. S. Bankruptcy Court and
provide a copy to the Trustee's office with your completed application.

3.

Have your attorney approve and sign the application also.

4.

Have the lending institution complete their part of the application.

5.

The Chapter 13 Trustee's office reviews the application and then, if
approved, forwards it to Bankruptcy Court for approval. It takes
approximately 2-3 weeks to process the application. (The Trustee's office
has no control over the length of time required for Court to review the
application).

6.

Call your Attorney if you have any questions or need help in filling out
this application.

7.

The Trustee's office will not give specific information about your Chapter
13 case to any lending institution. We will mail a print out of your case to
you if requested. You may share this information with any potential
creditor.

8.

We only send nne payoff letter to your Attorney, if you intend
payoff your case. This amount will be mailed to you only after we have
audited your case.
*** Only COMPLETED APPLICATIONS will receive an audit ***

9.

You must provide a written estimate if your application to incur debt is
for home or vehicle repairs.

Return the completed application to:
H-64

Chapter 13 Trustee
P. O. Box 2204
Lexington, Kentucky 40588
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UNITtDSTATESBANKRUPTCYCOURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENtUCKY

RE:

CASE NO.

DEBTOR(S)
APPlICATION TO INCIIR ADDITIONAl DFBI

The Debtor hereby applies to the Court for approval of additional debt to be repaid by way of
direct installment payments.
The additional debt is as follows:
PURCHASE PRICE:
(If this debt does not involve a purchase, skip down to "TOTAL AMOUNT OF DEBT").

DOWN PAYMENT:
TRADE-IN:

(if applicable)

TOTAL A.t\10UNT OF DEBT:
MONTHLY INSTALLMENT:
PURPOSE OF DEBT:
NAME OF CREDITOR:
SECURITY: (Describe)
The debt is for property or services necessary for the Debtor(s) performance under the plan.
The Debtor(s) will be able to make the payments on the new debt as well as maintain
payments Under the plan. Attached is a current income and expense budget form. The Trustee
has reviewed the budget and believes it is a fair account of the Debtor(s) current financial
situation.
Previous application to incur additional debt?

Dated:

Debtor

Debtor

Attorney for Debtor(s)

Chapter 13 Trustee
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CREDITOR'S COlVThllTlVIENT

It is hereby acknowledged that _____- - - - - - - - - - - - (Name of Borrower)
has applied to _ _ _ _---:::-""""':"'"-:---------- for credit as follows:
(Leuder)

PURCHASE PRICE:
(If the new debt does not involve a purchase, skip down to "TOTAL NEW DEBT").

r

DOWN PAYMENT:

r

TRADE-IN:
(If Applicable)
TOTAL NE\V DEBT:

r

MONTHLY INSTALLlVIENT: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

r

SECURITY: (DESCRIBE)

r

INTEREST RATE ON LOAN:

r
r

r
r

It is understood that the applicant is in an active Chapter 13 case in the Bankruptcy

Court for the Eastern District of Kentud-y.
Approval of the credit extension is hereby granted subject only to the approval of said
Bankruptcy Court which the Borrower undertakes full responsibility to obtain.

DATE:

r
I

r

,

BY: __---~-----------(LENDER'S SIGNATURE AND TITLE)

",..

i
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mUTED STATES BA1~1{R,(JPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

INRE:

J
J
J

DEBTORS

CASE NO:

ORDER APPROVING ADDITIONAL DEBT

j

J
j

The debtor(s} have applied to the Court for approval of debt (after filing Chapter
13). The Trustee has no objection to such additional debt and feels that the additional debt
should not interfere with the performance of the plan.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court approves the application of the above
Debtor(s} to incur additional debt in an amount not to exceed
for
thepurposeof __________________________________________________
The parties agree and it is so Ordered that such additional debt shall not be affected
by any Chapter 13 discharge entered in this case. The Chapter 13 Trustee shall not be
responsible for administering this additional debt.
Thisthe _________ dayof ____________________,19 ___.

1
J
J
j
j

BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
Approve Entry:

Attorney for the Debtor

J
J
J

J
Chapter 13 Trustee

J

•
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Chapter 13 Trustee
Eastern District of Kentucky
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Beverly Burden Web Access Agreement

Chapter 13 Standing Trustee
Website Access Agreement
This Agreement is made and entered into by and between the Office of the Trustee, Beverly M. Burden, Chapter 13 Standing Trustee
(hereinafter referred to as a TRUSTEE), AND
INDIVIDUAL USER NAME: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
AND
COMPANYIFIRM NAME: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- - - Both the INDIVIDUAL-USER AND COMPANY/FIRM are liable under this Agreement and may only access cases in which they are a
creditor or debtor.
The Trustee is a duly appointed Chapter 13 Standing Trustee for the Eastern District of Kentucky, vested with the duties as set forth in
U.S.C. Section 1302(b), including the duty to fumish information concerning debtors' estates and the administration of these estates. The
Trustee maintains records and files in computerized form. The Trustee permits approved Internet Access to the User for the purpose of
viewing and inspecting files of debtors for selected information regarding receipts and disbursements of funds.
The User desires Internet access to view and inspect these selected files.
THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants contained in this agreement and the satisfactory performance of all
conditions stated, the Parties agree that
1. INTERNET ACCESS TO RECORDS - The User shall be given Internet Access to, and the Trustee shall provide that access to
selected records and data maintained by the Trustee.
2. LIMITATIONS ON ACCESS AND USE - User hereby acknowledges and agrees to Internet Access.
PURPOSE - Shall be for the sole purpose of viewing and inspecting the selected data and records under the control and custody of the
Trustee, and User shall neither make nor attempt to make any data entry changes or modification to any record or data.
USE - Is provided solely for the use of User in User's business. User hereby expressly agrees that it will not use nor allow the use of
records, data or information obtained through the Intemet Access for the purpose of solicitation or any other use or practice not
specifically permitted by this Agreement
MANNER - Will be accessed and used by User only in the manner expressly authOrized and permitted by the Trustee. User agrees that
it will neither use nor permit use of the Website in any manner or fer any purpose which is not authorized by the Trustee or which is
unlawful or which is likely to cause damage or disrepair to the equipment, software, records or Website of the Trustee.
3. CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF RECORDS - User hereby expressly acknowledges and agrees that the records and data for which
access is provided under this Agreement are and shall remain records under the control and custody of the Trustee, and access is
provided only under the direct supervision of the Trustee, pursuant to the terms of this Agreement and all reasonable and necessary rules
and procedures adopted by the Trustee.
User, further, expressly acknowledges and agrees that while accessing, viewing and using the Trustee's selected records, the User shall
be under the same duties, responsibilities, and obligations as the Trustee to protect and carefully keep and preserve the records, subject
to the same penalties for any violation of those duties and obligations.
4. CONDITIONS FOR USE AND ACCESS
A. EQUIPMENT AND CONNECTIONS - The User shall obtain and supply, at its sole cost. all equipment. including computer,
peripherals, modems, software and connections and shall be responsible for and pay any and all other fees or costs necessary to
implement this Agreement

5. TERM OF AGREEMENT -This Agreement shall continue until such time as it is terminated pursuant to the provision in the following
subsection.
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6. TERMINATION - This Agreement may be terminated by either the Trustee or by the User, at any time, for any reason whatsoever,
without notice.
7. INDEMNIFICATION - User shall and hereby agrees to indemnify the Trustee for, and to hold Trustee harmless from any claims,
demands, suits, damages or costs, of any kind, arising out of or relating to use and access provided under this Agreement, caused or
claimed to be caused by any act or failure of Trustee.
8. ASSIGNMENT OR SUBCONTRACT - This agreement shall not be aSSigned nor shall any use or access provided under this
Agreement be subcontracted, co-opted or allowed to any other person, firin or other legal entity without the express written consent of the
Trustee, and such consent may be conditioned upon such terms and conditions as the Trustee may require.
9. ENTIRE AGREEMENT - This Agreement, together with any rules or procedures adopted by the Trustee shall constitute the entire
Agreement between the parties, and User hereby expressly acknowledges that it is not relying upon any other representations or
agreements not expressed in writing as a part of this Agreement. This Agreement may not be amended or modified, except in writing,
and signed by all parties.
10. DISCLAIMERS AND LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY:
A. NO WARRANTIES - The Trustee hereby expressly disclaims any express or implied warranties of the software program, computer

equipment or computer, and User hereby expressly assumes all risk related to the use and access provided under this Agreement.
B. NO REPRESENTATIONS CONCERNING ACCURACY OR COMPLETENESS OF RECORDS - The Trustee hereby expressly
disclaims any representation or assurance conceming the accuracy, completeness or substantive nature of any data to which access is
being provided and User hereby acknowledges this disclaimer and waives any claim or reliance upon such representations or
assurances.
C.NO LIABILITY FOR ERRORS OR FAILURES - The Trustee shall not be liable in any manner under this Agreement for any error,
inaccuracy or incomplete information contained in the records for which access is provided, and User hereby expressly releases the
Trustee from any claim, demand or suit arising from or as a result of any such error, inaccuracy or incomplete information.
Further, the Trustee shall not be liable in any manner under this Agreement for any failure, malfunction or other delay, Inconvenience, or
inability of the computer system, software or equipment, and User hereby expressly releases the Trustee from any claim, demand, or suit
arising from or as a result of any such failure, malfunction, delay, inconvenience or inability of the system software or equipment.
D. NO WARRANTY AS TO CURRENT DATA OR INFORMATION - The data and information available in the Trustee's records is as
current as pOSSible, depending on work flow, work needs, holidays, weekends, restraints on the Trustee, and any elements or factors
outside the control of the Trustee.
Payoff balances are only approximated due to the aforementioned conditions, recent receipts or disbursements, claim changes, court
orders or accruing interest. Exact payoff amounts should be obtained through the Trustee's Office by specific written request.
E. ADMISSIBILITY AS EVIDENCE - The Trustee makes no representation that the data and information available by accessing the
Trustee's Website will be admissible in Court as a Hearsay exception pursuant to Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
.• User. shall forward.an original of this ,signed and da~d Agreement to the attention of Danatia Coulter. Upon receipt, and approval by
Trustee, Trustee will promptiy sign and return a copy of this Agreement to User along with a user-id and password.
11. CorporationS/Companies: Firms, and/or any parties or Individual using the aSSigned user-id and password are liable under this· .
agreement.
.

Print or type all information.

J
J

J
J
J
]

j

J

J
J

J

J
j

j

Enter Company Name:
Enter User Name:
Titie:
Address:

j

City, State Zip:
PhonelFax Number:
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Signature of User:

Print Name:
Date:

Mail with self·
addressed, stamped
envelope to:

User 10 Request
Chapter 13 Trustee
PO Box 2204
LeXington, KY 40588

Or fax to:

(859)255-3143

Office of The Trustee

r

Beverly M. Burden
By:

r

Beverly M. Burden
Chapter 13 Standing Trustee

r
r

Page 3 00

Beverly Burden Web Access Agreement

,

r

r

r

Date:
Internet Website: www.13network.com
Chapter 13 Use Only
Userl.D.:
User password:

;r

r
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CHAPTER 13 ORIENTATION

r

r

r

•

•

r

ASHLAND

FRANKFORT"

• LEXINGrON

r

OW&~SBORO

r

,.

•

•

BOWLING GREEN

r

r
r
r
r
1

r
r

Beverly M. Burden, Trustee
Eastern District of Kentucky

100 East Vine Street, Suite 500
Community Trust Building
P. O. Box 2204
Lexington, Kentucky 40588-2204

I

r
r
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r

Introduction
This· booklet will help to answer some of the most common

r

questions or problems arising from being in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy.

r

more information with a particular problem, feel free to call the office.

r
r

r

r
r.

Please refer to this handbook often as a reference guide. If you need

Calling
theOffice

3

~

AM

until

4:00

through Friday.
number is

PM

Monday

The phone

(859) 233-1527.

r

to the proper person.

r
r

r
r

r

A

staff of 12 is well qualified to

r
r

Chapter 13 is commonly

Office hours are from 9:00

answer your questions.

r

Payments

The

receptionist can direct your call

called the Wage Earner's Plan. It
involves payment of debt to your
creditors

and

allows

your

property to be protected from
creditors. You may be able to
complete your plan early if you
are able to increase the amount
of money you payor if some
creditors do not file a claim in
your case. Plans usually last 3-5

Have a question about your
payments?

years but should never exceed 5
years in length.

Call: 233-1527 (See below list
for extension numbers)

Generally, you pay us and
we pay your creditors, according

Covington cases Corbin cases Frankfort cases Pikeville cases Lexington casesAshland cases -

Ext. 101
Ext. 101
Ext. 105
Ext. 105
Ext. 106
Ext. 111

to your plan. We make payments
to your creditors once a month.
We pay all secured creditors
first, then priority creditors and
finally, unsecured creditors.
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MAIL ALL PAYMENTS TO:

Direct Payments

Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY

P. O. Box 1766
You should have received a

Memphis, TN 38101-1766

j

·Payment Information- letter with
exact details about your particular
case, such as due date each month
and payment amount.

you must

remain CUrrent on all .payments.
You may pay by personal check,
money order or cashier's check made payable to the Chapter 13
Trustee. Write your case number
on all payments.

Payroll Deductions
Call the office IF you would
like your Chapter 13 payments

J
j

taken straight from your paycheck.
Ask for the Case Manager for your
case.

We need your employer's

exact name and address (where
your payroll comes from).

This

Payroll Deduction Order (PDO) is
signed by the Judge and can only

If you fall behind or
become I'delinquent'l In
your payments, one or
more of your creditors
could file for a "rell~f
from the automatic .'.
stay'l on your case•....
This means· a creditor ... · .
·can get·theCourt's
permission .to ..
repossess your
property. Call your
attorney If you receive a
motion for relief from
stay. Your attorney can
tell you what your
options are.

J
J
J

be stopped by a court order signed
by the Judge. This deduction must

J

J
j

J
j

stay in place as long as you are in
bankruptcy or as long as you work
for this employer. It usually takes
1'!'2 .weeks to get the deduction
started

from. your

J

J

paycheck.

Contlnye mailng yoyr payments to
Memphis until you see it has
started coming out of your check.
If you

change jobs often,

the Trustee may not let you use
payroll deduction.
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r
r'"

r
r,

If you are paid every week or twice a month, your payment to
the Trustee will be divided up and taken out of each paycheck.
See the following chart to see how payments are determined.

IF YOUR MONTHLY PAYMENTS ARE $500.00/MONTH:

r

,..

To find out what the Weekly amount would be:

!

r
r
,

r
r.
,.
!

,..
i

r
r
".
!

,.

Multiply

$500.00

x
divide by

12
52

-

$115.38 .

(months)
(weeks per year)
weekly

To find out what the Bi-Weekly amount would be:
(Every two weeks - this means 3 pay periods in some
months)
Multiply

$500.00

x
divide by

12
26
$230.77

(months)
(pay periods per year)
bi-weekly

To find out what the Semi-Monthly amount would be:
(Paid twice a month)

divide by
-

$500.00
2
$250.00

I

,.
,.
i
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(pay periods per mo)
semi-monthly

]
j

j

J
j
Extra Payments

Stopping Payroll
Deductions
When your case is paid in full,
the Trustee's office will send your
employer written notice to stop your
payroll deductions.
Please be
patient and allow a little time for
deductions to stop coming out of
your check.
Anything extra paid to the
Trustee will be sent back to you the
following month.

Returned Checks
Memphis will send a personal
check back through the bank one
time only if it comes back marked
"insufficient or non-sufficient funds".
If it doesn't clear a second time, we
will send you a letter notifying you
that your check has been returned.
You will need to send another
check to Memphis immediately.
Two NSF checks mean that you will
no longer be allowed to pay by
personal check. After that, you
would need to pay by money orders
or cashier's checks only.
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Extra
payments
are
certainly allowed, and even
encouraged, if you are able to
do so. You do need to keep
making your regular monthly
payments even if you have paid
"extra" on your case. Your plan
calls for a disbursement
(payment) to be sent to your
creditors each month!

J
J
J

J
j

Outside Payments

J

Your
payments
are
governed by law once you have
filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
You cannot pick and choose
which particular creditor you
would like to pay ahead of others
or which creditor you might like
to pay directly, "on the side."
You are responsible for paying
all normal living expenses that
come due after you file
bankruptcy. Your mortgage is
usually paid directly by you also.
Make sure you know which
creditors you must pay directly
and which will be paid through
your Chapter 13 case.

j

J
J
J
J
J

..

-

r
roo

r
r
r

r
r
r

r
ro

Most plans last 3 - 5 years. It
is rare that a plan will last the exact
number of months it was originally
scheduled. Sometimes, a creditor
will file a claim for a larger amount
.than you' thought you owed, or
interest rates might be changed.
You may have even forgotten to list
a debt in your petition. All these
things will lengthen the time it takes

This is a summary of your creditors
who are being paid by the Trustee's
office, based on your plan and
claims filed by creditors.

Please

look this over carefully for any
errors. If you object to a claim that

to payoff your case.
On the other hand, some-

has

been

filed

in

your case'

times one or more creditors may

because, for example, the amount

not file a proof of claim with the

is wrong or you do not owe that

r

Court.

possibly

creditor at all, you need to call your

r

shorten the time to pay aft your

attorney to file an objection with the

case. Therefore, the length of

Court.

r
r
,

Length of Ch. 13 Plan

r

lor

r

This

could

your plan can change'over the

TRUSTEE~S· OFFICE.

Your case summary also lists

3 - 5 year period.

payments you have made to the
Trustee for this particular six month

Case Summaries

period.

If you believe you have

The Trustee will mail a

made a payment that is not on this

print-out of your case semi-

report, call the Trustee's office and

annually, in January and July.

ask to speak to the Controller.

r

'r

DO NOT CALL THE
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Payments to Creditors

IMPORTANT NOTE:
The Trustee's office can only
change a claim when, and if,
the creditor files a new claim
with the Court.

Generally, creditors have 3
types of debts or claims:
..

J
J
J
J
j

Secured Creditors:
Have claims against property
that has been

Claims Filed by
Creditors

pledged as

collateral such as a
home, car or furniture.

Money you send to the
Trustee's office goes toward the
any

Priority Creditors:

additional

Have claims for taxes, past

attorney's fees and the people you

due child support, attorney's

owe (your creditors).

fees or Chapter

Trustee's

fees,

..

Creditors

13 fees.

J
J
J
J
j

generally have 90 days from your

These

first date set for the Meeting of

unsecured.

j

Unsecured Creditors:

j

claims are

Creditors to file a claim with the
Court. The Trustee can only pay

..

those creditors who filed a claim

Are owed debts that have no

with

collateral

Bankruptcy Court.

The

such

as

credit

Trustee cannot pay a creditor who

cards, medical·· expenses;

did not file a claim with the Court.

signature loans, etc.

Sometimes, you need to make
sure a certain creditor files a claim.

All your secured debts are

Call your attorney to help you get

paid first, then priority, and finally

a claim filed if a creditor that you

unsecured debts. Unsecured debts

listed on your petition does not

are

appear on your summary.

depending on your plan.

not

always

paid

in

full,

J

J
J

•

•

•
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r

called an "Application to Incur

Co-Signed Debts

r
r
r
,

Debt. II

co-signer or guarantor on your

not

debts from collection activity by a

unless

creditor. This protection lasts only

emergency situation or unusual

as

circumstances.

long

as

you

remain

in

r

bankruptcy. Creditors should not

r

payments from them.

r

The Trustee generally will

Chapter 13 usually protects a

approve
you

the

application

are -facing

an

call your co-signers and try to get
Call your

attorney if this happens.

Selling Your Property
Similar rules apply here as

r.

they do for obtaining new debt. You

r

of your property without the Court's

r
r
r

r
r
r

;r

cannot sell, give away or trade any

permission while in bankruptcy.

Permission for Credit
If you need to repair a furnace,
replace a broken-down car, or
borrow money for any reason while
you are in bankruptcy, you must get
the Trustee's written approval and a
court order. The Trustee has forms
that you and the lender must fill out
and sign. Your attorney must also
sign the forms. These forms are

,

H-91

Call your attorney to discuss any
special circumstances.

J
j
CompletionIDismissal
of Your Ch. 13 Plan

Income Taxes
The Court requires you to file
an income tax return each year in
a timely manner.
handled

by

Procedures

the

Staff

Returns are
IRS

Special

and

Compl~.tlvrl
Successful completion of your
Chapter 13 case means everything

J

,

..I

j

j

was set up and paid according to

are

your plan. An Order of Discharge

processed manually. causing a

will be sent to you from Washington

delay of your refund. Tax refunds

D.C. when your case is paid out.

are generally sent directly to you.

j

J

Dis!l11ssaJ

j

require you to sign an Agreed

An "Order of Dismissal" is sent

Order to send us money from your

when you have failed to follow one

J

tax

refund the following year, if

or more of the conditions of your

you fall behind in your plan

approved plan. Falling behind on

payments. If an IRS tax claim has

your payments Is a major reason

been

most cases are dismissed. You are

filed

no longer under the protection of

in your

the Court· and creditors are' free to' .

Chapter

start collecting payments, foreclose

The

Trustee

will

sometimes

13 case,

J

on or repossess your property.

the IRS

Your unsecured creditors are also

will

free to obtain judgments against

probably

...

you or to garnish your wages. The

withhold
any refund and apply it toward the

IRS can take over your wages

•

and/or bank acco~nts until your tax

.debt you owe them.

debts are paid in full.

•

•
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Non-Discharged
Debts

Filing Chapter 7
Bankruptcy

There are some debts you
may owe

that

may

not

be

discharged or closed out at the end
of your bankruptcy case unless
they have been paid in full through
your Chapter 13 plan.

These

include student loans, back child

becomes

necessary during your bankruptcy
to change your case to a ·complete
bankruptcy·.,

This

is

called

converting your case to Chapter 7
Bankruptcy. You need to discuss
this thoroughly with your attorney.

owed because of a death or
personal injury claim.

r
r
r
'r
r

is a voluntary plan, yo.u may ask to

r

sometimes

support or alimony, and money

Voluntary Dismissal
of Your Case

,

It

Since Chapter 13 Bankruptcy .

The Chapter 13
Trustee's Office
cannot give you
any legal advice
on filing Chapter
7 Bankruptcy.

have your case dismissed at any
time. Your attorney will need to file
the proper paperwork with the
Court.

Please

discuss

this

thoroughly with your attomey.

'r
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We only
administer
Chapter 13 cases!

Final Report and Audit
The Trustee's office will send a Final Report
to Bankruptcy Court once your case is paid in full
and all payments made to your creditors have
cleared the bank. We do an in-house audit to
make sure everything was set up and paid
correctly. You will get a successful completion
letter at that point from the Trustee's office. It
may be a few months before you get the official
Order of Discharge from the federal government.

J
J
J
J
J
J
J
j

j
j

Your Credit Rating
Your bankruptcy is a matter of public record. It will appear in the
newspaper and on credit reports. Generally, the Chapter 13 information
will stay on your credit report for 10 years. It is up to any potential
lending institution to evaluate your credit record for future credit
purposes.

J
J
J

I

You should wait about 3 months after your bankruptcy case has
been closed out to request a copy of your credit report. Check to see
if there is anything that needs to be corrected ot updated.

.J

.

•

•
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Three Major Credit Reporting Agencies

r
r·

Experian (formerly TRW)
PO Box 2350
Chatsworth, CA 91313-2350
(800) 682-7654

r

r

r
r
r

One free copy per year

Equifax
PO Box 740241
Atlanta, GA 30374
(800) 685-1111

$8.00 per person in
most states

Trans Union Corporation
PO Box 390
Springfield, PA 19064-0390
(800) 888-4213

$8.00 per person

r
r

'r

r

r
r
r
r

Please send a copy of my credit report
Name: ___________________

_________

Spouse Name: _________________________
Current Address:

-----------------------------

Previous Address: ________________________
Social Security Number___________________
Spouse Social Security Number: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Date of Birth: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Date of Birth - Spouse: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

r

r

~

Spouse Signature

Signature
H-95
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Important Documents

,...

There are several documents you
need to keep when you file
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, as well as
those sent to you after you
complete your Bankruptcy.

-

1. Copy of your Petition
2.
3.
4.
5.

j

Plan Amendments or Plan Modifications
All Schedules
Trustee1s Final Report
Order of Discharge

J

J

Important questions you need to ask yourself:
I

1. Did all your creditors file timely claims?
(Remember a creditor can still refuse future credit because
your debt is viewed as a loss if it was not paid in full).

J

...1

2. Were there other debts not paid through the bankruptcy?
3. Were all liens cancelled?
4. Do you have all clear titles due you?
•

REMEMBER:

•

You may still need to pay any liens, judgments, tax debts
or student loans if they were not paid in full through your plan.
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CHAPTER 13 RESPONSIBILITIES
DEBTOR
Files plan with Bankruptcy Court through Attorney
Attends 341 Meeting of Creditors
Attends Confirmation Hearing
Makes timely payments to Trustee's office
Continues regular payments to mortgage company
Calls Attorney with any changes needed to plan
Notifies Trustee of any changes in:
employer or salary; marital status; address; phone number
Notifies Bankruptcy Court Clerk of change of address

ATTORNEY
Advises Debtor on any legal matters
Files petition and plan with Bankruptcy Court Clerk
Attends 341 Meeting of Creditors with Debtor
Attends Confirmation Hearing with Debtor
Files any changes to the plan with Bankruptcy Court Clerk

TRUSTEE
Recommends approval or confirmation of plan
Sends monthly payments to creditors who file claims
Notifies the Court when Debtors miss payments
Sends quarterly reports to Debtors
Recommends approval of applications to go Into debt
Audits case upon completion

CREDITORS
File proofs of claim with Bankruptcy Court Clerk
Unsecured creditors have 90 days from 341 meeting to file a claim
Governmental creditors (IRS) have 180 days from petition date.

BANKRUPTCY COURT
Final authority on any matters of dispute (by court hearing)
Approves bankruptcy plan
Receives all correspondence filed on case (clerk's office)
Dismisses or converts case If terms of plan are not followed
Officially "Discharges" case after successful completion
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J
DEFINITIONS
OF
GENERAL BANKRUPTCY TERMS
Arrearage - amount of payments the debtor is behind at time
of filing bankruptcy.
Automatic Stay - creditors stop trying to collect payments
listed in bankruptcy. Goes into effect when debtor files.
Bar Date - last date for a creditor to timely file a proof of
claim.
Chapter 13 - wage earner's plan - allows debtor to pay back
debts over a period of 3-5 years.
Chapter 7 - straight bankruptcy - allows certain assets or
property to be sold to pay back creditors.
Co-Debtor Stay - automatic stay which protects people who did
not file bankruptcy but are listed on same debt as the debtor
who filed bankruptcy.
Confirmation - Court approves the debtor's filed plan.

J
J
j
j

J
j

J
J

J
J
J

Conversion - .changlngabankruptcycase from"one chapter to
another.
Delinquency - plan payments made to the Trustee are past due,
case could get dismissed.

II

Dismissal - a Court Order ending the bankruptcy case. The
debtor is no longer under the protection of the Court. Creditors
have the right to begin collecting on debts again. This is not
the same as completing, or paying out, a case.
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DEFINITIONS - Continued

r

Meeting of Creditors - also known as 341 Meeting or First
Meeting. Trustee and Creditors question the debtors under
oath about their plan.

r

Modification of Plan - changes the plan in some way, has to be
approved by the Judge.

r
r
r

Order - a ruling by the Judge that requires some action to be
taken in the case.

r
r
r
'r

r
r
r

r

lr
1

ir

r

Post Petition - something that happens after the bankruptcy
petition is filed.
Pro Se - a debtor who files bankruptcy without an attorney or
legal counsel.
Proof of Claim - a creditor files a form with the Bankruptcy Court
Clerk in order to start receiving payments on a case.
Relief from Stay - an Order allowing one particular creditor to
start collecting payments again from the debtor.
Secured Creditor - any party holding a lien on property or who
has issued a loan with some type of collateral used as security.
Special Class -an unsecured claim, such as a co-signed debt,
which is treated differently from other unsecured claims.
Trustee - person appointed to handle bankruptcy cases.
Unsecured Creditor - one whose debt is not secured by any
property or collateral, such as credit card debt or a signature
loan.
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Where Your Money Goes
Write down an estimate of your expenses in these categories.

Monthly Average

Spending Category
1. Savings
2. Housing
3. Groceries
4. Cigarettes
5. Clothing
6. TransportationlParking
7. MedicallDental
8. Car Payment
9. Car Insurance
10. Gasoline
11. Insurance (Life, Car, Other)
12. Utilities (Heat, Water,Gas)
13. Telephone
14. Garbage
15. Taxes (IRS, Property, etc.)
16. Support & Child Care
17. Tuition and Books
18. School Loans
19. Haircuts
20. Recreation & Entertainment
21. Gifts and Donations
22. Newspaper
23. Basic Cable
24. Eating Out
25. Lunches/Snacks
26. Pets
27. Miscellaneous
TOTAL:
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BANKRUp.TCY FRAUD
IS A
FEDERAL CRIME I!!

r
r
r
r

r

It is against the law to:
•

Hide your property from creditors or the
bankruptcy Trustee.

•

Give your property to a family member in
order to keep the property away from your
creditors or the bankruptcy Trustee.

r

•

Lie about your finances under oath!

r

•

·Make false statements in··your bankruptcy
petition or schedules.

•

File a false claim against a person in
bankruptcy.

r.
r
'r
ir

'r
r
r
r
,
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CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE

r

WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

r
r
r

r
r

r
r
r

r
r

r

r

r
r
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I.
A.

Western District Of Kentucky: Chapter 13 Trustee
Generally

Chapter 13 practice under the United States Bankruptcy Code is basically the same allover
the United States, but different local rules and practices create differences which are worthy of note.
In the Western District of Kentucky there were approximately 2,400 Chapter 13 filings for
the fiscal year ending September 30,2000. We are averaging about 205 filings per month for the
year ending September 30, 2000. Chapter 13 First Meetings of Creditors are held in four (4)
locations in the Western District of Kentucky with approximately 85% of the cases being heard in
Louisville, 7% in Paducah and the balance almost equally divided between Owensboro and Bowling
Green. Chapter 341 Hearings are held 3 full days per month in Louisville and 1 day each in
Paducah, Bowling Green and Owensboro.

B.

Confirmation Hearings

Of particular interest to Chapter 13 debtor and creditor representatives is the fact that
Confirmation Hearings are usually held on the same day as the 341 Hearings. Objections to
confirmation must be filed promptly so that the Trustee and counsel for the debtor will be aware of
them and they can be presented to the court at the conclusion of the 341 docket. Chapter 13 cases
are routinely confirmed by the court upon the recommendation of the Trustee unless there is an
objection to confirmation by a creditor or the Trustee or the case proposes to pay less than 70% to
unsecured creditors. In the event of a Trustee or creditor objection, or if the case proposes to pay
less than 70% to unsecured creditors, a Confirmation Hearing is held before the court the same day
as the 341 Hearing. The time and place of that hearing will be noted on the Notice to creditors
regarding the meeting of creditors.

C.

Filing Of Claims

The Bankruptcy Code provides ninety (90) days to creditors to file claims from the date of
the first scheduled Meeting of Creditors. Local rules in the Western District of Kentucky provide
that secured and priority claims of creditors should be filed in the Clerk's office at least three (3)
business days preceding the Meeting of Creditors and should contain a statement of the net balance
as of the date of the filing of the petition and any appropriate documentation. This is particularly
important so that the Trustee, debtors and creditors will have an opportunity to establish the secured
value of any such claim and to also establish the interest rate to be applied to that secured value. As
the local rules provide, the contract rate of the secured creditor may be modified to the market rate
by agreement of the parties or by hearing before the court if no agreement can be reached regarding
a modified interest rate.

D.

Property Appraisal

In the Louisville Division of the Western District, the court has appointed an appraisal
company to appraise personal property of debtors. This personal property typically includes
automobiles, furniture, appliances and other property which appears from the petition to serve as
collateral for a debt. These appraisals are typically available at the First Meeting of Creditors so that
a value for secured claims can be established. With the help of an objective third party appraisal,
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it is much easier to reach an agreement as to the value of the automobile or other collateral which
secures a debt. In most Chapter 13 cases, valuing collateral is a very important function. As such,
it is important for secured creditors to have their claims filed on a timely basis so that the amount
of the claim, the secured portion, and the interest rate can be established at the First Meeting of
Creditors and then included in the Order of Confirmation.

E.

Attorney Fees

It has been the custom and practice in Chapter 13 cases in the Western District of Kentucky
for the debtor's counsel attorney fees to be paid through the Chapter 13 Plan rather than being paid
directly by the debtors. The Court has set attorney fees in typical Chapter 13 cases and has reviewed
those fees on an annual basis such that for the year 2000, attorney fees in a typical Chapter 13 case
are $1,140.00 for work done from the beginning of the case through the submission of the Schedule
of Allowed Claims. If counsel believes that a particular case has taken more time and merits greater
compensation, counsel should advise the Trustee at the Meeting of Creditors that an application for
a fee will be filed. The fee application will then be acted upon by the court. Whether the fee is the
standard set amount or the amount approved by the court pursuant to a fee application, normally
one-half of the fee will be paid with the first distribution to secured creditors with the balance being
paid after the Schedule of Allowed Claims has been filed with the court.

G.

J

Orders of Confirmation

Orders of Confirmation reflecting the amounts, secured values and interest rates for secured
claims, the amounts of priority claims and a percentage proposed to be paid to unsecured creditors
are prepared by the office of the Chapter 13 Trustee for submission to the court after the
Confirmation Hearing. The Order of Confirmation also provides for the amount of the payment to
be paid by the debtor and how it is to be paid (monthly, weekly, bi-weekly, semi-monthly or other).
The question of a payroll deduct order is addressed at the Meeting of Creditors, and unless there is
a good reason why it should not be done, the court will typically order a payroll deduct to ensure the
Plan payment is made. Approximately 75% to 80% or more of the Chapter 13 cases in the Western
District of Kentucky have payroll deduction orders, and the Trustee has found that these cases work
much more effectively than cases in which payroll deduct orders are not possible. Obviously there
are some cases, such as where the debtors are self-employed, on Social Security or otherwise unable
to provide a payroll deduction, where such deductions are not possible.

F.

J

Section 341 Hearings

In preparing for the Section 341 Hearing, counsel for the debtor must be aware that 11 U.S.C.
Sec. 1326 requires debtors to begin making payments within thirty (30) days ofthe filing of the Plan.
Due to the fact that in some cases the Section 341 Hearing is longer than thirty (30) days after the
filing of the petition, counsel for the debtor should collect and hold in escrow the amounts of the
proposed Plan payments from the debtors so that they will be available at the time of the Section 341
Hearing. This will allow the debtor to be current with the amount of the proposed payment at the
time the case is considered for confirmation. If the debtor is not able to make payment at the time
of the First Meeting of Creditors, it may be a basis for denying confirmation of the case. If a case
is confirmed, but the debtor gets behind in his payments by thirty (30) days or more, the Trustee will
file a motion with the court asking the court to require the debtor to show cause why his case should

H-I06

J
J
J
j

J
J
J
J
J
j

j

J
j

J

not be dismissed for failure to make the Plan payments. A hearing will then be scheduled on this
request.
As was mentioned earlier, unsecured creditors have ninety (90) days from the date ofthe first
scheduled 341 Hearing to file claims. The Order of Confirmation will provide that the attorney for
the debtor will have a period beginning at the end of that ninety (90) day period and extending for
thirty (30) days to file a Schedule of Unsecured Claims which have been timely filed which are to
be paid in the Plan. After the filing of the schedule, the second installment of the attorney fees is
paid.

H.

Less Than 100% Plan

In any case proposing to pay less than 100% to unsecured creditors, the Order of
Confirmation provides that the attorney for the debtor is to compute the amount ofunsecured claims
which have been filedto see iflessthan all the claims scheduled were in fact filed on a timely basis.
Ifso, the attorney for the debtor should compute the amount ofunsecured debt to be paid in the Plan.
In other words, ifall the unsecured debt is not paid, the percentage to be paid to the filing claimants
should increase.

I.

Tax Returns, Tax Refunds, and Revised Budgets

An additional requirement imposed by local rule is that any debtor with less than a 100%
Plan is to file with the Trustee annually a copy of his federal and state income tax returns and a
revised budget. Additionally, so as to be sure that all disposable income is paid into the Plan, the
debtor is required to pay to the Trustee any income tax refund which he is to receive from the state
or federal government. This refund is to be used to pay the percentage of unsecured debt which is
not proposed to be paid in the Plan. In other words, if the Plan is a 70% Plan and an income tax
refund is received, that refund is applied toward paying the 30% that was not to be paid under the
Plan rather than to satisfying the provisions ofthe 70% Plan. The court has ruled that earned income
credit is not considered to be a refund and is not covered by this rule. As a result, earned income
credit is not required to be paid to the Trustee. Tax returns and budgets have to be filed with the
Trustee by May 15 of each year and the tax refund paid to the Trustee when received.

J.

Semi-Annual Debtor Report

The Trustee is required by regulations ofthe United States Trustee to provide a semi- annual
Debtor Report to all debtors in Chapter 13 cases and their attorneys. These reports are typically
mailed on or about march 30 and September 30 of each year and show the amounts paid by the
debtor, the distribution ofthe amounts received by the Trustee for the payment of creditors, and the
balances due the creditors after their payments. Since there are more than 5000 pending cases in the
Western District of Kentucky, debtors are requested to ask any questions concerning these reports
in writing so that the Trustee can appropriately respond.

K.

Priority And Mortgage Payments

Secured claims are paid in a Chapter 13 Plan prior to a payment of priority claims.
Unsecured claims are paid last. With respect to claims that are secured only by the principal
residence of a debtor, ifthere is a default in the payments owed to the mortgage lender prior to the
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bankruptcy filing, the Bankruptcy Code requires that such a default be cured within a reasonable
period of time. The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Kentucky has determined that a
reasonable time is twenty-four (24) months or less. As a result, the default 011 any mortgage loan of
this type must be cured within twenty-four (24) months while the debtor continues to pay the current
payments owed to the lender. Virtually all mortgage payments are made directly to the creditor
("outside the Plan") while all payments to cure a default are made through the Trustee.
L.

Trustee Commission And Expenses

The Trustee is entitled by law to charge a commission and expenses which cannot exceed
10%. The current charge for the Trustee ofthe Western District of Kentucky is 2.75%, an amount
set by the United States Trustee based upon the budget ofthe Chapter 13 Trustee. That fee is subject
to change effective October 1 of each year.

M.

Plan Period

The Bankruptcy Code requires debtors to pay all oftheir disposable income into the Plan for
only thirty-six (36) months. However, most of the Plans confirmed in the Western District of
Kentucky are longer than thirty-six (36) months. The reason for this seems to be that if the debtor
is going to make payments for sixty (60) months rather than thirty-six (36) there is not as much
scrutiny of the disposable income question. Additionally, in cases in which there is a question of
the "liquidation" test, (the Code-imposed requirement that creditors get for their claims as least as
much as they would get if non-exempt assets ofthe debtor were liquidated by a Chapter 7 Trustee)
the longer time period increases the ability ofthe debtor to meet that test in a Chapter 13.

N.

General Trustee Office Information

The Office ofthe Chapter 13 Trustee, Western District ofKentucky , is located at 310 Legal
Arts Building, 200 South Seventh Street, Louisville, Kentucky 40202. This building is located at
the corner of Seventh and Market Street in downtown Louisville. The telephone numbers for the
office are (502) 581-9042 and (502) 581-9087. However, any creditor seeking a report regarding
the status of a particular case and when payment will be made should request that report in writing.
Alternatively, the Trustee has available in the office a terminal which may be accessed by a creditor
representative to obtain information about cases in which they are involved. To make an
appointment to use this terminal, the representative should contact the Trustee's office.
In dealing with the Trustee's office, the creditor seeking a report and the debtor making a
payment should be sure to use the applicable case number. This will ensure that the creditor gets
the correct information and that the debtor's payment is credited to the proper case.

o.

Case Closure

Once a case is completed or dismissed for any reason, the Trustee's office will file a final
report with the Bankruptcy Court showing all receipts and disbursements and to whom
disbursements were made. This final report cannot be filed with the court until all the checks used
to make disbursements in that particular case have cleared the bank and been returned to the Trustee.
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P.

Debtor Creditor Rehabilitation

In conjunction with the International Credit Association of Kentuckiana and ACCEPT, a
consumer credit counseling service of the American Red Cross, the Chapter 13 Trustee presents a
program by which Chapter 13 debtors completing 100% plans can attend two seminars, each
approximately 3 hours long, one at the beginning of the Plan and one at the time that the Plan is
completed. The seminars deal with consumer financial matters such as budgeting, credit reports,
applying for credit and other similar topics.
The purpose of the seminar is to provide Chapter 13 debtors with information that will be useful
to them in avoiding the problems that led to the bankruptcy filing. The benefit of being involved
in the program is that a number of potential creditors have agreed that they will look favorably
upon credit applications of persons in this program who have both completed their Plans and
attended the seminars. The program is coordinated through the office of the Chapter 13 Trustee
and is taught by attorneys, credit counselors and a representative from the Chapter 13 Trustee's
office.
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I.

STAY LITIGATION IN CHAPTER 13 CASES

A. Stay Relief Against Co-Makers
As in all bankruptcy fIlings, the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. Section 362 is imposed
immediately upon the entry of the Order for relief. In addition, a second stay is imposed in
Chapter 13 cases by 11 U.S.C. Section 1301. This stay applies to any action against
co-makers on consumer debts. (In other words, business debt would not be subject to the
co-maker stay of Section 1301.)
There are three grounds for stay relief against a co-maker under Section 1301. These
are as follows:
1.

If the co-maker received the benefit of the loan proceeds,

2.

If the creditor's interest would be "irreparably harmed", or

3.

If the plan does not propose to pay a particular debt.

The following are examples of how each of these grmmds can come into play.
Co-maker received the benefit ofthe loan proceeds

Son goes into a car dealership to purchase his first car. Since the son has not
established a credit history yet, the dealership requires him to get a co-maker. Dear old Dad
comes to the rescue once more and co-signs the debt with the son.
Dad is laid off at work and files Chapter 13 bankruptcy proposing to pay 100% to all
unsecured creditors. Can you get the co-maker stay terminated? The answer is yes.
The non-bankrupt co-maker (Son) is the party that got the benefit ofthe loan. He is
not the bankrupt, so you have grounds to have the co-maker stay terminated. If this is a
100% plan, why would you want to do that? Remember, the stay under § 1301 is just like
the stay under § 362 as to the co-maker. Technically, you should not be contacting the co
maker, sending him notices, sending him monthly statements, etc. This would include the
creditor's ability to repossess the vehicle upon a future default. By getting the co-maker stay
terminated, you allow your creditor client to deal with the co-maker directly without fear of
violating the § 1301 stay.
Irreparable Harm

This is the same kind of "harm" that you would show in order to get a temporary
restraining order. Some examples are the co-maker taking the car out of the jurisdiction
while he is stationed in Germany, the vehicle has been abandoned in a repairman's shop, the

1-1

vehicle has been seized by the police for transporting drugs and you need to file a petition
for remission or risk forfeiture of the unit, etc. The point is that this cannot be some run of
the mill inconvenience. It has to be something severe that endangers the creditor's interest
in the collateral.
The plan does not propose to pay the debt

If a Plan proposes to pay unsecured claims at the rate of 70 percent (with no interest
paid thereon), a creditor would be entitled to co-maker stay relief for the 30 percent of its
unsecured claim not being paid by the Chapter 13 debtor. The creditor would also be entitled
to co-maker stay relief for the interest which is to accrue on the entire loan, plus any attorney
fees allowable pursuant to its loan documents. Similarly, if a Plan proposes to pay a secured
creditor's claim as "fully secured" but at a reduced rate of interest, the creditor would be
entitled to seek co-maker stay reliefin order to collect the difference between its contract rate
of interest and the interest rate proposed by the Plan (as well as any attorneys fees
recoverable pursuant to the terms of the loan documents).
Once the co-maker stay is terminated you may file suit in state court for the sums that
you are not being paid through the bankruptcy. The natural tendency it to file suit only for
the amounts that you are not being paid in the Chapter 13 plan (in the example above, the 30
percent, the unpaid interest and attorney fees). This is a mistake. You would sue for your
entire debt, including court costs, interest on the entire amount owed and attorney fees.
The trap lies in Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 55.03. It states in pertinent part
that:
A judgment by default shall not be
different in kind from or exceed in amount
that prayed for in the demand for judgment
Here is what will happen. You will get the co-maker stay terminated, and then
you file suit for what you are not being paid in the Chapter 13. You get a judgment by
default. Then, the bankrupt either converts his petition to one under Chapter 7, the
bankruptcy gets dismissed and the former barlkrupt skips or he dies with no assets before
completing the plan.. By receiving a judgment in the amount of the shortfall from the
Chapter 13, only, you have foreclosed yourself from ever collecting all that you were
owed on the debt.
The solution is to sue for the entire debt, but be very careful to collect only the
amount that you are not being paid through the bankruptcy. Yes, you will have to keep
very close tabs on what you are collecting, but you prevent a potential malpractice action
by your client for limiting their recovery on the debt.
The customary $75.00 filing fee for stay relief motions is not required to be paid
when a motion to terminate the co-maker stay is filed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 1301.
Bankruptcy Rule 9014 states that: " ... reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing
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shall be afforded the party against whom relief is sought." Accordingly, a copy ofthe motion
must be sent to the co-maker. Therefore, one must question whether the creditor and debtor
can enter into an Agreed Order Terminating the Co-maker Stay unless the co-maker signs off
on it, or unless a motion is made for approval ofthe Order pursuant to 4001 (d) [which speaks
only to the termination ofthe § 362 stay and does not mention the stay afforded co-makers
under § 1301]. This is but another one of those questions that cause the bankruptcy
practitioner to wake up screaming in the middle of the night.
B. Termination Of Section 362 Automatic Stay

The automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. Section 362, which is applicable to both the debtor
and "property of the estate," may be terminated for a myriad of reasons, which are less
clearly delineated. These reasons include "lack of adequate protection" and "good cause".
While the latter is a rather amorphous standard, the standard of"lack ofadequate protection"
is more easily defined.
1. Proposed Plan does not Amortize Claim Over Plan Term
"Lack ofadequate protection" would include the fact that the Plan as proposed would
not amortize a secured creditor's claim over the three to five-year term ofthe Plan. The Plan
as proposed must provide for payment of the creditor's allowed secured claim (as that is
defined in 11 USC § S06(a» plus a "market" rate of interest over the term of the Plan since
the debtor usually will not be able to pay creditor's allowed secured claim on the "effective
date ofthe plan," i.e., upon confirmation. (See, 11 USC § 132S(a)(S)(B)(ii» Ifthe Plan does
not generate sufficient monthly payments to amortize the allowed claim, stay relief would
be appropriate.
The amount that the creditor is to receive under the plan must also keep pace with
depreciation of creditor's collateral. For instance, if the creditor's claim is secured by a
vehicle that is depreciating at the rate of $1 00 per month and the amount that the creditor is
receiving under the plan is only $30 per month, then the creditor is not adequately protected.
The entire debt may get paid out over the life ofthe plan, but ifthe case were to be dismissed
or converted to Chapter 7, then creditor would be much worse offthan when the bankruptcy
commenced.
In order to get a good idea of rate of depreciation on an automobile, you could take
several months' worth ofNADA blue books and see how the value ofyour client's collateral
changes from month to month. If the payments that your client receives from the plan
monthly are not equal to or greater than this, your client is not adequately protected.
2. Plan Payments Deferred For Extended Period
Additionally, even ifthe total payments to a secured creditor over the five-year term
ofthe Plan will amortize its claim, stay relief may still be appropriate ifthose payments will
be deferred for a great length oftime. Specifically, the payment of administrative expenses
or real estate mortgage arrearages may be paid prior to disbursements to general secured
creditors. If it will take an inordinate amount oftime to pay administrative expenses (such
as attorneys fees, appraiser's fees, Trustee's fees, etc.), then a secured creditor may be
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entitled to stay relief if many months will elapse before the Trustee disburses to general
secured creditors.
For example, a Plan might propose a payment to the Trustee of $200.00 per month.
If the debtor's attorney is allowed a fee of $975.00, and the Court-appointed appraiser
(particular to the Western District of Kentucky) is allowed a fee of$100.00 then the debtor
will have to pay approximately $1,075.00 to the Chapter 13 Trustee before disbursements
to secured creditors begin. If the debtor is paying $200.00 per month to the Trustee, it will
take approximately eight (8) months before secured creditors ever receive the first
disbursement from the Chapter 13 Trustee. In the interim, your client's collateral is
presumably depreciating, and thus the secured creditor's interest in its collateral is not being
adequately protected during this delay. See In Re: Estes, 185 B.R 745 (BImcy. W.D.Ky.
1995).
One resolution to this dilemma is request that the creditor receive some adequate
protection payment during the time that the administrative claims are being paid. Some
courts are hesitant to do this, so your only option may be to file your motion.
3. Payments to One Secured Creditor Ahead of Another
Even if administrative expenses are being promptly retired (so that disbursements to
secured creditors will begin quickly), sometimes certain secured creditors are paid ahead of
other secured creditors, thus resulting in a lack ofadequate protection to the secured creditor
which is being paid later. Specifically, if the debtor has substantial real estate mortgage
arrearages, these must be retired by the Chapter 13 Trustee within 18-24 months (pursuant
to local practice). Thus, a situation can arise where the Trustee must pay substantial
mortgage arrearages within 24 months, and must devote substantially all ofthe monthly Plan
payments for this period in order to retire these sums. This can result in the Trustee's
inability to make any payments to other secured creditors until the third year of the Plan!
Obviously, other secured creditors are not being adequately protected in such a situation, and
should move for stay relief and/or adequate protection. Note, however, it you have not
objected to the plan on these grounds, you may be barred by res judicata from bringing such
a motion at a later time.
4. Failure to Maintain Insurance on Collateral
An additional basis for stay relief (lack ofadequate protection) would be the debtor's
failure to maintain insurance on a creditor's collateral. In fact, in the Western District of
Kentucky, a debtor's failure to provide satisfactory proof of full coverage insurance on a
motor vehicle at the Section 341 Meeting results in the immediate termination of the
automatic stay, without further notice or hearing. See Appendix containing Local Rules.
[NOTE: At the writing of this Chapter the Courts for the Eastern and Western
Districts of Kentucky are investigating the possibility of having joint local rules. This
could affect or modify the relief mentioned in the Western District's Local Rule]
However, it is important to note that this Local Rule is only in effect in the Western
District of Kentucky, and thus a motion to terminate the automatic stay is necessary in the
Eastern District of Kentucky when the debtor fails to provide insurance on a motor vehicle.
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5. Cancellation of Certificate Insurance and Accident and Health Insurance
The cancellation ofcredit life insurance and accident and health insurance (which are
financed by many creditors) is an additional area which may require stay relief. Many
creditors finance credit life insurance and accident and health insurance on behalf of their
customers. The substantial premiums for these insurance coverages are then added into the
principal amount of the loan and financed over the term of the contract. If the debtor is
unwilling to increase the amount ofthe creditor's allowed secured claim by the value ofthese
separate contracts, the creditor should move the Court to cancel the credit life insurance and
accident and health insurance (if the debtor is unwilling to permit these cancellations
voluntarily). The rebated premiums can then be applied to reduce the unsecured portion of
the debtor's loan.
6. Repossession of Collateral
A final area where stay relief is necessary is with respect to collateral which has been
lawfully repossessed prior to the filing of the bankruptcy. If it has not yet been sold, a
motion for stay relief is necessary to enable the creditor to consummate the sale.
Frequently, though, the pre-petition repossession spawns the filing of the debtor's
Chapter 13 petition, so that the debtor may seek "tum-over" of the repossessed collateral.
Prior to June 4, 1999, there was no obligation on a creditor's part to return the vehicle if the
pre-petition repossession was lawful. Ifthe debtor wanted the vehicle returned, then he had
to file an adversary proceeding, rather than by motion. See, BR 7001(1) and In Re Estes,
185 B.R 745 (Bkrtcy. W.D.Ky. 1995). The creditor was under no obligation to return the
repossessed collateral simply upon the debtor's request for same. See In Re Young, 193 B.R.
620 (Bk. D.C., 1996). Rather, the Court must have found that the creditor's interest in its
collateral will be "adequately protected" before the Court orders the return ofthe collateral.
While the answer probably has not changed in Kentucky, The Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel for the Sixth Circuit has held to the contrary. In the case of Transouth Fin. Corp. v.
Sharon (In re Sharon), 234 B.R. 676 (BAP 6th Cir. 1999), the BAP upheld the decision ofthe
lower court mandating that the creditor return the vehicle to the debtor upon the filing ofthe
Chapter 13 petition There the court found:
Nothing in §§ 362 itself suggests the "adequate protection" exception
to the automatic stay argued by TranSouth. As demonstrated above,
the presence of "property ofthe estate" triggers the proscription in §§
362(a)(3). There is no "exception" to property of the estate for
property with respect to which a creditor claims a right of "adequate
protection." To the contrary, as recognized by the Supreme Court in
Whiting Pools, §§ 541 and 542 of the Code work together to draw
back into the estate a right of possession that is claimed by a lien
creditor pursuant to a prepetition seizure; the Code then substitutes
"adequate protection" for possession as one of the lien creditor's
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rights in the bankruptcy case. (Citations Omitted)

Sharon at 683.
Decisions from the 6th Cir. BAP are not binding precedent in Kentucky. In fact,
for a succinct summation of the other side of this coin, see the dissenting opinion from
Judge Stosberg ("The panel's automatic turnover approach sanctions a procedure used to
bludgeon creditors by employing the petition as a device to recover a repossessed vehicle
without a hearing. "). See also, Barringer v. EAB Leasing (In re Barringer), 244 B.R. 402
(Bkrtcy E.D. Mich., 1999); In re U.S Physicians, Inc., 235 B.R. 367 (Bkrtcy E.n. Pa.,
1999); In re Bernstein, 252 B.R. 846 (Bkrtcy D.D.C. 2000). Be that as it may, this is
another factor to consider when advising your client on how to handle the situation. It is
advisable to immediately make a motion to terminate the stay and ask the court for an
expedited hearing if the debtor is clamoring for return of the collateral. That should
assuage the debtor and minimize the chance that the court may impose sanctions for a
creditor's inaction.
Caveat: If the collateral is inadvertently repossessed post-petition, however, then it
must be returned to the debtor immediately! In the case of a post-petition repossession, the
debtor is not required to file a complaint for turn-over, but simply make demand on the
creditor. A creditor's failure to immediately make amends will quickly turn its innocent
violation of the automatic stay to a willful one, thus subjecting the creditor to the penalties
found under 11 USC § 362(h).

II.

OBJECTION TO PLAN CONFIRMATION

. A. Filing Of Objections To Confirmation
Objections to confirmation must be filed in writing, and it is imperative that the
deadlines for same be observed. The if a creditor fails to object and the plan is confirmed,
then the creditor is stuck with the result and will not be able to convince the court to
reconsider absent fraud or extraordinary circumstances.
B. Bases For Objections To Confirmation
Typical bases for Objections to Confirmation include the following:
•

Valuation of collateral

•

Feasibility

•

Failure to commit all "disposable income" to the Plan

•

Liquidation analysis

•

Interest rate

•

Lack of good faith

•

Debtor's proposal to surrender collateral "in full satisfaction
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of debt"
•

Attempted "write-down" of home mortgages

•

Disparate treatment of classes of unsecured creditors

1. Valuation of Collateral
A creditor is secured, and paid post-petition interest, only to the extent ofthe value
of its collateral. See 11 U.S.C. Section 506(a). Not surprisingly, Chapter 13 debtors and
their creditors have very divergent views on the value ofparticular items of collateral. In the
Western District ofKentucky , Louisville Division, the Court sends an appraiser to value the
debtor's personal property. The appraisal is filed prior to the Section 341 Meeting. It is not
binding on either party, but is usually followed by the Judge, unless the creditor can show
that it was obviously in error. The creditor does have a right to demand a valuation hearing,
though, pursuant to Rule 3012.
What measure ofvalue should be used? Retail? Wholesale? Something in between?
Everyone thought when the Supreme Court of the United States agreed to hear the case of
Associates Commercial. Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 117 S. Ct. 1879,1997 U.S. LEXIS
3688,138 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1997) that the question had been answered. Specifically, the Court
held:
is the value ofthe collateral to be determined by (1) what the secured
creditor could obtain through foreclosure sale of the property (the
"foreclosure-value" standard); (2) what the debtor would have to pay
for comparable property (the "replacement- value" standard); or (3)
the midpoint between these two measurements? We hold that
§506(a)directs application of the replacement-value standard.
Rash at 956.

Most people originally reading the opinion thought that this meant that
"replacement value" would be equated with retail value. However, what the text of the
opinion giveth, the footnotes taketh away. The now infamous footnote 6 reads:
Our recognition that the replacement-value standard, not the foreclosure
value standard, governs in cram down cases leaves to bankruptcy
courts, as triers offact, identification of the best way of ascertaining
replacement value on the basis of the evidence presented. Whether
replacement value is the equivalent of retail value, wholesale value,
or some other value will depend on the type of debtor and the nature
of the property. We note, however, that replacement value, in this
context, should not include certain items. For example, where the
proper measure of the replacement value of a vehicle is its retail
value, an adjustment to that value may be necessary: A creditor
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should not receive portions of the retail price, if any, that reflect the
value ofitems the debtor does not receive when he retains his vehicle,
items such as warranties, inventory storage, and reconditioning. Cf.
90 F.3d at 1051-1052. Nor should the creditor gain from
modifications to the property--e.g., the addition of accessories to a
vehicle--to which a creditor's lien would not extend under state law.

Where does all this leave us? Pretty much back to where we were before the Rash
decision. In the Western District of Kentucky, Louisville Division, value is established
by an appraiser that is paid from by the estate as an administrative expense. Those values
come close to retail. While there is no appraiser in the Eastern District of Kentucky, or in
the other Divisions of the Western District, values there generally come close to
approximating retail, "blue book" (NADA) value.
If a secured creditor is being paid directly ("outside the plan") is valuation of the
collateral important? It is, and this is another trap for the unwary.
Many times a debtor will propose to pay a creditor its entire claim directly, that is,
the payments do not go through the Chapter 13 trustee. The creditor, being thrilled with
the prospect that they are not going to incur a loss on the account, will continue to get
their contract payments on time and pay no attention to the value placed on the collateral
by the debtor. They think, "why do I care? I am going to be paid in full? I don't care if
they value my collateral at half the value, it does not matter." It does not matter unless
the debtor converts the Chapter 13 petition to one under Chapter 7.
§ 348(£)(1) states that:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), when a case under chapter 13 ofthis
title is converted to a case under another chapter under this title 
(A) property of the estate in the converted case shall consist
of property of the estate, as of the date of filing of the
petition, that remains in the possession of or is under the
control of the debtor on the date of conversion; and
(B) valuations of property and of allowed secured claims in the
chapter 13 case shall apply in the converted case, with allowed
secured claims reduced to the extent that they have been paid in
accordance with the chapter 13 plan. (Emphasis added)
Therefore, even if the debtor is paying you directly, they, would be able to redeem
the collateral upon conversion for the remaining balance of the allowed secured claim. See,
11 USC § 722. An example will help explain.

1-8

A creditor has a $10,000 loan secured by an automobile worth $7,000. The debtor
proposes to pay this debt outside the plan, but Schedules B, C and D show the value of the
vehicle at $5,000. Three years into the plan, the debtor loses his job and has to convert to
Chapter 7. By that time, the debtor has paid down $4,000 on the principal and all of the
interest to that time. Since the value ofthe collateral as established and unchallanged in the
Chapter 13 was $5,000, the debtor could redeem for $1,000. The remaining $2,000 in value
and the undersecured portion of the loan would be discharged. Unless the creditor could
show that the setting of the value was incident to some sort of fraud, the creditor can do
nothing.
Being paid directly can be a wonderful thing, but the creditor must be wary.
2. Feasibility
Creditors' counsel should review the debtor's budget of monthly income and
expenses (Schedules I and 1) carefully to determine whether the debtor has sufficient
income to fund the Plan. At a minimum, the debtor's net income should equal or exceed
the monthly living expenses and the proposed Plan payment. Any budget showing a
negative cash flow would be subject to a feasibility attack.
However, even if the budget purports to show that the debtor has sufficient income
to fund a Plan, the creditor's counsel should look carefully at the individual items in the
budget of monthly expenses to determine if they are reasonable. The debtor may have
estimated hislher monthly expenses much too low, and an argument can be made that this
particular debtor cannot reasonably be expected to live the next five years ofhislher life on
such a "spartan" budget. For example, the debtors may have budgeted too little for food, or
may have nothing in the budget for medical expenses. Additionally, a review ofthe debtor's
automobile insurance policy may indicate that the actual monthly premium is much higher
than the monthly expenditure reflected in the budget.
Other places to look to see if the Schedules I & J may need to be amended are
How many tax deductions has the debtor taken? Is he trying to inflate his
refund?
Has the debtor confused a "union due" with a payment to a credit union on an
unsecured debt?
How regular is overtime?
Ifthe debtor is self-employed, is there an allowance for the payment of taxes?
Is the debtor sure that his mortgage payment does not include taxes and
insurance?
If the debtor is paying a creditor directly ("outside the plan") has that expense
item been deducted from Schedule 17
If only one spouse has filed is the other one working and has that spouse's
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income been included in the Schedule I? If not, are the expenses in Schedule J
ALL the family expenses, such that it appears that the bankrupt is paying for all
the family expenses?
Is there any cushion for emergencies, birthday presents for children? If so, is it
reasonable?
3. Failure to Pay all "Disposable Income" to the Plan
If a review of the debtor's budget of income and expenses shows that the budget
appears feasible, the next question which the creditor's counsel should address is whether
the debtor is in fact committing all "disposable income" to the Plan. See Section
1325 (b)(1 )(B). In other words, if the debtor's budget shows excess "disposable income"
which is left-over after payment ofmonthly living expenses and the proposed Plan payment,
the creditor should object to the fact that the debtor is not paying all disposable income into
the Plan. If the debtor pays more into the Plan, the Plan may be able to be shortened from
sixty (60) months to thirty-six (36) months, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 1322(d), or the
percentage paid to unsecured creditors may be increased.
The creditor's counsel should also look closely at the withholdings from the debtor's
wages. Frequently, debtors have payroll deductions to repay unsecured loans to their credit
unions, or payroll deductions for savings plans, such as 401-K's. This is additional
"disposable income" which can and should be committed to the Plan, thus resulting in a
higher monthly Plan payment (which correspondingly results in a faster pay-back to
creditors).
4. Liquidation Analysis
Section 1325(a)(4) provides that the debtor's Plan must propose to pay creditors as
much as they would receive in a liquidation ofthe debtor's assets under Chapter 7. Thus, the
debtor's Schedules ofReal Property and Personal Property should be reviewed, to determine
if the debtor has non-exempt equity in either his realty or personal property.
Ifthe debtor's assets could be liquidated in a Chapter 7, so that all general unsecured
creditors would receive more by such a liquidation than they would through the plan, then
the court cannot confirm that plan. This could be true even if the debtor proposes a 100%
plan.
Is a dollar today worth the same as a dollar 36 or 60 months from now? Of course
not. Therefore, ifthe debtor's estate could be liquidated today and all creditor. paid in full,
then the debtor has to pay those unsecured creditors the time value of their money. Call it
interest, call it a discount factor, call it a net present value, call it whatever you will. The
bottom line is that the unsecured creditors must be paid their claim plus interest if the
debtor's estate is solvent. See In Re: Hardy, 755 F.2d. 75 (6th Cir. 1985).
5. Interest Rate
The Plan must pay creditors the value of their claim as of the effective date of the
plan, i.e., the confirmation date. See, Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) Since few debtors (at least
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none that the authors have ever seen) can pay all claims upon confirmation, they must
provide a market rate of interest, to compensate for having to wait to be paid (see discussion
immediately above). Occasionally, Plans are proposed which provide for no interest
whatsoever to secured creditors. This is a clear violation of § Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) and
confimlation of those plans should be summarily denied.
Other plans may propose a grossly insufficient rate. Such Plans are obviously
objectionable. An appropriate "market" rate of interest has not been conclusively
established, but presumably varies on a case-by-case basis. The creditor should stress,
though, that it is a market rate for similarly situated borrowers, i.e., borrowers who
presumably have no equity in any of their assets, and are obviously financially distressed.
In other words, the current "market" rate to a financially distressed borrower, such as a
Chapter 13 debtor, will presumably be higher than the "market" rate to an average bank
customer. See, Memphis Bank and Trust Company v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427 (6th Cir.
1982). Moreover, if the creditor's loan was made close to the filing of the bankruptcy, one
can probably safely assume that the contract rate is reflective of the "market" for this
particular debtor.
6. Lack of Good Faith
Section 1325(a)(3) requires that the .Plan be proposed in "good faith". This is an
elusive and evolving standard. However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has set forth
twelve factors to be considered in making this determination. See Caldwell v. Hardin, 851
F.2d. 852 (6th Cir. 1988) and 895 F.2d. 1123 (6th Cir. 1990); see also In re Okoreeh-Baah,
836 F.2d 1030 (6th Or. 1988); In re: Barrett, 964 F.2d. 588 (6th Cir. 1992). The twelve
points to be considered as follows:
a.

the amount of the proposed payments and the amount of the
debtor's surplus;

b.

the debtor's employment history, ability to earn and
likelihood of future increase in income;

c.

the probable or expected duration ofthe Plan;

d.

the accuracy of the Plan's statements of the debts, expenses
and percentage repayment ofunsecured debt and whether any
inaccuracies are an attempt to mislead the court;

e.

the extent of preferential treatment between classes of
creditors;

f.

the extent to which secured claims are modified;

g.

the type ofdebt sought to be discharged and whether any such
debt is nondischargeable in Chapter 7 (also, how much ofthis
type debt is the debtor seeking to discharge in his plan);

h.

the existence of special circumstances such as inordinate
medical expenses;
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1.

the frequency with which the debtor has sought relief under
the Bankruptcy Reform Act;

J.

the motivation and sincerity of the debtor in seeking Chapter
13 relief;

k.

the burden which the Plan's administration would place upon
the trustee; and,

1.

whether the debtor is attempting to abuse the spirit of the
Bankruptcy Code.

Typical "bad faith" objections which can and should be filed include debts which
were incurred immediately prior to the bankruptcy filing, debts premised on false financial
statements, and debts which would otherwise be nondischargeable in Chapter 7. However,
the fact that a debt would be nondischargeable in a Chapter 7 case does not automatically
require the Court to deny confirmation ofthe debtor's Plan. As noted parenthetically above,
if only a small percentage ofthe debt that is sought to be discharged in the Chapter 13 would
not be discharged in a Chapter 7, then that is not enough. Additionally, ifthe percentage that
the debtor is proposing to pay to unsecured creditors is relatively high such that creditors
with this type debt are not being significantly harmed, then this element alone will not be
sufficient to challenge confirmation. This is simply one of the factors to be considered by
the Court in determining whether the Plan has been filed in "bad faith". The more factors
that are present, the stronger the objection to confirmation.
7. Debtor's Proposal to Surrender Collateral "In Full Satisfaction of Debt"
Debtors frequently propose to surrender collateral in Chapter 13 Plans. However, a
creditor is not required to accept its collateral in full satisfaction of its indebtedness. The
creditor is entitled to sell the collateral, and have any deficiency balance treated as a general
unsecured claim. See In re Claypool, 122 B.R. 371 (Bk. W.D. Mo. 1991).
This may happen even after the plan has been confirmed. Example: the debtor
will have been in the Chapter 13 for several years, and will want to return a vehicle. The
debtor will want the creditor to sell the vehicle and then reclassify the remaining debt as
unsecured, while at the same time moving the court to incur new credit to purchase
another vehicle. Another scenario would be where the debtor wrecks the car, but the
insurance proceeds are less than the remaining balance on the creditor's allowed secured
claim (as established in the Order of Confirmation). Here the debtor will want the
creditor to take the insurance proceeds and reclassify the remaining portion of the debt as
unsecured. Can the debtor avail himself to the provisions of 11 USC § 1329(a) and
reclassify these debts?
The answer is now a resounding "NO." The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
recently held in the case of In re Nolan, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 26642, 2000 FED App.
0376, Bankr. L. Rep (CCH) P78,284 that Congress did not intend for 11 USC § 1329(a) to
permit debtors to modify a plan and reap a windfall. Confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan
binds ALL parties, including the debtor. See, 11 USC § 1327(a) Upon confirmation, both
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parties accept the risk of depreciation and deficiency. In rejecting cases to the contrary, the
Sixth Circuit held:
First, section 1329(a) does not expressly allow the debtor to alter, reduce or
reclassify a previously allowed secured claim. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1329(a) (1993).
Instead, section 1329(a)(1) only affords the debtor arightto request alteration
of the amount or timing of specific payments. A debtor cannot use section
1329(b)(1) to enlarge the modifications pernlitted by section 1329(a), since
section 1329(b)(1) does not apply unless the proposed modification first
complies with section 1329(a)(1). See, Chrysler Fin. Com. 234 B.R. at 394
(quoting Taylor, 99 B.R. at 904-05). A modification that reduces the claim
of a secured debtor would add a claim to the class of unsecured creditors, a
change prohibited by section 1329(a). [footnte omitted] See, 234 B.R. at 394
95 (quoting Taylor, 99 B.R. at 905 n.3). Section 1329(a)(1) should not be
read so broadly as to authorize the reclassification of claims. See, Coleman,
231 B.R. at 400.
Just like a creditor, the debtor is bound by the valuations of collateral fixed by the
entry of the Order of Confirmation. What is grease for the goose is grease for the gander.

8. "Write-Down" of Home Mortgages
Section 1322(b)(2) provides that loans secured only by mortgages on the debtor's
principal residence cannot be modified by a Chapter 13 plan. However, Section 506(a)
provides that a claim is treated as "secured" only to the value ofthe collateral. Ifa mortgage
loan is "under-secured" (with collateral value being less than the balance owed), can a debtor
invoke Section 506(a) and (d) to modify the home mortgage debt?
Fortunately, the answer is generally "no". Debtors are no longer able to
"write-down" home mortgages to the value of the real estate collateral. Despite a majority
oflower Court opinions to the contrary, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Nobleman
v. American Savings Bank, 113 S.Ct. 2106 (1993), that Chapter 13 debtors cannot modify
the rights of home mortgage lenders by "bifurcating" the debt, i.e., by "writing-down" the
debt to the value of the collateral, and treating the balance as unsecured. (But see, Judge
Lee's opinion in the In re Hiler case, 94-50299 that can be found on the Eastern District of
Kentucky's website). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Nobleman, debtors' Plans
frequently provided that home mortgages would be treated as secured only to the value ofthe
collateral. However, this is no longer permissible, so long as the creditor's only collateral
is a mortgage on the debtor's principal place of residence, for which the last payment is due
after the Plan is complete. The debtor's Plan must provide that all post-petition mortgage
payments will be paid pursuant to the contract schedule.
The debtor can "cure" pre-petition arrearages, though, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section
1322(b)(5). However, this must be done within a "reasonable" time, which is typically
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limited to twenty-four (24) months in the Western District of Kentucky.
9. Disparate Treatment of Classes of Unsecured Creditors
A further basis for objection to a Chapter 13 Plan is if the debtor proposes to treat
unsecured creditors differently. With the exception ofco-signed unsecured or undersecured
debts (which can be paid as a separate class, in order to protect the co-signers - See, 11 USC
§ 1322(b)(I)), all general unsecured debts must receive the same treatment. However,
debtors frequently propose to treat student loans as a special class of unsecured debt, and
sometimes even seek to have the student loans given a "priority" status. This constitutes a
basis for objection, pursuant to an unpublished opinion from the Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Kentucky, In re Crenshaw, Bankruptcy No. 5-91-0926. Crenshaw held
that it is impermissible for debtors to propose to pay student loans as priority debt, or to
otherwise provide for student loans to receive "better" treatment than other general
unsecured creditors would receive under the Plan.
However, there may be a new ploy in town that is a different slant on this same
subject.
Student loans are usually long term in nature. 11 USC § 1322(b)(5) allows the debtor
to propose a plan that provides for the "maintenance of payments while the case is pending
on any unsecured claim or secured claim on which the last payment is due after the date on
which the final payment under the plan is due." One interpretation of this section would
allow the debtor to propose to maintain contract payments on this long term debt during the
term of the Chapter 13 plan. While this is not a classification per se, it is classification in
practice. See also, 11 USC § 1322(b)(4).
Similarly, many debtors propose to pay signature loans to their credit unions
"outside" of the Plan, by payroll deduction. This is clearly objectionable, because such a
proposal allows the credit union to receive its contract payments (including post-petition
interest), while other general unsecured creditors receive less than 100 percent of the
principal amount oftheir debt (and receive no post-petition interest whatsoever). See In Re
Harshbarger, 66 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 1995). If you are representing a general unsecured
creditor (or even ifyou are representing a secured creditor, which could benefit from having
more money paid into the Plan on a monthly basis), an Objection to Confirmation is
appropriate ifthe debtor is proposing to pay unsecured loans to a credit union, etc., by payroll
deduction.

III.

CONFIRMATION AND DISMISSAL LITIGATION

A. Confirmation
In addition to the specific bases for Objections to Confirmation set forth above, an
additional issue which can be raised at the Confirmation Hearing is whether the debtor is
current in his escrowed Plan payments (in the Western District) or in his payments to the
trustee (in the Eastern District). Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 1326(a)(l), the debtor is to
commence Plan payments within thirty (30) days after the date of filing. Thus, on the date
ofthe Confirmation Hearing, the debtor is required to have made all Plan payments accrued
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to that date.
It is important that the Plan payments be current on the date of confirmation of the
Plan, or the Plan will obviously be in default immediately following confirmation. These
are the creditor's adequate protection payments. It is much more cost-effective to bring this
fact to the Court's attention at the Confirmation Hearing, rather than to wait until after
confirmation to file a motion for stay relief or dismissal. Obviously, if a creditor is aware
ofthis prior to the hearing on confirmation the motions to convert to a Chapter 7, to dismiss
and a motion to terminate the § 362 and § 1301(if applicable) stay(s) could be filed and
noticed for the confirmation hearing.

B. Dismissal
The most obvious basis for a post-confirmation Motion to Dismiss is Plan default in
payments. The Trustee's office should monitor the debtor's compliance with the terms of
the Plan, and ifthe debtor is not making the payments as required, the Trustee will frequently
file a Motion to Dismiss the case (sometimes known as a "show cause" motion). However,
creditors are not required to wait for the Trustee to file a "show cause" motion. Creditors are
free to file Motions to Dismiss and/or Motions for Stay Relief at any time (assuming, of
course, that good cause exists for the filing of same).
If a creditor's claim is not being paid post-confirmation, it is prudent to order a copy
of the Trustee's report, to ascertain why the creditor's claim is not being paid. If the debtor
is making all payments to the Trustee as agreed, then a Motion to Dismiss would not be
appropriate. Rather, a Motion to Temlinate the Automatic Stay due to lack of adequate
protection for this particular creditor's interest might be in order. However, as noted above,
if the debtor is paying in accordance with the provisions of the plan, a plan to which the
creditor did not object, then the creditor may be precluded from seeking stay relief by the
doctrine of res judicata. Additionally, it may be prudent to make a courtesy call the trustee
in this instance. Your client's not getting paid may be due to situation in the trustee's office
that can be remedied by picking up the phone.
However, if the debtor is not making his Plan payments per the terms of the
confirmed plan, then a Motion to Dismiss would be appropriate (unless the Court has
authorized a payment suspension). Ifthe debtor is in default in the Plan payments without
prior Court authorization, then a Motion to Dismiss should be filed pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
Section 1307. A sample Motion to Dismiss is attached as Appendix B to this chapter.
At the hearing on the dismissal motion, the debtor's counsel will invariably have a
proposal for curing the defaulted Plan payments. Obviously, though, this proposal must be
analyzed in terms of feasibility. After all, if the debtor has been unable to make the plan
payments, it is highly unlikely that he will be able to make increased Plan payments in order
to promptly cure the default. Ifthe court is inclined to grant such a forbearance, then request
a provision in the order
When a post-confirmation default has occurred, the creditor can file either a Motion
to Dismiss or a Motion to Terminate the Automatic Stay. One potential benefit to filing a
Motion to Dismiss (as opposed to a stay relief motion) is that no $75.00 filing fee is required.
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Also, ifthe debtor's Plan default is not substantial, a Motion to Dismiss may serve to get the
debtor "back on track" with the Plan payments.
However, remember that ifthe plan is dismissed, then it will be a free-for-all amongst
creditors to vie for the debtor's remaining assets. It may spur the debtor into converting the
petition to on under Chapter 7 where any deficiency balance remaining due after liquidating
your collateral would be discharged rather than paid as an unsecured claim in the Chapter 13.
Also, from a cost standpoint, remember that with a motion to dismiss, ALL creditors have
to be noticed.
Ifthe default is substantial, and a voluntary conversion by the debtor is a potential (or
has even been mentioned by debtor's counsel), then it may be wise to file the motion to
terminate the stay to take advantage of 11 USC § 109(g). If a debtor requests a voluntary
dismissal following the filing of a motion for relief from the automatic stay, then that
individual may not qualify as a debtor for 180 days after the dismissal. This is a little know,
yet powerful weapon.
Likewise, make sure the individual qualifies for relief under Chapter 13 ofthe Code.
11 USC § 109(e) sets out the debt limits for an individual in order to qualify to be a debtor
under Chapter 13. Currently, the individual must have less than $269,250 in noncontingent,
liquidated unsecured debt, and less than $807,750 in noncontingent, secured debt. If the
individual is over these limits, then they do not qualify for relief under Chapter 13 and may
h~ve to file a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 petition. This is not uncommon for small, sole
proprietorships.
This is not the only tool available to a creditor in order to limit a debtor's ability to
file another bankruptcy petition. Say for instance you represent a client that is secured by
rela estate. You are at the courthouse steps ready to sell the debtor's home when you get a
notice of a Chapter 13 filing. This, in an of itself is pemlissible. What if, however that this
is your third trip to the courthouse steps, because each time you get the stay terminated, the
debtor dismisses that petition and files another on the eve ofthe foreclosure sale. You will
file an objection to the plan on good faith grounds and a motion to dismiss. You are
confident that the judge will grant the motion to dismiss (again), but anticipate the filing of
yet another Chapter 13 petition. What can you do?
In your motion, ask the judge to condition the dismissal so the debtor may not file
another petition under any chapter for (as an example) 120 days. You set out the history of
filings in the case and tell the judge that you think that denying the debtor the ability to file
another petition for 120 days will allow you time to get the property sold. You predicate
your motion on the language in 11 USC § 349(a) that says: "[u]nless the court, for cause,
orders otherwise, the dismissal ofa case under this title does not ... prejudice the debtor with
regard to the filing of a subsequent petition under this title... ." Such an abuse of the
bankruptcy process may be the "cause" the judge needs to afford your client this relief.

IV.

PRACTICE ISSUES IN CHAPTER 13 CASES FOR CREDITORS
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Unless your creditor client is a large bank, consumer finance company or business
which has a significant number of its collection accounts in bankruptcy proceedings, it is
unlikely that the creditor has a complete understanding ofthe differences between a Chapter
7 liquidation and a Chapter 13 consumer reorganization. It is important to give your client
a basic understanding of how a Chapter 13 works. One ofthe leading Treatise's on Chapter
13 Bankruptcy practice, Judge Keith Lundin's .Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, Second Edition (John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1994) [a new edition of this book is being sold at the writing of this
article - your writers have ordered it, but it has not yet arrived. The citation above will be
dated] recommends that attorneys discuss the following topics with their creditor clients to
ensure that they can protect their rights in a Chapter 13 proceeding:
1.

Differences between Chapter 13 and Chapter 7

2.

Existence and role of the Chapter 13 trustee

3.

Handling of the notice of filing of a Chapter 13 case

4.

The automatic stay and the codebtor stay

5.

When to refer a Chapter 13 case to counsel

6.

The meeting of creditors

7.

Negotiation of (favorable) treatment in the plan

8.

The special rights of secured claim holders; valuation,
interest, and periodic payments

9.

The (more) special rights of real estate secured claim holders

10.

The special rights of landlords and lessors

11.

The best-interest-of-creditors test, disposable income test, and
other rights of unsecured claim holders

12.

Effects of confirmation

13.

Importance of filing a proof of claim

14.

Dividend checks - when they can be expected and in what
amounts

15.

Monitoring the debtor's performance after confirmation - how
to know when a plan is failing

16.

When conversion or dismissal is appropriate

17.

How to get reports and information on a pending case.

Lundin, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy at §1.130.
By the same token, there are several important issues which creditors attorneys should
consider in approaching a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. While this list is clearly not a
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comprehensive guide to Chapter 13 Creditor practice, it does provide an excellent "quick
reference" to several important issues.

A. File Your Proof Of Claim Early
Unless a creditor has a litigation based claim against the debtor for which it may be
entitled to a trial by jury, Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 896 (1990), that creditor should
always file a proof ofclaim. See 11 U.S.C. §§501, 502, 503, 506, 507 and 1305; Bankruptcy
Rules ofProcedure 3001,3002,3004,3007 and 3012. Under the amendments to section 502
enacted in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, the failure to file a timely proofof claim can
result in the disallowance of that claim. See generally, In re Schaffer, 173 B.R. 393, 395
(BkrtcyN.D. Ill. 1994); Inre Weissman, 126B.R. 889 (Bkrtcy W.D. Ill. 1991)(failureto file
claim for nondischargeable debt prevents Creditor holding the claim from receiving a
distribution from Chapter 13 Plan); In re Crooker, 159 B.R. 790 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Ky. 1993), (a
late filed claim may not be accepted in a Chapter 13 case)

In the event your client does not timely file a proof ofclaim, check and see ifyou can
claim that an "informal" proof of claim has been filed in the Chapter 13 case. See In re
McCoy Management Services, Inc., 44 B.R. 215 (Bkrtcy W.D. Ky. 1984). See also, In re
Southwest Equip. Rental, 193 BR 276 (Bkrtcy E.D Tenn., 1996) (five elements necessary for
a valid informal proofofclaim. One, it must be in writing; two, it must contain a demand by
the creditor on the debtor's estate; three, it must express an intent to hold the debtor liable
for the debt; four, it must be filed with the Bankruptcy Court; and five, the facts of the case
must make allowance equitable); But see, In re M. J. Waterman and Assoc., 227 F.3d 604
(6 th Cir., 2000) (Upheld: lower court's refusal to treat creditor's pre-bar date filings as an
informal proof of claim and his objection to debtor's bankruptcy reorganization plan as an
informal ballot in a Chapter 11) Ifany writings filed with the Court and sent to the debtor's
counsel contain the claim, then you may be able to have the claim allowed in the Chapter 13.
Finally, even secured claim holders should file timely proof of claim in Chapter 13
cases. While a majority of cases hold that liens and mortgages will survive a bankruptcy
discharge even if no proof of claim is filed (See Cen-Pen Corp. v. Hanson, 58 F.3d 89 (4th
Cir. 1995)), there is substantial authority to the contrary. In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459 (7th Cir.
1995). Therefore, care should always be taken when notice of a bankruptcy is received to
file your proof of claim.
B. Review The Debtor's Plan: You May Not Like What You See
Under 11 U.S.C. §1327, the provisions ofa confirmed Chapter 13 plan are binding
on both a debtor and Creditor even ifthe claim ofthe creditor is not provided for by the Plan.
See generally, In re Ivory, 70 F.3d 73 (9th Cir. 1995); Homebanc v. Chappell, 984 F.2d 775
(7th Cir. 1993); In re Szostek, 886 F.2d 1405 (3d Cir. 1990). But see Cen-Pen Corp. v.
Hanson, 58 F.3d 89 (4th Cir. 1995). Therefore, ifyou represent a creditor and fail to file an
objection to a Chapter 13 Plan provision which is unfavorable to your client, that client will
be bound to the terms of the Chapter 13 Plan under the doctrine of res judicata. See In re
Rodgers, 180 B.R. 5q4 (Bkrtcy E.D. Tenn. 1995) (Creditor'S failure to object to Plan which
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proposed to pay the Creditor nothing on its $338,746.20 timely filed proof of claim meant
that the Plan was binding on the Creditor even though it was unconfirmable). While there
is no direct Chapter 13 authority from either the Sixth Circuit or Kentucky Federal Courts
on this issue, the Sixth Circuit decision in Thompson v. Kentucky Lumber, 860 F.2d, 674
(6th Cir. 1984), a Chapter 11 case, clearly supports the line of cases which holds that a
confirmed Plan is binding on a non-objecting Creditor.
It is important to note that where a Creditor does not receive adequate notice of a
Chapter 13 filing or the contents of a Plan, that a confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan will not
be binding on that creditor if to do so would result in a denial of due process. Piedmont
Trust Banks v. Linkous, 990 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1993).
Perhaps the most controversial issue in this area concerns whether a lien can be
removed by a confirmed Chapter 13 Plan. The majority position, lead by the cases of
Cen-Pen Com. v. Hanson, 58 F.3d 89 (4th Cir. 1995); Sun Finance Co. v. Howard, 972 F.2d
639 (5th Cir. 1992); and Southtrust Bank of Alabama v. Thomas, 883 F.2d 991 (11 th Cir.
1989) hold that the confirmation of a Chapter 13 Plan cannot, by itself, adversely affect the
lien rights of a secured claim holder. These are in opposition to a growing line of cases
which holds that if a Chapter 13 Plan treats a claim as an unsecured claim, that claim will
lose any lien it had ifthe Chapter 13 Plan is confirmed without objection. See In re Penrod,
50 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1995); In re Chappell, 984 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1993); and In re Pence,
905 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1990). These cases interpret the provisions of 11 U.S.C. §1327
literally, and hold that a confirmed Plan is binding on both the debtor and his or her creditors,
even to the extent of releasing an otherwise valid lien. While there is no Sixth Circuit or
Kentucky case on point, the better practice is to avoid this problem by carefully reviewing
Chapter 13 Plans and objecting if your claim is not properly treated.
The cases cited above seem to ignore the clear mandate ofBankruptcy Rule 7001(2)
which states that any proceeding to determine the validity, priority , or extent of a lien or
other interest in property (other than the avoidance of a lien pursuant to BR 4003(d)), must
be done by adversary proceeding. Your writers would submit that rule, alone, makes such
provisions in plan void (versus voidable). However, with courts allowing the dischargability
ofstudent loans and the creation ofexemption where none previously existed (see discussion
ofTaylor case, infra) when a creditor rests on its rights, prudence dictates a close inspection
of the plan and objection where necessary.
Another area where ignoring the provisions of a plan can adversely affect a secured
creditors is in the area of release of a lien upon payment of the creditor's allowed secured
claim plus interest. 11 USC § 506(d) states that to the extent that a claim is undersecured, the
creditor's lien is void. Does that mean that upon payment ofthat allowed secured claim, plus
interest the creditor must release that lien prior to completing the plan? If a creditor does
not object to such a provision in a plan, then the debtor could demand release ofthe lien. If
the collateral is sold, and the bankruptcy later dismissed prior to completion, then the creditor
could be out in the cold.
However, there is case law that does support an objection to such a plan provision.
Judge Howard held in the case onn re McPherson, 230 B.R. 99 (Bkrtcy E.D. Ky., 1999) that
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a creditor may not be required to release its lien until all payments under the plan have been
made. Here, a plan was confirmed with a provision stating that "the holder of any allowed
secured claim provided for by the plan shall retain a lien securing such claim until the
amount for which the claim is allowed as secured is paid in full. 11 U.S.C. §§
1325(a)(5)(B)(I), 1327(c)." Upon payment in full of the allowed secured claim, the debtor
requested the creditor to release its lien, which request was refused. Thereafter, the Chapter
13 trustee filed a motion to require the creditor to release its lien and for penalties against the
creditor. In overruling the trustee's motion, the Judge Howard observed at page 101 of his
decision that:
This Court believes, however, that in order to protect the creditor
from premature lien termination, and insure that the debtor is not held
hostage beyond the time he/she has performed according to the
confirmed plan, that the better approach is to require that a lien be
released upon successful completion of the Chapter 13 plan, but
before a discharge is entered.
Your authors suggest the better practice is to object to such provisions at the outset
so that you are not play~ng "catch up" later.
C. The Automatic Stay In Chapter 13 Cases
As discussed elsewhere in this Monograph, 11 U.S.C. §362 applies in Chapter 13
proceedings. That means that upon the filing of a Bankruptcy petition, nearly all collection
activities against a debtor or debtor's property, including all lawsuits, all efforts to repossess
property and all acts to obtain, perfect or enforce a lien. However, in two important respects,
the scope of the automatic stay is far broader in Chapter 13 proceedings than it is in other
bankruptcy cases.
1. Post Petition Property
As noted above, the automatic stay protects both the debtor and the debtor's property.
Under 11 U.S.C. §1306 property of the estate includes a debtor's post petition earnings and
property acquired by the debtor after the filing ofthe Chapter 13. See generally, In re Scott,
142 B.R. 126 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Va. 1992); In re Euerle, 70 B.R. 72 (Bkrtcy. D.N.H. 1987);.Jn
re Koonce, 54 B.R. 643 (Bkrtcy. D.S.C. 1985) ($1.3 million prize won in Lottery by debtors
after confirmation of their Chapter 13 Plan was property of the estate). Contra In re
Tschiderer, 73 B.R. 133 (Bkrtcy. W.D. N.Y. 1987). This means that even creditors holding
post petition debts must take care when attempting to collect so as not to violate the
automatic stay. See In re Heflin, 145 B.R. 560 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1992).
2. The Codebtor Stay
One ofthe unique features of a Chapter 13 case is 11 U.S.C. § 1301, which protects
people who are jointly liable with a debtor or a consumer debt from having the creditors
holding such joint debts proceed against them until the conclusion oithe Chapter 13 case or
until they obtain relief from the Codebtor stay. See 11 U.S.C. §1301. See also In re
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Sommersdorf, 139 B.R. 700 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1991) (discussing broad scope of Section
1301).
It is important to note that the protection of the Codebtor stay only applies to
consumer debts. See U.S.C. §101(8). See In re Green, 157 B.R. 496 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ga.
1993); Norman v. Norman, 13 B.R. 894 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Mo. 1981). Therefore Codebtors on
business or commercial loans are not protected.

Further, a creditor may obtain relief from the Codebtor stay by showing:
A).

the nonbankrupt Codebtor received the consideration for the
debt. See generally, In re Motes, 166 B.R. 147 (Bkrtcy. E.D.
Mo. 1994); In re Rhodes, 85 B.R. 64 (Bkrtcy N.D. Ill. 1988);

B).

the Debtor's Chapter 13 Plan does not propose to pay the
creditor's claim in full. See Friendly Finance Discount Com.
v. Bradley, 705 F.2d 1409 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Fink, 115
B.R. 113 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1990); First National Bank v.
Garrett, 36 B.R. 432 (Bkrtcy. MD.Tenn. 1984); or

C).

that the Creditor's interest would be irreparably harmed by a
continuation of the codebtor stay. See Harris v. Ft.
Oglethome State Bank, 721 F.2d 1052 (6th Cir. 1983).

However, if a Creditor files a Motion for Relief from the Codebtor stay, either the
debtor or the nonbankrupt codebtor must object to that motion within 20 days after it is filed
or relief from the Codebtor stay will be automatically granted. See 11 U.S.C. § 130l.
D. Review A Debtor's Claimed Exemptions
As in other Bankruptcy proceedings, Chapter 13 debtors in Kentucky are entitled to
claim their state law exemptions. Property which is exempt is excluded from the liquidation
test of 11 U.S.C. §1325(a)(4). See In re Alderman, 150 B.R. 246 (Bkrtcy. D.Mont 1993).
See also, In re Soloman, 67 F .3d 1128 (4th Cir. 1995).
In 1992 the Supreme Court in Taylorv. Freeland & Kronz, 507 U.S. 976 (1992) held
that unless a timely objection to an exemption is made within thirty (30) days after the
meeting ofcreditors, any exemption will be deemed allowed even ifthere is no basis for the
claimed exemption under applicable law. Therefore, it is extremely important for creditors
to review the debtor's claimed exemptions at the beginning of the case or they may forfeit
their ability to look to those assets in a Chapter 13 Plan. But see In re Walker, 153 B.R. 565
(Brktcy. D. Or. 1993) (Creditor can object to improperly claimed exemption as objection to
confirmation of Plan, even if no timely objection to exemption was made).
E. Leases And Other Executory Contracts: A Forgotten Issue
In the current financial climate ofcar leases, time shares, rent-to-own furniture, leases
and executory contracts are an increasingly important aspect of Chapter 13 practice. Under
11 U.S.C. §1322(b)(7), a Chapter 13 debtor may assume or reject an unexpired lease or
executory contract in either the Chapter 13 Plan or by separate motion under the provisions
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of 11 U.S.C. §365. Creditors need to be aware of the special protections creditors holding
executory contracts are entitled to in Bankruptcy proceedings.
The initial issue which a creditor must determine is whether an "executory contract"
is actually a contract or a disguised security agreement. See In re Terrell, 892 F.2d 469 (6th
Cir. 1989) (Michigan Land Sale contract); In re Yost, 54 B.R. 818 (Bkrtcy W.D. Ky. 1985).
If an agreement has been validly terminated before the bankruptcy filing then there could be
nothing left to assume. See generally In re Morgan, 181 B.R. 579 (Bkrtcy N.D. Ala. 1994).
Further, a Debtor may not be allowed to reject a contract ifthe rejection is in bad faith. Shell
Oil Co. v. Waldron, 785 Ed.2d 936 (11 th Cir. 1986). Unless the contract in question is a true
lease and not a disguised security agreement, the protections of 11 U.S.C. §365 are not
available and a secured debt can be "crammed down" to the value of its collateral under 11
U.S.C. §1325. See Ledford v. NRM, Inc., 94 B.R. 103 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1988).
Ifa contract is found to be executory, then in order to assume the contract ifthere has
been a default in the contract, a debtor must:
1)

cure, or provide adequate assurance that the default will be
promptly cured;

2)

compensate, or provide adequate assurance of prompt
compensation to any party other than the debtor, for any
actual pecuniary loss resulting from the default; and

3)

provide adequate assurance offuture performance under such
contract.

How prompt is a prompt cure or prompt compensation for purposes of 11 U.S.C.
§365 is not exactly known and will have to be determined on a facts and circumstances basis.
See Inre Yokley, 99 B.R. 394 (Bkrtcy. M.D. Tenn. 1989). However, the rule in the Western
District of Kentucky on an automobile lease is six months. See, In re Reed, 226 B.R. 1
(Bkrtcy W.D Ky. 1998).
Further, if the agreement in question is a lease of nonresidential real property, then
either the motion to assume the lease or the Plan containing an assumption ofthe lease must
be filed in court no more than sixty (60) days after the bankruptcy petition is filed. If one of
these filings is not made, then the lease is deemed rejected by operation oflaw. In re Anuro,
72 B.R. 424 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Cal. 1987).
Finally it is important to note that the rejection of a lease or executory contract may
give rise to an unsecured claim for damages which arise as a result ofthe breach ofthe lease.
See 11 U.S.C. §502. Subject to certain limitations, tlle rejection of a lease of a house or
apartment can give rise to a claim of damages for up to one (1) year's rent. Also, the
resulting deficiency balance may also give rise to an administrative priority expense if the
lease is accepted, and there is a post-confirmation default. See, 11 USC § 365(g)(2)(A) and
Lundin, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy at §4.89.
F. Homes Are A Lender's Castle: 11 U.S.C. §1322(b)(2)
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As a general rule, debtors may "write down" a secured debt to the value of the
collateral under 11 U.S.C. §1322(b)(2). However, in light ofNobleman v. American Savings
Bank, 506 U.S. 1020 (1993) a debtor may not generally "write down" a claim "secured only
by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence ... " This general
rule has a narrow exception in the Eastern District ofKentucky for second mortgages which
have no equity to which to attach. See In re Williams, 161 B.R. 27 (Bkrtcy RD. Ky 1993);
In re Moncrief, 163 B.R. 492 (Bkrtcy E.D. Ky 1993). The Western District ofKentucky has
not yet considered this issue.
However, in order to obtain the protection of Section 1322(b)(2) a lender must have
1) a security interest; 2) secured only; 3) by real property that is 4) the debtor's principal
residence. Each of these elements must be met or the secured claim may be modified.
1. A Security Interest
Under 11 U.S. C. § 101(51) a security interest is defined by the Bankruptcy Code as
a "lien created by agreement." Therefore any nonresidential liens on a debtor's principal
residence will be subject to foreclosure. The only exception to this general rule is when a
creditor has a judgement lien against debtors arising from the foreclosure of a mortgage on
the debtor's principal residence. See First National Fidelity Corp. v. Perry, 945 F.2d 61 (3d
Cir. 1991).
2. Secured Only by Debtor's Principal Residence
In the Sixth Circuit, it is settled law that credit life, credit disability or other similar
insurance are not "additional security" for the underlying loan for purposes of 11 U.S.C.
§1322(b)(2). In re Davis, 989 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1993). Further, other intangible collateral
such as "Hereditaments, appurtenances, rents, royalties, profits and fixtures" will generally
not be considered as additional security so as to destroy the protections of § 1322(b)(2). Id.
However, if the collateral is more tangible in nature, then the protections of 11 U.S.C.
§1322(b)(2) will be lost. See Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F .2d 123 (3rd
Cir. 1990). Unfortunately, there is no clear guidance on what "boilerplate" mortgage
language is acceptable and what is not. See In re Hammond, 27 F.3d 52 (3d Cir. 1994).
However, prior to the filing ofbankruptcy a creditor may be able to abandon or waive
a security interest in additional collateral oflittle value (for example household goods). See
Southern Discount v. Ivey, 13 B.R. 27 (Bkrtcy. W.D. N.C. 1981). See also, In re Amerson,
143 B.R. 413 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Miss. 1992). Unfortunately for creditors, attempts to "clean up"
its security interest post filing will not allow a creditor to obtain the benefits of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1322(b)(2). See Dent v. Associates Equity Services, Co., 130 B.R. 623 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ga.
1991).
3. A Security Interest in Real Property
One ofthe most unusual issues in Bankruptcy is whether a mobile home is real estate
for purposes of 11 U.S.C. §1322(b)(2). This issue turns on whether a mobile home is
considered real property or personal property under applicable state law. See In re Weaver.
69 B.R. 554 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Ky. 1987) (discussing Kentucky law on mobile homes); Hiers v.
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Hiers,3 Ky. AR 15 at p.l0 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 1996). As noted by one authority "this
question will be ... [detennined] on whether the mobile home is really affixed to the ground
or... merely stuck in the mud. Debtor's counsel might be tempted to suggest that the debtor
put the wheels back on the trailer if modification... is a goal ... Creditor's counsel might
consider stealing the wheels or at least getting pictures before the home becomes mobile
again." Lundlin, 1 Chapter 13 Bankruptcy 4-41 (1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.).
4. The Real Estate is Used as the Debtor's Principal Residence

It is clear from the language of the statute that the protections of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1322(b)(2) do not protect claims secured by second or vacation homes. See In re Saglio,
153 B.R. 4 (Bkrtcy. D.R.I. 1993). A difficult question arises, though, when a debtor lives
on a tract ofproperty which is used for agricultural or commercial purposes or a business of
the debtor is located in the same structure as the debtor's principal residence. Several courts
have held that where the debtor's residence contains both substantial income producing
property and the principal residence, the obligation will be modifiable. See In re Del Valle,
186 B.R. 347,349 (Bkrtcy. D. Conn. 1995); In re Dinsmore, 141 B.R. 499 (Bkrtcy W.D.
Mich. 1992). See also In re McVay, 150 B.R. 254 (Bkrtcy. D. Or. 1993) (Bed & Breakfast
home). However, depending on the facts of a given case, such property may be given 11
U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) protection. See Paulsen v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Com., 179 B.R.
492 (E.D. La. 1995).
G. Dischargeability Of Debts In Chapter 13
Finally, even if you represent an unsecured creditor, your debt may be
nondischargeable in a Chapter 13 case. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1328, debts which are for
restitution or a criminal fine, debts which are provided for under §1322(b)(5) (long tenn
secured debt which will not be relieved until after the tennination of a Chapter 13 Plan),
certain unauthorized post-petition consumer debts under 11 U.S.C. § 1305 and debts which
are nondischargeable under 11 U.S. C. §523 (a)(5)(alimony and child support), (a)(8) (student
loans) or (a)(9) ("drunk driving" debts) are nondischargeable in Chapter 13 proceedings.
With respect to these debts, to the extent a Chapter 13 plan does not propose to pay these
debts in full, any unpaid balance will survive the Chapter 13 discharge. Further, if the
debtors acquire any assets which are not property ofthe estate, stay relief could be sought so
the creditor can attach these assets.
As a general rule, there is little a creditor can do if it holds a nondischargeable Chapter 13
claim during the case given the broad definition of property of the estate, unless you can
convince the debtor to separately classify your claim and pay it in full. However, except
for nondischargeable debts under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5) which have the status as priority
claims, a classification which would give a de facto priority position to nondischargeable
debts will probably be disallowed if challenged because it would unfairly discriminate
between similar classes of creditors under 11 U.S.C. §1322(b)(1). See Groves v.
LaBarge, 39 F.3d 212 (8th Cir. 1994); McCullough v. Brown, 162 B.R. 506 (N.D. Ill.
1993); In re Hiner, 161 B.R. 688 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho 1993). There is some caselaw to the
contrary, but it is clearly a minority position. See In re Tucker, 159 B.R. 325 (Bkrtcy. D.
Mont. 1993); Inre Strictland, 181 B.R. 598 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ala. 1995).
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V.

APPENDIX

Note: many of the forms relative to Chapter 13 practice in the Eastern and Western
Districts of Kentucky are subject to change upon the adoption of Joint Local Rules
for these two Bankruptcy Districts. At the writing of this Chapter, proposed Joint
Local Rules have been submitted to the judges for both Divisions, subject to change,
amendment and comment by the Bar. Check the web sites for the Eastern District at
http://www.kyeb.uscourts.gov/ and the Western District at
http://www.kewb.uscourts.gov/ for changes in these rules and forms.

A. Notice Of Commencement Of Case Under Chapter 13

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
546 U.S. Courthouse
601 W. Broadway
Louisville, KY 40202
NOTICE OF COMMENCEMENT OF CASE UNDER CHAPTER 13
OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, ORDER FOR RELIEF
MEETING OF CREDITORS, AND FIXING OF DATES
IN RE (Name of Debtor)

Case Number:
Date Filed (or Converted)

ADDRESS OF DEBTOR

NAME/ADDRESS OF ATTORNEY FOR DEBTOR
NAME/ADDRESS OF TRUSTEE
William W. Lawrence
310 Legal Arts Bldg.
200 S. Seventh Street
Louisville, KY 40202
Telephone Number: (502)
581-9042
DATE/TIMEILOCATION OF MEETING OF CREDITORS
September 26, 1996 at 3:00 pm
509 U.S. Courthouse (use 6th Street Elevators)
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601 W. Broadway
Louisville, KY 40202
Filing Claims: Deadline to File a Proof of Claim is 12/26/96 - The debtor has filed a plan
AVOIDANCE OF LIEN. All motions to avoid liens shall be filed within 60 days
following the first date set for the 341 meeting. Failure to file within said time shall
result in denial of such motions.
NOTICE: Confirmation hearings will be held in Courtroom #3 on the same date as the
341 meeting. For cases having 341 meetings in the a.m., confirmation hearings will be
held at 11 :30 a.m. For cases having afternoon 341 meetings, confirmation hearings will
be held at 4:00 p.m.
THIS CASE MAY BE DISMISSED WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE IF THE
SCHEDULES ARE NOT FILED WITHIN 15 DAYS FROM THE DATE THE
PETITION WAS FILED.
COMMENCEMENT OF CASE. An individual's debt adjustment case under chapter 13
of the Bankruptcy Code has been filed in this court by the debtor or debtors named above,
and an order for relief has been entered.
CREDITORS MAY NOT TAKE CERTAIN ACTIONS. A creditor is anyone to whom
the debtor owes money. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor is granted certain
protection against creditors. Common examples of prohibited actions by creditors are
contacting the debtor to demand repayment, taking action against the debtor to collect
money owed to creditors or to take property of the debtor, and starting or continuing
foreclosure actions, repossessions, or wage deductions. Some protection is also given to
certain codebtors of consumer debts. If unauthorized actions are taken by a creditor
against a debtor, or a protected codebtor, the court may punish that creditor. A creditor
who is considering taking action against the debtor or the property of the debtor, or any
codebtor, should review Sec. 362 and 1301 ofthe Bankruptcy Code and may wish to seek
legal advice. The staff of the clerk of the bankruptcy court is not permitted to give legal
advice.
MEETING OF CREDITORS. The debtor (both husband and wife in a joint case) is
required to appear at the meeting of creditors on the date and at the place set forth above
labeled "Date/TimelLocation of Meeting of Creditors" for the purpose of being examined
under oath. Attendance by creditors at the meeting is welcomed, but not required. At the
meeting, the creditors may examine the debtor and transact such other business as may
properly come before the meeting. The meeting may be continued or adjourned from
time to time by notice at the meeting, without further written notice to the creditors.
Failure to attend the Sec. 341 Meeting shall result in dismissal unless the court orders the
meeting continued upon motion of debtor.
PROOF OF CLAIM. Except as otherwise provided by law, in order to share in any
payment from the estate, a creditor must file a proof of claim by the date set forth above
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labeled "Filing Claims." The place to file the proof of claim, either in person or by mail,
is the office of the clerk of the bankruptcy court.
All creditors filing claims shall serve a copy on the attorney for the debtor.
PURPOSE OF A CHAPTER 13 FILING. Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code is
designed to enable a debtor to pay debts in full or in part over a period of time pursuant to
a plan. A plan is not effective unless approved by the bankruptcy court at a confirmation
hearing. Creditors will be given notice in the event the case is dismissed or converted to
another chapter of the Bankruptcy Code.
ALL SECURED CLAIMS MUST BE FILED IN THIS OFFICE THREE (3) BUSINESS
DAYS PRECEDING THE MEETING OF CREDITORS. ALL SUCH CREDITORS
WHO FAIL TO DO SO WILL NOT BE TREATED AS SECURED CREDITORS FOR
PURPOSES OF DISTRIBUTION.
OBJECTION TO THE CONFIRMATION OF A PLAN MUST BE FILED BY THE
FIRST DATE SET FOR THE CONFIRMATION HEARING.
For the Court:

Diane S. Rohl
8/23/96
Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court
FORM B 91 0011

US Bankruptcy Court
COURT
200 Merrill Lynch Plaza
Kentucky
100 East Vine Street
Lexington, KY 40507-1406

Entered

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY
Eastern District of
Covington

NOTICE OF COMMENCEMENT OF CASE UNDER CHAPTER 13 OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE,
MEETING OF CREDITORS, AND FIXING OF DATES
CASE NUMBER:

DATE FILED:

NAME OF DEBTOR(S)/akaldbalSSNIEIN:

ATTORNEY FOR DEBTOR(S):

ADDRESS OF DEBTOR(S):

TRUSTEE:
Sidney N. White
100 E. Vine St. #500
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PO Box 2204
Lexington, KY 40595
(606) 233-1527
MEETING OF CREDITORS:
HEARING
April 16, 1996 at 10:00 am
US Bankruptcy Courtroom
Greenberg Bldg 2nd FI
513 Madison Ave
Covington, KY 41011

CONFIRMATION
June 4, 1996 at 10:15 am
US Bankruptcy Courtroom
Greenberg Bldg 2nd F1
513 Madison Ave
Covington, KY 41011

FEE APPLICATIONS BY COUNSEL FOR THE
DEADLINE TO FILE A
PROOF OF CLAIM:
DEBTOR(S) FOR SERVICES PERFORMED IN
REPRESENTATION OF THE DEBTOR(S) IN THIS
90 DAYS AFTER
THE DATE SET FOR THE
CASE FOR AN AMOUNT NOT IN EXCESS OF $500
MEETING OF CREDITORS
SHOWN ABOVE.
MAY BE RECEIVED AND ACTED ON BY THE COURT
AT THE CONFIRMATION HEARING. FEE
APPLICATIONS IN EXCESS OF SUCH AMOUNT WILL
BE ACTED ON ONLY AFTER NOTICE TO ALL
CREDITORS AND PARTIES IN INTEREST
COMMENCEMENT OF CASE. An individual's debt adjustment case under chapter
13 of the Bankruptcy Code has been filed in this court by the debtor or debtors named
above, and an order for relief has been entered. You will not receive notice of all
documents filed in this case. All documents filed with this court, including lists of the
debtor's property and debts, are available for inspection at the office of the clerk of the
bankruptcy court.
CREDITORS MAY NOT TAKE CERTAIN ACTIONS. A creditor is anyone to
whom the debtor owes money or property. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor is
granted certain protection against creditors. Common examples of prohibited actions by
creditors are contacting the debtor to demand repayment, taking action against the debtor
to collect money owed to creditors or to take property ofthe debtor, and starting or
continuing foreclosure actions, repossessions, or wage deductions. Some protection is
also given to certain codebtors of consumer debts. If unauthorized actions are taken by a
creditor against a debtor or protected codebtor, the court may penalize that creditor. A
creditor who is considering taking action against the debtor or the property of the debtor,
or any codebtor, should review sections 362 and 1301 of the Bankruptcy Code and may
wish to seek legal advice. The staff of the clerk of the bankruptcy court is not permitted
to give legal advice.
MEETING OF CREDITORS. The debtor (both husband and wife in ajoint case) is
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required to appear at the meeting of creditors on the date and at the place set forth above
for the purpose of being examined under oath. Attendance by creditors at the meeting is
welcomed, but not required. At the meeting the creditors may examine the debtor and
transact such other business as may properly come before the meeting. The meeting may
be continued or adjourned from time to time by notice a the meeting, without further
written notice to creditors.
PURPOSE OF CHAPTER 13 FILING. Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code is
designed to enable a debtor to pay debts in full or in part over a period of time pursuant to
a plan. A plan is not effective unless approved by the bankruptcy court at a confIrmation
hearing. Creditors will be given notice in the event the case is dismissed or converted to
another chapter of the Bankruptcy Code.
PROOF OF CLAIM. Except as otherwise provided by law, in order to share in any
payment from the estate, a creditor must fIle a proof of claim by the date set forth above
labeled "Deadline to File a Proof of Claim."
The place to fIle the proof of claim, either in person or by mail, is the offIce of the clerk
of the bankruptcy court. Proof of claim forms are available in the clerk's offIce of any
bankruptcy court.
****FILE CLAIM FORM ON REVERSE SIDE IN DUPLICATE WITH: US
BANKRUPTCY COURT,
200 MERRILL LYNCH PLAZA, 100 EAST VINE STREET, LEXINGTON, KY
40507-1406****
FOR THE COURT

DATED:
FORMB91

Betty L. Jennette, CLERK

B. Motion To Dismiss

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
_ _ _ _ DISTRlCT OF _ _---,_
)

INRE:

)

)

CASE NO.

)

DEBTOR

)

)

1-29

MOTION TO DISMISS

Comes

. , a creditor, by counsel, and respectfully moves

the Court to dismiss the within Chapter __ proceeding, and as basis therefor states that
the debtor is $

is arrears on hislher plan payments.

WHEREFORE,

respectfully requests that this case be

dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,

COUNSEL FOR

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was this
_ _ day of

, 19-, served by mail upon the following.

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
_ _ _ _ DISTRICT OF _ _ __
)

INRE:

)
)

CASE NO.

)

DEBTOR

)
)

1-30

ORDER
On motion of _ _ _ _ _ _ _, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently
advised;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the within case be, and it hereby is dismissed
with prejudice.

JUDGE, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT

DATE
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Overview
• What is CM/ECF?
• When will it be here?

1

• What will it take to be connected?
• How much will it cost?
• What will it look like?
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When will CM/ECF be available?

• Weare estimating 2 to 3 years from now.
• Currently, CM/ECF has not been fully
developed

"""'1-"

• Courts may start receiving a finished product in
2001.

• It may take up to 3 years for all Courts to
receive the product.
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Why discuss CMlECF now?

.I CMIECF is going to be a big change in the
way business is conducted
.I Preparation is the key to success
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.I The system must work well for the attorneys,
public and Clerk's Office
.I Participation in electronic case filing by
attorneys is critical to success
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t does it take to get connected?

Access with a Browser

.puter (most any modem computer that
get Internet access)
1~rnet

in and Password

filers, a copy of Adobe Acrobat writer
possibly a scanner
-

"""1

' "1

\0

..,

How much will it cost?

7 cents per page viewed (N/A to filing)
One page is defined as 54 lines of data
Time is irrelevant
Number of times printed does not affect
cost
t""
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What will CM/ECF look like?

-"

• The format and placement on our Internet site
have not been finalized

• The following slides show what it could look
like in the future to view and file documents
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About Our Court

Help/FAQ's

What's New

u.s. Bankmptcy Court
fortbe
Western District of Kentucky

Case Information

Site Search

Local Rules

Quick Answers

L.

L

L--

L-

'-

I

L..-.

L·- L.

L

L

If you do not see any buttons on this page please use our alternate home page.
Comments and Feedback

Links

L

Fee Information
This page was last edited on 0912612000 at 04:23 PM .
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ECF Login
Notice
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This is a Restricted Web Site for Official Court Business only. Unauthorized entry is prohibited
subject to prosecution under Title 18 of the U.S. Code . .All activities and access attempts are logged.

Login:

Password:

1\

--,

--,~~,

=,-,

o...-4

"'"

L-..

..

'-

.1-.

u.s. Bankruptcy Court
Southern District of California
Official Court Electronic Document Filing System
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This facility is for Official Court Business only. Activity to and from this site is logged. Document filings on this system are
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(Examples: Desoto, Des*t)

(Example: 99-80013)

"~".~,

'I

..J-,

First Name
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Type
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NOTICE: Access to the information in this system is currently available at no charge; however, a user fee, approved by the Judicial
Conference of the United States, may be applied in the future.
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Alias
Associated Cases
Attorney
Calendar By Case
Case Summary
Creditor
Docket Report
Judge

Query
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00-0512l-JH George Mchael Tipps and Cynthia Lynn Tipps
Case type: bk Chapter: 13 Asset: y Vol: v Judge: John J. Hargrove
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Filing Date #
05119/2000
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00-05123-JH George Michael Tipps and Cynthia Lynn Tipps
Case type: bk Chapter: 13 Asset: y Vol: v Judge: John J. Hargrove

Docket Text

Chapter 13 Voluntary Petition, Schedules A-J & Statement of Financial Affairs &
Disclosure oJ Compensation Receipt Number 136023. Fee Amount 185.00 filed by Ivan
Trahan on behalf of Cynthia Lynn Tipps. George Michael Tipps. (M:cFarlane. T.) (Entered:
05/22/2000)

05/19/2000 2
Chapter 13 Plan filed by Ivan Trahan on behalf of Cynthia Lynn Tipps, George Michael
"lIlTipps. (M:cFarlane. T.) (Entered: 05/22/2000)

.2

~

Application for Confinnation ofPlan~ Order Confirming Plan and Allowing Attorney Fees.
signed on 6/27/2000. (N"aiman. E.) (Entered: 06/28/2000)

05/24/2000.1 ~der and Notice For Meeting of Creditors with Certificate of Service with 341(a) meeting
to be held on 6/22/2000 at 02:00 PM at 341A Conference Room Chapter 13 Proof of
Claims due by 9120/2000. (M:cFarlane, T.) (Entered: 05/24/2000)

0612712000
09/08/2000

Notice of Classification of Claim and Right To Request a Hearing with Certificate of Mailing.
Claim No.: 0004 & 2004 oj Sears Roebuck & Co. filed by Thomas H. Billingslea on behalf

-#~,~-,

~

-.:t

~

.....

L_

'

.....

L~

00-05123-JH George lMichael Tipps and Cynthia Lynn Tipps

case Number:

a:2 - tJ$d3 -1113

Chapter 13 (Mandated Form)

Case type: bk Chapter: 13 Asset: y Vol: v Judge: John J. Hargrove

GeoF9! MicMel TiPE!...
Cynthia Lynn Tipps

563-82-6980

555-49-7928
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In Re: {NAME)

UNITED STATES; BANKRUPTOV COURT
• SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

L

L

L_

"""'

VI

1-:1

012

this system are

:""; ""-, -"' -, .-, --, -., --, -, . . ,. . " -, --, --, -, -, '-, =.

u.s. Bankruptcy Court
Southern District of CaHfornia
Official Court Electronic Document Filing System
fadlity is for Official Court Business only. Activity to and from this sUe is logged Document filings
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Bankruptcy Events
Answer/Response ...
Appeal
Batch Filings
Claim Actions
Court Events
Creditor Maintenance ...
File Claims
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Open a Case
Orders/Opinions ...
Other
Plan
Trustee/US Trustee
Trustee's 341 Filings
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File a Motion
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Bankruptcy·
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Adversary
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•

Query
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Reports
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logout
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Bankruptcy·

Adversary

•

Query

•

Reports

•

Logout
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Add/Create New Party

File a Motion: 99·70000 John Humble Brubaker and Big Bank Lending
Please select the filer:
Select the Party:
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ile a Motion: 99·70000 John Humble Brubaker and Big Bank Lending
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Motion for More Definite Statement
Motion for Order Fixing Last Date to File Proof of Claim
Motion for Payment of Administrative Expenses
Motion for Relieffrom Stay (CSD 1160 & 1163) (fee)~
Motion for Remand
Motion for Sanctions
Motion for Setting Hearing
Motion for Stav Pendina ADDeal
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File a Motion: 99·70000 John Humble Brubaker and Big Bank Lending
Select the pdf document (for example: C:\199cv501-21.pdf).
Filename

IS,: \~~lI!PlJn~~10~. ~d~t __ .__ _ _.,'. "'_~_]
IAttachmepts to Document: €, No 0 Yes
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ile a Motion: 99·70000 John Humble Brubaker and Big Bank Lending
document filed (mandatory)
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Relief from Stay Number:l_".,.c"",=::.~.!:;c=:cJl
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Does this filing refer to an existing document in this case? (If yes. click on the box)
NOTE: If the event you are docketing is an answer/response. you will be prompted on a subsequent screen for its related
motion. Therefore. do not click on this box to establish a relationship to the motion you are answering.
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Motion for Relieffrom Stay, to repossess saillJoatfiled by Joe B. Coolon behalf of Big Bank.
Lending. (Brubaker, Jolm)

L_ ··L_

Warningl f Submitting this screen commits this transaction.
You will have no further opportunity to modify this submission if you continue.
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~ Filing receipt

ocket Text:
otion for Relief from Stay, to repossess sailboat filed by Joe B. Coolon behalf of Big Bank Lending. (Brubaker, John)

fonowing document(s) are associated with this transaction:
)ocument description: Main Document
IVUpawu. filename: s:ltemp/motion. pdf
r ....onic document Stamp:
P CASBStamp_ID=875559582 [Date=10/25/2000] [FileNumber=16022-0] [
'~at7af589aab8b125cfde4c5~cdfdca83c982890eb4eflae9a48£8e46855d4cd9748

abc3£8462d480092aea4dl1d3a42e3eld478d372f4636178929bdeb4]]
70000 Notice will be electronically mailed to:

annie_333@yahoo.com
70000 Notice will not be electronically mailed to:
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Questions?
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"The important thing is
not to stop
~
questioning. "
-Albert Einstein
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Case Mana emenf

Electronic Case Fifes
The Case ManagementlElectronic Case Files (CMlECF)
system uses Internet technology to give the U.S. federal judiciary a
new mechanism for infonnation handling. Attorneys can file
pleadings from their offices via a Web browser; judges, court
staff, and attorneys have immediate access to new and historical
documents; and case data and documents are managed effectively.
CMlECF is currently used in four district and five bankruptcy
courts around the country. Since its inception, CMlECF has
handled over 15,000 cases and 175,000 documents and docket
entries for a user community of 75 judges, 400 court staff, and
1000 attorneys who use it to file their documents. Because of its
initial success, CMlECF service will be expanded throughout the
federal courts over the next few years. Consequently, the federal
courts are reexamining traditional policies, practices, and rules
that may need to be adjusted for the Internet world
The prototype for CMlECF was developed by the
Administrative Office (AO) of the U.S. Courts with the
participation of nine volunteer courts. The AO's Technology
Enhancement Office (TEO) designed and programmed the
software and was assisted by the Applications Management and
Development Division (AMDD). This prototype for bankruptcy
and civil cases was evaluated against various commercial and
court-developed alternatives and was chosen as the basis for a
CMlECF system to serve all appellate, district, and bankruptcy
courts. An AO project team under AMDD is managing the
ongoing development and implementation of CMlECF.

Features of CMlECF
)- Next-generation case management, tracking of motions,
answers, deadlines, and hearings.
)- Up-ta-date reports, queries, and docket sheets produced.
)- Electronic delivery of documents to, from, and within the
co~rts.

)- Electronic retrieval of case documents and dockets by all
users.
)- Electronic document management, storage, security, and
archiving.
)- Automatic creation of docket entries from attorney filings.
)- Electronic notices of filing to other CMlECF participants.

J - 29
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The CM/ECF Project
The goal of the CM/ECF project is to create a system that
allows nearly all documents associated with a court case to be
handled electronically.
CM/ECF supports the unique interests of different communities (the courts, the attorneys, and the public) while providing
the same range of document processing capabilities to all.
We expect that many people will file documents electronically over a network by using a standard Web browser, even
though CM/ECF does allow people to submit the same documents on a computer disk or even on paper if they prefer. The
documents submitted electronically must be in Portable Document Format (PDF).

eSYstem
thecouri, lIotforce th(

. new p/'()cesses.~· . .

The network used to access CM/ECF is the DCN (the Judiciary's private network), in the case of the courts, or the Internet,
in the case of the attorneys and the public.
Interaction with CM/ECF is via a Web browser, HTML
forms that enable document "attachments," and interactive software. The Web server application software collects the forms
data, processes it, and forwards data and documents to a private
server for storage.
As byproducts of the filing, case management information is
created and notices of filing are transmitted to case participants.
Immediately upon filing, the case docket sheet and associated
documents become available on-line to both the case participants
and the public.
For example, an attorney prepares a motion on her PC with
her word processor of choice. She saves the document and
"prints" it using Adobe's PDFWriter. Using her Web browser.
she then connects to the home page of the federal court associated with the filing and "files" the motion. The attached PDF
document is automatically forwarded to the court's CM/ECF
Web site. Once the data is validated, it is stored in the court's
CMlECF database.
CM/ECF was first introduced as a prototype in the fall of
1996 and has been used by other federal district and bankruptcy
courts since late 1997 and early 1998. CM/ECF activity has
steadily increased with more than 1,000 new cases and 15,000
additional entries each month.
The nine prototype demonstration courts have helped us prioritize and refine the capabilities of the system. By combining
our systems expertise with the courts' business expertise, we
have developed a system that exactly matches the needs of the
federal courts.
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CM/ECF ... designed
for the federal courts
CMlECF is being developed by the AO's TEO and
AMDD in cooperation with federal district, bankruptcy, and
appellate courts. These organizations have been involved in
the development of virtually every national case management
system for the federal judiciary since 1976. The six original
TEO application developers have, in total, over 120 years of
experience with computer systems for the federal judiciary; the
full implementation team has more than 250 years of experience.
The designers understand that, while staffing and money is
tight in the federal courts, the caseloads continue to increase
and the case document management challenges are enormous.
They know that any new system cannot add to the worldoad.
For these reasons, they designed the CMlECF architecture in
such a way that it allows for:

>

Use of the networks, machines, and word processing facilities in use today by the federal courts and legal community.

>

Gradual implementation of electronic filing at each court's
chosen pace.

>

Tailoring of the system to local court preferences and
practices.

The system design is based on the following key
"enablers" - the standards, hardware components, and software components that minimize the cost to create, modify,
support, and deploy the CMlECF system:

>

DCN ("inside'') access to enable the courts to use the
communications network already in place.

>

Internet ("outside") access to enable easy and inexpensive
electronic communication from the attorneys (unlike other
case management systems, CMlECF enables information
submission over the Internet).

>

Web browser is free and available to everyone, to replace
the previous requirement for PC-based software.

>

PDFWriter, which enables any word processor on any
platform to be used.

>

Any existing PC or Macintosh with a network connection;
federal courts already have DCN access and most attorneys have Internet access.

J - 31
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The CM/ECF Technical Solution
The success of CMlECF is largely due to the chosen
technical solution, which is characterized by the following
practices.
Use of commerical products and standard languages

•

•

Commercially available products (Informix and StrongHold)
are used to manage the database and the Web servers,
respectively.
Standard programming languages (perl, HTML, and
JavaScript) are used for the application system.

J

J

Ease of maintenance through high-level tools

The CMlECF design team created some programming tools
that combine the developers' programs together in such a way that
many standard programming tasks are eliminated. These include
complicated processes associated with the latest technology, such
as maintaining accurate page context information as the Intemet
user navigates between pages, collecting data from those pages
and saving it for special database interface procedures, checking
the user's access rights to those pages, and issuing special
database commands when appropriate. Because of these support
tools, changes can be made faster and a programmer's learning
process is simplified.

,

J

The provision for user customization

Three basic activities occur when a person selects a docket
category from a CMlECF menu:
•

User identifies the specific event type to be docketed, such as
"answer to cross-claim."

•

CMlECF prompts for preliminary information, such as the
case number and parties.

•

CMlECF runs the processes for that event type.

For each event type, the court's CMlECF administrator can
specify (using a simple Excel spreadsheet) which processes to
run, the sequence in which to run them, and certain behaviors of
the processes, such as how the user will be prompted and what
data will be collected. The administrator can also set up overall
CMlECF parameters that are unique to the particular court site,
such as court name and date formats.
CMlECF provides special tables that enable these tailoring
activities.
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Graphical User Interface
Once a person logs into CMlECF, he is immediately presented with a series of very simple, interactive pages that provide
choices and input fields and that hyperlink to other pages, based
on the person's selection.
We learned a very important lesson from prior systems:'
keep it simple. We are in the process of refining the interface to
, ensure this is true in every aspect of a person's interaction with
the system.

Isolation of the public and private systems
The Outside Environment

CMlECF is publicly accessible from the Internet. Any
authorized user, such as an attorney, can access the system by
using a standard Web browser, such as Netscape. His or her
CMlECF requests and data are submitted through the Common
Gateway Interface (CGI) recognized by Internet browsers.
An "outside" server, protected by a special "firewall" designed for the Internet, processes all public requests. The
frrewall software protects against intruders and unauthorized activities.
The Inside Environment

CMlECF is privately accessible by the federal courts from '
their Data Communications Network (DCN). They submit sim- ,:r;::;:,;:"2,4-/louf
pIe requests and data over this network.
An "inside" server, protected by special frrewall software
designed for the inside environment, processes all court user requests.
Both servers have identical software to enable this separation of public and private activity and to handle access to the
Internet.

Use of Portable Document Format
All documents uploaded to CMlECF must be in Portable
Document Format (PDF). This format enables regular documents to be viewed electronically and shared with others on the
Internet without loss of any document formatting characteristics.
PDF is also a secure format that doesn't allow hidden text or
links, as do many word processors. Saving a document in PDF
requires only afew clicks ofyour mouse.
'
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Filing with CM/ECF
You can see from the following example that CM/ECF is very easy to use. These windows show
the steps you would take to file a motion using CM/ECF. Although each court can tailor specific aspects
of docketing processes, such as the selections and text displayed, the basic process is the same for all
court types.

1. Prepare the document
You can create the document to be filed by using any ~=!=
word processor. Then select Ambal PDFWriI" as the
printer to prepare your document for CM/ECF.

i

In filing a document, you just show CM/ECF that this is
the document you want to file (see Step 8).

J
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3. Select a function

2. Log into ECFp

.J

J
All
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u.s. DIstrIct Court
DIstrtct DewIopment S)'sIem
Ofllclol Court Electraalc Document FII1nI s)'IIeID

4. Select the document type

5. Enter the case numbel
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7. Select the relief(s)

6. Select the party
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You can select the individual

The list items shown for selection are
determined by the court.

party already associated with

the case, or you can use the
"group" option.
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The details provided in this window are
detennined by the court. In this window, the
person has selected a response deadline by using
a pop-up calendar.

You can browse your file list to
select the filing document by
using the Browse button.

r
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r.: ..................................

10. Review the docket text

11. Done!

File a Motion

File a Motion

_T_

c..~

I-.k

=-_~-'I\I\

_ .........:_...._
You can modify the generated
docket text or just press the
Next button.

CMlECF gives you a filing receipt to
print or store on your computer. A
....... '1 notice oCtile filing is also sent via email to other participants and interested

~=====:".a1 parties,
who can
viewlogging
the document
and
D
docket sheet
without
into CM!
ECF.
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CMlECF offers a wide variety of
reports. You can select one of these,
the Docket Sheet. to verifY the filing
we just completed in this example.

The Docket Sheet shows the filing just
completed. You can click on the
document number to display the
associated PDF document.
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The following can be found at the Judiciary's Internet site (www.uscourts.gov):
"Electronic Case Files in the Federal Courts: A Preliminary Examination of Goals, Issues and the Road Ahead,"
March 1997.
"Local Rules and Procedures Governing Prototype Electronic Case FOe (ECF) Systems in the Federal District and
Bankruptcy Courts," December 1998.
"Electronic Case Files: Interim Technical Standards and Guidelines." February 1998.
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Inquires can be directed to:
Electronic Case Files Initiative, Gary Bockweg, Project Manager
(202-273-2736; bockweg@teo.uscourts.gov)
Electronic Case Fdes Prototype, Michael Greenwood, Project Manager
(202-273-2748; greenwoo@teo.uscourts.gov)

Summer 1999

J - 36

J
J

r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r

UMITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
REQUESTS FOR CASE INFORMATION
The Bankruptcy Clerk's Office for the Western District of Kentucky is located at 601 W. Broadway, Suite
546, Louisville, Kentucky 40202 (502-627-5700). There are several different means of obtaining case information
from the Bankruptcy Court
1)

There is no fee charged with this service. The information that can be obtained from vcrs
includes the debtor's name, case number, date case was filed, type of case, trustee, debtor's
attorney, debtor's attorney's phone number, discharge date, closing date, creditors' meeting date
and whether assets appear to be available for distribution. [Cases available on vcrs are those that
~
were filed on or after July, 1992.*]
2)

r

r
r
r
r
r

WebCIS. All information available on vcrs may be obtained via the Internet at

WWW.kywb.llSCOUrts.gov by clicking on WebCrS. There is no fee charged for this service.
3)

r
r
r
r

VCIS The Voice Case Information System (VcrS) allows a caller to access basic case
information from any touch-tone telephone at any time by dialing 502-627-5660 or 800-263-9385.

PACER The local PAC~R system allows computer access to not only basic case information b~t
also to recent docketing entries, claims registers, and case reports. This system, like vcrs, is ..
available at any time. PACER subscribers also have access to the Natio1ial U.S. Party/Case
Index. which provides case name, case number, filing date and the court in which the case was

filed. Information on registering for these services and the fees charged may be obtained from the
PACER Service Center at www.pacer.psc.uscourts.gov or by calling 1-800-676-6856. RegisterCd
PACER users can access the local PACER system via the Internet at www.kywb.uscourts.gov or
modem at 502-627-5664 or 1-800-263-9389. The National U.S. Party/Case Index can be accessed
at www.pacer.llspci.uscourts.gov or by modem at 1-800-974-8899. [Cases available on the local
. PACER are those that were filed on or after July, 1992*, and cases available on the National Index
vary by each court.]
4)

PUBLIC TERMINAL A computer terminal for use by the public to obtain case infonnation is
available in the Louisville Clerk's Office..This terminal may be used at no cost during normal office

operating hours (8:30 a.m. - 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday).
5)

CLERK'S OFFICE PERSONNEL

If you are unable to obtain information from vcrs, PACER, or the public terminals, you may be
able to obtain the following information from the Clerk's Office without charge:
a)

If the exact name of the debtor or the case number is provided and the information
is easily retrievable from the Court's automated database (case filed in'this federal
judicial district on or after July 1, 1992*), you may obtain the followin~basic
information: debtor's name, case number, whether a debtor has filed for
banlauptcy, whether the case is voluntary or involuntary, chapter of case, attorney
for debtor, trustee, whether there are assets, date of section 341 meeting,
discharge/dismissal date (if entered), debtor's soc~al security number, and a general
status of the case. You may contact the Clerk's Office staffwith up to two case
requests either by telephone or a visit to the Clerk's Office.
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b)

If the exact name of a party or an adversary proceeding number is provided and
the information is easily retrievable from the Court's automated database
(adversary proceedings filed in this federa1judi~ial district on or after July 1, 1992),
you may obtain the following basic information: adversary name, adversary
number, date the complaint wac; filed, name of party's attorney of record, the
related case number and a general status of the adversary proceeding. You may
contact the Clerk's Office staff with up to two adversary proceeding requests
either by telephone or a visit to the Clerk's Office. (Limited information is also
available on adversary proceedings filed from 1980 to1992. Additional information
will require a review of the closed record. See Item 5-e.)

c)

Requests for photocopies of case or adversary proceeding documents can be made
in writing, in person or by phone. If the requestor provides a clear document
reference (i.e., document number or date document entered where very few
documents entered on such date) and the document is available within the Couit
premises, the Clerk's Office will provide the copies free of any additional search
charge (copywork fee ofS.50 per page still applies).

d)

All pending cases & adversary proceedings may be reviewed in
person :free of charge.

e)

Information on reviewing or obtaining copies of documents in closed cases and
adversary proceedings can be obtained from Clerk's Office personnel or our web
site at www.kywb.uscourts.gov.

A S15 search fee is required in the following requests:

6)

t)

Requests for docketing events that are not basic information.

g)

Requests for basic information regarding cases filed before 1986; such information
is maintained on microfiche film, and requires a physical search by the Clerk's
Office.

h)

Requests to examine or copy a document where the requestor does not provide an
accurate case number and docket number and the deputy must physically search
the Court's record.

i)

Written search requests, which require a written response by the Clerk's Office.

PROCEDURAL iNFORMATION The Clerk's Office personnel will furnish general procedural
information, but pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 955, the Clerk's Office is PROHIBITED FROM
GIVING LEGAL ADVICE.

*Limited information is available on cases filed between 1986 and June 1992. Additional
information on these cases will require a review of the closed case (see Item 5-e). For basic
inf~rmation on cases filed prior to 1986, see Item 5-g.
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Moderator:
C.R. "Chip" Bowles, Jr.
GreenebcllIm Doll & McDollald PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky

Panelists:
Hon. Joall Lloyd Cooper
Ullited States Bankruptcy Court
Westerll District of Kentucky
Hon. Hellry H. Dickillsoll (Retired)
Formerly oft/,e Ullited States Ballkrllptcy Court
Westerll District of Kelltucky
HOII. William S. Howard, Chief Judge
United States Ballkruptcy Court
Easterll District ofKelltucky
Hon. Joe Lee (Recalled)
Ullited States Bankrllptcy Court
Eastem District of Kentucky
Hon. Joseph M. Scott, Jr.
Ullited States Ballkruptcy COllrt
Eastern District of Kentucky

Copyright 2000, Bowles, Cooper, Dickinson, Howard, Lee, Scott
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Caselaw Update on Bankruptc)' Ethics

Claude R. Bowles, Jr.

1. In re Downs, 103 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 1996) The leading case out of the Sixth Circuit on the application
of Bankruptcy Rule of Procedure 9011 and section 329 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Sixth Circuit held
that if a debtor's attorney violated a fiduciary duty, the attorney's minimum sanction would be total
denial of an fees.
2. In re Bonneville Pacific Cmp.. 196 B.R. 868 (Bkrtcy. D. Utah 1996), afCd in part rev'd in part,
Hansen. Jones & Leta v. Sepl. 1998 WL 111673 (D. Utah 1998) The leading pair of cases discussing
in exhaustive detail what are counsel for the debtor-in-possession's duties to a Bankruptcy estate. The
District Court comes to the strange (and wrong) conclusion that counsel for DIPs do not owe a
fiduciary duty to the Bankruptcy estate they represenL
3. Kentucky Bar Association v. Devers, 936 S.W. 2d 89 (Ky. 1997) A detailed analysis of how not to
represent a debtor at a 341 meeting. A copy of I;his case is auached to this update.
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EXHIBIT
936 S. W.2d 89
(Cite as: 936 S. W.2d 89)
KEN'lUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION,
Complainant,

v.
Robert L. DEVERS, Respondent.
No. 96-SC-239-KB.
Supreme Court of Kentucky.
Dec. 19. 1996.

client and providing that lawyer having direct
supervisory authority over another lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that other lawyer
conforms to rules of professional conduct, by failing
to adequately explain to bankruptcy trustee that his
clients could not produce title to trailer in which
they were living and by sending untrained and
uninformed representative from attorney's office to
represent clients in bankruptcy proceeding.
Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof.Conduct.
Rules 1.3, S.l(b).

As Corrected Jan. 30. 1997.
In attorney discipline proceeding, the Supreme
Court held that three-year suspension was warranted
for attorney's failure to appear on behalf of clients,
failure to communicate adequately with clients, and
closure of attorney's practice without returning fees
paid to attorney.
Suspension ordered.
[1] AITORNEY AND CLIENT ~42
4Sk42
Attorney violated rule prohibiting lawyer from
knowingly making false statement of material fact or
law to tribunal, by filing answer on behalf of client
which stated that civil proceeding was stayed due to
pending banlauptcy action ~hen there was· no such
bankruptcy action. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 3.130, Rules
of Prof.Conduct, Rule 3.3(a).
[2] ATfORNEY AND CLIENT ~37.1
4Sk37.1
Attorney violated rules requiring lawyer to act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing
client and providing that lawyer having direct
supervisory authority over another lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that other lawyer
conforms to rules of professional conduct. by failing
to adequately explain to bankruptcy trustee that his
clients could not produce title to trailer in which
they were living and by sending untrained and
uninformed representative from attorney's office to
represent clients in bankruptcy proceeding.
Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof. Conduct,
Rules 1.3, S.I(b).
[2] AITORNEY AND CLIENT ~44(1)
4Sk44(1)
Attorney violated rules requiring lawyer to act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing

[3] AITORNEY AND CLIENT ~37.1
4Sk37.1
Attorney violated rule providing that lawyer shall be
responsible for another lawyer's violations of rules
of professional conduct under certain circumstances,
when another attorney in a attorney's office filed
answer to civil action using client's alias.
Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 3.130. Rules of Prof.Conduct,
Rule S.I(a-c).
[4] AITORNEY AND CLIENT ~42
45k42
Attorney violated rule prohibiting lawyer from
knowingly making fals~ statement of material fact or
law to tribunal when another attorney in attorney's
office filed answer in civil suit on behalf of client
under alias undisclosed to courts. Sup.Ct.Rules,
Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 3.3(a)(I).
[5] AITORNEY AND CLIENT ~44(1)
45k44(1)
Attorney violated rule requiring lawyer to act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing
client when neither attorney nor anyone from
attorney's office ·appeared in civil suit to defend
clients against plaintiffs motion for judgment on the
pleadings. Sup.Ct.Rules. Rule 3.130, Rules of
Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.3.
(6) AITORNEY AND CLIENr ~44(1)
4Sk44(I)

Attorney violated rules requiring lawyer to keep
client reasonably informed about status of case,
represent client competently, and act with
reasonable diligence, when attorney advised client
that she should stop making payments to bankruptcy
trustee, which resulted in dismissal of client's
bankruptcy case, and when no appearance was made
by either attorney or representative from attorney's
office at meeting of creditors after client filed
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936 S.W.2d 89
(Cite as: 936 S.W.2d 89)
another bankruptcy petition. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule
3.130, Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4.
[7] ATI'ORNEY AND CLIENT ~44(1)
4Sk44(1)
Attorney violated rule stating level of competence
required . and rule holding that lawyer must
adequately communicate with hiS clients, by failing
to inform clients that their motion to amend their
bankruptcy plan had been overruled as a result of
absence of counsel for clients at hearing on motion.
Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof. Conduct,
Rules 1.1, 1.4(a).

[8] ATI'ORNEY AND CLIENT ~37.1
4S1c37.1
Attorney violated rule prohibiting aiding in
unauthorized practice of law by operating office
which was staffed by unlicensed employees, persons
whose daily activities consisted of activities which
constituted practice of law. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule
3.130, Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule S.S(b).
[9] ATIORNEY AND CLIENT ~44(1)
4Sk44(I)
Attorney violated rules requiring lawyer to
communicate adequately with his clients and
requiring lawyer to refund unearned fees upon
termination of representation, by closing office
without informing clients and by failing. to refund
fees paid to attorney by clients. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule
3.130, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.4(a, b),
1. 16(d).
[9] ATIORNEY AND CLIENT ~44(2)
4Sk44(2)
Attorney violated rules requiring lawyer to
communicate adequately with his clients and
requiring lawyer to refund unearned fees upon
.termination of representation, by closing office
without informing clients and by failing to refund
fees paid to attorney by clients. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule
3.130, Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rules 1.4(a, b),
1. 16(d).
[10] ATIORNEY AND CLIENT ~44(1)
4Sk44(I)
Attorney violated rules holding that lawyer must be
diligent, that lawyer may withdraw from case only if
withdrawal will create no prejudice to client, and
that lawyer must refund any uneamed fee upon
termination of representation, by closing his office

without any notice to client, without refunding any
portion of monies that client had paid and without
filing petition for relief on her behalf, and by closing
out client's file without notifying her. Sup.Ct.Rules,
Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rules 1.3,
1.16(b, d).
[10] ATI'ORNEY AND CLIENT ~44(2)
4Sk44(2)
Attorney violated rules holding that lawyer must be
diligent, that lawyer may withdraw from case only if
withdrawal will create no prejudice to client, and
that lawyer must refund any unearned fee upon
termination of representation, by closing his office
without any notice to client, without refunding any
portion of monies that client had paid and without
filing petition for relief on her behalf, and by closing
out client's file without notifying her. Sup.Ct.Rules,
Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rules 1.3,
1.16(b, d).
[11] ATIORNEY AND CLIENT ~44(2)
4Sk44(2)
Attorney violated rule holding that lawyer shall
refund any unearned fees upon termination of
representation, by closing clients' file and attorney's
practice without informing clients that he was no
longer allowed to practice and without informing
clients that no bankruptcy petition had been filed for
them. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 3.130, Rules of
Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.16(d).
[12] A'ITORNEY A..1\ffi CLIENT ~S8
4SkS8
Three-year suspension was warranted for attorney's
actions of, inter alia, failing to appear on behalf of
clients, failing to communicate with clients, and
closing offices without refunding fees paid to
attorney, despite attorney's loss of office managers
and staff and inability to find competent
replacements.
·91 Barbara S. Rea, Kentucky Bar Association,
Franlcfort, for Complainant.
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Stephen G. Montoya, Robert L. Devers, Phoenix,
AZ, for Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
The Inquiry Tribunal issued eleven charges,
containing a total of twenty-six counts, against
respondent, Robert L. Devers.
The Board of
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Governors of the Kentucky Bar Assocjation found
respondent to be guilty on sixteen counts and not
guilty on ten counts. The Board recommended a
two year suspenSion accompanied by an order to pay
costs. Respondent filed a notice of review with this
Court. Due to the voluminous nature of the counts
of which respondent was found guilty, each one will
be taken in tum.
[1] 1. Respondent was found guilty of violating
SCR 3.130-3.3(a) which probJ."bits a lawyer from
knowingly maIcing a false statement of material fact
or law to a tribunal.
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Respondent filed an answer in Knott District Court,
on behalf of a his client, Bill Smith, which stated
that the civil proceeding was stayed due to a pending
bankruptcy action. However, there was no such
bankruptcy action. It was not actually filed until
two months after the District Court had continued
the civil matter.
There was ample evidence to support a fmding of
guilt on this charge.
[2] 2. Respondent was found guilty of violating
SCR 3.130-1.3 which requires a lawyer to act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing
a client. Respondent was also found guilty of
violating SCR 3.130-S.I(b) which provides that a
lawyer having direct supervisory authority over
another lawyer shall make' reasonable efforts to
ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the rules of
professional conduct.
Respondent failed to adequately explain to the
Bankruptcy trustee that respondent's clients, Sidney
and Violet Johnson, could not produce the title to the
trailer in which they were living due to the fact that
the Johnson's were purchasing the trailer via a land
contract and therefore did not possess title although
the residence was listed on the Johnson's bankruptcy
schedules as personal property.
Also, at the meetings of the creditors, an untrained
and uninformed representative from respondent's
office was sent to represent the ]ohnsons. The
bankruptcy petition was ultimately dismissed and the
representative from respondents office told the
]ohnsons that they mtist wait a period of time prior
to refiling when in actuality, the Order dismissing
the petition stated that the ]ohnsons could refile

immediately.
There is ample evidence for fmdings of guilt on
these charges.
[3] 3. Respondent was found guilty of a violation
of SCR 3.130- S.I(a), (b) and (c) which provides
that a lawyer shall be responsible for another
lawyer's violation of the rules of professional
conduct only if the lawyer orders or, with
knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the
conduct involved or the lawyer is a partner in a law
firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has
direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer,
and knows of the conduct at a time when its
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails
to take adequate remedial action.
Warren Kent Williams and Donna ]0 Williams
came to respondent's office for the purpose of filing
a Chapter 13 bankruptcy action. After the filing,
Mr. Williams was sued upon a deficient loan.
However, in the civil suit, Mr. Williams was sued
under a name that he had previously used, Kent A.
Williams. The bankruptcy court was not aware of
this additional name. Mr. Williams returned to
respondent's office and met with another attorney
who filed an answer to the civil .action under the
name Kent A. Williams, stating that Kent A.
Williams did owe the debt bUt that he (Kent A.
Williams) was preparing to file for bankruptcy and
therefore the proceedings should be stayed. The
attorney also assured Mr. Williams that she would
take care of the civil suit.
There is ample evidence to support a rmding of
guilt on this charge.
[4] 4. Under the above stated facts, respondent was
also found guilty of violating ·92 SCR
3. 130-3.3(a)(I) which prohibits a lawyer from
knowingly making a false statement of material fact
or law to a tribunal.
The Board looked to the filing of the answer by an
attorney in respondent's office under an alias
undisclosed to the courts in this instance and
determined that it amounted to a false statement of a
material fact.
There is ample evidence to support a finding of
gUilt on this charge.

Copr. C West 1998 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

K-5

936 S.W.2d 89
(Cite as: 936 S.W.2d 89, *92)

[5] 5. Respondent was found guilty of violating
SCR 3.130-1.3 which requires a lawyer to act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing
a client.
.
Neither respondent nor anyone from respondent's
office appeared in the civil suit t~ defend against the
plaintiff's motion for a judgment on the pleadings.
Judgment was entered against the respondent's
client, Kent A. Williams, due to the lack of any
defense and due also to the fact that the court was
never adequately informed of the actual status of the
Williams' case in bankruptcy; the only information
that the civil court had was a boiler plate statement
that Kent A. Williams intended to file bankruptcy.
There is ample evidence to support a rmding of
guilt on this charge.
[6] 6. Respondent was found guilty of violating
SCR 3.130-1.4 and 3.1~0-1.1 and 1.3 which
require a lawyer to keep a client reasonably
informed about the status of the case, represent the
client competently and to act with reasonable
diligence.
Respondent filed a motion in Bankruptcy Court for
a hardship discharge of a Barbara Jo Deering's
Chapter 13 payment schedule. The motion was
overruled but Respondent advised Ms. Deering that
she should stop making payments to the Chapter 13
trustee. Ms. Deering followed this advice and, as a
result, the trustee moved to db:miss her C2Se, which
the court did. Therefore Ms. Deering was left with
no bankruptcy protection.
Thereaftet, Ms.
. Deering's creditors initiated vigorous efforts toward
.
collection.
Ms. Deering was unable to contact respondent
personally, but filed a Chapter 7 petition pursuant to
advice she received from an associate in
respondent's office. No appearance was made by
either respondent or a representative from his office
at the first meeting of creditors and Ms. Deering
was never informed by respondent or his office that
respondent had been banned from further practice in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky .
There is ample evidence to support a finding of
gUilt on this charge.

[7J 7. Respondent was found guilty of violating
SCR 3.130-1.1 which states the level of competence
required and SCR 3.130-1.4(a) which holds that a
lawyer must adequately communicate with his
clients.
Respondent failed to inform Jerry Owens and
Barbara Owens that their motion to amend their
Chapter 13 payment plan had been overruled as a
result of the absence of counsel for the Owenses at
the hearing on the motion. Due to this failure to
inform, the Owenses systematically reduced their
payments to the trustee in accordance with the
reduced payment plan that their motion had
requested.
In response to the delinquency in
payments, the trustee moved the court to dismiss the
case, which was granted at a hearing of which the
Owenses had no knowledge.
No one from
respondent's office appeared on the Owenses behalf.

..
i

l

,

J

J

J

There is ample evidence to find guilt on this
charge ..

J

[8] 8. Respondent was found guilty of violating
SCR 3.130-S.5(b) which prohibits aiding in the
unauthorized practice of law.

j

Respondent operated an office which was staffed by
unlicensed employees, persons whose daily activities
consisted of activities which constituted the practice
of law as defined as, -any service rendered
involving legal knowledge or legal advice, whether
of representation, counselor advocacy in or about of
court, rendered in respect to the rights, duties,
obligations, liabilities, or business relations of one
requiring the services. - SCR 3.020.

j

J

J

There is ample evidence to support a rmding of
guilt on this charge.
*93 [9] 9.
Respondent was found guilty of
violating SCR 3.130- 1.4(a) and (b) which requires
a lawyer to communicate adequately with his clients
and KRPC 1.16(d) which requires a lawyer to
refund unearned fees upon the termination of the
representation.

J

Respondent was hired to represent Hughey Rice and
Imagene Rice in the filing of a bankruptcy petition.
The Rices were informed of the Respondent's fee
and accompanying court costs. The Rices began
installment payments of the respondent's fee. When
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over half of the fee had been paid, Mrs. Rice
discovered that the respondent's office had been
closed. When she inquired at respondent's office in
another town, she was told that the office was
unable to help her and therefore she was unable to
complete the payments. Respondent never filed a
bankruptcy petition for the Rice's and there is no
evidence that any legal work was undenaken on
their case.
Respondent refunded $300 of the $525 paid by the
Rices, but only upon the instigation of these
proceedings.
There is ample evidence to fmd guilt on these
charges.
[10] 10. Respondent was found guilty of \iolations
of SCR 3.130-1.3 which holds that a lawyer must be
diligent, SCR 3.130-1.16(b) which holds that a
lawyer may withdraw from a case only if the
withdrawal will create no prejudice to the client and
SCR 3.130-1.16(d) which holds that a lawyer must
refund any unearned fee upon the termination of the
representation.
Respondent was retained by Judith Stanley in a
Chapter 7 proceeding.
Mrs. Stanley paid
respondent $700, via his office employees, at his
Pikeville office. Respondent then closed his eastern
Kentucky offices, without any notice given to Mrs.
Stanley, without refunding any portion of the monies
that she had paid and without ming a petition for
relief on her behalf. Respon(fent also closed out or
inactivated Mrs. Stanley's file without notifying her;
she continued to believe that she was being
represented by respondent.

United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky. Respondent also faUed to
inform the Murpheys that no petition had been filed
for them.
Respondent refunded $700 to the Murpheys, but not
untU two weeks before the hearing before the Board
of Governors was scheduled to take place.
There is ample evidence for a finding of guUt oil
this charge.
[12] Respondent argues that the recommendation of
the Board of Governors is excessive due to a list of
circumstances over which respondent had no
control. Such circumstances include the loss of
office managers and staff in several of respondent's
offices and respondent's inability to fmd competent
replacement employees who could effectively
manage a practice that ·was growing rapidly.
Respondent also requests that his past practice
history and reputation in the legal community be
considered.
The Court considered the facts as presented by
respondent, but there is no way to overcome the
obvious, egregious and serious nature of the charges
of which respondent has been found guilty. Due to
the nature of these fmdings and the pattern of ethical
misconduct they reflect (KBA v. Frazer. Ky.. 883
S.W.2d 878 (1994); KBA v. L.M. Tipton Reed,
Ky., 631 S.W.2d 633 (1982», it is unnecessary to
go further with our legal analysis. The evidence
overwhelmingly
supports
the
suspension
recommended by the Board of Governors of the
Kentucky Bar Association.

is ample evidence to support a fmding of
guilt on these charges ..

Pursuant to SCR 3.370(9), this Court adopts the
decision and recommendation of the Board of
Governors as to all matters *94 pertaining to the
respondent, Robert L. Devers.

[11] 11. Respondent was found guilty of \iolating
SCR 3.130-1.16(d) which holds that a lawyer shall
refund any unearned fees upon the termination of the
representation.

THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as
follows:

Ther~

Respondent accepted $700 from David Murphey
and Sonda Murphey as a fee for services to be
rendered in a bankruptcy proceeding. Respondent
closed the Murphey's file as well as respondent's
practice, without informing the Murpheys that
respondent was no longer allowed to practice in the

1. That the respondent, Robert L. Devers is hereby
suspended from the practice of law in Kentucky for
a period of three (3) years.
The period of
suspension shall commence on the date of entry of
this Order and continue until such time as he is
reinstated to the practice of law by order of this
Court pursuant to SCR 3.510.
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2. Respondent is directed to pay the costs of this
action in the amount of $7,723.22.
3. Pursuant to SCR 3.390, respondent shall, within
ten (10) days from the entry of this Order, notify all
clients in writing of his inability to represent them
and to furnish CWies of said letters of notice to the
Director of the Kentucky Bar Association.
STEPHENS, C.J.,. and COOPER, GRAVES,

STUMBO
JOHNSTONE,
LAMBERT,
WINTERSHEIMER, IJ., concur.
ENTERED: December 19, 1996.
lsI Robert F. Stephens
Chief Justice
END OF DOCUMENT
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A lawyer shall pro\·ide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge. skill.
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.
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[Adopted by Order 89-1. cIT. 1-1-90)

Commentary
Supreme Court
1989:
Lf!gctl I\l1mrlf!c~,!f! cmel Skill

[I] In detennining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant fhctors include
the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter. the lawyer's general experience. the lawyer's training and
experience. in the field in question. the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to
refer the matter to. or associate or consult with. a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. In many
instances. the required proficiency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise in a particular field of la\\: may be required in
some circumstances.

[:!] A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the
lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some important
legal skills. such as the analysis of precedent. the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting. are required in all legal problems.
Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of detennining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve. a skill
that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly
novel field through necessary study; Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of
established competence in the field in question.
.
[3J In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily
required where referral to or consultation or association with another lawyer would be impractical. Even in an emergency.
however. assistance should be limited to that reasonably necessary in the circumstances. for ill considered action under
elllergency conditions can jeopardize the cliem's interest.

[41 A lawyer may accept representation where the requisite level of competence can be achieved by reasonable preparation .
.11tis applies as well to a lawyer who is appointed as counsel for an unrepresented person. See also Rule 6.2.

TllOr(}lIgI1l1l!...... ~1~1c1 Prel'Ctrttl iOI1

(5] Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the tactual and legal elements of the
problem. and lise of methods and procedures meeting the stnndards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate
preparation. The required attention and preparation are detennined in part by what is at stake: major litigation and complex
transactions ordinarily require more elaborate treatment than matters of lesser consequence.

.\lClIIllUil1ll1,t!. ('(JlllPI!II!I1CI!

[6) To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill. a lawyer should engage in continuing study and education. If a system of
peer review has been established. the lawyer should consider making usc of it in appropriate circumstances.

SCR 3.130( 1.5) FEES
SCR 3.130(1.5) FEES

(a) A lawyds fcc shall be reasonable. Some factors to be considered in detennining the reasonableness ofa fee include the
Ii.lllowing:
( I ) TIle time and labor required. the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved. and the skill requisite to
perform the legal service properly;
(2) The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the
lawyer:
(3) TIle fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services:
(·n The amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances:
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client:
(7) TIle experience. reputation. and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client. the basis or rate of the fee should be communicated to the client.
preferably in writing. before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered. except in a matter in which.a
contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. Such a fee must meet the requirements of Rule 1.15(a). A
contin!!ent fee a!!reement shall be in writin!:! and should state the method b\' which the fee is to be detennined. includin!! the
percentage or p~rcentages that shall accru'"e to the lawyer in the event o"f settlement. trial or appeal. litigation and ~ther
expenses to be deducted from the recovery. and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is
calculated. Upon recovery of any amount in a contingent fee matter. the lawyer shall provide the client with a written
statement stating the outcome of the matter and showing the remittance to the client and the method of its detemtination.

..
i

.J

j

(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for. charge. or collect:
(I) Any fee in a domestic relations matter. the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of
a divorce or upon the amount of alimony. maintenance. support. or property settlement. provided this does not
apply to liquidated sums in arrearage; or
(2) A contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
(e) A division ofa fee between lawyers who are not in the same finn may be made only if:

( I ) (a) The division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or.
(b) By written agreement with the client. each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation:
and
(2) The client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and
(3) The tqtal fee is reasonable.
[Adopted by Order 89-1. err. 1-1-90]
COi\1;\lENTARY

Supreme Court

..

,j

-

•

1989:

•
(II When the lawyer has regularly represented a client. they ordinarily will have e\"olved an understanding concernin!! the
basis or rate of the fee. In a new client-lawyer relationship. howewr. an understanding as to the fee sho~lld be prol~ptly

•
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~stablishcd.

It is nOl necessary to recite nIl the factors that underlie the bnsis of the fee. but only those that are directly
in\'olved in its computation. It is sufficient. for example. to slntc tllnt the basic r:lie is an hourly charge or a fixed amount or
an estimated nmoulll. or 10 identil~' the factors that mny be taken illto nccount in tinnily fixing the fee. When developments
occur during the representation that render an earlier estimntc substantially inaccurate. a revised estimate should be provided
to the client. A \\Titll!n statement concerning the fee reduces the possibility of misunderstanding. Furnishing the client with a
simple memorandum or a copy of the lawyer's customary I~e schedule is suflicient if the basis or rate of the fee is set f0l1h.

/2) A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee. but is obliged to return any unearned portion. See Rule 1.I6(d). A
lawyer may accept property in payment for services. such as an ownership interest in an enterprise. providing this does not
involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule I.SO).
However. a fee paid in property instead of money Illay be subject to special scrutiny because it involves questions concerning
both the value of the services and the lawyer's special knowledge of the value of the property.
(3) An agreement may not be made whose tenns might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or
perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example. a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby
services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be
required. unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. Otherwise. the client might have to bargain for further
assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction. However. it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the
client's ability to pay . A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful
procedures. When there is doubt whether a contingent fee is consistent with the client's best interest. the lawyer should offer
the client alternative bases for the fee and explain their implications. Applicable law may impose limitations on contingent
lees. such as a ceiling on the percentage.

[-I] A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same firm. A
division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as
and most otien is used when the fee is contingent and the division is between a referring lawyer and a trial specialist.
Paragraph (e) permits the lawyers to divide a fee on either the basis of the proportion of services they render or by agreement
between the participating lawyers if all assume responsibility for the representation as a whole and the client is advised and
does not object. It does not require disclosure to the client of the share that each lawyer is to receive. Joint responsibility for
the representation entails the obligations stated in Rule 5.1 for purposes of the matter involved.

Displlles owr Fees
[5] If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes. such as an arbitration or mediation procedure
established by the bar. the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure for
detemlining a lawyer's fee. for example. in representation of an executor or administrator. a class or a person. entitled to a
reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party
concerned with the fee should comply with the prescribed procedure.
[6] Factor (3) is intendl~d to prohibit unreasonably high fees and does not prevent a lawyer from sharing fees that arc less than
"customary."

K-13
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SCR 3.130(1.6) CO~FIDEI'iTIALITY OF INFORl\lATION

(;ll ,\ lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents alier consultation.
except for disclosures that arc impliedly authorized in order to carry Ollt the representation. and except as stated in paragraph

(b).
(h)

A lawyer may re\·eal such infonnation t.o !be extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
To prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily hann: or
(2) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client.
to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the
client was involved. or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of
the cI ient: or
(3) To comply with other law or a court order.

(I)

IAdopted by Order 89-1. eft:

1-1-90]
CO:\1MENTARY

Supreme Court
1989: II] The lawyer is part of a judicial system charged with upholding the la\\". One of the lawyer's functions is to advise
clients so that they avoid any violation of the law in the proper exercise of their rights.
[2] The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate confidential information of the client not only
facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages people to seek
early legal assistance.
[3] Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to detennine what their rights are and what is. in the maze of
laws and regulations. deemed to be legal and correct. The common law recognizes that the client's confidences must be
protected from disclosure. Based upon experience. lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given. and the law
is upheld.
(4] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer maintain contidentiality of intormation
relating to the representation. The client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to
embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter.
[5] The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies of law. the attorney-client privilege (which includes
the work product doctrine) in the law of evidence and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The
attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise
required to produce evidence concerning a client. TIle rule of client-lawyer contidentiality applies in situations other than
those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compUlsion of law. The confidentiality rule applies not merely to
matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all intornlation relating to the representation. whatever its
source. A lawyer may not disclose such infomlation except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or
other law. See also Scope.

[6\ The requirement of maintaining confidentiality of inlonllation relating to representation applies to government lawyers
who may disagree with the policy goals that their representation is designed to advance .

..,wJuwi=ec! Disclosure

(7\ A lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in catTying out the representation.
except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circlllllstances limit that authority. In litigation. lor example. a
lawyer Illay disclose information by admitting a tact that cannot properly be disputed. or in negotiation by Illaking a
K-14
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disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion.
IS) I.awyers in a linn may. in the course of the !irm's practice. disclose to each other information relating to a client of the
linn. unlcss the c1icnt has instructed that panicular information be confined to specified lawyers.
Disdtl.wre .·'dn'rsL' to ( '1iL'1Il

(q) TIle conlidentiality rule'is subject to limited exceptions. In becoming priv)' to information about a client. a lawyer may

lorcscc that thc client intends serious hann to another person. However. to the extent a lawyer is required or permitted to
disclose a clicnt's purposcs. the client will be inhibited from revealing facts which would enable the lawyer to counsel against
a wrongful course of action. The public is better protected if full and open communication by the client is encouraged than if
it is inhibited.
[10] Several situations must be distinguished.

111] First. the lawyer may not counselor assist a client in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2(d). Similarly. a
lawyer has a duty undcr Rule 3.3(a)(ol) not to use false evidence. This duty is essentially a special instance of the dUly
prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) to avoid assisting a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct.
(12] Second. the lawyer may have been innocently involved in past conduct by the client that was criminal or fraudulent. In
such a situation the lawyer has not violated Rule 1.2(d). because to "counselor assist" criminal or fraudulent conduct requires
knowing that the conduct is of that character.
[13] Third. the lawyer may learn that a client intends prospecti\'e conduct that is criminal and likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily harm. As stated in paragraph (b)( I). the Ia'wyer has professional discretion to reveal information in
order to prevent such consequences. The lawyer may make a disclosure in order to pre\'ent homicide or serious bodily injury
which the lawyer reasonably believes is intended by a client. It is very difficult for a lawyer to "know" when such a heinous
purpose will actually be carried out. forthe client may have a change of mind.
[14] The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires consideration of such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with
the client and with those who might be injured by the client. the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors that
may extenuate the conduct in question. Where practical. the lawyer should seek to persuade the client to take suitable action.
In any case. a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary
to the purpose. A lawyer's decision not to take preventive action permitted by paragraph (b)( I) does not violate this Rule.
Wit hdroll'al

[15] If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially funhering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct. the
lawyer must withdraw. as stated in Rule 1.16(a)( I).
[16] After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making disclosure of the clients' confidences. except as otherwise
provided in Rule 1.6. Neither this rule nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of
withdrawal. and upon withdrawal the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion. document. affimHltion. or the like.
(17) \\11ere the client is an organization. the lawyer may be in doubt whether contemplated conduct will actually be carried
out by the organization. Where necessary to guide conduct in connection with this Rule. the lawyer may make inquiry within
the organization as indicated in Rule 1.13(b).

L18) Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in a client's conduct or other misconduct of
the lawyer involving representation of the client. the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to a claim involving the conduct or representation of a tOrlner
client. The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has been made. Paragraph (b)(2) does no't
rcquire the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or proceeding. that charges sllch complicity. so that the ddi:nse
may be established by responding directly to a third pany \\ho has made such all assertion. The rig.ht to delcnd. of course.
;lpplies wherc a proceeding has been commenced. Where practicable and not prejudicial to the lawyer's ability to establish the
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defense. the lawyer should advise the client of the third party's assertion and request that the client respond appropriately. In
e\".:l1I. disclosure should be no !!reater than the Iawver reasonablv believes is necessarv to vindicate innocence. the
di~c1osure should be made in a mann~r which limits acces~ to the infon~lation to the tribunal ;r other persons having a need
to know it. and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent
practicablc.

,111\'

!I 9)

If thl! lawyer is charged with wrongdoing in which the client's conduct is implicated. the rule of confidentiality should
not prevcnt the lawyer from defending against the charge. Such a charge can arise in a civil. criminal or professional
disciplinary proceeding. and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client. or on a wrong
alleged by a third person: for example. a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting together. A
lawyer entitled to a Ice is pernlitted by paragraph (b)(2) to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it. ntis aspect of
the rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the
liduciary. As stated above. the lawyer must make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary disclosure of information
relating to a representation. to limit disclosure to those having the need to know it. and to obtain protective orders or make
other arrangements minimizing the risk of disclosure.

DisdoSlires Otherll'ise Required or AIII/wrizec/
(20] The attorney-client privilege is differently defined in various jurisdictions. If a lawyer is called as a witness to give
testimony concerning a client. absent waiver by the client. paragraph (a) requires the lawyer to invoke the privilege when it is
applicable. The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a court or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the
lawyer to give information about the client.
(21] The Rules of Professional Conduct in various circumstances permit or require a lawyer to disclose infonnation relating
to the representation. See Rules 2.2. 2.3. 3.3 and 4.1. In addition to these provisions. a lawyer may be obligated or pernlitted
by other provisions of law to give information about a client. Whether another provision of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a
matter of interpretation beyond the scope of these Rules. but a presumption should exist against such a supersession.
(22) Paragraph (b)(4) gives the lawyer professional discretion to reveal such information as the lawyer reasonably believes is
necessary to comply with a court order.
Former Clief71

[23] nle duty of confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated.
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SCR 3.130(1.7) COl"FLlCT OF INTEREST: GENERAL RULE

(a) A lawyer shall not represent a cliell! iflhe representation oflhat client will be directly adverse to another client. unless:
(I) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other
client: and
(2) Each cI ient consents alier consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client or to a third person. or by the lawyer's own interests. unless:
(I) TIle lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversdy affected: and
(2) The client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is
undertaken. the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common representation and
the advantages and risks involved.
(Adopted by Order 89-1. eff. 1-1-90]
COl\lMENTARY

Supreme Court
1989:
Loyulty 10 (( Cliel1/

(I] Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client. An impemlissible conflict of interest may exist
before representation is undertaken. in which event the representation should be declined. If such a conflict arises after
representation has been undertaken. the lawyer should withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16. Where more than
one client is involved and the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after representation. whether the lawyer may
continue to represent any of the clients is determined by Rule 1.9. See also Rule 2.2(c). As to whether a client-lawyer
relationship exists or. having once been established. is continuing. see Comment to Rule 1.3 and Scope.

[2] As a general proposition. loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that
client's consent. Paragraph (a) expresses that general rule. Thus. a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate against a person
the lawyer represents in some other matter. even if it is wholly unrelated. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in
unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse. such as competing economic enterprises. does riot
require. consent of the respective clients. Paragraph (a) applies only when the representation of one client would be directly
adverse to the other.
{3] Loyalty to. a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider. recommend or carry out an appropriate course of
action for the client because of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect forecloses altematives
that would otherwise be available to the client. Paragraph (b) addresses such situations. A possible conflict does not itself
preclude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and. if it does. whether it
will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses
of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client
wishes to accommodate the other interest involved.
CIi/1SU/WI;()/1 ClIIlI COI7Si:11!

(-l J A c1il!nt may consent to representation notwithstanding a contliet. HoweVer. as indicated in paragraph (a)( I) with respect
to representation dircctly advcrse to a c1icnt. and paragraph (b)( I) with respect to material limitations on representation of a
clicnt. whl!n a disintcrestcd lawyer would concludc th:ll thc clicnt should not agrec to the representation undcr thl!
circumstances. the lawyer involved cannot propcrly ask for such ag.reement or prO\-idc representation on the basis of thl!
client's consent. Whl!n morc th:1Il one client is in\'olwd. thc qUl!stion of contliet must bl! resolved as to each client. Moreover.
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th~r~

may h~ circumstances wh~re it is impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example. when the
lawyer represents diftcrent clients in rd:ned matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to
~rmit the other client to make an informed decision. the law~w cannot properly ask thc latter to consent.

151

The lawy~r's own interests should not be permitted to have adverse effect on reprcsentation of a client. For example. a
lawyer's need for incomc should not lead the lawyer to undertake matters that cannot be handled competently and at a
reasonable fee. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5. If the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question. it may
be diflicult or impossible for thc lawyer to give a client detached advice. A lawyer may not allow related business interests to
affect representation. for example. by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest.

("(Jllli ia~ ill Lit ~~at ion
(6] Paragraph (a) prohibits representation of opposing partisan litigation. Simultaneous representation of parties whose
interests in litigation may contlict. such as coplaintiffs or codefendants. is governed by paragraph (b). An impennissible
conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony. incompatibility in positions in relation to an
opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in
question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing
multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one
codefendant. On the other hand. common representation of persons having similar interests is proper if the risk of adverse
effect is minimal and the requirements of paragraph (b) are met. Compare Rule 2.2 involving interntediation between clients.
[7] Ordinarily. a lawycr may not act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter. even if the other
matter is wholly unrelated. However. there are circumstances in which a lawyer may act as advocate against a client. For
example. a lawycr representing an enterprise with diverse operations may accept employment as an advocate against the
enterprise in an unrelated matter if doing so will not adversely affect the lawyer's relationship with the enterprise or conduct
of the suit and if both clients consent upon consultation. By the same token. government lawyers in some circumstances may
represent government employees in proceedings in which a government agency is the opposing party. The propriety of
concurrent representation can depend on the nature of the litigation. For example. a suit charging fraud entails confl ict to a
degree not involved in a suit for a declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation.
[8J A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question that has arisen in different cases. unless
representation of either client would be adversely affected. Thus. it is ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in cases
pending in different trial courts. but it may be improper to do so in cases pending at the same time in an appellate court.

IIlIt:r::st ofPerson

Payin~for

a Lall)'er's Scm'ice

[9J A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client. if the client is informed of that fact and consents and the
arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client. See· Rule 1.8(f). For example. when an insurer
and its insured have conflicting interests in a matter arising from a liability insurance agreement. and the insurer is required to
provide special counsel for the insured. the arrangement should assure the special counsel's professional independence. So
also. when a corporation and its directors or employees are involved in a controversy in which they have conflicting interests,
the corporation may provide funds for separate legal representation of the directors or employees. if the clients consent after
consultation and the arrangement ensures the lawyer's professional independence.

Other Conjlict SilUatiol1S
[10] Conflicts of intercst in contexts other than litigation sometimes may be diflicult to assess. Relevant factors in
determining whether there is potential for adverse effect include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with
the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer. the likelihood that actual conflict will arise and
the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise. The question is olien one of proximity and degree.
,

[11) For cxample. a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic
tt) cach other. but common representation is permissible wherc the clients are generally aligned in interest evcn though there
is some ditTerence of interest among them.

[I::!) C"ontlict questions may also arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare
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wills for sc,oeral family members. such as husband and wife. and. dep~nding upon the circumstances. a conflict of interest
may arisc. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under
dne view. the client is the fiduciar\": under another view the client is the estate or trust. including its beneficiaries. The lawver
should make clear the relationship'to the parties involved.
•
(13] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine
whether the responsibilities of the two roles may contlict. TIle lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters
involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise. the
potential intensity of the conflict. the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the po~sibility of the corporation's
obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the
lawyer's independence of professional judgment. the lawyer should not serve as a director.

Cm!flici C""'"Keel hy el/1 Opposing Par(l'
(14J Resolving questions of conflict of interest is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer undertaking the representation. In
litigation. a court may raise the question when there is reason to infer that the lawyer has neglected the responsibility. In a
criminal case. inquiry by the court is generally required when a lawyer represents mUltiple defendants. Where the conflict is
such as clearly to call in question the fair or efficient administration of justice. opposing counsel may properly raise the
question. Such an o~iection should be viewed with caution. however. for it can be misused as a technique of harassment. See
Scope.
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(a) A lawyer 5hallnot enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly a~quire an ownership. possessory. security
or other pecuniary interest ad\'erse to a client unless:

....,

....

(I) The transaction and tenns on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client
and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood
b\' the client:
C!) The client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the transaction:
and
(3) TIle client consents in writing thereto.
(b) A lawyer shall not use infonnation relating to representation ofa client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client
consents after consultation.
(c) A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent. child. sibling. or
spouse any substantial gift from a client. including a testamentary gift. except where the client is related to the donee.
(d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client. a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer
literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on infonnation relating to the representation.
(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation. except
that:

J
,

J

(I) A lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation. the repayment of which may be contingent
on the outcome of the matter: and
(2) A lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the
client.

(0 A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:
(I) Such compensation is in accordance with an agreement between the client and the third party or the client
consents after consultation;
(2) There is no interference with the iawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer
relationship: and
.
(3) Infonnation relating to representation ofa client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.
(g) A I~~\'yer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or
against the clients. or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas. unless each client
consents after consultation. including disclosure of the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the
participation of each person in the settlement.
(h) A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless
pennitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement. or settle a claim for such liability with
an unrepresented client or fonner client without first advising that person in writing that independent representation is
appropriate in connection therewith.

•

(i) A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent. child. sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in a representation
adverse to a person who the lawyer knows is represented by the other lawyer except upon consent by the client after
consultation regarding the relationship.

•

(j) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is
conducting for a client. except that the lawyer may:

•

( I ) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses: and
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C!) Contract with a cJi~nt for a r~asonabl~ conting~nt f~e in a ci\'il case.
(Adopt~d

by Order 89-l.l!ff. 1-1-90)
CO;\[\IE~TAR\,

Supreme Court
1989:
TrCIIl.w,,·tiolls Betweell CIiI!I1I Ullel LClw)"er

[I] As a general principle. all transactions between client and lawyer should be fair and reasonable to the client. In such
transactions a review by independent counsel on behalf of the client is often advisable. Furthermore. a lawyer may not exploit
infornlation relating to the representation to the client's disadvantage. For example. a lawyer who has learned that the client is
investing in specific real estate may not. without the client's consent. seek to acquire nearby property where doing so would
adversely affect the client's plan for investment. Paragraph (a) does not. however. apply to standard commercial transactions
between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others. for example. banking or
brokerage services. medical services. products manufactured or distributed by the client. and utilities' services. In such
transactions. the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client. and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and
impracticable.
[2] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client. if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For example. a simple gift
such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If effectuation of a substantial gift requires
preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance. however. the client should ha\'e the detached advice that another
lawyer can provide. Paragraph (c) recognizes an exception where the client is a relative of the donee or the gift is not
substantial.
Litc:ralJ' Rights

[3] An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the conduct of the representation creates a
conflict between the interests of the client and the personal interests of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of
the client may detract from the publication value of an account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer
representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shalt consist of a share in
ownership in the property. if the arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5 and paragraph (j).
Persoll Payillg/or Luwyer~~ Ser"iccs

[4] Paragraph (f) requires disclosure of the fact that the lawyer's services are being paid for by a third party unless such
paymeQt is provided for in an agreement between the client and the third party. Such an arrangement must also confoml to
the requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning confidentiality and Rule 1.7 concerning conflict of interest. Where the client is a
class. consent may be obtained on behalf of the class by court-supervised procedure.
Limitil1g Liuhili(l'

[5] Paragraph (h) is not intended to apply to customary qualifications and limitations in legal opinions and memoranda.
FClmi(\' Rel(lli(}llships Betweel1 LCllIrers

[6] Paragraph (i) applies to related lawyers who are in different finns. Related lawyers in the same firm arc governed by
Rules 1.7. 1.9. and 1.10. The disqualification stated in paragraph (i) is personal and is not imputed to members of tinns with
whom the lawyers are associated.
..kCfllisitit)ll t~r IIllC!rr!st ill l.ilig(lfioll

[i) Paragraph (j) states thl! traditional

gcn~ral

rule that lawyers arc prohibited Ii'om acquiring a proprietary interest in
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litigation. This gcneral rule. which has its basis in COllllllon-law champcrty and maintcnance. is subject to specific exceptions
de\ eloped in decisional Jaw and continued in these Rules. such as the exception for reasonable contingent fees set forth in
Rule 1.5 and the exception for cCl1ain ad\"anccs of the costs of litigation set forth in pamgraph (c).
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A lawye," who has fonnedy represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation;
(b) Represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer fonnerly was
associated had previously represented a client
(I) whose interests are materially adverse to that person: and
(:!) about whom the lawyer had acquired infornlation protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter: unless
the fonner client consents after consultation.

(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter of whose present or former finn has fonnerly represented a
client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(I) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the fonner client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3
would pemlit or require with respect to a client or when the information has become generally known: or processed by the

Clerk. excepting. however, any communication between the parties concerning negotiations for an agreed sanction which
shall not be transmitted to the Disciplinary Clerk or Trial Commissioner nor filed of record unless the sanction proposal is
approved by the Court. No sllch paper or copy thereof shall be sent by. or on behalf of. any party to the Court. the Board. the
Trial Commissioner. Inquiry Commission. or any member thereof.
(2) reveal infonnation relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a
client.
{Amended by order 99-1, eff. 2-1-00; adopted by Order 89-1, eff. 1-1-90]
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(a) While lawyers are associated in a linn. none ofthelll shall knowingly represent a client when anyone of them practicing
alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7. 1.8(c). 1.9 or 2.2.
(b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a linn. the linn is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person

with interests matl!rially adverse to those of a client represented by the fomlerly associated lawyer and not currently
represented by the linn. uniess:
( I ) The matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented
the client: and
(2) Any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the
matter.

J
j

J
J

(c) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.
(d) A liml is not disqualified from representation ofa client if the only basis for disqualification is representation ofa former
client by a lawyer presently associated with the firm. sufficient to cause that lawyer to be disqualified pursuant to Rule 1.9
and:
( I ) the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no specific part
of the fee therefrom: and
(2) written notice is given to the former client.

j

J
j

(Amended by Order 99-. I eff. 2-1-2000: prior admendment eff.I-I-90]
COMMENTARY

Supreme Court
1989:

Definition of "Firm "
[I] For purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct. the term "firm" includes lawyers in a private firm. and lawyers
employed in the legal department of a corporation or other organization. or in a legal services organization. Whether two or
more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. For example. two practitioners who
share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a finn.
However. if they present themselves to the public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm.
they sh.ould be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers
are relevant in determining whether they are a firm. as is the fact that they have mutual access to confidential information
concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore. it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule
that is in\·olved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not
represent opposing parties in litigation. while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by
one lawyer is attributed to another.

(2J With respect to the law department of an organization. there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department
constitute a liml within the mean in!! of the Rules of Professional Conduct. However. there can be uncertaint\' as to the
identity of the client. For example. it-may not be clear whether the law department ora corporation represents a sl~bsidiary or
an atliliated corporation. as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar
.
question can arise conceming an unincorporated association and its local afliliates.
(3) Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid. Lawyers employed in the same unit of a legal service
organization constitute a linn. but not necessarily those employed in separate units. As in the case of independent
practitioners. whether the lawyers should be treated as associated with each other can depend on the particular rule that is
involved. and on the specilic facts of the situation.

J
J
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J
J
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Hl Where a lawyer has joined a private firnl after ha\'ing represented the government. the situation is governed by Rule 1.11
(a) and (b): where a lawyer represents the go\'ernment after ha\'ing served private clients. the situation is governed by Rule
1.11 (c)( I ). The individual lawyer il1\'oh'ed is bound by the Rules generally. including Rules 1.6. 1.7. and 1.9.
[5] Dim'rent pro\'isions are thus made for mo\'ement of a lawyer from one private tirnl to another and for movement of a
lawyer between a private finn and the government. The government is entitled to protection of its client confidences. and
therefore to the protections provided in Rules 1.6. 1.9. and 1.11. However. if the more extensive disqualification in Rule 1.10
were applied to former go\'ernment lawyers. the potential effect on the government would be unduly burdensome. The
government deals with all private citizens and organizations. and thus has a much wider circle of adverse legal interests than
does any pri\'ate law firm. In these circumstances. the government's recruitment of lawyers would be seriously impaired if
Rule 1.10 were applied to the government. On balance. therefore. the government is better served in the long run by the
protections stated in Rule 1.11.
Principles ofImputed Disqualification

[6] The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies
to lawyers who practice in a law firnl. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially
one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound
by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a) operates only among the
lawyers currently associated in a firin. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another. the situation is governed by
paragraphs (b) and (c).
Luu:rers MO\'il11{ Between Firms
[7] When lawyers have been associated in a firm but then end their association. however. the problem is more complicated.
The fiction that the law finn is the same as a single lawyer is no longer wholly realistic. TIlere are several competing
considerations. First. the client previously represented must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is
not compromised. Second. the rule of disqualification should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from having
reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third. the rule of disqualification should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from fonning
new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association. In this connection. it should be
recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms. that many to some degree limit their practice to one field or another.
and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputed disqualification
were defined with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one
practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel.

[8] Reconciliation of these competing principles in the past has been attempted under two rubrics. One approach has been to
seek per se rules of disqualification. For example. it has been held that a partner in a law firm is conclusively plesumed to
have access to all confidences concerning all clients of the firm. Under this analysis. if a lawyer has been a partner in one law
firm and then becomes a partner in another law firm. there is a presumption that all confidences known by a partner in the
first firm are known to all partners in the second firm. This presumption might properly be applied in some circumstances.
especially where the client has been extensively represented. but may be unrealistic where the client was represented only for
limited.purposes. Furthermore. such a rigid rule exaggerates the difference between a partner and an associate in modern law
firms.
[9] The other rubric formerly used for dealing with vicarious disqualification is the appearance of impropriety proscribed in
Canon 9 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. This rubric has a twofold problem. First. the appearance of
impropriety can be taken to include any new client-lawyer relationship that might make a former client feel anxious. If that
meaning were adopted. disqualification would become little more than a question of subjective judgment by the former
client. Second. since "impropriety" is undefined. the tenn "appearance of impropriety" is question-begging. It therefore has to
bc recognized that the problem of imputed disqualification cannot be properly resolvcd either by simple analogy to a lawyer
practicing alone or by the very general concept of appearance of impropriety.
{IO] A rule based on a functional analysis is more appropriate for determining the question of vicarious disqualification. Two
lunctions are involved: preserving confidentiality and avoiding positions adverse to a client.
( ·OI~ficll.!lUidli(\·

[II} Preserving confidentiality is a question of access to infornlatioll. Access to infonnatioll. in turn. is essentially a question
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of fact in particular circumstances. aided by inferences. deductions or working presumptions that reasonably may be made
about the wa\" in which law\'ers work together. A law\"er may have general access to files of all clients of a law finn and mav
regularly participate in disc~lssions of th-eir affairs: it should· be infe"fred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all informatio~
about all the fiml's clients. In contrast. another lawyer may have access to the files of only a limited number of clients and
participate in discussion of the afTairs of no other clients: in the absence of information to the contrary. it should be inferred
that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not those of other clients.
[11] Application of paragraphs (b) and (c) depends on a situation's particular facts. In any such inquiry. the burden of proof
should rest upon the firm whose disqualification is sought.

-

[13] Paragraphs (b) and (c) operate to disqualify the firm only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information
protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b). Thus. if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge of information relating to a
particular client of the firm. and that lawyer later joined another firm. neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is
disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter even though the interests of the two clients
conflict.
[lot] Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm. a lawyer changing professional association has a continuing
duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9.

Acll"er:re Positions
[\5] The second aspect ofloyalty to client is the lawyer's obligation to decline subsequent representations involving positions
adverse to a former client arising in substantially related matters. This obligation requires abstention from adverse
representation by the individual lawyer involved. but does not properly entail abstention of other lawyers through imputed
disqualification. Hence. this aspect of the problem is governed by Rule 1.9(a). Thus. if a lawyer left one firm for another. the
new affiliation would not preclude the firms involved from continuing to represent clients with adverse interests in the same
or related matters. so long as the conditions of paragraphs (b) and (c) concerning confidentiality have been met.

•
•

•

•
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SCR 3.130(1.13) ORGANIZATION AS CLIENT

(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly
authorized constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer. employee or other person associated with the
organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation
that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might
be imputed to the organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer
shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. In determining how to
proceed, the lawyer shall give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences,
the scope and nature of the lawyer's representation, the responsibility in the organization and the
apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters and
any other relevant considerations. Any measures taken shall be designed to minimize disruption of the
organization and the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the
organization. Such measures may include among others:
(1) Asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) Advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for presentation to
appropriate authority in the organization; and
(3) Referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by
the seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest authority that can act in behalf of the
organization as determined by applicable law.
(c) If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest authority that can act on
behalf of the organization insists upon action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law and is
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer may resign in accordance with Rule

1.16.
(d) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other
constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when it is apparent that the organization's
interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.
(e) AJawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees,
members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's
consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate
official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.
[Adopted by Order 89-1, eff. 1-1-90]

COMMENTARY
Supreme Court
1989:
The Emity liS the Clielll
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[1] An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors,
employees, shareholders and other constituents.

..
j

[2] Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of the corporate organizational
client. The duties defined in this Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations. "Other
constituents" as used in this Comment means the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees
and shareholders held by persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations.
[3] When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates with the organization's
lawyer in that person's organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, by
way of example, if an organizational client requests its lawyer to investigate allegations of wrongdoing,
interviews made in the course of that investigation between the lawyer and the client's employees or
other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6. This does not mean, however, that constituents of an
organizational client are the clients of the lawyer. The lawyer may not disclose to such constituents
information relating to the representation except for disclosures explicitly or impliedly authorized by the
organizational client in order to cany out the representation or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6.
[4] When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be
accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and
operations, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province. However,
different considerations arise when the lawyer knows that the organization may be substantially injured
by action of a constituent that is in violation of law. In such a circumstance, it may be reasonably
necessary for the lawyer to ask the constituent to reconsider the matter. If that fails, or if the matter is of
sufficient seriousness and importance to the organization, it may be reasonably necessary for the lawyer
to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. Clear justification
should exist for seeking review over the head of the constituent normally responsible for it. The stated
policy of the organization may define circumstances and prescribe channels for such review, and a
lawyer should encourage the formulation of such a policy. Even in the absence of organization policy,
however, the lawyer may have an obligation to refer a matter to higher authority, depending on the
seriousness of the matter and whether the constituent in question has apparent motives to act at variance
with the organization's interest. Review by the chief executive officer or by the board of directors may
be required when the matter is of importance commensurate with their authority. At some point it may
be useful or essential to obtain an independent legal opinion.
[5] In an extreme case, it may be reasonably necessary for the lawyer to refer the matter to the
highest authority. Ordinarily, that is the board of directors or similar governing body.
However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain conditions highest authority reposes
elsewhere; for example, in the independent directors of a corporation.

j

..1
..

organi~ation's

Relatioll to Other Rilles
[6] The authority and responsibility provided in paragraph (b) are concurrent with the authority and
responsibility provided in other Rules. In particular, this Rule does not limit or expand the lawyer's
responsibility under Rule 1.6, 1.8, 1.16, 3.3 and 4.1. If the lawyer's sen'ices are being used by an
organization to further a crime or fraud by the organization, Rule 1.2(d) can be applicable.

•

•

GOl'ernmelll Agency
[7] The duty defined in this Rule applies to governmental organizations. Howe\'er, when the client is a
governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality

•

'I
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SCI{ 3.I3UlI.13) ORGANIZATlOl\ AS CLIENT

and assuring that the wrongful official act is prevented or rectified. for public business is involved. In
addition. duties of lawyers employed by the govemment or lawyers in military service may be defined
by statutes and regulation. Therefore. defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the
resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the gO"ernment context. Although in
some circumstances the client may be a specific agency. it is generally the government as a whole. For
example. if the action or failure to act involves the head of a bureau, either the department of which the
bureau is a part or the government as a whole may be the client for purpose of this Rule. Moreover. in a
matter involving the conduct of government officials, a government lawyer may have authority to
question such conduct more extensively than that of a lawyer for a private organization in similar
circumstances. This Rule does not limit that authority. See note on Scope.
Clarifyillg the Lawyer's Role

[8] There are times when the organization's interest may be or become adverse to those of one or more
of its constituents. In such circumstances the lawyer should advise any constituent, whose interest the
lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the conflict or potential conflict of interest, that the
lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and that such person may wish to obtain independent
representation. Care must be taken to assure that the individual. understands that, when there is such
adversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization cannot provide legal representation for that
constituent individual, and that discussions between the lawyer for the organization and the individual
may not be privileged.
[9] Whether such a warning should be given by the lawyer for the organization to any constituent
individual may tum on the facts of each case.
Dual Represelllatioll

[10] Paragraph (e) recognizes that a lawyer for an organization may also represent a principal officer or
major shareholder.
Derivative Actions

[11] Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or members of a corporation may bring suit to
compel the directors to perform their legal obligations in the supervision of the organization. Members
of unincorporated associations have essentially the same right. Such an action may be brought ~ominally
by the'organization, but usually is, in fact, a legal controversy over management of the organization.
[12] The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an action. The
proposition that the organization is the lawyer's client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative
actions are a normal incident of an organization's affairs, to be defended by the organization's lawyer
like any other suit. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of
the organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's
relationship with the board. In those circumstances. Rule 1.7 governs \vho should represent the directors
and the organization.

r
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SCR 3.13U(2.2) INTERMEDIARY
SCR 3.130(2.2) INTERMEDIARY

(a) A lawyer may only act as internlediary between clients if:
( I) The lawyer consults with each client concerning the implication~ of the common
representation, including the advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the attorneyclient privileges, and obtains each client's consent to the common representation;
(2) The lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on terms compatible with
the clients' best interests, that each client will be able to make adequately informed
decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of material prejudice to the interests of any
of the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful; and
(3) The lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation can be undertaken
impartially and without improper effect on other responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the
clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client concerning the decisions to be
made and the considerations relevant in making them, so that each client can make adequately infonned
decisions.

l

..i

j

j

(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, or if any of the conditions
stated in paragraph (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to represent
any of the clients in the matter that was the subject of the intermediation.
[Adopted by Order 89-1, eff. 1-1-90]
COMMENTARY

Supreme Court
1989: This Rule explicitly recognizes the special role of the lawyer acting as an intermediary, to be
distinguished from joint representation as an advocate.

....
j

[1] A lawyer acts as intermediary under this Rule when the lawyer represents two or more parties with
potentially conflicting interests. A key factor in defining the relationship is whether the parties share·
respon.sibility for the lawyer's fee, but the common representation may be inferred from other
circumstances. Because confusion can arise as to the lawyer's role where each party is not separately
represented, it is important that the lawyer make clear the relationship, and obtain the client's consent,
preferably in writing.
{2] The Rule does not apply to a lawyer acting ·as arbitrator or mediator between or among parties who
are not clients of the lawyer, even where the lawyer has been appointed with the concurrence of the
parties. In performing such a role the lawyer may be subject to applicable codes of ethics, such as the
Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint Committee of the American
Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association.
[3] A lawyer acts as internlediary in seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an
amicable and
a business in which two
. mutually advantageous basis;
. for example. in helpina to oroanize
;:,
or more chents are entrepreneurs, workmg out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two
or more clients have an interest, arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate or a marital
,:)
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SCR 3.130(2.2) INTERMEDIARY
division or mediating a dispute between c1iel'its. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially conflicting
interests by developing the parties' mutual interests. The alternative can be that each party may have to
obtain separate representation. with the possibility in some situations of incurring additional cost,
complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, all the clients may prefer that the
lawyer act as intemlediary.
[4] In considering whether to act as internlediary between clients, a lawyer should be mindful that if the
intemlediation fails the result can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. In some
situations the risk of failure is so great that internlediation is plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer
cannot undertake common representation of clients between whom contentious litigation is imminent or
who contemplate contentious negotiations. More generally, if the relationship between the parties has
already assumed definite antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests can be adjusted by
intermediation ordinarily is not very good.
[5] The appropriateness of intermediation can depend on its form. FomlS of intermediation range from
informal arbitration, where each client's case is presented by the respective client and the lawyer decides
the outcome, to mediation, to common representation where the clients' interests are substantially though
not entirely compatible. One foml may be appropriate in circumstances where another would not. Other
relevant factors are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a continuing basis
and whether the situation involves creating a relationship between the parties or terminating one.
[6] In some circumstances a lawyer wiII undertake representation of a party in litigation or negotiation.
and be forced to deal with an unrepresented party. For example, the lawyer representing a spouse in a
divorce case may deal with the unrepresented spouse within the limits of Rule 4.3. The fact that that
lawyer negotiates with the unrepresented spouse does not make the lawyer an intermediary, or subject
the lawyer to the special rule of disqualification contained in Rule 2.2(c).

Confidentiality and Privilege
[7] A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of intermediation is the effect on
client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. In a common representation, the lawyer is
still required both to keep each client adequately informed and to maintain confidentiality of infomlation
relating to the representation. See Rules 1.4 and 1.6. Complying with both requirements while acting as
intermediary requires a delicate balance. If the balance cannot be maintained, the common
representation is improper. With regard to the attorney-client privilege. the prevailing rule is that as
betwe.en commonly represented clients the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if
litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege wiJ) not protect any such communications, and the
clients should be so advised.

[8] Since the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented clients, intemlediation is

r
r

r
r

improper when that impartiality cannot be maintained. For example, a lawyer who has represented one
of the clients for a long period and in a variety of matters might have difficulty being impartial between
that client and one to whom the lawyer has only recently been introduced.

COllsultation
[9] In acting as intemlediary between clients. the lawyer is required to consult with the clients on the
implications of doing so, and proceed only upon consent based on such a consultation. The consultation
should make clear that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship nornlally expected in other
circumstances.

K-31

~l

K 3.13U(2.2) 1!'< J tKyltUJAK'

[10] Paragraph (b) is an application of the principle expressed in Rule 1.4. Where the lawyer is
intcnncdiary. the clients ordinarily must assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each
client is independently represented.

...

Wirlulra"'al

[11] Common representation does not diminish the rights of each client in the client-lawyer relationship.
Each has the right to loyal and diligent representation, the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule
1.16, and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning obligations to a fonner client.

..

...
;
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SCR 3.130(5.1) RESPO~SIBILlTlES OF A PARTNER OR SUPERVISORY LAWYER
SCR 3.130(5.1) RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PARTNER OR
SUPERVISORY LAWYER

(a) A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the finn has in effect measures giving reasonable
assurance that all lawyers in the finn confonn to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other
lawyer confonns to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct only if:
(I) The lawyer orders or. with knowledge of the specific conduct. ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) The lawyer is a partner in the law finn in which the other lawyer practices. or has direct supervisory
authority over the other lawyer. and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or
mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.
[Adopted by Order 89-1. eff. 1-1-90]
COMMENTARY

Supreme Court
1989: [I] Paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the professional w~rk of a finn or legal
department of a government agency. This includes members of a partnership and the shareholders in a law firm organized as
a professional corporation: lawyers having supervisory authority in the law department of an enterprise or government
agency; and lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities in a finn.
[2] The measures required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraphs (a) and (b) can depend on the finn's structure
and the nature of its practice. In a small finn. infonnal supervision and occasional admonition ordinarily might be sufficient.
In a large finn. or in practice situations in which intensely difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more elaborate
procedures may be necessary. Some finns, for example. have a procedure whereby junior lawyerS can make ·confidential
referral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special committee. See Rule 5.2. Finns. whether large or
small. may also rely on continuing legal education in professional ethics. In any event. the ethical atmosphere of a finn can
influence the conduct of all its members and a lawver havine: authoritv over the work of another mav not assume that the
•
•
subordinate lawyer will inevitably confonn to the R~les.
(3] Paragraph (c)( I) expresses a general principle of responsibility for acts of another. See also Rule 8.4(a).
[4] Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty ofa lawyer having direct supervisory authority over perfonnance of specific legal work
by anot~er lawyer. Whether a lawyer has such supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a question of fact. Partners
of a private finn have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the finn. while a partner in charge of a
particular matter ordinarily has direct authority over other finn lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by
a partner would depend on the immediacy of the partner's involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. The supervisor
is required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct
occurred. Thus. if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotiation.
the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension.

{51 Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of paragraph (b) on the part of the
supen'isory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation of paragraph (c) because there was no direction. ratification or
knowledge of the violation.
(6] Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a). a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner. associate
or subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond
the scope of these Rules.

r
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J
SCR 3. 130(5.2)

RESPO~SIBILITIES

OF A

SUnORDI~ATE

LAWYER

(a) A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another
~rson.

(b) A subordinate law\"er does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a
supervisory lawyer's re~sonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.
[Adopted by Order 89-1. eff. 1-1-90]

..

1
I

CO;\1MENTARY

.J

Supreme Court

1989: [I] Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acted at the direction
of a supervisor. that fact may be relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge required to render conduct a
violation of the Rules. For example. if a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at the direction ofa supervisor. the subordinate
would not be guilty ofa professional violation unless the subordinate knew of the document's frivolous character.
(2] When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional judgment as to ethical
duty. the supervisor may assume responsibility for making the judgment. Otherwise a consistent course of action or position
could not be taken. If the question can reasonably be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers is clear and they are
equally responsible for fulfilling it. However. if the question is reasonably arguable. someone has to decide upon the course
of action. That authority ordinarily reposes in the supervisor. and a subordinate may be guided accordingly. For example. if a
question arises whether the interests of two clients conflict under Rule 1.7. the supervisor's reasonable resolution of the
question should protect the subordinate professionally if the resolution is subsequently challenged.
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SCR 3.130(5.5) UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

A lawyer shall not:
(a) Practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; or
(b) Assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of
law.
(Adopted by Order 89-1. c:rf. 1-1-90]
COMMENTARY

Supreme Court
1989: TIle definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another. Whatever the
definition. limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by
unqualified persons. Paragraph (b) does not prohibit a lawyer from employing the services of paraprofessionals and
delegating functions to them. so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and retains responsibility for their work.
See Rule S.3. Likewise. it does not prohibit lawyers from providing professional advice and instruction to non lawyers whose
employment requires knowledge of law: for example. claims adjusters. employees of financial or commercial institutions.
social workers. accountants and persons employed in government agencies.. ln addition. a lawyer may counsel nonlawyers
who wish to proceed pro se.
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PROBLEM #1
"And you can pay our fees with Chickens"
You have a client who operates a small gift shop. He and his wife clearly qualify
for a Chapter 13 and could propose a 100% 60-month plan. Unfortunately, they need
about $3,000 in tax and other nonbankruptcy legal work pre-petition before their Chapter
13 would be a success and they have no extra funds and no way to borrow the money to
pay the needed pre-petition fees. They propose to pay you by giving you $3,000 in
country hams, Kentucky Crafts, and a $1,000.00 watch. The bank, which has a mortgage
on the inventory of the Gift shop, has no problem with this payment and you can use the
items.
ISSUE A.
Can you accept this type of payment for doing the pre-petition work and
still represent the debtors in their Chapter 13? If so, what disclosures should you make to
the Bankruptcy Court?

ISSUE B.
Your Spouse likes the Gift Shop's merchandise and as the debtors are
short of funds they would like to reduce their monthly payments under the plan and pay
your fees through gift certificates. Can you do this?

ISSUE C.
Shortly before you file the Chapter 13 you determine that it would be
better for the wife to file a Chapter 7. Unfortunately, the debtors have no extra funds and
need the Gift Shop's entire inventory for the Christmas Holidays. The debtors' offer to
pay your normal fees from the wife's salary from the gift shop within the next six months
after you file her Chapter 7. Can you agree to the debtor paying your fees after you file
the Bankruptcy? Can you attempt to collect your Chapter 7 legal fees after the
Bankruptcy is filed and the wife's debts are discharged?
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PROBLEM # 2
"You own a What!"
You have a client who needs to file a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy. He went through a
divorce 8 months ago and has closed his small motorcycle repair shop. The Bank
repossessed all the equipment in full satisfaction of its secured debt and has no claim on
the remaining inventory which your client values at approximately $600.00. The only
other property the debtor tells you he owns is a car worth $1,000.00, $700.00 in clothing,
and $500.00 in tools. The Debtor owes about $35,000.00 in credit card debt, $20,0000.00
in bad business debts, and $4,000.00 in back Federal taxes. The agreed divorce decree
has as part of the property settlement section an agreement by the debtor that he will hold
his fonner spouse harmless for all of the above debts. You review the schedules with the
debtor, fully disclose his duties under the Bankruptcy Court and file them On December
1,2000. On December 3,2000 the Debtor's fonner spouse calls you and says she knows
they Debtors schedules are false and wants to meet with you to tell you about the
problems. You call your client who tells you the divorce was bitter and his fonner spouse
will do anything to "get him" and that you should not waste your time talking to her.

ISSUE A.
Do you have to meet with the Debtors fonner spouse? Even if you are not
required to meet with the fonner spouse should you meet with her?

ISSUE B.
Assume you meet with the Debtor's fonner spouse and she tells you that
he has a 1967 Corvette, in perfect condition, which he keeps at his fathers farm. When
you discuss this matter with the debtor, he tells you that the car was purchased by his
brother 4 years ago just before his brother got a divorce and is held in the name of his old
motorcycle repair shop. The car was titled in the shop's name so his brother's fonner
spouse would not fmd out about the car. He presents you with proof that his brother
purchased the car with his own funds as well as a copy of his will (which was prepared 4
years ago) which states that the car is the property of his brother. The debtor says he did
not disclose the car because he did not want to get his brother in trouble. What should
you advise the debtor to do? Should you disclose this infonnation to anyone? Assuming
your client refuses to amend his schedules, what should you do?

ISSUE C.
Assume the fonner does not disclose any new infonnation to you.
However, 2 months after the case is closed a motorcycle collector visits the debtor and
discovers that the room full of outdated spare parts contains several hundred rare Indian
and HD motorcycle parts which have never been removed from their original cases. Your
client calls and asks you to draw up a sale agreement to sell the parts for $100,000.00.
You know that the trustee did not have the parts appraised because both you and your
client assured the trustee that the old parts were outdated and of little value. What do you
do? Assuming your client did not know these used parts were in the back of his old shop
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and did not intend to deceive the trustee when he filled out his schedules, what should
you do if the debtor now refuses to reveal these facts to the trustee?

ISSUE D.
Nine months after the case is closed, you are at state court motion hour
and see the Debtor settle a car accident case for $40,000.00 with the Witless Insurance
Co. The Debtor PI attorney states in open Court that the accident occurred 4 weeks before
the Debtor filed his chapter 7 case. You review the debtor's schedules and find no
mention of the accident claim. You review your notes and find that the debtor expressly
told you that he had no outstanding claims, including claims from accidents. The debtor
refuses to take your phone calls or respond to your letters. What should you do? What
should you do if you see the Debtor's PI attorney and he tells you he is glad the accident
occurred after the bankruptcy was file or the Debtor ''would not have gotten the money".
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BANKRUPTCY ETHICS:
A DIFFERENT WORLD?

C. R. Bowles, Jr.

L

INTRODUcnON

As a general rule, BanIcrupk:y law is truly a different world from the rest of "'normal legal
practice"'. The Bankruptcy Code's detailed and complex provisions, the mass of technical opinions from
the specialized Bankruptcy courts and the broad equity powers of courts under the Bankruptcy Code
make bankruptcy an extrelnely difficult area of the law in which to practice. However;. as noted by a
leading commentator in the field of bankruptcy ethics, there is some good news because: "'u you know
anything about the rules governing lawyer proCessional respollSlDility (aka 'legal ethics'), then you know
most of what you need to lcnow about bankruptcy~.t
This generalobservatio~ white correct, does not mean that there are only a few "special" Bank
ruptcy ethics issues. Indeed,1ega1 ethics may play a greater role in bankruptcy proceedings than any
other area of the law due to four general factors which arise from the unique natwe of practice under
the Bankruptcy Code.
~ it is important to note thatunlilce most tribuna1s, courts ovesseeing Bankruptcy proceed
ingsbave to appove the retention of counsel for bankruptcyestates underChapler 11 and a.pter 122,
creditors committees in Qapter 11 casefI and BanIcrupk:y trustees4. Therefore, there is an open judidal
review of an attomey'sdedsionto ta1ce a c1ientin the majority ofbanlcruptcy cases, which is normally a
private matter in most other litigation settings.

Second, there is extensive judicial review of legal fees in BanIcrupk:y cases. While most cases .
involve fee requests of munsellordeblors-in-posse~ unsecured cmditorscommittees, and trustees,
a Ban1cruptcy Court will review any legal fees for which a party is seeIdng reimbursement from the
BanIcrupk:y estate'. This judicial review and the fact that payment ofbankruptcy professionals reduces
the "pot of Il'lOI\e}'" available for disbibution to a debtor's creditors means that any fee application in a
bankruptcy proceeding must be prepared with care, and. in general accordance with certain guidelines .
set forth by the Office of The United States 'Ih1stee under the provisions of 28 US.C§ 586'.
A third reason why legal ethics are more complex in a bankruptcy setting is the w\usual nature
of the parties to a bankruptcy case. In a Jaw suit or the purchase or sale ofa business, there are generally
a small number of legal interests whiCh must be considered by an attorney in the representation of a
particular client However, in a Bankruptcy case you have a debtor, upwards of thousands of creditors
as well as other interested parties, each of whom have wildly differing interests vis-a-vis the debtor, and
most, if not all, other interested parties' . Indeed even doing a simple conflict check can be a nightmare in
a large case where an attorney would have to cross check thousands of creditors and other interest
holders to see if he or she can accept the representation of any party in a bankruptcy cases.
_ A final factor which also complicates bankruptcy ethical considerations is the seemingly simple
issue of "who is your client"? As noted throughout this Chapter, situations involving closely held busi
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nesses where attorneys outside of bankruptcy may have no problem in representing both the business,
the primary shareholders and/or the corporate officers, become conflict ridden dilemmas, due to the
"differing" interests of the bankruptcy estate (i.e. collecting the most money for creditors) and the indi
viduals who have the fiduciary duty to operate the business of the estate.
Itis the purpose of this Chapter to review indetall some of the most important ethical consider
ations' which an attorney must deal with when representing a debtor, bankruptcy estate, or creditor's
committ=.iWhile attorneys who are representing aeditors in bankruptcyalso have ethical issues arise10,
these iss1lesare almost always issues which would also arise ina non-banlcruptcy context and are there
fore beyond the scope of this chapter. Therefore, in the alleged words of the great Yogi Berra, "Let's
begin at the beginning!"

n.

u

A.

11 U.s.C §327(a): Employment Of Professionals

U.s.C§§ 327 AND 1103: EMPLOYMENT OF PROFESSIONALS

11 U.s.C §327(a) governs the employment of all professionalsu~ including attorneys, who are to
be hired by trustees or debtors-in-possession. Under this provisio~ an attorney can be employed as the
"general counsel" for a bankruptcy estate onlyif: 1) the attorney is "disinterested12"; and 2) the attorney
neither represents nor holds an interest which is adverse to the bankruptcyestateD. While these tests are
somewhat similar in nature, they are independent tests, each of which must be met by prospective
attorneys, ifthey wish to be employed as counsel for a Ban1cruptcy estate14• For an excellent discussion
of these two requirements, see In re Omegas Group. Inc., 195 iJ.R. 875 (Bkrtcy W.o. Ky. 1996).
In the Sixth Circuit, the two-part test of11 U.s.C§ 327(a) is applied both literally and strictly by
courts in reviewing whether a professional can be employed by a bankruptcy estateU. The Sixth Circuit
has refused to allow either a broad reading of 11 U.5.C.§ 1107(b)1', which provides tbat an attomey will
not bedisqua1ified from repesenting a debtor solely because of the attomey's pre-petition represents
tionof thedebtor, or the general powers of11 U.5.C.§ 1(617 to override thepJainJanguageof sedion.327.
Therefore, if an attorney does not fall within the Hteral definition ofa disinterested person then there is
no chance that his or her employment will be approvedll.

Other than failing to meet the statutory definition of disinterestednesS, there are two broad
classes of "situations" whJch muld prevent a law firm from being able to represent a banlauPtcYestate
under 11 U.s.C§ 327(a)1': (1) multiple representstion of related entities by the proposed attorney, and
(2) co~ between the debtor and the attorney due to interests, unre1ated to the debtor, which the
attorney either holds or represents.

1.

Multiple Representation of Related Parties

The problems related to a law firm's representation of related parties probably causes more
disqualifications or rejections of proposed counsel under 11 U.S.c.§ 327(a) than any other ethical prob
lem20. While, representation of multiple related entities does not require a ~ disqualification of a
law firm seeking to represent a bankruptcy estate under 11 US.C§ 327(a)21, a law firm's employment
should not be approved under section 327(a) if there is even lithe appearance of conflict irrespective of
the integrity of the firm or person under consideration22l1• Among the situations which can give rise to
either the appearance of impropriety or an actual conflict warranting a rejection of a law firm's employ
ment application are:
a.

Representation of a partnership and its partnersll

b. Representation of a corporation and related corporations24
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c.

Representation of a corporation and its owners2S

d. Representation of a corporation and its officers ·or directors2'
e. Representation of an individual's ban1ciuptcy estate and the individua127
f.

.

~

Representation of related bankruptcy estates for the same bankruptcy
trustee2'.

The leading test on whether a law firm should either be refused employment or removed as
counsel for a banlaupky estatecan be found in theThhd Oreutt'sdedsion min re BH IE P, Inc.2t. In that
case the court was faced with the question of wbether a baDkruptcy tnIStee and his attorneys, who
served as a Chaplel'7 trustee in theQapter7 aaesof a mrporationaDd each of lis two priDdpals bad
to be disqualified due to the fad that the thIee Qapter 7banlaupky estates held claims against each
other. The Third Cireuit noted that there were two separate situations under section 327(a) where ooun
sel for a bankruptcy estate muId be disqualified: 1) where the p-ofessional had an actual conflict of
interest; and 2) where there is only a -potentiat- conflict of interespt.1n the former case court's have no
discretion and must refuse to approve a professional's employment under section 327(a). However, in
the latter case a court could approve the retention of the professional, even in light of the potential
conflict, if such an appointment would be appropriate under the facts and cin:umstances of the case3l.

2.

Confl.icts Between the Debtor and its Attorney

There are a number of situations which prevent an attorney from representing a debtor under
the provisionsof 11 USes 327(a) that do not involve the representationofentities related to the debtor.
While such conflicts are rather uncommon, they can be broadly grouped into 4 categories.

a.

Representation of Thitd Parties

As noted by the Bankruptcy oom in Matter ofAUied A,ttists PictureS Cmp.: (The ABA's] Code
. of Professional Responsibilif¥ provide[s] that the professional judgment of a lawyer must be ~
solely for the benefit of this.dient, free of compromising influences and ~ties, and ptedudes [his or
her] acceptance of employment that will adversely affect his judgment or di1u~·his loyal~. In bank
ruptcy cases. this means that the debtor's or the tnJsteefs oounsel can generally not represent creditors
of the debtor's estate», although some exceptions have been made in laJge <l1apleI' 11 cases where law
firms represent creditors in ·small'" matters not related to the banlauptcy c:ast!!'. Further, counsel cannot
also represent noncreditor parties who may be targets of a lawsuit by a bankruptcy estate!S.

b.

. .Business and Financial TtesBetweenthe Debtor and the Proposed Attorneys

As a general rule, Bankruptcy Courts have refused to allow the employment of attorneys to
represent the estate where the attorneys, their law firms or some member of their law firms have a direct
financial or business tie to the debtor or the debtor's principals. While this obviously includes attorneys
who are disqualified because they are not disinterested under the express tenns of 11 U.S.C§ 101(14) as
they had an ownership interest in the debtor1li, it also includes cases where members of an attorney's
law finn have served as officers or directors of a debtor corporation!1, co-owned property with the
debtor", possibly owed money to the debtor» or has some other connection to the debtorfll. Therefore, a
law finn should carefully examine all of its ties and its attorneys' ties to a debtor before applying to be
counsel for a Bankruptcy estate.

c.

Retainer and Pre-Petiti,on Payment Problems

One of the oldest41 and most critical problems facing attorneys in representing a bankruptcy
estate is "How do you get paid"? The problem of getting paid for representing the debtor in a bank
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ruptcy proceeding is often complicated by the real and practical need to get your own pre-petition bills
paid before the bankruptcy is filed.Q. The primary probleins are: 1) do pre-petition payments of out
standing bills by a debtor- render an attorney ineligible to be approved as counsel for the estate under
section 327(a) because the payments may have been a pleference; and 2) do certain types of retainers
(i.e. retainers in the form of liens or mortgages on the debtor's propertyG) disqualify a law finn from
'~
seeking employment as a bankruptcy estate's general counsel.

Jlhe. initial problem, of pre-petition payments to law firms, is bankruptcy's version of the fa
mous Reatch 22'~. As noted by the Bankruptcy court in the case of In Ie Decor CoIporation:

Regarding the issue of thepre-petition paymeuts.butlor [the debtor paying its
attorney's pre-petition legal biDs, the debIor's attomey) would have been a
aeditor of the estate and subject 10 the statutlJryctisqualifkationmandateci by
section 101(14XA). In absence of a waiver of its UI\SeCUIed claim- the ultimate .
-curative'" measure- [the debtor's attorneys) would have been non-disinter
ested. Here, aeditor status has been awided by ~ving payment within
ninety(90) days prior to the filing, and such transfers may well constitute pref
erential payments. This role as a prospective defendant may constitute a dis
qualifyingadverse interest and render the [debtor'sattomeys) ineligt"ble to claim
the designation of a Rdisinterested.", professionaL_*
The best advice which can be given in tIjs situation is to review the case law in this area4S and
make a careful judgment as to Whether it would be practical to perform the ultimate curative measure
and waive any pre-petition claim which the law firm may have against the debtor.
The second major problem facing law firms iswhethera law finn can take a retainer in the form
of a lien against the debtor's property? In the Sixth Orcuit, such retainers do not automatically dis
qua1ify an attorney from being employed under section 327(a). In the Ohio case of In Ie Watson46, the
~ adopted a ten (10) element test to determine wbetheI' under the facts of a particu1at case such a
retainer would cause the disqualification of an attorney &pm employment as counsel for a bankruptcy
estate under section 327. Therefore, while it is risky to take a lien as a retainer, it is not per se improper
and could be approved by a court under appropriate c:in:umstances.

d.

Oiher Problems

F"mall~ there are some situations, which are beyond characterization, that prevent an attorney
from being employed as Counsel for the estate41. These situations generally involve ethical consider
ations wbich will not be discussed in detail here. Perhaps, the most famous of these cases is In Ie Phila
delphia Athletic Oub. Inc.4S where the court refused. to appoint a law finn to represent a Chapter 11
trustee where the law firm represented. two of the debtor's three partners against the third partner in

bitter litigation.

B.

11 US.e. §327(e): Employment As Special Counsel

Under 11 US.e. §327(e) an attorney can be hired for a IIspecified special purpose", if.the attor
ney does not represent or hold any interest adverse to the estate". This provision cannot be used to "end
run" section 327(a)'s requirements by appointing a de facto general counsel in the guise of a IISpecial
counsel"so. The leading case from courts in the Sixth Circuit discussing this issue is Matter of F & C
Intern., Inc.51 from the Southern District of Ohio. In a well reasoned opinion, the court held that counsel
who had been jointly representing the debtor and several of the debtor's directors in securities litigation
had an actual conflict of interest, as opposed to merely being disinterested, and refused to e?Cpand the
special counsel's role in the bankruptcy proceedings. The court also held, on it's own motion, that in
order for the law firm to continue as special counsel for the bankruptcy estate, it would have to with
draw as counsel for the directors.
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c.

11 us.c. §1103(b): Employment As Counsel For A Committee Of Creditors

Under section 1103(b), a oommittee of creditors may retain attorneys and have them oompen
sated by the debtor's banlauptcy estate, if the attorneys do not hold or represent having an adverse
interest to the interests represented by the oommittee'2. Merely representing individual creditors of the
same class as the creditors represented by the oommittee does not, per se constitute representation on
an adverse interest.

-. -In the Sixth Circuit, there are two recent appeUate decisions, National UQl1iciatorsD and Dadio
~ which recently addressed what constituted an adverse interest under section 1103(b). In National

Liqyidators the Us. District Court for the Southern District of QUo reversed and remanded a dedsion
of the BanlcrupIcy Court where the BaDkru.ptq anut ~ denied all fees to counsel for the unsecmed
creditor's coaunittee due to an undi8clQsed sepeaeatatIon of certain amunittee members in a related
SEC investigation of the debtor which the BaDkru.ptq Court held was the representation of an adverse
interest due to the committee members' possible M~ to pn!felence and or fraudulent convey
ance actions by the debtor.
The District Court carefully reviewed the requirements of Section 1103(b) and found that the
adverse interest rUle was clearly designed to prevent Mattorney oonflicts of interest"55. It found that
while there was a slight potential for a conflict of interest in the case, there was no actual conflict of
interest and that disallowance of the entire fee was unwarranted. It remanded the case to the bank
ruptcy court for a reduction in fees due to the lack of appropriate disclosUre concerning the related
representation56•

InDaido Steel, the DistrictCourt affirmed the BanlauptcyCourt'sorderallowing the committee's
counsel to remain employed under Section 1103(b) even though one of the law firm's clients became
interested in pun=hasing the debtor's assets. One of the key elements to this decision was the fact that
the committee's attorneys promptly notified the Bankruptcy Court of their ~tion of the pr0
spective pun:haser in other matters unrelated to the banlcruptcy. The District Court specifically found
that this representation did not mnstitutean ·adverse ~ for purposes ofSection 1103("'0) and that
disqualification was not warranted.
D.

Full Disclosure, The Key Issue?

An issue which is often overlooked in the discussion of mnflictsofinterest is whether theattor
ney made a full disclosure of any potential conflict at the beginning of the case? There seems to be an
erroneous view in some quarters that ignoring MJDinorM potential conflict matters in the disclosure is
appropriate as it may avoid ·needless litigation"'. Such a view not only conflicts with the requirements
of the Bailkruptcy Code concerning the employment of coun.seJS1 but it also is a very dangerous tactic as
courts are almost universally more offended by the nondisclosure than they are with the underlying

c6nflict!'.
Perhaps the leading case concerning the problem with failing to make full disclosure is In re
National Uqyidators. Inc.59; In that case, the District Court reviewed a Bankruptcycourtdoo.sion which
had denied all fees to counsel for the unsecured creditors committee due to the committee's undis
closed representation ofone of the members of the committee in SEC investigations related to the debtor's
business. The Bankruptcy Court found this representation to be an actual conflict of interest.
The District Court, after a detailed review of the facts surrounding the representation, found
that there was no conflict of interest in the law finn's representation of the committee and one of its
members under these circumstances and held that denial of aU fees was inappropriate. However, the
District Court did find that the law firm did fail to make an appropriate disclosure and that a reduced
amount of sanctions was appropriate and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for further pro
ceedings.
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It is therefore clear that any representation or connection which a law firm has which might
possibly be a problem in being approved as counsel for a bankruptcy estate or creditor's committee
must be disclosed in the initial employment application. The worst that can happen is that the applica
tion may not be approved and you will not work Mfor freft' during the bankruptcy'4. When in doubt,
disclose.

.

E.

.~

Nunc Pro Tunc Employment: Better Late Than Never?

As o.iscussed in detail above, an attorney's employment must be approved prior to being eli
gtble to have fees awarded ina bankruptcy proceeding't. Howevea; in far too many cases, attoineys fail
to malce timely applications forempJoymentandll\U8tNqUest retroadive,m -nunc pro ~ approval
of their employment by the court. In 1984 the Sixth CimJit&eemingly approwd the practice of retr0ac
tive empJoyment in the Gecqetown of ~ decision whele the murt DOted that such employ
ment could be approved in appropriate dIcumstances, but overruled the lower court's decisions to
approve employment in this case due to a massive mnflid of inteIest on the part of debtor's counsel.

Courts in the Sixth Circuit have generally used two tests to determine whether retroactive em
ployment should be approved. The court in In re VJac;hos" employed a four part test, centering on
parties' knowledge of the services being provided and the Jack of an otherwise valid objection to the
employment to determine whether an attorney should be employed as a professional under section
327(a). Other courts have used the nine part facts and circumstances test of In re Twinton Properties"
when considering this issue.
It is important to note that the general ~e" of Gecqetown of I<etterin& is now in some doubt
in light of the Sixth Circuit's recent federated decision. In federated. the Sixth Cin:uit stated: M Accord
ingly, we hold that a valid appointment under §327(a) is a condition precedent to the decision to grant
or deny compensation under §33O(a) or §328(c)'SM. While this language does not expressly overrule the
dicta of Geor&etown of Ketterin&- it does cast some doubt on the strength of that decision as to the issue
of nunc"pm tunc employment of professionals.

,. m.

u

U.s.c.§ 329:· DEBTOR'S nANSACI10NS Wl'IHATI'OKNm'S

While only attorneys who seek to be employed by a bankruptcy estate or aeditors committee
need to formally apply to the court to have their employment approved, all attorneys including attor
neys for Clapter 7 and Chapter 13 debtors must malce the disclosures required by Section 329(a) of the
Bankruptcy. Code". Under Section 329(a), aU attorneys who represent debtors must file a statement of
all compensation paid or agreed to by the debtors for services in connection with the bankruptcy case.
This statement must also disclose-ihe source of these payments. One Sixth Circuit'7 and several Bank
ruptcy Court" decisions discuss the ease of compliance with this provision and the many problems
which can arise if it is ignored.

IV.

11 U.S.C.§330: FEEAWARDS

While the collection of legal fees is not directly an ethical issue, the relationship of fee awards to
an attorney's "employability" and the court's control over fees, makes section 330 an important ethical
section under the Bankruptcy Code. Section 330 is often involved in key ethical decisions due to the fact
that many objections to fee awards involve requests for an attorney disqualification as counsel for a
bankruptcy estate under the provisions discussed above. These issues have been reviewed above and
will not be-addressed in this section.
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As a general rule, an attorney's fees and expenses are governed. by the "Lodestar" standard of
compensation which states that a reasonable attorney fee in a given matter is determined by multiply
ing a reasonable hourly rate by the reasonable number of hours expended on the matter". While a
detailed discussion of this standald is beyond the smpeof this chapter below is a listing of cases which
in general discuss lodestar and fee application requirements in Kentucky:

1. In re Bodd~ 950 F.2d 334 (6th Or. 1991)

2. In re A & A Enermr ProJ?erties. 1M 865 F.2d 256 (6th Or. 1988)

3. In re AtweD. 148 B.R. 483 (Bkm.y. W.o. Ky. 1991)
4. Inrel.F.WJ&ner"SonsCo.,135 B.R.264(Bkrk:y. W.D.Ky.I991)

5. In re Belknap. Inc.. 103 B.R. 842 (Bkrk.y. W.o. Ky. 1989)
6.

In re Chou-Oten Chemi@Is,Inc.,31 B.R. 842 (B1atcy. W.O. Ky. 1982)

7.

In re Costello. Case No.89-02230 (Bkrtc:y. B.D. Ky. Dec. 31, 1992)(Unpub
1ished Opinion)

Recently, the Office of the United States 'Ihlstee announced new technical requirements for fee
applications under 11 US.C§ 330"'. These guidelines have not yet be adopted by Kentucky courts in
bankruptcy cases, but should be followed., if nothing~ to prevent an objection to your fee application
by the
'Dustee'. Office. The
nustee guidelines are in line with the requirements of In re I.F.
Waper's Sons Co.. the leading Kentucky case on what information a fee appliCation should contain.

u.s.

v.

u.s.

BANI<R.UPTCY RULE OFPROCEDUKE 9011

While an attomey is under an ethicalobligatiOn to M~ represent his or her client, Bank
ruptcy Rule of Procedure (MJSRP') 901171 places Bmitations on how far those actions may go. As ex
plained by the Honorable Guy Cole in in re R. and D. GrouP, Inc.72: MJWle 9011 delineates two types of
sanctionable conduct: MOne,'[w]here the papers are frivolous, legally 1IDft!8SOnable, or without factual
foundation', and two, ~here the pleading is filed for an improper purpose'.N'13 The first type of pro
saibed conduct under Rule 9011 addresses whether a party and/or its attorney's conduct were objec
tively nmonable, while the second ionn of improper conduct goes to issues primarilyre1ated to subjec
tive llgood faithll74• In Kentucky, the standaniCor imposing Rule 11 sanctions is whether utheindividual's
conduct was reasonable under the circumstancesN7S•

In determining whether an attorney's conduct is objectively reasonable, the Sixth Oreuit has
indicated that factors such as : 1) the time available to the attorney for investigation of the claims; 2)
whether the attorney had to rely on a client for infonnation as to the facts underlying the pleading in
question; 3) whether the pleading was based on a plaUSible view of the law; and 4) whether the attor
ney relied upon another attorney's investigation in filing the pleading', must be considered. In deter
mining whether the pleading was filed. for an improper purpose, the court must examine the facts and
circumstances surrounding the casi"'.
Two unpublished decisions, In re Dixon78 and In re Braun" address the method of determining
damages under Rule 9011 and the procedural requirements for putting a party on notice of a request for
such damages. These opinions, along with R. and D. Group are required reading for any party which is
seriouSabout pursuing a Rule 9011 motion in a bankruptcy matter.
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VI.

_ 28 U.S.c. § 1927

28 US.C§ 192~ is a provision which predateS both Federal Rule of Procedure 11 and BRP 9011
and pennits a court to impose costs, attorney fees and expenses on any attorney who so multiplies the
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously_wit. As 28 US.C§ 1927 is much more limited. in
scope that Rule 9011, it is no longer used frequently in bankruptcy proceedings. Its main use is for those
few situaticins where an attorney pursues a non-frivolous claim through the use of "'multiplicative liti
gation tactics that are harassing-lor} dilatory""2 which are not coveted by Rule 9011. Fora discussion of
the relationship between Rule 9011 and 28 US.C§ 1927 the Tennessee case of In re Southern Industrial
Banking Corp.• 91 B.R. 463 (B1atcy. B.D. Tenn. 1988) p-ovides the best treatment of the topic of any
published decision from the Sixth On:uit.
U

VIL

DUTY TO THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE: WHO IS YOUR CUENn

In the typical nonbankruptcy case, it is fairly easy to identify yourclient. As more than one legal
sage has expressed it, ."'your client is the guy [or gal] who pays yout". However, when representing a
debtor in a reorganization proceeding under Chapter 11 or Chapter t2'3 such a generalization just does
not work. To understand this problem we must first discuss the difference between a bankruptcy es
tateM (i.e. the actual entity undergoing bankruptcy reorganization and which is paying your bills) and
the individuals who are managing the estate (and are signing the checks).

In simple, non-technical terms the bankruptcy estate is an entity which arises upon the filing of
a bankruptcy and consists of the non-exempt assets which were owned by the debtor prior to the filing
of a bankruptcy reorganization. It is the Mpurpose" of the bankruptcy estate to obtain the highest p0s
sible return for the estate's creditors and, in certain limited. dn:umstances, other interest holders85 The
individuals who manage the bankruptcy estate's affairs in a IeOIgUUzation proceeding are usuallyei
tberthedebtor-in-possession (--oIP") or a O1apterll trustee. DIPs are generaIlyeitherthe management
of a business entity debtor or an individual or couple in a so-called Mindividual" Chapter 11. Problems
in identifying your client arise in JeOJg8IUzation cases when the interests of the DIP conflicts with the -
. interests of the bankruptcy estate. Several cases serve to mustrate this point.
One of the leadingcases in this emergingarea of bankruptcy legal ethics is In re United Utensils
Corp.·. In this case the court was confronted with the question of whether a law {inn which represented.
a bankruptcy estate in a Chapter 11 proceeding could represent a subsequently appointed. bcuUauptcy
trustee, ip Qctions against the debtor's former officers and shareholders. 1be court in considering the
objection of a former officer to the employment on the grounds that it violated. his individual attorney
client privilege with the proposed counsel held that the law finn did not individually represent the
individual officer' and sole shareholder through its representation of the debtor corporation during the
Chapter 11. The court held that the finn could be employed as special counsel to the trustee under
Section 327(e) unless the officerIshareholder could produce specific evidence of an attorney client rela
tionship independent of the attorney client relationship between the debtor and the law finn87.
The case of In re LoveB" shows the special problems an attorney for a bankruptcy estate faces in
an individual Chapter 11 case. In Love the court was reviewing the attorney's fee application in a com
plex Chapter 11 proceeding. In the Chapter 11 proceeding the attorneys for the estate, at the direction of
the individual DIP, resisted efforts of a major creditor to force the DIP to repay unauthorized draws
from various businesses owned by the bankruptcy estate, and opposed the unsecured creditor's
committee's efforts to prevent the debtor from settling estate claims against the debtor~s children and
wife. The court found that the attorneys breached their duty to the Chapter 11 estate by assisting the
DIP in his efforts to protect his family and ultimately denied their fee application in full89•

K-47

Bankruptcy Ethics

The full extent of this problem can best bee ~ however, in the case of In re DeVlieg Inc.90•
Here, counsel for a Olapter 11 bankruptcy estate were fired by the DIP, after the debtor's counsel filed
suit against several insiders of the debtor, including the debtor's sole officer. However this firing did
not go unnoticed and the DIP was quicldy replaced by a Chapter 11 trustee who sought to hire the
Chapter 11 estate's former attorneys as the trustee's special oounsel to pursue the law suit which got
them fired. Not surprisingly some of the insiders who fired the attorneys in the first place objected to
this employment. The Bankruptcy Court approved the employment and the insider appealed. After
re~g 11 U.s.c.§ 327(e) the District Court ruled that the attorneys neither held or n:Presented an
adverse interest to the estate and that their employment should be authorized. However in a footnote to
the opinion the court noted:
.
The mncem with fom8 CD1lDIeI for the debIcr Js that they wDl DOt be in a
position [to be objective in advlllDg. trusteeJ-.1n the pesem case, this am
cern does not appear to be implicated: as evidenced by the timing and appar
ent circumstances of the fi1ing of the LBO Jitiga~ [the attomeysl mayactu
ally have begun acting in the inteIest of the estate (and, in doing so, not neces
sarily following the directions ofits then~ the debtor) even before a chap
ter 11 trustee had. been appointed. Thus the usual COIlC.'eI'I\ with the employ
ment of former counsel for the debtor, residual loyalty to that client, would not
appear to be a problem here__ In so noting, however, the court does not pass
on whether such behavior would comply with applicable standards of profes
sional responsibility".
This footnote shows the confusion this situation can generate for even federal murts in this area. To the
extent that DeVlie& suggests that munsel for Chapter 11 bankruptcy estates have an ethical duty other
than to the bankruptcy estate as their client, such a ruling is dearly wrong and against the weight of
authori~.

vm.

DUI'YTOTHE COURT

One of the mOst unusual ~ least explored aspects of legal ethics in the bankruptcy context
concerns the duty of attorneys, to the court, to dUdose information about the misconduct of the indi
·viduals who control the bankruptcy estate. Due to the expansive nature of the financial disclosures
required in a bankruptcy proceeding this duty of disclosure must be balanced against an attorney's
duty of loyalty to his client. In this respect, state ethical duties can come into some conflict with a bank
ru~ J.ttomey's duty to the Bankruptcy Court as an officer of the Court and a Court appointed Coun
sel for a bankruptcy estate.

In Chapter 7 cases, it is clear that an attorney cannot counselor assist his. or her client in filing
false bankruptcy schedules or concealing estate assets" for the same reasons an attorney cannot allow
his client to commit perjury in a criminal case without protest". These ethical issues are beyond the
scope of this Chapter and will not be reviewed in detail95•
However, attorneys in a reorganization proceeding, have a far higher burden. In reorganization
cases, attorneys are representing clients in a continuing judicial proceeding, not merely counseling cli
ents about past misconduct or legal problems". In such proceedings, attorneys for the estate are consid
ered officers of the court, and are fiduciaries to the Bankruptcy Estate97• As noted by the Bankruptcy
Court in In re Sky Valley. Inc.:
The unique circumstances which surround insolvency and the filing of a Chapter
11 case place the attorney for the debtor-in-possession in the unusual position
of sometimes owing a higher duty to the estate and the bankruptcy court than
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to his client In fact, the status of the client and the attorney often overlap in a
Chapter 11 case, as the debtor's attorney must take conceptual control of the
case and provide guidance for management of the debtor, not only to discern
what measures are necessary to achieve a successful reolg8llization, but to as
sure that, inso doing, compliance with the Banlauptcy Code and Rules is sought
rather than avoided. Debtor's attorney duty as fiduciary of the estate requires
. :,
an active concern for the interests of the estate and its beneficiaries98•
...1:L
. Recently, several Bankruptcy Courts have held that counsel for bankruptcy estates have a duty
to the courts to inform them if the individuals operating a bankruptcy estate's affairs are acting against
the best interests of the estate. The Bankruptcy Court in In Je United UtensiJs Corp. dearly articulated
this duty by ho1ding: "'If thedebtor~ DOtfulfiDingitsobHga~ to theestale, it is the responsibility and
duty of Debtor's counsel to bring such matters to the atIeNion of the court""'.
This developing duty was discussed in detail by the US. Bankruptcy Court for Utah in In re
Bonneyi1le Pacific CorJ?, 196 B.R.868 (Bla1cy. D. Utah 1996). This opinion is, without.doubt" the stron
gest statement of a court appointed munsel's duty to the bankruptcy estate and Bankruptcy Court in a
Chapter 11 proceeding. Bonneyi1le was a complex Chapter 11 case, involving numerous related busi
ness entities, which was heavily involved in a series of classic MJand flips"'(i.e. insider sales of property
designed to artificiaIly inflate the value of the property in order to defraud third party investors and
lenders). After a stormy reoIganization attempt, a Chapter 11 trustee was appointed, and evidence of
serious &aud was unrovered by the trustee. This Bonneville opinion arose in the context of a motion to
reconsider the Bankruptcy Court's earlier denial of the entire fee application of the debtor's Chapter 11
counsel.

In this long and harshly worded opinion, the Utah Bankruptcy Court made it clear that all
counsel who are retained with court approval in a banlcruptcy proceeding have a fiduciary duty to the
bankruptcy estate and the Bankruptcy Court to disclose suspected wrong doing by the insiders of a
corporate debto~ 196 B.R. at 885. While this opinion arose in a large Chapter 11 proceeding, it is still
advised reading for any attorney who may find him or herself representing a "ess-than-honest" debtor
in a Bankruptcy case.

for

This bend towanl imposing a fiduciary duty on debtor's munsel and ~
the various
committees will require all counsel retained with court approval to carefully monitor the activities of
the person or persons nmning the debtor's affairs or run the risk of being disqualified or having the
Bankruptcy Court deny their fee applications, due to their failure to fulfill their fiduciary obligations.

IX.

CRIMINAL BANKRUPTCY ATIORNEYS

This CQSe sadly illustrates the peril of practicing law in lin unfamiliarsubjectarea, for, as oneattorney has learned,
ignorance of the law does not excuse an offense. U.s. v. ParkhilPoo
The ultimate "rules" of bankruptcy ethics can be found at 18 U.S.c.§§ 152 - 157101 which are the
federal statutes directly relating to bankruptcy crimes. 18 :US.C§ 157 relating to "Bankruptcy Fraud" is
a recent addition to the federal criminal statutes and is especially broad and should be read by any
attorney who plans to represent a debtor in bankruptcy.
The problem of "criminal" bankruptcy attorneys in not a new issue. See U.S. v. Switzer, 252 F. 2d
139 (2d Cir. 1958); CQ&hlan v: U.s., 147 F.2d 235 (8th Or. 1945). Nor is it confined to inexperienced or
"poor" practioners. See U.S. v. Goodstein, 883 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1989)(Attorney with 40 years of bank
ruptcy experience). While there is not a large number of reported cases involving attorneys Who have
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been convicted of "bankruptcy crimes" there are several instructive Court of Appeal cases which ad
dress the troubling aspect of this topic.

By far the lcugest class of "'bankruptcy crilne$N for which attorneys have been convicted, in
volve the concealment of assets of the bankruptcy estate. In the cases of U.S. y. Smithson102, U.S. v.
Center101 and U.S. y. Parkhill1CM attorneys were convicted of assisting their clients in concealing assets .
from the bankruptcy estate through a variety of means. A brief review of these cases shows that the
atto~ in question were actively involved in the fraud and their convictions were not unexpected.
Far more troubling is the case of US. \t Zimmerman1G5. There an attorney was~, along
with clients of his Jaw firm" his Jaw firm" his Jaw partner and one of his associate attorneys, with
c:onspiracy to mmmitaiminal bud in CXJDDeCtion with thebidiDg of a dient's assets from its creditors
through the _of the Jaw finn'sllUst IICCOUDt. The aUomeyin tbisc:ue hid ontyminlmal connectIcms
with the debtor or the debtor's repn!Sel\tation in the bankruptcy case, but was nevertheless indicted
and ultimatelymnvicted on the strength of two Ban1auptcy Court opinions which found the attorney's
law firm probably was amspiring with the debIor to bide assets. The attomey's conviction was over
turned and the case remanded for a new trial due to the improper use of the Ban1cruptcy Court opin
ions, but the case still emphasizes the danger in this ama even when you are not directly overseeing a
bankruptcy case for your firm.

Perhaps the most blatant case of defrauding a bankruptcy estate of its assets is US. v. Edgarl06.
In that case the attorney for the owner of a corporation in a Chapter 11 proceeding negotiated the saleof
the debtor's business, drew up the paper work mnceming the transfer of the business, and structured
the sale so the assets of the debtor and the proceeds of the sale paid to the debtor's owner would be
difficult to trace'lI7. Needless to say the bankruptcy court was not informed of the debtor's president's
excellent salesmanship until seven months after the completion of the sale. The Court of Appeals up
held the conviction but remanded this case for resentencing•
. The strangest bankruptcy related crime an attomey has been convicted ofis undoubtedly the
crime ofciJmmventingtheblind case draw system ofassigningjudges to banlcruptcycases found in the
caseof US. ¥ AUpst101. In Aupst, the attomey was having an affair with a Ban1auptcyCourt ~
clerk. The attorney cxmspired with the intake clerk to ensUre that his cases were not assigned to a bank
ruptcy judge who was mnservative in awarding attomeyfees. While the crimein~is unJikely to
be repeated, it does illustraJe that any attempt to manipulate the banlauptcy system in a questionable
manner could lead to federal aiminal charges.

x.

KENTUCKY CASES ON BANKRUPTCYETlUCS

As discussed at the beginning of this article, the basic concepts of state ethics law form the core
of Bankruptcy ethics law. Therefore, it is not surprising that Kentucky's state bar association and the
Kentucky Supreme Court have a great interest in enforcing their ethical standards against attorneys
who engage in unethical conduct in bankruptcy proceedings. While a detailed discussion of Kentucky's
ethical rules and enforcement procedures is beyond the scope of this Chapter, below is a brief list of
cases dealing with various types of ethical problems.
1). Failure to TlIl\ely Perform Duties: KBA v. Reeves, 851 S.W. 2d 478 (Ky.
1993); KBA v. Goodrich, 851 S.W. 2d 479 (Ky. 1993).

2). Bankruptcy of an attorney is not, in and of itself, grounds for disbar- .
ment: See Greene v. KBA,904 S.W. 2d 233 (Ky. 1995). However, repayment
of discharged debts could be a condition of reinstatement: Barrett v. KBA,
819 S.W.2d 316 (Ky. 1991).
.
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3). Attonleys may not prosecute individuals who they represented in bank
ruptcy proceedings: Nunn v. Commonwealth, 896 S.W.2d 911 (Ky. 1995).
4). Giving the Bankruptcy Court a NSF check for bankruptcy filing fee,
which the client has prepai4 is an ethical violation: KBA v. Watson, 867
S.W. 2d 191 (Ky. 1993).

0'

i.5). Taking payment of attorney fees, prior to paying the bankruptcy filing
- fee, in violation of Bankruptcy R.ule 1006, is an ethical violation: KBAy.
Wharton, 810 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1991).

6). AidiDgiaafrauciuleDt~ .. _ethkal vloJaticm: Roberts~ KBA.771 S.W. 2d.(6 (Ky. 1989).

.,

7). Maldngfalse financial Hatements to leaders is an ethical violatiOD:~
~ I<BA. 764 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1989).

8). Bankruptcy 1kustee stealing money from a BaDkruptcy estate is an ethi
cal violation: In re Shumate, 382 S.W. 2d 405 (Ky. 1964).
XL

CONCLUSION

Understanding the principals ofethics in thepractice of bankruptcy law is, in many ways, a far
simplertask than understanding the intricaciesof the Bankruptcy Code. What malces banlauptcyethics
somewhat different from the traditional rule of ethics, is not a different set of rules regulating profes
sional conduct, but the unusual nature of the underlying bankruptcy proceedings themselves. It is the
hope of this author that the preceeding Qapter provides a useful guide to all attorneyS who wish to
practiCE banlcruptcy law and plevents them from fa1Iing prey to some of the unusual ethical consider-
ations which must be addressed in this field.
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